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The suggestion is now widespread that fundamental changes 
within the advanced Western economies are part of the 
transition to a new era of capitalist development. The 
geographical repercussions of this change, the form of the 
new geography of production, has become the subject of much 
conjecture. The question has become one of explaining how 
the present period of economic restructuring is being 
translated into a period of spatial restructuring. 
A key element of such theories of change has been the "high 
technologies", defined both as a process of change and as 
the basis of new industries encapsulating new forms of 
production. Indeed, for the proponents of the New 
Industrial Spaces theory, the rise of "high technology" 
industry is the harbinger of structural change and its 
spatial development indicative of the new geography of 
production we may expect throughout North America and 
Western Europe (Scott and Storper, 1986; Scott, 1988a; 
1988b). 
This thesis outlines a theoretical and empirical 
investigation of the New Industrial Spaces theory, an 
investigation framed by the principal claim of the theory 
to explain the processes structuring the emergent geography 
of production. Firstly, a critique of this claim argues 
that whilst the explanation provided (based on transaction 
costs) is plausible, it rests upon a particular and 
deficient conceptualisation of the firm. Secondly, allowing 
for such reservations, it is argued that the explanation of 
the New Industrial Spaces' theorists has yet to be shown as 
empirically valid. Thus, in the search for this evidence, 
an empirical investigation of Britain's own prominent 
candidate for the title New Industrial Space, namely "high 
technology Hertfordshire", is undertaken. Whilst this 
empirical investigation provides evidence for the New 
Industrial Spaces theory, it also highlights the theory's 
failure to explain fully the growth of "high technology 
Hertfordshire". In contrast, the thesis develops an 
alternative conceptualisation of contemporary 
agglomerations of production. 
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CHAPTER ONE: Welcome Aboard The (Earth-bound) 
U. S. S. Enterpris 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis represents the fusion of, for me, two 
compelling elements of society today, elements encapsulated 
in the cult programme, Star Trek. On the one hand is that 
aura of science, technology and (economic) progress, as 
Scotty ("the technological wizard") desperately strives for 
Warp Factor mind-boggling with a mechanised toothpick, and 
Spock scans yet another surprisingly "Earth-like" planet 
suitable for human life-forms. On the other hand, is the 
mission of the U. S. S. Enterprise itself, "to go where no 
(hu)man has gone before", to investigate "space: the 
final frontier". 
Today, back on Earth, scientific progress and wizardry has 
become synonymous with "high technology" or rather "high- 
tech". The "ideology of high-tech" (Morgan and Sayer, 1988) 
implies the term's use as a prefix to all and sundry goods, 
whether training shoes, furniture, architecture or, most 
chillingly, a "war of the 90s" in the Gulf. Most 
insistently, however, "high technology" has also become the 
policy-makers' panacea for economic decline, the "technical 
fix", the "sunrise" of a new golden era of growth. 
Also back on Earth, and with an admitted play on words, 
"space" becomes "the distance, expanse or area between or 
within things". Thus, the mission may be re-interpreted as 
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one of investigating exactly what are the ("spatial") 
relations which structure the distance between things. In 
other words, what relations structure the geographical 
organisation of things and, for this particular thesis, 
what are the relations which structure the geographical 
organisation of, not things, but industry. 
Whilst this investigation of the "spatial", in the 
abstract, may be a difficult concept to grasp, its purchase 
on today's world may soon be shown. For example, the 
destruction of the Amazonian rainforests, massively 
expanded in the last 15 years or so by the lighting of 
8,000 fires a day during the "burning season" (Kaufman et 
al., 1989, quoted in Hecht and Cockburn, 1989), has brought 
to the attention of the world the "Greenhouse Effect". In 
turn, while Britain sweltered through record temperatures 
in the summer of 1990, many saw it as a partial result of 
the burning of the Amazonian. Yet, to link the two 
instances, requires the specification of a spatial relation 
of which we know very little. Exactly what the regional 
(spatial) impacts of the Greenhouse Effect are, and will 
be, is a matter of intense and heated (! ) debate (Warwick 
and Farmer, 1990). 
A further example of the importance of the "spatial" is the 
popular concept of Britain's economic and social "North- 
South divide" (Champion and Townsend, 1991). Indeed, the 
concept's political significance burst forth recently as 
the "one-nation" Tories, led by Michael Heseltine, mounted 
a challenge for the leadership of the Conservative party, 
only to be outdone by a man with a "vision of no division", 
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North-South or otherwise, within Britain (see also 
Martin, 1988a). Yet, before such a vision can be realised, 
the relations structuring this "geographical divide" or, 
for that matter, any form of geographical organisation must 
be uncovered. A mission to investigate the "spatial" in 
society is, indeed, of relevance. 
Moreover, the North-South divide is also an example of 
particular pertinence to the substance of this thesis. For 
it represents, in part and rather crudely, the geography of 
economic growth and decline in Britain today. It is part of 
the uneven spatial development of Britain's industry. And 
it is this uneven spatial development, and particularly 
that part attributable to "high technology", which this 
thesis will focus upon. It is the fusion, in several 
different ways, of "high technology" and uneven spatial 
development in Britain today which is the driving interest 
behind this piece of research. 
"High technology" and the anatomy of lob creation 
The geography of economic decline and its explanation, 
partly conceptualised in the phrase the "anatomy of job 
loss", has been extensively studied in the last decade or 
so (see, for example, Massey and Meegan, 1982; Martin and 
Rowthorn, 1986). However, a renewal of our concern with the 
"anatomy of job creation" has been called for once more 
(Boddy, 1987; Hall, 1987). For, whilst Britain has 
experienced the dramatic decline of its metropolitan cities 
and historically important industrial regions such as the 
valleys of South Wales, the West Midlands and the North 
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East, the emergence of new regions of economic growth has 
also been mapped with much ensuing hyperbole, none more so 
than the "high technology" regions of the M4 Corridor and 
Silicon Glen. 
Public announcements of innumerable heritage centres and 
theme parks highlight that the leisure and tourist 
industries form another part of this new wave of economic 
growth but it is the set of industries known as "high 
technology", beyond all others, which has captured the 
imagination. Wrapped up in images of white coats and green 
fields, quiet, clean, and traversing the world at the push 
of a button, these industries and their technologies have 
come to represent the industries of the future and, as 
such, the industries which will give "a place" (both in the 
spatial and aspatial sense of the term) in that future. 
Thus, it has been these industries which have topped the 
shopping list of policy-makers at the national and local 
level. "High technology" has become the prime target of 
regional and local development programmes, a cure for 
Britain's uneven spatial development. 
"High technology" as cure or symptom? 
It is in this policy realm, as much as any other, that a 
particular "ideology of high-tech" has taken hold. For, 
firstly, there is no simple correlation between the 
appearance of new technologies, and their associated 
industries, and job growth. Indeed, Chapter Two opens with 
a quote by Hall et al. (1987) identifying recent job loss 
within the "high technology" industries. Moreover, the 
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chapter goes on to discuss differing views of the impact of 
"high technology", including those which see large-scale 
technological unemployment as a consequence. 
Furthermore, the fact of "high technology" job loss 
nationally has seemingly been lost in the "silicon images" 
of those few parts of Britain which have profited from the 
growth of "high technology"; images which precisely 
highlight the uneven spatial development of Britain's "high 
technology" industry itself. Moreover, and rather 
depressingly, Chapter Three shows how this uneven spatial 
development mirrors, or rather contributes to, that uneven 
spatial development depicted in the North-South divide. In 
other words, "high technology", whilst being suggested as 
the cure, is actually part of the symptom. 
Finally, if the full meaning of uneven spatial development 
is understood, the belief: 
"... that other places can hope to clone Silicon Valley's [or 
even the M4 Corridor's] development is deeply misconceived. 
This is because it is an integral part of a larger structure of 
combined and uneven development - the inter [national] spatial 
division of labour in electronics - and not an island of 
growth, divorced from developments elsewhere. Within this 
structure, different places have different yet interdependent 
roles, so that changes in one part imply changes in another. 
Since there is only a limited amount of prestige functions 
within the industry to go round, the dreams of the hundreds of 
local boosterists wanting to emulate Silicon Valley could only 
be realized simultaneously by a miracle equivalent to that 
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depicted in the parable of the feeding of the thousands with 
two fishes and five loaves. " (Morgan and Sayer, 1988, p. 39) 
Yet, although such a blinkered scenario of a "high 
technology" future may be criticised, especially for its 
condemning to the "dust(rust? )bin" a vast range of 
declining industries, regardless of their possibilities for 
rejuvenation and, indeed, their actual "high technology" 
content (see Chapter Two), this image does hold an element 
of truth. The misrepresentation of "high technology as job 
generator" may partially explain its unwarranted 
popularity, but it is hard to see how this factor fully 
explains the symbolic importance of "high technology" both 
within, and beyond, the field of-economic development. Yet 
what the popular symbolism of "high technology" most 
represents, more than anything else, is summed up in 
terminology such as that of "leading-edge", "advanced", 
"progress" and, ultimately, "the future". And it is this 
image, if any, of "high technology" as part of the (but 
not the whole) future which does hold true. "High 
technology" may not be synonymous with job creation, but it 
may be argued that it is a symptom of structural change in 
the economy (and society). 
"High technology" and structural change 
Although a switch in the focus of study from the anatomy of 
job loss to that of job creation may be taking place, it 
must be realised that the theory of such economic change 
intricately includes and links the two substantive areas. 
They are but two sides of the same coin of "restructuring". 
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Study of the "anatomy of job loss" suggests its cause to be 
rooted within a crisis of capitalism in the advanced 
Western economies (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982; Massey and 
Meegan, 1982; Martin and Rowthorn, 1986). Similarly, however, 
the "anatomy of job creation" is also rooted in the 
dynamics of capitalist accumulation, and the response to 
such crisis in particular. The major transformations 
recently witnessed within the British economy (including 
its economic geography), highlighted in the dichotomous 
analogy of Hall (1987), are more than mere incremental 
change by the capitalist system. Rather, what we are 
witnessing is structural change within the system 
(Freeman, 1986; Harvey, 1987; Lash and Urry, 1987; Leborgne 
and Lipietz; 1988; Lipietz, 1986; Piore and Sabel, 1984; 
Scott, 1988b). 
And it is from theories of structural change that "high 
technology" truly gains its symbolic significance (and 
interest). For, just as popular conceptions view it as the 
future so, within theories of structural change, "high 
technology" is viewed as the harbinger of structural 
change, more so as part of the process of restructuring. In 
fact, it is argued that the appearance of "high technology" 
industry (major job creator or not) is nothing less than 
indicative of a new phase in the historical development of 
capitalism (Hall, 1981; Leborgne and Lipietz, 1988; 
Marshall, 1987; Piore and Sabel, 1984; Scott and 
Storper, 1986; Scott, 1988a; 1988b). 
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"High technology" and the new geography of production 
Just as distinct forms of uneven spatial development have 
characterised previous economic periods, so the uneven 
spatial development of "high technology" is being argued to 
be symptomatic of the space economy of an emergent economic 
era. In other words, the uneven spatial development of 
"high technology" is being seen as the future spatial form 
of the geography of production (Scott and Storper, 1986; 
Scott, 1988a; 1988b). For Scott and Storper, in particular, 
that spatial form is (re)agglomeration of production, and 
the growth of "high technology" industrial agglomerations 
is just one element of a new geography of production, 
otherwise known as the New Industrial Spaces. 
Thus, an interest in "high technology" and its uneven 
development eventually leads us to the claim of the New 
Industrial Spaces' proponents that agglomeration (of "high 
technology" industry) is exemplary of the new geography of 
production. And it is this claim which this research will 
investigate. Moreover, this investigation will take a 
particular line of enquiry. For, as stated earlier, the 
research mission's general objective is to investigate the 
"spatial"; to gain greater understanding of the relations 
which structure the geographical organisation of industry. 
Thus, if, as Scott and Storper argue, (high technology) 
agglomeration represents the emergent production geography 
of Western capitalist industrial development, the question 
to ask is what are the relations structuring the formation 
of this pattern. That is, what are the processes 
driving the contemporary growth of agglomeration? 
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Hence, through a theoretical and empirical analysis of the 
processes structuring the pattern of uneven development 
of Britain's "high technology" industry, this research will 
investigate the causal process(es) argued to be structuring 
a central element of the economic geography (the New 
Industrial Spaces) of a new historical period of capitalist 
development. 
1.2 The Structure of the Mission 
The starting point of the mission, then, is to outline the 
pattern of "high technology" industrial development in 
Britain. However, an immediate problem arises concerning 
what is actually meant by "high technology". As Chapter Two 
reveals, whilst "high technology" may not represent a 
concept "far too incoherent to be of any analytical use" 
(Morgan and Sayer, 1988, p. 37), it is a moving target. The 
boundaries of any listing of "high technology" industry 
continually oscillate, dependent on which particular 
combination of a myriad of indicators is taken to create a 
listing. 
This problem of definition is revealed in Chapter Two 
through a comparison of various recent estimates of "high 
technology" employment in Britain. Some of the reasons for 
this diversity of estimates (based on the indicators used) 
are then discussed. However, the chapter then goes on to 
argue that the diversity of indicators used, and therefore 
definitions of "high technology" taken, are a consequence 
of theory-laden views as to what "high technology" is; 
theory-laden views which shape any choice of industrial 
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sectors as "high technology". By explicitly recognising the 
theory-laden element of definition, and in contrast to the 
argument of Morgan and Sayer (1988), it is argued within 
Chapter Two that coherence may be brought to the concept of 
"high technology". This coherence may be derived by 
"stepping back" to theories of structural change within 
which "high technology" is conceptualised as a particular 
element of a process of (structural) change. For, in 
essence, it is the characteristics which arise from the 
structural role given to "high technology" within such 
theory which set the definitional parameters for the 
concept and any ensuing indicators of high technology. 
Finally, at the end of Chapter Two, the implications which 
arise from the (re)conceptualisation of "high technology" 
in terms of a process of change are dealt with by a return 
to the issue of "high technology" and its impact on 
employment. Most especially, it becomes clear that those 
impacts, firstly, are uneven and secondly, may be 
critically determined by forces outside the sphere of the 
technology itself but part of the wider process of change. 
Once a clearer view of "high technology" has been achieved 
in Chapter Two, the mission is able to continue with the 
process of outlining the industrial geography of Britain's 
"high technology" industry. Confirming one of the 
conclusions of Chapter Two, the geography of "high 
technology" described in Chapter Three clearly describes an 
uneven impact. It is a description of a high technology 
spatial divison of labour dominated, numerically and 
functionally, by the Western Crescent, a select few 
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counties of the South East of England. In other words, it 
is a picture dominated by a "high technology industrial 
agglomeration". 
With the aim of the mission being that of identifying and 
explaining the processes structuring such a geographical 
pattern, Chapter Three turns, in its latter half, to 
theories of uneven spatial development. In the previous 
chapter it has already been seen that "high technology" may 
only be understood as an element of a process of change 
conceptualised within such theory and, hence, it is to such 
theory we must turn to identify exactly what processes of 
change "high technology" represents. Three theoretical 
viewpoints - long waves, industrial divides and regimes of 
accumulation - are discussed, each with their own 
conceptualisation of "high technology" as representative of 
a process of change. Thus, in turn, and arising from these 
differing conceptualisations, each theory's particular 
interpretation of the geography of "high technology" is 
outlined; interpretations which identify different causal 
processes structuring the pattern of "high technology". 
That is, different explanations as to how processes of 
change, encapsulated in the term "high technology", are 
working to structure an emergent pattern of industrial 
development. 
Particularly forthright in its explanation is the New 
Industrial Spaces thesis of Scott and Storper (1986; 
Scott, 1988a; 1988b) which, as much as any other work, has 
made prominent the symbolic importance of "high technology" 
and its uneven spatial development. Within the work of 
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Scott and Storper, a detailed rationale (a precise logic of 
"transaction costs") is advanced in explanation of this new 
geography of agglomeration. In effect, Scott and Storper 
provide an explanation of exactly how the processes, as 
well as what processes, of change are translated into an 
emergent geographical pattern. It is upon this explanation 
that the mission will focus. 
Thus, Chapter Four develops a theoretical discussion of the 
New Industrial Spaces thesis. Firstly, the theory is 
outlined in greater detail and, in particular, the "logic 
of translation" set out. A path of structural economic 
change engendering change in production logic and, thus, 
change in economic behaviour by firms which, by virtue of 
the "transaction costs" mechanism, precipitates a change in 
locational behaviour is traced. The outcome of that 
locational behaviour is argued to be agglomeration and the 
name given to these new agglomerations of production is the 
New Industrial Spaces. 
Once outlined, the New Industrial Spaces thesis is then 
subjected to a theoretical critique. The critique begins 
with a discussion of the arguments for and against the 
particular path of structural change adopted in the New 
Industrial Spaces approach; namely, the transition to a 
post-Fordist regime of flexible accumulation. It then 
follows with an alternative view (encompassing more 
possibilities) of the likely economic behaviour of firms in 
response to this structural transition. Following this, and 
in line with the particular focus of the research, a more 
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insistent critique of the locational mechanism of 
"transaction costs" is then described. Most especially, 
this part of the critique takes a realist view of social 
phenomena to de-construct the ways in which the mechanism 
is alleged to operate to produce agglomeration. In 
particular, this deconstruction brings forward the role and 
meaning of contingency in explaining social phenomena. 
Finally, in the light of this analysis of the causal 
mechanism of the New Industrial Spaces, Chapter Four ends 
with a critical discussion of the empirical evidence for 
the mechanism's operation in forming the New Industrial 
Spaces. It is concluded that whilst empirical evidence of a 
variety of agglomerations has clearly been provided within 
the New Industrial Spaces theory, the same can not be said 
concerning the evidence for the causal mechanism(s) 
driving the growth of such agglomerations. 
Thus Chapter Four, with certain qualifications attached, 
concludes that the New Industrial Spaces theory does 
provide a theoretically plausible (but not necessary) 
explanation for the contemporary agglomeration of 
production. However, in the light of the empirical evidence 
provided, the question remains as to whether or not this 
hypothesis is also empirically relevant. It is the search 
for such empirical evidence which sets the framework for 
the remainder of the mission. 
In Chapter Three, Britain's premier "high technology 
industrial agglomeration", the Western Crescent, was 
identified. In Chapter Five, a preliminary reading of the 
distinguishing characteristics of a New Industrial Space 
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confirm the Western Crescent's, and in particular one of 
the leading counties within it, "high technology 
Hertfordshire's", compatibility as a prime candidate for 
the title New Industrial Space. The remainder of Chapter 
Five outlines the two-stage methodology subsequently 
employed to investigate this candidature. 
Firstly, much more information and evidence is required to 
confirm that "high technology Hertfordshire" does, indeed, 
represent a fair and valid candidate with which to 
investigate the New Industrial Spaces thesis. The gathering 
of this evidence involved the collation of results of other 
explorations of the region backed up by a long range scan, 
by postal questionnaire, of high technology establishments 
in Hertfordshire. Exactly how this questionnaire was 
undertaken and its success is explained in the chapter. The 
results of this stage of the exploration are detailed in 
Chapter Six. 
Chapter Six analyses the rapid industrial gzowth of "high 
technology Hertfordshire" such that, today, it is arguably 
the leading "high technology" location in Britain. The 
bedrock of this growth has been the aerospace and other 
defence industries, overlain by the growth of computer 
electronics and pharmaceuticals and, most recently, the 
rapid growth of a computer services sector. The county's 
growth, combined with other agglomeration characteristics 
such as specialised "high technology" labour markets and a 
general environment of "high technology", clearly matches 
it with those descriptions of New Industrial Spaces which 
have been put forward. 
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However, within the theoretical critique of Chapter Four, 
it is argued that whilst the requirements for evidence of 
agglomeration have been met satisfactorily within the New 
Industrial Spaces thesis it is, critically, evidence of the 
causes of such agglomeration which is lacking (ie. evidence 
for the transaction costs mechanism). Similarly, such 
evidence is lacking from the description of "high 
technology Hertfordshire" given in Chapter Six. Hence, it 
is the search for such evidence which the second stage of 
the exploration methodology addresses. As Chapter Five 
describes, the postal questionnaire also serves a second 
role, that of identifying establishments in Hertfordshire 
whose locational decision suggested the operation of the 
"transaction costs" mechanism. And, once identified, a 
series of case studies, by interview, of these 
establishments was undertaken to discover exactly how the 
locational mechanism had operated to cause agglomeration. 
Thus, a long range scan of "high technology Hertfordshire" 
was followed up by a "landing" in the region. 
Chapter Seven, then, outlines the second (and major) form 
of analysis of the postal questionnaire results. Through 
this analysis the agglomeration of "high technology 
Hertfordshire" is dissected to discover exactly how many 
establishments fitted the locational model of the New 
Industrial Spaces thesis. Moreover, the manner of this 
"fit" is then investigated through a series of case 
studies. Thus, the chapter provides a detailed empirical 
study of the causal mechanism of the New Industrial Spaces 
and completes the theoretical and empirical investigation 
of the New Industrial Spaces thesis. 
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However, from Chapter Seven, it becomes clear that only a 
minority of those high technology establishments surveyed 
fit the locational model of the New Industrial Spaces. In 
other words, the model fails to fully explain "high 
technology Hertfordshire". Therefore, in Chapter Eight, 
further possible explanations of "high technology 
Hertfordshire" highlighted by the postal questionnaire 
returns are identified and, once more, investigated through 
a set of case study interviews. 
Finally, back on board, Chapter Nine describes the 
iterative fusion of newly gathered fieldwork with past 
theoretical conceptions. Firstly, this fusion extends our 
knowledge of that part of space known as "high technology 
Hertfordshire". Secondly, further insight into theories of 
(Earthbound) economic space, particularly that of the New 
Industrial Spaces thesis, is gained. Thirdly, such insight 
ultimately leads to an alternative conceptualisation of 




CHAPTER TWO How High Are You? High Technology and 
Questions of Definition 
2.1 "High Technology" as Job Generator? 
"... at the national level the much vaunted 'high technology' 
group upon which so much hope seems to be pinned, contributes 
not to employment gain, but to substantial loss. In fact, over 
15% of these high technology jobs were lost over the period 
[1971-83]. " (Hall et al., 1987, p. 18) 
So conclude the authors of one of the most recent 
influential books on "high technology" industry'in the 
United Kingdom. 
Hall et al. (1987) described a fall in "high technology" 
employment from 689,100 in 1971 to 583,700 in 1983. Using 
the updated 1980 SIC base they found the reduction in "high 
technology" employment from 1981-1984 to be 13,200 jobs or 
1.5%. Butchart (1987), also using the 1980 SIC, has 
similarly described the decline of "high technology" 
employment. In 1975 employment stood at 1,358,000 and 
reached a low of 1,234,000 in 1983. In 1984 employment rose 
to 1,249,000 only to once more continue its decline to 
1,239,000 in 1986,6% of total UK employment. 1 Employment 
decline would seem to characterise the "high technology" 
industries of the United Kingdom. 2 
1 Most recently, Champion and Townsend (1990), using Butchart's (1987) 
definition, have charted a 5.5% decline (representing 66,900 jobs) in UK "high 
technology" employment between the years 1981-1987. 
2 Yet, as Keeble (1989, p. 155) has noted, "high technology" employment decline 
was still less than a third of that for manufacturing as a whole during the period 
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Although these commentators all agree that there has been a 
decline in employment, an interesting point to note is Hall 
et al. 's (1987) figure for "high technology" employment, in 
1984, of 879,800, as compared to Butchart's (1987) figure 
of 1,249,000 for the same year. In further comparison, 
Cooke (1986) gave an approximate figure of 650,000 "high 
technology" jobs in 1986 compared to the figure Butchart 
(1987) gives of 1,239,000. Thus, whilst one may continue to 
hold the initial view that "high technology" employment has 
declined, from the above figures it is difficult to tell by 
how much and from what level. 
The extent of confusion about the precise aggregate numbers 
of UK "high technology" jobs is only heightened by the move 
to a disaggregated list of jobs per "high technology" 
industrial sector. For example, one industrial sector 
generally agreed upon as "high technology" is "information 
technology (IT)". In a recent study, total employment in IT 
in December 1984 was given as 1,714,000 (Preston et al., 
1985, Appendix 2). In other words, the sector had nearly 
500,000 more jobs than the whole of "high technology" 
industry put together if comparison is made with Butchart's 
(1987) figure, let alone the figure of Hall et al. (1987)! 
Clearly something is amiss but, on closer inspection, a 
logical explanation for the widely variant estimates of 
"high technology" employment can be put forward. This 
explanation may be derived from the major problems 
encountered in the definition of "high technology" 
1975 to 1986. Furthermore, Butchart (1987, p. 87) shows that over a similar period 
the ouput of the "high technology" industries averaged a growth rate of 2.8% per 
annum. In other words, "high technology" industry has undergone a period of job- 
loss growth. 
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industries, revolving around both conceptual and 
operational issues and their interplay. 
2.2 Pick-a-(Dualist) Definition 
Hall et al. (1987), when finalising their definition of 
"high technology" industry, initially concentrated on the 
conceptual difficulties of definition involving three 
separate dualisms: high technology producers/high 
technology users, high technology/new technology and, 
implicitly, manufacturing/services. 3 
The question of whether or not to include producers and/or 
users of "high technology" in any definition is relevant 
due to the distinction to be made between "high technology" 
products as against "high technology" production 
processes (ie. the use of "high technology" products in 
production). 
This distinction produces a four-part matrix by which 
industries can be classified, ranging from industries 
producing "high technology" products using "high 
technology" production processes such as aerospace to those 
industries using low technology production processes to 
produce low technology products such as widgets (Hall et 
al., 1987, p. 11). In between, one classification alternative 
represents the use of low technology production processes 
3 See Sayer (1989a) for a discussion of the dangers of dualistic thinking in 
geography, and the social sciences more generally. 
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to produce "high technology" products, for example, the 
labour intensive assembly of semiconductor chips (Henderson 
and Scott, 1988). The final classification involves 
industries such as the motor industry, using high 
technology "robotic" production processes to make low 
technology products, or the use of computer cutters in the 
clothes industry (Hardill, 1988). 
Further work which highlights the technological 
sophistication of "user" industries is that by Townsend et 
al. (1981, p. 91, see also von Hippel, 1988). Their work has 
shown that industrial sectors traditionally regarded as 
"low technology", such as textiles and footwear, were major 
net importers of technology between 1945-1980 (quoted in 
Charles and Howells, 1987). Furthermore, Charles and Howells 
(1987) have themselves suggested that nearly one third 
(31.9%) of all UK R&D expenditure for 1985 was accounted 
for by "traditional" industries (excludes services), 
including 38.2% of privately funded R&D expenditure. One 
particular example they highlight is the widespread 
application of biotechnology within the "traditional" food 
and drink sectors. 4 
Today, one technology, microelectronics, is sweeping 
through industry and at the same time emphasising the 
debate over the producer/user duality. As early as 1980 the 
CSE Microelectronics Group documented the impact of 
microelectronics on production processes ranging from the 
4 An interesting example of biotechnology within the food industry is the recent 
(February 1991) announcement made by Delta Biotechnology, a subsidiary of a major 
brewer (Bass). Within their laboratories they have carried out the first stages in 
the creation of "yeast-derived" human blood. 
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coal industry to motor manufacture, banking and education 
(CSE, 1980). One study of the UK found that, by 1983,18% of 
all production processes contained microelectronics 
(Northcott and Rogers, 1984, quoted in Hall et al., 1987). A 
recent update of this study has gone on to suggest that: 
"... 59 per cent of factories, representing five-sixths of total 
manufacturing employment, now use the chip to automate 
production to some extent... " (Large, 1988) 
Thus, the widespread diffusion of microelectronics is just 
one possible example of the impact the inclusion of "high 
technology" users would have on the definition of "high 
technology" industry. In effect: 
"... a definition based on aggregate industries which included 
high tech process users would incorporate many industries 
making traditional products. " (Hall et al., 1987, p. 11-12) 
Yet it is questionable whether such a dualism is ultimately 
helpful in developing a definition. For the problem with 
the model of classification used above is that: 
"In reality, of course, these quadrants may merge, with a 
combination of low and high technology products being used in 
any production process for making any 'high' or 'low tech' 
product. " (Hall et al., 1987, p. 11) 
Hence, whilst assembly of semiconductors represents an 
unskilled low technology process, the (continued) 
innovation of the semiconductor itself is widely viewed as 
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the core of the information technology revolution. 
Furthermore, Hall et al. (1987) have gone on to highlight 
the difficulty of making a distinction between producers 
and users anyway, for example, in the case of computer 
software consultants. But they conclude by stating their 
particular interest to be with that of "high technology" 
producers alone. 
High technology and new technoloav 
On reaching a decision about the producer/user duality, 
Hall et al. (1987) are immediately confronted with the 
problem of a second duality within definition, that is 
"high technology" as against "new technology". Several 
previous studies have avoided the term "high technology" 
preferring the term "new technology" (see for instance 
Brady and Liff, 1983). The classifying of technology 
temporally, as an option to making value judgements as to 
what is or isn't "high technology", on first glance seems 
preferable. However, Hall et al. (1987) go on to outline 
the problem of "dating" a technology, which simply replaces 
the previous problem of making qualitative decisions on 
technological content. 
For example, and outlining geography as an important 
element, they suggest that the date of introduction of a 
"new" technology varies across industries, regions and 
nations. Equally, the ability to classify industrial 
processes according to the period in which the technology 
was developed may be hampered when technologies emerge over 
a period of time which coincide with more than one phase of 
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industrial innovation (op. cit., p. 12-13). One need only look 
at "long wave" theory, and the debates presently taking 
place within it, to exemplify the importance and yet 
extreme difficulty of "dating" innovation and technological 
progress. 
Mensch (1979) in his epic work Technological Stalemate: 
Innovations Overcome the Depression argued that he had 
identified particular years, "radical years of history", in 
which heightened innovation - the driving force behind long 
waves - took place, only for his work to be discredited by 
Freeman et al. (1982) partly on the basis of his dating of 
innovation: 
"... there is a high degree of ambiguity surrounding any 
estimate of invention and innovation dates, and differences of 
opinion are likely even when a single source of information 
such as Jewkes et al. is used. Some of those classified to the 
1930s in Mensch's list could equally plausibly be allocated to 
other decades... " (Freeman et al., 1982, p. 47) 
Instead, Freeman et al. (1982) argue for the importance of 
diffusion and adoption of technology rather than its actual 
innovation date. 
The third duality, that of the distinction between 
manufacturing and services, does not represent an initial 
problem to Hall et al. (1987) because of their earlier 
decision to concentrate on producers of high technology. 
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They recognise that the service industries also undertake a 
production process which may result in a high technology 
product, for example, computer software. While this may 
seem obvious today, such a recognition is an advance on 
previous theory. Take, for example, economic base theory 
which views services as dependent upon the independent and 
wealth-creating manufacturing sector. 
However, if, in conclusion, the above dualisms highlight 
the need for "conceptual" thought before attempts to define 
"high technology" industry are made, the pragmatic 
requirements of gaining an operationally adequate 
definition often ultimately override such thinking. For 
example, Hall et al. (1987) arrive at a final definition of 
"high technology" industry which includes no service 
sectors despite their initial conceptual decision to 
include services. This is due not to the fact that no 
service industries were found to be "high technology" but 
rather, that none of the information required to produce 
the proxy indicators of "high technology" on which Hall et 
al. based their definition was actually available for 
services (op. cit., p. 16). Hence, services are conceptually 
included but operationally excluded. 
This outcome is all the more unnerving given Hall et al's 
(1987) express aim to be "objective" in their definition of 
"high technology" industry, in comparison to earlier 
"subjective" approaches (op. cit., p. 13). 
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The "objective" and the "subjective" approaches to 
definition 
Breheny et al. (1985) discuss how the "subjective" approach 
to definition, seen in the work of Oakey (1981), Haug 
(1986) and Cooke (1986) amongst others, involves value 
judgements as to which industries (by SIC) should be 
classified as "high technology". This approach: 
"... avoids thorny conceptual problems and gives a working 
definition, [but) it is very unsatisfactory in that it is 
peculiar to the analysts concerned, has no objective base and 
makes comparison virtually impossible. " (Breheny et 
al., 1985, p. 120) 
In contrast, the "objective" approach involves attempts to 
identify characteristics a priori, and hence proxy 
indicators, of "high technology" (industries), and a large 
amount of research has been undertaken aimed at identifying 
such indicators (for example, see Glasmeier et al. 1983; 
Hall and Markusen, 1982; Langridge, 1984; Premus, 1982). 
Inputs and outputs 
Monck et al. (1988) usefully categorise these indicators 
as, on the one hand, measures of resource inputs to "high 
technology" activity and, on the other, measures of output 
or performance of high technology firms. 
The most common measure of inputs used is that based on R&D 
intensity, creating proxy indicators such as R&D 
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expenditure as a percentage of total industry sales/net 
output/gross value added/turnover or other similar measures 
of "output" (Butchart, 1987; Hall et al., 1987; 
Mansfield, 1988; Pavitt, 1979; Rees, 1979). Problems arise, 
however, due to the paucity of official standard 
information on R&D expenditure across all industrial 
sectors (eg. Hall et al., 1987). Also, various anomalies 
occur such as new small firms and industries appearing to 
be more R&D intensive, due to being in early stages of 
product development with initial sales underdeveloped 
(Monck et al., 1988). At the other extreme is the 
petrochemicals industry with vast sales to compare with its 
relatively small R&D expenditure. Such anomalies are part 
of the problem with input measures which are purely 
quantitative in nature. 
In contrast, the importance of the qualitative aspect of 
R&D must also be recognised, and has been by the team 
involved in the design of the survey questionnaire for the 
UKSPA/Peat Marwick McLintock survey of all UK science parks 
(Wield and Quintas, 1986; see Monck et al. (1988) for full 
results and analysis of survey-5). Within the survey, 
questions were put to firms about the technological content 
and relative novelty of their products, and/or the 
knowledge input to their services, in addition to questions 
on amounts of R&D expenditure. For example, firms were 
5 Despite the recognition of this important aspect to R&D expenditure as an 
indicator, and its use in defining "high technology", Monck et al. (1988) argue 
that the definition of "high technology" is in fact chosen for them by their 
subject matter, namely, "firms located on Science Parks" (op. cit., p. 129 and 
p. 140) . Such an example precisely highlights how operational considerations often 
override conceptualisation in discussions and definitions of "high technology". 
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asked whether they were engaged in "radical" new research 
or merely developing "new" or "complementary" product 
ranges. From this, Wield and Quintas (1986) were able to 
conclude that firms on Science Parks were "R&D intensive" 
based on R&D expenditure levels but, in addition and 
significantly: 
"... that, if anything, most Science Park firms are, in their 
modest way, diffusing and applying new technologies into the 
economy rather than being technologically "leading edge" - (and 
that] this may be where the economic impact of Science Parks 
really lies. "(op. cit, p. 53)6 
A further input measure commonly used is that based on 
occupational structures of industries, such as the 
proportion of an industry's labour force which is in 
technical occupations (Butchart, 1987; Hall et al., 1987; 
Markusen et al., 1986; Monck et al., 1988). Problems again 
arise particularly as to the classification of "technical" 
and the availability of industry-wide data (Butchart, 1987). 
Also, once again, Harris and McArthur (1985) argue that 
such an aggregate statistic, like R&D expenditure, is 
misleading and needs to be combined with qualitative data 
as to the type of work "technicians" are involved in, and 
how this relates to the particular technology in question 
(op. cit., p. 34) . 
A variety of measures of output are also used. One example 
is product sophistication (Vinson and Harrington, 1979) and 
6 See Massey, Quintas and Wield (forthcoming) for greater discussion of this 
issue and the relationship between technology and economic development more 
generally. 
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other examples are rates of innovation and patenting 
activity (Monck et al., 1988; Oakey et al., 1982; Patel and 
Pavitt, (1987); Pavitt, 1980). A further output measure, 
linked to initial views of "high technology" industry as 
the industrial saviour, is rates of growth in employment. 
Yet it has already been seen that "high technology" 
industry has not lived up to certain early expectations 
concerning its job generation potential. However, this 
measure does serve to highlight the circularity evident 
within many attempts to define and measure "high 
technology". As Markusen et al. (1986) write: 
"Fundamentally, this approach contains a serious conceptual 
error. It is based on the tautological notion that since high 
tech industries are anticipated to be rapid net job generators, 
they can be defined by this performance. " (op. cit., p. 13, 
authors' emphasis) 
Thus, a variety of both input and output measures have been 
used in the quest for a definitive "objective" list of 
"high technology" industries. But, as Button (1988) has 
noted, the dichotomy between "objective" and "subjective" 
can itself be misleading. For he points out how lists 
created by the use of "objective" measures are then 
dissected using "subjective" cut-off points. For example, 
Breheny et al. (1985) chart the attempts of Langridge 
(1984) to apply Hall and Markusen's (1982) definitional 
criteria of "all industries and services which over a ten- 
year period had exhibited a2 per cent per annum growth 
rate in employment" and those "with a ratio of production 
workers to total employment 20 per cent below the national 
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average". As Button (1988) suggests, this does beg the 
question, why 2% growth rate and why 20% below the national 
average. 
Similarly, Butchart (1987) puts forward that: 
"An industry becomes a candidate for inclusion in the high 
technology grouping if its R&D intensity is above the average 
for manufacturing industry as a whole and it will automatically 
be included if its intensity is substantially above the 
average ... "(op. cit., p. 84) 
He recognises the problem of defining just what is meant by 
"substantially above" the manufacturing average and decides 
on a cut-off point of 20%. However, it is important to 
recognise that this is an "arbitrary" cut-off point within 
a wider methodology using "objective" indicators. 
Even when, and if, "objective" indicators of "high 
technology" can be agreed upon, their use to produce a list 
of "high technology" industries is still highly 
problematical. For such indicators are often applied to 
select particular (high technology) sectors from lists 
drawn up using the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
system which is itself flawed. 
It has already been seen how industry may be viewed on the 
basis of its product and/or its process of production 
(pp. 30-31). The SIC system takes as its basis the final 
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product but, the Minimum List Headings (or Activity 
Headings) it creates are broad categories so that within 
any heading significant inter-firm product 
heterogeneity may indeed be occurring. For example, in 
MLH 364, radio and electronic components, firms involved in 
the production of "low technology" radio valves are 
classified along with those involved in the production of 
solid state circuitry (Hall et al., 1987, p. 19). 
Moreover, intra-firm heterogeneity in the production 
process may also be disguised through classification by 
product. The work of Hymer (1975), Massey (1979; 1984) and 
Lipietz (1980), amongst others, has identified how 
establishments within the same firm, producing the same 
product, may be set within a functional hierarchy. 
Establishments may often each be involved in different 
separate stages of the production process ranging from R&D 
to basic assembly. Indeed, such corporate "spatial 
structures of production" can, at an aggregate level, 
create a distinctive "spatial division of labour" based 
less on product specialisation (ie. the basis of SIC) than 
functional specialisation (based on relations of 
production) [Massey, 1984]. 7 
So, a multi-site firm may be classified as "high- 
technology" by its product and, hence, all its 
establishments will also be so classified. However, in 
reality, some establishments, due to their position in the 
functional hierarchy, may be involved in parts of the 
7 Massey (1988) has recently suggested that the newly emergent UK spatial 
division of labour can be conceptualised as integrating both sectoral and 
functional specialisation in a new and different form. 
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production process involving virtually no "high" 
technological content and, for example, consequently have 
employment structures heavily dominated by unskilled 
labour. Examples of such cases have been documented within 
the US semiconductor industry whereby Silicon valley is the 
R&D centre for a multi-national production process which 
includes unskilled assembly plants in South-East Asia 
(Henderson and Scott, 1988). Furthermore, it is also 
feasible that a similar situation of process heterogeneity 
may occur between different production lines within the 
same establishment. The SIC system, however, classifies 
establishments on the basis of their (or their firm's) 
major product. 
Heterogeneity may also exist between firms involved 
within the production of a single "high technology" product 
(ie. inter-firm heterogeneity in the production 
process). Firms may specialise in a particular part of the 
production process of a product. The nature of that product 
will see them defined as "high technology" but, just as 
individual establishments within a multi-site firm may not 
actually be involved in a technologically sophisticated 
production process, so such independent firms may also fit 
this scenario. Indeed, this may become an increasingly 
important factor to consider if, as proponents of "flexible 
specialisation" believe, we are seeing the disintegration 
of large firms and the creation of small specialist 
subcontrators in their place (see Chapter Three). 
A final problem with the SIC system, other than general 
problems of data collection which plague all the major 
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social surveys, is that the classifications are temporally 
static (at least over the medium term). With the constantly 
changing nature of technology, SIC, relating to previous 
industrial composition and technology, may well hide 
current industrial activity changes which may be 
quantitatively minor but qualitatively major (Harris and 
McArthur, 1985). The most obvious example of this at the 
present time is the growth of "biotechnology" (OTA, 1984; 
Sharp, 1985), leading the author of the official UK 
definition of "high technology" industries to write: 
"... that statisticians have yet to discover and define a 
biotechnology industry, even less to collect statistics for 
it. " (Butchart, 1987, p. 85) 
The continual "progress" of technology implies that a 
definitive list of "high technology" industries is unlikely 
ever to appear as there can be no temporally static list of 
high technology industries (Glasmeier, 1985). 
"Choices" in definition 
In conclusion, it has been briefly outlined how the 
interplay of both conceptual and operational issues can 
open up the potential for widely differing definitions of 
"high technology". Such definitions, once deconstructed, 
are revealed to be based on a series of key "choices", 
often conceptualised as dualisms. In turn, significantly 
different estimates of "high technology" employment arise 
from the particular compilations of choices which are made. 
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Take, for example, the difference between Butchart's (1987) 
estimate of high technology employment in 1984 of 1,249,000 
and Hall et al's (1987) figure of 879,800 (see earlier, 
pp. 28-29). These employment estimates were based on 
definitive lists of "high technology" industry (see Table 
2.1), yet what may surprise the reader is that both 
Butchart (1987) and Hall et al. (1987) used the same 
definitional criteria for their widely differing lists. 8 
Two major differences in the final lists can be seen which 
account for the difference between the two "high 
technology" job estimates. 
8 Gutchart (1987) used R&D intensity - measured by ratio of intra-mural 
expenditure to industry gross ouput - as the first indicator. Any Activity Heading 
with a figure 20% above the UK manufacturing average was automatically defined as 
high technology, with those Activity Headings with an above average figure also 
becoming candidates for inclusion. A second measure was then employed to assess 
these "candidates". The second measure was those Activity Headings with a ratio of 
administrative, technical and clerical (ATC) employees to operatives above the UK 
manufacturing average, a proxy measure for the proportion of scientists, 
professional engineers and technicians in the labour force. Butchart found that no 
"candidate" on R&D intensity had a below average score on the second measure thus 
he included them all in his definition. Indeed, none of the Activity Headings 
already chosen had a below average figure with all but one having a substantially 
above average figure. 
Hall et al. (1987) firstly identified MLH sectors (ie. 1968 SIC) with above average 
percentages, for British manufacturing industries, of engineers, technologists and 
scientists. An initial definition of 36 manufacturing and 10 service MLH's was 
arrived at. A "core" group of 7 MLH manufacturing industries which had "relatively 
high" R&D expenditure was then further isolated to complete the final list. Hall 
et al. explain the problems they had with this second indicator such as the 
unavailability of R&D expenditure figures for all service MLH's as well as many 
manufacturing MLH's. In fact, some of this data was not available for 3 of the 7 
manufacturing sectors chosen by Hall et al. so that these sectors were chosen 
purely on the basis of one indicator, % skilled occupations. Yet, strangely, 2 of 
these 3 chosen sectors have lower skilled occupation percentages than other 
sectors not chosen. No explanation can be found for this leading to the puzzling 
conclusion that there is no logic, at least in terms of the indicators used, to 
the final choice of sectors. 
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TABLE 2.1 A comparison of Hall et al's (1987) and 
Butchart's (1987) definitions of high technology industries 
MM Industry description 
272 Pharmaceutical chemicals & preparations 
363 Telegraph & telephone apparatus 
364 Radio & electronic components 
365 Broadcast receiving & sound equipment 
366 Electronic computers 
367 Radio, radar & electronic capital goods 
383 Aerospace equipment manufacturing 
Source: Table 2.3 Hall et al. (1987) 
Butchar (1987) definition of high technology indust -i-es based-2a 
1980 SIC. Those industries in bold also represent the updated 1980 
SIC equivalents of Hall et al's (1987) classification. 
£I Industry Description 
2514 Synthetic resins & plastic materials 
2515 Synthetic rubber 
2570 Pharmaceutical products 
3301 Office machinery 
3302 Electronic data processing equipment 
3420 Basic electrical equipment 
3441 Telegraph & telephone apparatus & equipment 
3442 Electrical instruments & control systems 
3443 Radio & electronic capital goods 
3444 Components other than active components mainly 
for electronic equipment 
3453 Active components & electronic sub-assemblies 
3640 Aerospace equipment manufacturing & repairing 
3710 Measuring, checking & precision instruments & apparatus 
3720 Medical & surgical equipment & orthopaedic appliances 
3732 Optical precision instruments 
3733 Photographic & cinematographic equipment 
7902 Telecommunications 
8394 Computing services 
9400 Research & Development 
Source: Table 7, Butchart (1987); Table 2.4, Hall et al. (1987) 
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Firstly, Butchart (1987) has included 16 manufacturing 
sectors in comparison to the 7 of Hall et al. (1987). 
Secondly, Butchart (1987) includes 3 service sectors 
whereas Hall et al. (1987) have only one. 
Also, Preston et al. 's (1985) estimation of employment in 
the information technology industries can be seen as 
comparatively high due to two key choices in particular. 
Firstly, the inclusion of IT services (infrastructure) as 
well as IT producers and, secondly, the inclusion of "old" 
IT industries such as printing and publishing as well as 
the more familiar "new" IT industries such as electronic 
data processing equipment and radio and electronic capital 
goods (op. cit., p. 4). 
Hence, further inspection of "high technology" job 
estimates has provided some "explanation" for their 
numerical variance. Yet, ultimately, it has merely revealed 
a series of critical choices within the process of 
definition. What it has not explained is why these choices 
exist and on what basis these choices are made. The 
preceding deconstruction of definitions of "high 
technology" does not, ultimately, explain why such varied 
views (choices) of "high technology" should exist in the 
first place. 
2.3 "Theory-Laden" Definition 
Harris and McArthur (1985), however, provide an explanation 
while putting forward a solution to the problems of 
definition of "high technology". They argue that rather 
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than: 
"... chasing the chimerical and unobtainable definition of high 
technology and subsequently attempting to justify the inclusion 
of specific industrial sectors into such a vague and loaded 
framework, those whose aim is to analyse the genesis and impact 
of so-called high technology industry should, we believe, look 
afresh at the subject. " (op. cit., p. 7) 
"In particular, there has been a failure to explore the 
different structural roles played by different kinds of 
technology... " (ibid., p. 34, my emphasis) 
Thus, this fresh look should involve an attempt: 
"... to relate the work on new and expanding industries in which 
new technology is apparently important to a theoretical 
framework which considers the role that technical change plays 
in economic development. " (Harris and McArthur, 1985, p. 2) 
Harris and McArthur (1985), in particular, put forward 
"long wave" theory as giving: 
"... insights into the links between technological innovation 
and economic development which enable us to interpret "high 
technology" more clearly. " (op. cit., p. 8) 
Harris and McArthur (1985) are quite correct in arguing 
that, fundamentally, any approach to "high technology" 
definition must explore and identify the structural role 
of any particular technology included in such a definition, 
whether it be based on long wave theory or other theories 
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of structural change (see Chapter Three). This is the 
critical conceptual step, such that definition is based on 
structural characteristics which arise from the role 
assigned to "high technology" in any such theory. 
However, Harris and McArthur (1985) overstate the case that 
attempts to define "high technology" have failed in this 
conceptual step. Certainly examples can be found but it is 
precisely because definitions have been influenced 
(if only implicitly and often only partially) by 
views of the role particular technologies are 
deemed to be playing which explains fundamental 
differences in definition. It is this influence which 
explains the existence, and taking, of those "choices" 
which determine the variety of definitions of "high 
technology" to be found. 
This critical point can be exemplified by a return to the 
"objective" indicators of "high technology" outlined 
earlier. It was seen that such indicators are based on 
identifying a priori characteristics of "high technology". 
However, what must be recognised is the "theory-laden" 
aspect of such a process. Such a process takes place within 
a preconceived notion of just what "high technology" is and 
hence, what its characteristics are likely (ought) to be. 
So, for example, rate of employment growth as a 
characteristic of "high technology industry" was soon 
rejected. However, its initial choice as a possible 
definitional characteristic highlighted the tautological 
conception that, because "high technology industry" was 
theorised as a job generator so "job generation" could be 
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used as an indicator itself (see earlier, p. 39). Similarly, 
R&D expenditure and innovation rates, including patent 
activity, have been put forward as indicators becauselong 
wave theory characterises new technologies as part of 
highly innovative industries acting as the motors of 
structural economic change (see Chapter Three). The failure 
Harris and McArthur (1985) expose is a general failure, 
systematically and consistently, to relate theory to (both 
quantitative and qualitative) indicators when defining 
"high techn6logy", rather than the total absence of any 
theory view of a technology's role in structural change. In 
other words, the failure to be explicit about the theory 
which underpins any attempt to define "high technology". 
Ultimately, it is only through specific theories of 
economic change which identify the process of 
technical change as a key factor, that the need to 
classify "high technology" has arisen. Within such 
theory "high technology" is assigned a particular 
(often critical) role as part of the process of 
technological change. It is this role (whether 
explicit or implicit) which subsequently sets the 
definitional parameters within which the search for 
the litmus paper test for "high technology" can, 
and has been, carried out. 
2.4 Definition and Theories of Structural Change 
Recently, Aydalot and Keeble (1988) have provided an 
(explicit) example of the use of theories of structural 
change in "high technology" definition. In their work they 
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contrast two approaches to the study of "high technology": 
"Emphasis can either be focussed on the special nature of new 
activities and the types of changes which they engender in 
society: or on the degree of rupture with previous technologies 
and forms of social and economic organisation which they cause. 
In the former case, the focus is on the nature of change, in 
the latter, on the amount of change. " (op. cit., p. 4, authors' 
emphasis) 
Following this line of thought Aydalot and Keeble (1988) 
view the "special" nature of change as being encapsulated 
in the: 
"... transforming [of] an economy which was based on the 
production of material goods into a machine for the creation 
and transfer of information... It is therefore easy to argue 
from this side the case for the originality and specificity of 
current new technology, as well as for its particularly 
powerful and widespread impact... " (op. cit., p. 4-5) 
This interpretation, therefore, concentrates on the 
"information technology revolution" with a resultant list 
of "high technology" industries based on IT industries and 
services. Equally this: 
"... first interpretation does not point to identification of 
high-technology activities on the basis of the level of 
research and development activity, gor of new technology, 
involved. Rather, it suggests that they should be defined in 
terms of the degree of upheaval they engender in individual and 
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collective behaviour, in the sphere of work as well as 
in daily 
life. " (Aydalot and Keeble, 1988, p. 6) 
In contrast, the second approach concentrating on the 
degree of "rupture" is seen by Aydalot and Keeble (1988) as 
the view of "high technology" put forward in long wave 
theory (see Chapter Three). Theorists from this position 
believe that we are presently moving into the fifth 
Kondratiev cycle of a series of economic development 
cycles, each based on, and characterised by, a new and 
different technology: 
"So from this perspective, it is not a question of an 
historically-unique change resulting from the development of a 
totally new technology which has divided European history into 
two periods - before and after the information technology 
revolution - but rather one of major periodic technological, 
economic, and indeed spatial, re-alignments. " (op. cit., p. 5, 
authors' emphasis) 
Hence new technology and its continuous appearance is part 
of: 
"... more deeprooted economic, social and spatial processes 
[which] predate the development of new information technology, 
which is no more than the catalyst or driving force for a new 
cycle. " (Aydalot and Keeble, 1988, p. 5) 
So this approach, concentrating on innovation as a 
significant indicator, similarly includes micro-electronics 
and other IT industries in a definition of "high 
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technology" industries but, also, further industries which 
have appeared in the last few decades such as aerospace and 
biotechnology. 
Thus, Aydalot and Keeble (1988) provide examples of how 
theories of structural change may determine lists of "high 
technology industries" through the (theory-laden) 
indicators chosen to derive such lists. In fact, their 
appraisal actually underdevelops this crucial component to 
"high technology" definition. This underdevelopment stems, 
in one sense, from their initial conception of theories of 
change as focussing on either the "special nature" of 
change or "amount" of change incorporated in the "degree of 
rupture". For this dichotomy cannot be maintained 
convincingly because the "amount" of change is an essential 
and integral element of the "nature" of change. So, in 
effect, the "information technology revolution" is 
analagous to the "long wave" approach, in that they are 
both theories of periodic change involving "rupture", 
even though the time scale may be of a longer dimension and 
the "rupture" much deeper in the former case. Theories of 
structural change involve elements of both the "nature" and 
"amount" of change and Aydalot and Keeble (1988) have 
merely taken two different theories of periodisation, of 
structural change, and their different points of emphasis. 
Other theories of structural change also exist complete 
with their own emphases on particular aspects of "rupture" 
(see Chapter Three). 
The other sense in which Aydalot and Keeble (1988) 
underdevelop the importance of theories of structural 
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change in definition is in their summary of long wave 
theory and its view of "high technology". As Keeble (1988) 
writes in a further article in this edited edition: 
"The approach adopted here follows the second of the two 
alternatives identified [ie. based on long waves], where all 
radically new technologies which have appeared in recent years, 
and not just those in the information technology field, are 
viewed as potential contributors to the development of a new 
long cycle of economic growth. It also therefore logically 
focusses on the impact of significant innovations in creating 
new products and industries, and the essential role of research 
and development personnel and expenditure in this process. " 
(Keeble, 1988, p. 70) 
So Keeble (1988) goes on to argue that Butchart's (1987) 
definition of "high technology", with its use of R&D 
intensity and labour force (technical) characteristics, is 
the most up-to-date and appropriate definition of "high 
technology". However, it is precisely this approach of 
using "surrogate criteria" based on aggregate statistics 
which Harris and McArthur (1985) have so strongly 
criticised. Its use within a long wave perspective, a 
perspective which in their view permits the avoidance of 
just such an approach, must be rather disheartening. 
Harris and McArthur (1985) use the links made by long wave 
theory between technological innovation and economic 
development to distinguish between two different sets of 
technologies, often generically grouped as "high 
technology". On the one hand are the "widely diffusing 
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technologies" such as micro-processors in products, 
electronic office machinery and this category's wider 
extension as information technology. Such technologies are 
particularly related by the similar and major roles they 
are playing in the current downswing. On the other hand are 
the "newly emergent technologies" such as novel materials, 
biotechnology and alternative energy technologies. However, 
the crucial distinction to be made about this second set of 
technologies: 
11 ... 
is that the newly emergent technologies have 
little impact upon the structure of the economy at 
present. " (Harris and McArthur, 1985, p. 33, authors' emphasis) 
This approach, then, does make distinctions within "all 
radically new technologies which have appeared in recent 
years" (see Keeble, 1988, above). Indeed, it deliberately 
sets out to avoid such a conflation (Harris and 
McArthur, 1985, p. 33). 9 
So, Aydalot and Keeble (1988) may not go far enough in 
appraising the role of theories of structural change in 
definition, particularly within long wave theory, but they 
have crucially recognised such theory's place in any 
attempt at definition. Indeed, it is on the basis of 
theories of structural change that fundamental 
differences in definitions of "high technology" 
arise and that, in conjunction with problems of 
9 The work of Freeman et al. (1982), and their conception of "new technology 
systems", also highlights the differentiation within "new technology" which does 
occur within long wave theory (see Freeman, 1986, p. 110 also). 
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"operationalisation", a variety of figures for "high 
technology" employment in the UK are put forward. 
Within such theory, the appearance of particular (high) 
technologies, and their associated industries, has been 
conceptualised as part of an on-going process of 
(structural) economic change. Subsequently, it is the role 
ascribed to different kinds of technology as elements of 
this change which has acted as the definitional criterion 
for particular groups of technologies, and determined the 
choice of indicators which attempt to exhibit this 
criterion. Certain groups of technologies, connected by 
their common place within particular forms of change, have 
also, subsequently, been labelled as "high technology". 
2.5 "High Technology" as a Process of Change in 
Production 
The explicit recognition of "high technology" as a process 
of change holds two major repercussions. Firstly, the re- 
definition of "high technology" as a (group of industries 
related by and representing a) process of change holds a 
major repercussion when discussing the effects (outcomes) 
of "high technology". For such outcomes, often grouped as a 
"pattern", are related by the process (of technological 
change) causing them as outcomes and not necessarily 
their similarity (or not) as outcomes. This distinction 
represents a critical differentiation between a "pattern" 
as a (causal) group of outcomes whose members may be either 
similar or different but which actually relate to each 
other structurally or causally, and a "pattern" as a group 
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whose members share similar (formal) attributes but which 
need not actually connect or interact with one another 
(Sayer, 1984, p. 221). 
This distinction is critical because the recognition that 
similarity of outcome is not the automatic result of a 
single/common process of change highlights that, whilst a 
process of (technological) change (as encapsulated within 
"high technology") may be taking place, the operation of 
such a process will be mediated by other contingent 
conditions, possibly producing a wide (and potentially 
contrasting) range of effects (eg. job growth or job loss). 
Indeed, the insertion of technology within the wider 
context of the social relations of production, as occurs 
within theories of structural change, precisely illuminates 
just such an array of conditions. 
By firmly placing (high) technology within a theoretical 
structure which (i) theorises the role of technological 
change in economic development and (ii) places 
technological change within a historical perspective, much 
greater understanding of the likely (varied) impact and 
implications of "high technology" can be gained (Harris and 
McArthur, 1985) . 
It can be seen that such impacts go much wider than merely 
employment levels within a select few industries. If one 
concentrates on those jobs alone then the type of jobs 
they are as well as their number becomes important. But the 
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impact of (high) technology is much wider than this. It 
represents a process of change which creates ripples, even 
waves, throughout the wider economy, throughout all 
industry. 10 For analysts of industrial development, two 
particular implications of technological change have 
dominated debate based on, firstly, the effect on 
employment levels and, secondly, the effect on skills in 
employment. 11 
The impact on numbers employed 
The debate on employment levels has seen wide-ranging views 
of the impact of new technology revolving around the 
central concept of "displacement". The arguments are about 
whether or not the jobs displaced by the widespread 
diffusion of new technology, and in this contemporary 
period microelectronics in particular, will be compensated 
for, or exceeded by, the numbers of jobs created by the new 
technology. 
One extreme view forsees the collapse of work and the need 
for society to re-define exactly why we work, what work 
will involve and indeed the need to work (Jenkins and 
Sherman, 1979). Post-industrialists 12, such as Bell (1973), 
10 The impacts of technological change are also much wider than the narrowly 
economic impacts being addressed here. Some further examples are the impact on the 
urban form and notions of the "wired city", the rise of new forms of consumption 
patterns such as tele-shopping and, the particular focus of this thesis, the new 
geography of production. 
11 Whilst Braun and Senker (1982) provide a concise and structured summary of the 
history of this debate, the edited collection by Wood (1989) serves to highlight 
that this debate is still highly relevant, if only in its new guise as part of the 
"flexibility" debate. 
12 The term is used loosely but, like so many terms in social science, it is 
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Toffler (1980) and Stonier (1983), believe that the major 
structural trend of decline of manufacturing jobs, 
including ultimately those in the new industries, will be 
advanced by the latest technologies such that: 
"In 25 years it will take no more than 10 per cent of the 
labour force to provide us with all our material needs. " 
(Stonier, 1983, p. 122) 
Long wave theorists, in comparison, view the new technology 
industries as being important sources of job creation. 
However, such job creation is also combined with job 
displacement by the same technology. Whether or not job 
creation outweighs job displacement is dependent on the 
particular phase of the long wave being studied. Thus, 
Harris and McArthur (1985), in their application of long 
wave theory, argued that the UK was experiencing increased 
mechanisation during the early 1980s through the adoption 
of new technologies. With the UK economy, at this time, 
within the "downswing" phase such technologies were 
principally being introduced for the short-term benefits of 
reducing operational costs in the face of an economic 
climate of stagnant demand: 
"The growth of these "high technology" industries is, 
therefore, associated to a considerable extent with the 
rationalisation taking place in other sectors. " (Harris and 
McArthur, 1985, p. 17) 
lacking a tight definition. For a critique of "post-industrialism" see Neuberg 
(1975) . 
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Hence, job growth may well have occurred in some of the 
"high technology" capital goods industries, but have been 
founded upon a wider automation dynamic throughout industry 
which has entailed job loss. 13 This is exemplified by the 
case of microelectronics technology. Northcott and Walling 
(1988) estimate the job loss due to automation based on 
microelectronics as 45,000 jobs a year between 1983-1987 
and 15,000-20,000 jobs a year during the period 1981-1983 
(quoted in Large, 1988). However, Harris and McArthur (1985) 
go on to suggest that: 
"There is every reason to believe, for example, that 
contemporary widely diffusing (eg. microelectronics) 
technologies will constitute a major part of the technological 
web of a future upswing... " (op. cit., 1985, p. 35, authors' 
emphasis) 
Thus, the group of new industries based on these 
technologies will, during an upswing, become interlinked 
within "virtuous circles" resulting in a job-generating 
technological system involving considerable employment 
expansion. Indeed, the work of Freeman et al. (1982) 
provides just such a historical example of job growth based 
on the the previous technological system of electronics. 
Yet, whatever the balance of jobs created and jobs 
displaced, there is a further issue to technological 
change. The jobs created by new technology are not the same 
type as those being lost by the introduction of that same 
technology. The introduction of new technology also implies 
a shift in the skills required to work with such 




The impact on skills required 
Braun and Senker (1982) summarise the debate on the skill 
impact of new technology as condensing around three 
particular positions. Firstly, and deriving ultimately from 
Braverman's (1974) thesis, is the view that overall 
deskilling will occur. Monopoly capitalism will continue 
to use technology to increase productivity. Thus, the 
continued extension of the technical division of labour and 
automation of the production process will take place, 
involving the removal of any remaining autonomy and control 
from a homogenised deskilled workforce. 
Secondly, there is the view that the introduction of new 
technology will result in the upgrading of skills. 
Machines will become more sophisticated hence so will the 
skills of those required to work such machines. Equally, 
the continued structural trend to services will increase 
the total demand for skills as such occupations require 
greater skills (Braun and Senker, 1982). Most recently, the 
rise to prominence of the "flexible specialisation" thesis 
of Piore and Sabel (1984) has given this view further 
impetus (see Chapter Three). 
The final view of the effect of new technology, and one 
which is also receiving a great deal of attention in the 
discussion of "high technology", involves elements of both 
skill upgrading and deskilling. This view is the 
"polarisation" or "declining middle" scenario (see 
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Pahl, 1988, on the variety of actual possible scenarios 
under the term "polarisation"). It is suggested that the 
skill structure (and subsequent occupational structure) is 
bifurcating between an increasingly skilled elite involved 
in the design, programming and maintenance of the new 
technology, in contrast to a deskilled, unskilled mass of 
operators. "High technology" is leading to an: 
"... upgrading of a minority of workers and rapid growth of 
professional sectors, while a majority of workers are deskilled 
and reduced to low-paying jobs, either in labor-intensive 
services or in down-graded manufacturing [causing a] 
disappearance of the middle class. " (Castells, 1985, p. 23., 
quoted in Klak, 1989) 
Klak (1989) has, however, argued that evidence for the 
"high-technology work force polarisation" scenario is 
ambiguous and limited and is predominantly based upon 
overdrawn theoretical generalisations. In a review of the 
argument in the USA, s/he presents the scenario as being 
based on the merging of two types of evidence. Firstly, 
evidence from the occupational characteristics of the 
semiconductor industry and, secondly, evidence of 
occupational polarisation within the US economy as a whole, 
put forward by Bradbury (1986), Loveman and Tilly (1988) 
and Thurow (1984) amongst others. 
The former evidence comes from studies of the semiconductor 
industry such as Saxenian's (1985) study of Silicon Valley 
(see also Scott, 1988b; 1989). The dominance of the industry 
has been so great within the region that: 
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"Silicon valley's urban landscape has thus come to mimic the 
microelectronics industry's bifurcated social structure. The 
large and affluent professional-managerial strata of the 
industry's workforce is insulated in the north and west. . . with 
easy access to the electronics complex. Meanwhile, the 
industry's large, low-income production workforce is 
concentrated further to the south and east... " (Saxenian, 1985, 
p. 87) 
Similarly, Scott (1989), in his study of "The Technopoles 
of Southern California", argues how the region's "high 
technology" industrial base is resulting in: 
"A definite restructuring of local labor markets, with two 
distinctive strata becoming increasingly evident. On the one 
side, there is a stratum of skilled highly-paid workers... On 
the other side, there is a rapidly-expanding stratum of low- 
skilled low-wage workers comprising for the most part females 
and immigrants subject to great employment instabilities as 
manifest in high rates of turnover, part-time work and 
temporary work. " (op. cit., p. 6) 
In the UK, Kelly and Keeble (1988) have also provided 
evidence for skills polarisation within "high technology" 
industry. They found that during the period 1978-84, the 
UK's computer hardware industry experienced a 5.5% growth 
in employment. However, this was split between a growth in 
highly qualified research and development workers of 93% 
compared to a 20% decline in numbers of unskilled and semi- 
skilled workers. They also found a similar trend of job 
growth in skilled occupations and employment decline in 
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lower skilled occupations within the computer software and 
services sector (op. cit, p. 3-4). 
Lovering (1987) has also described a situation of 
"polarisation", but during a time of job-loss, within the 
UK electronics and aerospace industries. While these 
industries shed over 60,000 jobs between 1981-84, during 
the same period the number of scientists and technologists 
employed actually increased by almost 8,000 (op. cit., Table 
8). 
Concerning the US, however, Klak (1989) has concluded that: 
"Given what appears to be a general trend towards bifurcation 
in the work-force in the US economy as a whole (for 
example, Thurow, 1984), the results of this study suggest that 
high technology has been wrongfully accused of being 
responsible for that polarization. " (op. cit., p. 239) 
Moreover, s/he also concludes that: 
"In short, as a result of this study, I suggest that under the 
umbrella of a popularly-appealing concept such as high- 
technology industry there are a variety of industrial sectors, 
establishments, and firms, which are likely to exhibit 
divergent occupational patterns. " (op. cit., p. 240) 
This conclusion concurs with that reached by Elger (1987) 
in his review article of recent publications dealing with 
new technology and the transformation of work: 
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"Despite these reservations, both authors [Francis, 1986; 
Gill, 19851 provide useful overviews of the many case studies of 
NT, to which must now be added those reported in Purcell et 
al. [1986]. These new studies not only document a variety of 
experience which belies any uniform shift towards either 
upgrading or deskilling, they also reveal the substantial 
complexity of change even in specific settings, and beyond this 
they explore some of the sources of expectations and leverage 
which help to condition the divergent experiences of such 
change. " (op. cit., p. 532) 
In fact, both these conclusions merely serve to confirm the 
point that any: 
"... quest for general trends about the development of skill 
levels, or general conclusions about the impact of 
technologies, is likely to be in vain and misleading. " 
(Wood, 1982, p. 18, quoted in Wood, 1989) 
Thus, it is clear that the impacts of "high technology" as 
a process of change are varied. Moreover, concrete research 
must be undertaken to identify the "array of conditions" 
within which "high technology" is being introduced with 
such varied results. 
"High technology": Its significance as aprocess of 
The second major implication resulting from the recognition 
of "high technology" as a process of change concerns its 
actual significance as a process of change. Whilst 
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this chapter initially began with an attempt to determine 
the impact of "high technology", in terms of the numbers 
employed within the industry, it has gone much further. 
Firstly, it is clear that any such impact is varied and 
depends on the particular definition of "high technology" 
taken. But, secondly, it is also clear that the 
significance of "high technology" is much more than a 
question of jobs per se. Indeed, fundamentally, the issue 
here is not the definition of "high technology", and 
subsequent estimation of the numbers employed within its 
industries, at all. Rather, the issue is the recognition 
that technological change, and moreover the particular form 
of change encapsulated by "high technology", matters in the 
analysis of industrial development. 
The particular form of change "high technology" does 
represent is to be derived from any one theory of 
structural change, and it is from these theories that "high 
technology" has gained its significance (out of all 
proportion to its quantitative presence as an industry). 
For within such theory "high technology" is viewed 
as the harbinger of structural change, more so as 
part of the process of restructuring. In fact, it 
is argued that the rise of "high technology" 
(industry) is nothing less than indicative of a new 
phase in the historical development of capitalism. 
Subsequently, the impact of "high technology" may 
also be viewed as the sign of things to come 
(Hall, 1981; Leborgne and Lipietz, 1988; Marshall, 1987; Piore 
and Sabel, 1984; Scott and Storper, 1986; Scott, 1988a; 
1988b). 
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The preceding discussion of "high technology's" impacts has 
made clear that the process it represents is also a 
process of uneven development. Yet, an element of this 
unevenness is still to be discussed. That unevenness 
concerns "high technology's" impact on the geography of 
employment, on the pattern of uneven spatial development 
within the UK. This particular impact, as with the others 
so far discussed, has also been argued to be of critical 
significance. For, just as distinct forms of uneven spatial 
development have been characterised as the geographical 
expression of past economic periods, so the form of uneven 
spatial development characterised by "high technology" is 
thus being argued to be indicative of the space economy of 
the emergent economic era (Hall, 1981; Scott and 
Storper, 1986; Scott, 1988a; 1988b). Thus, it is to the 
uneven spatial development, the industrial geography, of 
the United Kingdom's "high technology" industry that we 
turn to in Chapter Three. 
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CHAPTER THREE: Sunrise in the South. Sunrays 
Stretching to the North: The Geography of Britain's 
High Technology and Theories of Uneven Spatial 
Development 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter begins with a portrayal of the uneven spatial 
development of high technology industry. Indeed, 
emphasising a conclusion of Chapter Two, it is within the 
geography of Britain's high technology industry, at a 
variety of spatial scales, that the uneven impact of high 
technology is most graphically and stunningly illustrated. 
For whilst the industry nationally has witnessed job loss, 
this picture hides the mixed fortunes of regions and 
localities and, in particular, the appearance of the 
"favoured few" - the high technology growth regions. 
Moreover, such variety of growth and decline represents 
only one dimension, the quantitative dimension, of the 
uneven development of Britain's high technology industry. 
The portrayal will go on to highlight the nature of the 
jobs, as well as the number, being created. And it is 
through this further dimension that a full picture of the 
uneven development of Britain's high technology will be 
gained. For from this may be drawn the uneven development 
of high technology's social relations of production: 
"The fact that one region has jobs only in direct production 
while another claims all the headquarters, or that areas differ 
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in their dominant industries, or that in one area the jobs on 
offer are overwhelmingly manual while in another there is a 
sizeable slice of white-collar and well-paid employment in 
research, all these differences reflect different forms of 
geographical organisation of the relations of production... 
... what has been seen simply as the spatial distribution of 
employment [in terms of numbers and types of job] is underlain 
by, and can be approached through, analysis of the geographical 
organisation of the relations of production. In relation to the 
substantive social sciences the argument is that the social 
structure of the economy, the social relations of production, 
necessarily develop spatially and in a variety of forms. These 
forms we shall call spatial structures of production. " 
(Massey, 1984, p. 67-68, author's emphasis) 
"But why does all this matter? The argument is that each 
different kind of spatial structure implies a distinct form of 
geographical differentiation, of geographical 
inequality... Geographical uneven development does not vary 
only in degree, as some of the arguments about increasing 
uneven development imply, it varies also in nature. " 
(op. cit., p. 82, author's emphasis) 
3.2 The Uneven Spatial Development of Britain's 
High Technology Industry: The Number of Jobs 
The first overwhelming aspect of the geography of high 
technology industry is that it exhibits a distinct North- 
South divide (in common with so many other contemporary 
indicators), 14 
14 For the most recent overviews see Champion and Townsend, 1990; 1991; Lewis and 
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In 1981,59% of Britain's high technology employment was 
concentrated in the three regions of southern England 
(South West, South East and East Anglia). The South East 
alone accounted for 46% of high technology jobs 
(Keeble, 1987). These figures were based upon: 
"... seven unequivocally high-technology Minimum List Heading 
sectors [which] can be identified on the basis of Kelly's 
criteria (1986), namely pharmaceuticals, scientific instruments 
and systems, broadcasting and sound reproducing equipment, 
aerospace, and electronic computers, components, and capital 
goods. " (op cit., p. 16) 
A more recent piece of Keeble's work (1988) [see Table 
3.1), using Butchart's (1987) wider definition of high 
technology industry, similarly illustrated the geographical 
concentration of high technology industry. Keeble (1988) 
found over 55% of 1981 high technology jobs were to be 
found in southern England (South East, South West and East 
Anglia), compared to these region's 42.3% share of 
Britain's total population (Crouch, 1989 quoted in Champion 
and Townsend, 1990). The South East alone accounted for 43% 
of Britain's high technology employment. The equivalent 
figures for 1984 also show no change in the picture of 
concentration. In fact, the percentage figures show a 
marginal increase to 56% and 44% respectively. 
What is important to note here, however, is how southern 
England held, if not increased its position, of dominant 
region within the overall context of high technology job 
Townsend, 1989; Smith, 1989. 
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loss. Not only did the years of net job creation heavily 
favour the South but the suggestion is that in times of job 
loss the South is losing fewer high technology jobs 
proportionately than the other regions. As it is, in 1984 
over 522,000 high technology jobs were situated in southern 
England. 
TABLE 3.1 The regional distribution of high technology 
industry in Britain, 1981-84 
Na-, 1981 No-, 1984 Change 1 981-4 
Region Employees Employees No. $ 
East Anglia 30,802 37,231 +6,429 +20.9 
Wales 36,926 37,993 +1,067 +2.9 
Rest of South East 321,085 322,127 +1,042 +0.3 
Scotland 87,695 86,044 -1,651 -1.9 
North 46,286 43,864 -2,422 -5.2 
Greater London 211,492 200,058 -11,434 -5.4 
East Midlands 78,013 73,391 -4,622 -5.9 
West Midlands 104,123 97,469 -6,654 -6.4 
South West 114,744 105,554 -9,190 -8.0 
Yorkshire and Humberside 52,328 46,540 -5,788 -11.1 
North West 145,072 127,870 -17,202 -11.9 
Great Britain 1,228,566 1,178,141 -50,425 -4.1 
Source: Keeble (1988) Table 4.3 
In contrast, the North West, containing the second greatest 
number of high technology jobs in 1981 of any region after 
the South East (145,000), experienced the highest absolute 
and percentage decline in high technology employment of any 
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of Britain's regions during the period 1981-84 (-17,000 
jobs or -11.9% respectively). 
One other aspect of the figures in Table 3.1 is that, 
despite the overall context of job loss, the three regions 
of East Anglia, Rest of South East and Wales experienced 
job growth. East Anglia experienced a dramatic growth 
rate of over 20%, although from a relatively small base. 
From a similarly small base Wales also experienced modest 
growth despite its status as a peripheral (and indeed 
"assisted") region. Furthermore, Scotland, a region of 
similar status to Wales, experienced a slight job decline 
of 1.9%, but even so this figure was half the figure for 
that of Great Britain as a whole. 
However, the overall picture presented by the regional 
geography of high technology employment is of significant 
geographical concentration. This impression is further 
strengthened by the move to the sub-regional scale. 
The geographical concentration of high technology industry 
in southern England intensifies as a step down the spatial 
hierarchy is taken. 
One of the more recent phenomena to catch both journalistic 
and policy makers eyes has been the notion that Britain has 
its very own Silicon Valley, namely the Thames Valley or M4 
Corridor (The Economist, 1982; Feder, 1983; Phillips et 
al., 1983; Thomas, 1983). Other regions where high technology 
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industrial growth has come to the attention have similarly 
tried to capture the imagery of Silicon Valley. So, for 
example, we have Silicon Glen in Scotland and Silicon Fen 
in East Anglia. 
The M4 Corridor 
One of the first major academic projects investigating the 
geography of high technology industry was undertaken at the 
University of Reading. Its aim was to investigate the 
proposition of the "M4 Corridor" (Hall et al., 1987). The 
research team initially reviewed the, at that time, sparse 
efforts made to measure and validate this new high 
technology "promised land". Previously, Gibbs (1983) and 
Ellin and Gillespie (1983), using 1971 and 1978 Census of 
Employment data, had concluded that, as seen above, the 
South-East had the highest concentration of high technology 
industry, but also that there was no obviously identifiable 
M4 Corridor (quoted in Hall et al., 1987). Similarly, an 
Engineering Industry Training Board report (Tank, 1984), 
based on a survey of its members in the electronics 
industry and covering the period 1978-1983, concluded that: 
"As far as the electronics industry is concerned, there is no 
such thing as an M4 corridor and other explanations are 
necessary to explain the distribution of, and growth in, 
electronics employment. " (Tank, 1984) 
The report identified seven counties which employed between 
10,000-50,000 people in the electronics industry, although 
four were the south-eastern counties of Essex, 
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Hertfordshire, Berkshire and Hampshire and a fifth was the 
metropolitan county of Greater London. However, of the 
seven counties which showed the fastest employment 
growth during the period only two, Berkshire and Gwent, 
straddled the M4 Corridor. In fact, the author argued 
for a 
"conurbation effect" but with a South-East bias. It was 
with this backdrop that Hall et al. (1987) investigated the 
notion of the M4 Corridor as a continuous high technology 
region, encompassing counties running from as far west as 
West Glamorgan to Greater London in the east. 
Chapter Two outlined Hall et al. 's definitive list of seven 
high technology manufacturing MLHs (see Table 2.1, p. 45). 
From this definition, and using 1981 Census of Employment 
data, the team plotted an employment distribution which 
could be seen to support the conurbation effect suggested 
in the EITB report. In terms of absolute employment the 
three metropolitan areas of London (91,000+ jobs), West 
Midlands (36,500 jobs) and Greater Manchester (27,300 jobs) 
rated highly, with some surrounding counties, such as 
Hertfordshire (45,000 jobs), Hampshire (33,800 jobs) and 
Lancashire (30,000 jobs), also topping the list (Hall et 
al., 1987, Figure 3.2 and p. 32). However, the authors noted 
that: 
"The dominance of the metropolitan areas in absolute high 
technology employment reflects, of course, their size as 
employment centres rather than any particular concentration of 
high technology activity" (Hall et al., 1987, p. 32) 
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Hence, to overcome this bias and allow measurement of the 
relative significance of concentrations of high technology 
jobs, the team undertook a location quotient analysis of 
the figures (see Table 3.2). Clearly topped by 
Hertfordshire, but with Avon second, the table gives some 
credence to the notion of an M4 Corridor but is by no means 
convincing. 
TABLE 3.2 Location quotients (above 1.0) for counties with 
5,000 or more high technology jobs, 1981. 
County 
Hertfordshire 



















West Midlands 1.02 
Base - GB 
Source: Hall et al. (1987), Table 3.6 
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However, the Reading team went on to argue that although 
total employment levels are useful, employment change in 
recent years must be seen as the best guide to high 
technology activity. Thus, an analysis of absolute 
employment change was undertaken for the years 1975-1981 
with the consequent placement of the metropolitan counties 
at the foot of the table, and promotion of Berkshire, the 
"premier" M4 corridor county, to the top of the rankings. 
TABLE 3.3 Aggregate high technology employment 1981, change 
1975-81, by selected counties, ranked by 1975-81 change. 
R nk Cou ty Em 
Absolute 












2 Hertfordshire 45060 +5914 +15.1 
3 Clwyd 5094 +3283 +181.3 
4 Hampshire 33807 +2179 +6.8 
5 Surrey 18191 +1811 +11.1 
6 Kent 14650 +1679 +12.9 
7 West Sussex 14694 +1669 +12.8 
8 Bedfordshire 7264 +1653 +29.5 
9 Lothian 9042 +1461 +19.3 
10 Lancashire 30033 +1392 +4.8 
58 Strathclyde 23575 -3847 -14.0 
59 Tyne and Wear 8490 -4032 -32.2 
60 Essex 24469 -4342 -14.9 
61 Nottinghamshire 15860 -5123 -24.4 
62 Merseyside 14417 -6435 -30.8 
63 West Midlands 36500 -8257 -18.4 
64 Greater London 91448 -17012 -15.7 
Great Britain 640874 -42429 -6.2 
Source: Hall et al. (1987), Table 3.8 
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Even arguing for employment growth as the most useful 
measure, Hall et al. (1987) ultimately agreed with the 
conclusions of earlier studies: 
"... that there is no identifiable, continuous corridor of high 
technology industry along the M4. " (op. cit., p. 46) 
However, the story did not end there. For: 
"In absolute employment terms, Greater London, at the 
Corridor's eastern end, with 91000 workers in 1981, still 
dominated the pattern despite massive losses in the preceding 
years... But the pattern of 1975-81 growth is dominated by 
Berkshire with 7600 additional jobs, Hampshire with 2200 and 
Surrey with 1800 - or, outside the Corridor altogether, by 
Hertfordshire's 5900 additional jobs. 
On this criterion the core of high technology activity, and 
particularly electronics, in Britain is at the London end of 
the 'M4 Corridor', in a belt running from Hertfordshire to the 
north-west of London, through Berkshire and into Hampshire and 
Surrey. It seems more appropriate, if labels are 
necessary, to refer to the 'Western Crescent': this 
pattern of high technology industry is not so much a 
'corridor' as an are around west London. Areas to the 
west of this crescent, particularly Avon and Wiltshire, 
popularly believed to feature strongly in the M4 phenomenon, 
show no particular dynamism; even farther west, South Wales 
generally shows losses in employment in our high technology 
sectors, rather than gains (Hall et al., p. 47-8, my emphasis) 
Hence, the research team at Reading, although denying the 
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existence of the M4 Corridor, did identify a sub-regional 
high technology agglomeration within the South East, 
namely, the Western Crescent. 
The existence of this agglomeration has subsequently been 
confirmed by Keeble's (1988) analysis of the 1984 Census of 
Employment. Figure 3.1 shows the continued numerical 
dominance of high technology employment by Greater London 
but also by Hertfordshire, Hampshire, Berkshire and Surrey 
- the Western Crescent counties. Keeble (1988) also 
identifies secondary concentrations of employment in North 
West England and central Scotland (op. cit., p. 76). Indeed, 
the map shows that a similar number are employed in the 
North-West as in the Western Crescent. The difference 
between the two areas could not be more significant 
however. 
Earlier, whilst discussing Table 3.1 (pp. 70-71), it was 
noted that the North West had experienced the greatest 
absolute and percentage decline in high technology 
employment of all the regions between 1981-84. This is 
graphically illustrated in Figures 3.2 and 3.3. In 
contrast, all the Western Crescent counties saw continued 
employment growth, the indicator Hall et al. (1987) 
distinguished as the most significant in analysing the 
geography of high technology. 
But what of the other so-called high technology 
agglomerations, Silicon Glen and Silicon Fen. What is the 
evidence for their existence? 
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Figure 3.1 The Geographical Distribution of High- 
Technology Industry in Great Britain, 1984 
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Figure 3.3 The Geographical Evolution of High- 
Technology Industry in Britain, 1981-4, by Rate of 
Employment Change 
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Silicon Glen 
The term "Silicon Glen" was first coined in 1975 by the 
Scottish Development Agency, since when its usage has 
become commonplace (Berss, 1983; Dunford, forthcoming; 
Haug, 1986; Moreton, 1981). Haug (1986), in making an 
explicit attempt to delineate the area geographically: 
"... defines Silicon Glen as a belt or corridor across Scotland 
bounded by Edinburgh, Dundee, Greenock, and Ayr. " (op. cit., 
p. 107) 
Hence, using this definition the area covers parts, but not 
always the whole, of all five "regions" (the Scottish 
equivalent of counties) of central Scotland - Tayside, 
Central, Fife, Lothian and Strathclyde. Unfortunately, this 
makes the analysis of the region by "County level" Census 
of Employment data problematic. This may also possibly 
explain the dearth of such analysis, with the consequent 
position that the following evidence is partially based on 
research with essential aims other than the investigation 
of Silicon Glen. 
So, if one looks back at Table 3.3 (p. 75) it can be seen 
that in 1981 Strathclyde had over 23,500 high technology 
workers. Lothian employed over 9,000 workers and Fife's 
high technology jobs figure was also over 8,000 giving the 
"county" a location quotient of 2.32, the second highest of 
any county in Britain. However, on the important criterion 
of employment growth (1975-81) the evidence was 
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contradictory with Lothian being ranked ninth in Britain 
with an employment increase of 1,461 or 19.3%. This 
contrasts sharply with Strathclyde, ranked 58th out of 64, 
having experienced a 14% job decline numbering nearly 4,000 
jobs. At the same time, a Scottish Development Agency 
report was quoting the Scottish electronics industry as 
involving over 200 firms and 40,000 employees (SDA, 1981 
quoted in Haug, 1986). 
By 1984, Keeble (1988) was noting the concentration of high 
technology employment in central Scotland (op. cit., p. 76 and 
see Figure 3.1). But Figures 3.2 and 3.3 on employment 
change 1981-84, highlight the variation between the regions 
of Silicon Glen. Three of the five counties, including the 
previously declining Strathclyde, experienced employment 
growth, but the remaining two experienced significant job 
decline. Dunford (forthcoming) suggests the Scottish 
electronics industry employs about 42,000 workers in 280 
companies, not including additional supply and service 
companies and employment. Moreover, work by Townsend (1987) 
has described Scotland's position as the most favoured 
European location for US high technology investment and 
predicted the arrival of 3,700 jobs during the period 1987- 
89 (quoted in Keeble, 1988, p. 86). This builds on the earlier 
work of Haug (1986) on the continued investment of US 
electronics multinationals in Silicon Glen. 
Yet such predictions as Townsend's (1987), and the faith 
behind them, must be treated with a certain amount of 
caution. For the US electronics industry is renowned for 
its rapid business cycles and its overseas investment is 
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also subject to such cyclical trends. Indeed, the recent 
withdrawal of Wang from Scotland emphasises the need for 
such caution. 15 Furthermore, whilst many analysts have 
concentrated on the importance of US multi-national 
investment to Scotland's electronics industry (Haug, 1986; 
Henderson, 1987; Townsend, 1987), it must be recalled that: 
"The development of the Scottish electronics industry dates 
from Ferranti's 1942 decision to open a gyro-gunsight factory 
in Edinburgh and the development of the instrument makers, Barr 
and Stroud, in Glasgow. " (Dunford, forthcoming, p. 81) 
Hence, evidence allows the conclusion to be drawn that 
Scotland, and especially central Scotland, has a 
significant number of high technology jobs. One may place 
the rhetorical label "Silicon Glen" upon this development 
if one wishes. However, most importantly, recent growth 
must be seen as modest. As was noted earlier, despite 
Scotland posting the fourth best high technology employment 
"growth" record of Britain's regions between 1981-84 this 
actually entailed a decline in jobs. Indeed, Scotland's 
growth is modest in comparison to that of Silicon Fen. 
Silicon Fen 
The term "Silicon Fen" is used to descibe an area of East 
Anglia which has seen spectacular high technology 
employment growth predominantly founded upon "the Cambridge 
phenomenon", the growth of high technology in Cambridge 
(Crang, 1988; Keeble, 1988; 1989; Segal et al, 1985; 1986). 16 
15 I thank Dave Wield for this particular point. 
16 In fact, it is pertinent to ask whether "Silicon Fen" is actually synonymous 
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Hall et al. (1987) made no mention of any East Anglian 
county when discussing high technology employment growth 
between 1975-1981. No East Anglian county was found to 
employ over 15,000 workers in high technology or had a 
location quotient above unity. Yet, between 1981-1984, East 
Anglia recorded high technology employment growth of 20.9%, 
an absolute employment growth of 6,429 (Table 3.1, p. 70), 
five times the absolute growth of the second placed region. 
This regional growth becomes all the more stunning on 
reference to Figures 3.2 and 3.3 (pp. 79-80) which show that 
Suffolk actually experienced high technology job decline 
during this period. Such decline was swamped by employment 
growth in Cambridgeshire and Norfolk, the counties posting 
absolute gains which placed them first and third 
respectively in a ranking of county high technology 
employment growth 1981-84 (Keeble, 1988, p. 80). Since such 
time growth has continued apace with the Cambridge sub- 
region, particularly, gaining a further 800 jobs between 
1985-86, with the prediction of a further growth of 1,200 
jobs for the following year (Segal et al., 1986; quoted in 
Keeble, 1989) . 
Hence, a descent of spatial scale gives a more nuanced 
picture of the geography of high technology than simply the 
North - South divide depicted in regional figures. Rather, 
this construction acts as an overarching framework within 
which sub-regional figures characterise, on the one hand, 
even greater high technology industrial concentration 
within the South East, namely the Western Crescent and 
with Cambridge and its environs or includes a greater area of high technology 
growth. 
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Silicon Fen agglomerations. On the other hand, however, we 
have also seen that such figures have highlighted high 
technology agglomeration in the North, particularly, 
Silicon Glen. 
Moreover, Figure 3.2 (p. 79) depicts high technology 
employment growth in almost half of Britain's (29) 
counties, with 14 counties recording an increase of at 
least 1,000 jobs between 1981 and 1984 (Keeble, 1988, p. 80). 
Indeed, on studying the county figures, Keeble (1988) has 
concluded that: 
"... the geography of high-technology development in 
the 1980s is one of widely dispersed growth in most 
regions, but with a particular focus on a broad band 
of southern English counties... " (op. cit., p. 80, author's 
emphasis). 
This countervailing trend of "dispersed growth" is 
emphasised by the final spatial scale at which the 
geography of high technology may be discussed. The growth 
of Silicon Fen has, as mentioned, been based upon "the 
Cambridge phenomenon", the growth of a high technology 
"locality". And it is to the spatial scale of the locality 
that we now move in the continuing analysis of the 
geography of Britain's high technology industry. 
In recent years, unsurprisingly, in the light of the rise 
of the "locality" as an object of study17, has been 
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founded a growing body of literature on high technology 
localities (Boddy et al., 1986; Crang, 1988; Gripaios et 
al., 1988; Keeble, 1988; 1989; MacGregor et al., 1986; Rainnie 
et al., 1989; Segal et al, 1985; 1986; Witt et al., 1988). Of 
the very few overviews of Britain's high technology 
localities which are to be found, a geographical pattern is 
described which further confirms the conclusions already 
reached. That is, that within an overarching North - South 
divide heavily centred on the South East, there is to be 
found significant dispersed growth of high technology 
employment within many counties and locales of Britain, 
both North and South. 
Very few overviews are to be found mainly because the 
spatial disaggregation of major social statistics has 
itself only recently been achieved, and then only 
partially. So, for example, Small Area Statistics derived 
from the 1981 Census are now available, as is the 
disaggregation of the Census of Employment to the spatial 
level of the Travel-To-Work-Area (TTWA). The release of 
such figures, however, lags even further behind in time 
than the general results of such censuses. Hence, 
Townsend's (1986) work on TTWAs between the years of 1978- 
81 was only made possible when Census of Employment data 
for such areas became available in 1984. The other problem 
with small area statistics is the confidentiality 
restrictions applied to such data so that no individual 
(household or establishment) may be identified from that 
17 Three recent major research programmes have taken the "locality-' as their 
geographical focus: the social Change and Economic Life (SCEL) initiative; the 
Changing Urban and Regional Systems (CURS) initiative; and the Economic 
Restructuring, Social Change and Locality project. 
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data alone. 
Within these restrictions, several illuminating pieces of 
research have been undertaken. One such example mentioned 
above is that of Townsend's (1986) work on employment 
growth between 1978-81 at the spatial level of TTWAs. In 
identifying employment growth between these years, Townsend 
sub-divided this growth into components of growth such as 
"producer services", "public sector" and "high technology". 
The first interesting finding was that 195 of Britain's 380 
TTWAs experienced high technology employment growth between 
1978-81. Thus, this gives a percentage figure of over half 
(51%) of all Britains' TTWAs (calculated from Table 
3, p. 536, Townsend, 1986). However, taking this figure as the 
Great Britain average a North-South divide can still be 
discerned. For those regions above the average are the 
familiar South East (59%), East Anglia (59%) and South West 
(54%), but also East and West Midlands (59% and 52% 
respectively). But, the regions of the "North" have not 
missed out on the growth of high technology. So, for 
example, the lowest figures are for the North-West and the 
North, which still saw 41% of their TTWAs experiencing high 
technology employment growth, with Scotland seeing 48% of 
TTWAs growing and Yorkshire and Humberside 50%. Indeed, the 
four leading TTWAs were spread throughout both North and 
South; being Dundee (Silicon Glen), Watford (Western 
Crescent), Macclesfield and Birmingham. 18 
18 Obviously, one must be careful here. Due to the small areas being talked about 
one large investment (or disinvestment) can have an unduly disproportionate impact 
on the overall figures. However, even if this is the case, it still highlights the 
dispersed nature of large scale high technology industrial investment. 
88 
The locality-based geography 
has been further depicted by 
again highlights the North-S, 
variation within this rather 
Interestingly, Cooke (1986), 
states that: 
of high technology employment 
Cooke (1986). Figure 3.4 once 
Duth divide but also the 
crude characterisation. 
in describing this figure 
"It is important to note that, in terms of aggregate location 
quotients it is not the M4 Corridor which shows up particularly 
strongly on this map, rather it is the older established 
northern outer metropolitan localities of Hertford and Harlow, 
Chelmsford and Braintree, and Sudbury that form the strongest 
contiguous concentration. Of equal individual importance 
thereafter are Slough, Basingstoke and Alton, and Yeovil. " 
(op. cit., p. 23) 
This description is similar to that of the Western Crescent 
described by Hall et al. (1987). Signs of Silicon Glen can 
also be identified from the map but, again, what the figure 
definitely depicts is the regional dispersal of high 
technology localities. 
A further fascinating overview is that by Begg and Cameron 
(1988). In a piece in which the locality takes the form of 
"urban areas", they rank British "cities" by 
concentrations of high technology employment as at 1981. 
The context is set by looking at the regional pattern of 
high technology employment whereupon, in conjunction with 
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"The striking feature of the regional distribution is the 
concentration of high technology employment in the South of the 
country, especially in the outer South-East... " (op. cit., p. 365) 
Consequently, on turning to the urban pattern, Begg and 
Cameron (1988) conclude that: 
"The distribution of high technology between urban areas 
reflects and is reflected in the regional pattern. " (op. cit., 
p. 368) 
In the situation where Britain's urban areas have a 
slightly greater concentration of high technology activity 
(a location quotient of 105) than the country as a whole, 
the location quotient for urban areas of the "North", 86, 
compares with the "South's" figure of 129 (op. cit., Table 
10). Indeed, taking the 25 urban areas with the lowest 
concentrations of high technology employment in 1981, we 
find that the most southerly town in the list is Corby in 
the East Midlands (op. cit., p. 368)! 
However, the list of the top 25 high technology urban areas 
cannot be so easily characterised. In fact, it contains 
within it virtually all the elements to the geography of 
high technology employment which have been portrayed in the 
previous pages. Eleven of the entries are to be found in 
just 3 of Britain's regions, otherwise known as the 
"South". Secondly, the top 3 entries, Stevenage, Bracknell 
and Welwyn & Hatfield respectively, are all located within 
Britain's major high technology agglomeration, the Western 
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Crescent. Thirdly, the other entries cannot be so easily 
characterised by their spatial pattern because their 
geography is that of "dispersal". So, for example, East 
Kilbride (8), Glenrothes (18) and Greenock (20), are the 
representatives of Silicon Glen, but also listed are 
Macclesfield (10), already highlighted by Townsend's (1986) 
work, Newton Aycliffe (4), Islwyn (17) and Preston (25) . 
Thus, the geography of high technology can be summarised as 
heavily concentrated within the South East and, indeed, 
within certain counties and localities of the South East. 
But, in contradiction, outlying concentrations are to be 
found in a range of localities widely dispersed throughout 
Britain. 
Spatial disaggregation has given greater insight into 
the geography of high technology but further disaggregation 
can take place to enhance the picture. For what must be 
remembered also is that "high technology industry" itself 
is an aggregate term. Chapter Two highlighted that the 
individual contents of the classification are a matter for 
debate but, nevertheless, it is a term which describes a 
collection of industrial sectors. Hence, further 
insight is to be gained from sectoral disaggregation. 
Firstly, use of the aggregate term "high technology" 
disguises the fact that individual high technology 
sectors are experiencing a variation in their 
fortunes. Hall et al. (1987) found that between 1975-83 
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five of their high technology sectors experienced job 
decline ranging from 5.65% for pharmaceuticals (MLH 272) to 
a staggering 59% for broadcasting, receiving and sound 
equipment (MLH 365). In contrast, their remaining two 
sectors experienced job growth, with electronic computers 
(MLH 366) achieving a growth rate of 34%. Hence, electronic 
computers actually went from a position in 1975 of 
employing 11,600 less workers than broadcasting, receiving 
and sound equipment, to one of employing 35,600 more in 
1983. 
A further example of the variation in individual high 
technology sectors' fortunes would contrast aerospace with 
computer services. Aerospace experienced severe job loss 
during the late 70s and early 80s period of restructuring, 
a process common to UK manufacturing as a whole, whilst 
computer services (an industrial sector not officially 
recognised before 1980), has continued on a path of 
extraordinary job growth since 1981 (Howells, 1987; Kelly 
and Keeble, 1988) . 
19 Such simple differences in dynamics as 
growth and decline, crucial though they are, can be lost 
when looking at high technology as an aggregate. And such 
differences are crucial, for the second element that is 
also lost when mapping high technology employment is that 
such individual sectors have distinct and different 
geographies, spatial patterns of growth and decline, 
which may or may not coincide. Hence, it is the unique 
19 In fact, the aerospace industry is still undergoing restructuring. For 
example, see Fairhall's (1990) article "How the collapse of the Berlin wall has 
left Westland helicopters up in the air" and Beavis et al. (1990), "BAe to close 
Preston and Kingston plants with the loss of 5000 jobs". On March 21st 1991, BAe 
announced a further 4,700 redundancies and Hawker Siddeley 4,000 job losses 
throughout its divisions (The Guardian 22.3.91) 
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geographies of sectoral growth and decline which construct 
the geography of "high technology" employment thus far 
described. 
Several articles have moved to a more sectorally 
disaggregated analysis by the sub-division of "high 
technology" into the dichotomy of "high technology 
manufacturing" and "high technology services". Martin 
(1988b) has shown that, at the regional level, the South 
East dominated employment in both high technology 
manufacturing and high technology services. In 1984,41.1% 
of high technology manufacturing jobs and 54.9% of R&D 
employment was to be found in the South East 
(op. cit., p. 225, Table 10.4). 
Similarly, Begg and Cameron (1988), in their ranking of 
high technology urban areas, also sub-divided their 
rankings on the basis of manufacturing and service 
employment. Hence, the top three areas, Stevenage, 
Bracknell and Welwyn/Hatfield are seen to have attained 
their positions due to very high manufacturing location 
quotients (LQ = 550+, UK=100). Yet all three localities 
also have an over-representation of high technology 
services. The comparison could not be more stark than with 
that of the fourth placed locality, Newton Aycliffe. Its 
position is entirely due to the presence of high technology 
manufacturing (LQ = 589) with its high technology services 
location quotient of 3.1 placing it joint 157th (out of 
162) in the services ranking. The fifth placed area of 
Chelmsford has a similar, though less dramatic, under- 
representation of high technology services (LQ = 45). In 
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contrast to such localities, Harlow (placed 11th) has a 
similar over-representation of both high technology 
manufacturing and services (LQ = 280 and 269 respectively). 
So, disaggregation using the dichotomy of manufacturing and 
services can provide greater clarity, yet the further step 
to analysis by sector still needs to be taken. Such a step 
was taken by Hall et al. (1987) with illuminating results 
(see Table 3.4): 
"For instance, aerospace (MLH 383) is concentrated in a few 
counties, such as Avon, Lancashire, Hertfordshire and 
Derbyshire. Indeed, some 90% of Avon's high technology 
employment was in that single industry at 1981; in Derbyshire 
and Lancashire the figures were 88% and 77% respectively. it 
may therefore be more accurate to call these 
predominantly aerospace centres... " (op. cit., p. 35-38, my 
emphasis). 
The importance of delineating these counties as aerospace 
centres rather than more generally areas of high technology 
has been proven by the years since 1981. Figure 3.2. (p. 79) 
shows that Lancashire, Derbyshire and Avon have all 
experienced high technology job loss between 1981-84. Armed 
with the knowledge that aerospace has seen a period of 
major restructuring and job shedding and the (sectoral) 
geography of aerospace outlined in Table 3.4, it becomes 
clear that the major, if not the, component of high 
technology job loss in these areas is attributable to the 
aerospace industry. Indeed, Avon has continued to suffer 
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at BAe's Bristol plant, whilst Lancashire has been 
devastated by the most recent decision of BAe to close its 
Preston plant with the loss of 3,000 jobs. 
Table 3.4 similarly shows that the high technology 
agglomeration Silicon Glen is one predominantly based on 
the electronics industry rather than high technology in 
its 
widest sense. In particular, its fortunes have been 
dictated by radio, radar and electronic capital goods (MLH 
367), a sector which experienced employment growth between 
1975-81 when other high technology sectors were 
experiencing job loss. Most dramatically, Hall et al's 
(1987) analysis by sectoral geography did confirm that one 
county could truly be described as "the county of high 
technology industry". Berkshire experienced employment 
growth in all seven high technology sectors over the period 
1975-83 (op. cit. p. 46). 
So, Hall et al. (1987) have shown the significant variation 
to be found in the geographies of individual high 
technology sectors. Similarly, Cooke (1986) has highlighted 
the sectoral specialisation of individual localities such 
that: 
"... each of the southern high-scoring localities with the 
exception of Slough is dominated by a particular four-digit SIC 
activity with both large employment numbers and very high 
location quotients. " (op. cit., p. 24) 
For example, Chelmsford, ranked fifth by Begg and Cameron 
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(1988), gained that position due to its sectoral 
concentration in radio and electronic capital goods (AH 
3443) and, more precisely, the presence of GEC-Marconi in 
the locality. In contrast, Hertford and Harlow, although 
well represented in a range of high technology sectors both 
had a specific concentration in aerospace (AH 3640), 
principally due to the presence of BAe and Hawker Siddeley 
Aircraft (op. cit ., p. 24) . 
The move to a sectoral analysis confirms that individual 
high technology sectors have their own distinct histories 
of (non) growth and unique geographies which may vary 
markedly to those of high technology as an aggregate. 
Indeed, disaggregation sectorally, as well as spatially, 
reveals a complex mosaic of localities experiencing unique 
combinations of high technology employment growth and 
decline. However, such a disaggregation does not alter the 
overall geographical pattern of high technology employment 
described. That is, a sectorally-based "high technology 
spatial division of labour" (Massey, 1984) dominated by the 
South East. 
3.3 The Uneven Spatial Development of Britain's 
High Technology Industry: The Nature of Jobs 
The geography thus far portrayed depicts the uneven 
development of high technology in Britain today, but it 
does so through only one dimension. Only the quantitative 
aspect of this geography has been discussed thus far. Yet, 
as has been stressed, the qualitative dimension, the 
nature of the jobs as well as the number, must be 
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integrated to obtain the complete picture. 
Chapter Two discussed this qualitative aspect of employment 
as a major problem concerning the SIC classification 
system, for jobs are not classified by their content but 
rather the product sector within which they take place. One 
example of such a SIC classified high technology sector, in 
which production functions can be reasonably easily 
delineated, is that of semiconductor production: 
"Semiconductor production involves five component labour 
processes. These are (a) research and development (R & D); (b) 
mask making...; (c) wafer fabrication...; (d) assembly of 
transistors, diodes and integrated circuits and (e) final 
testing of the product. These component labour processes have 
widely varying needs in terms of capital investment, labour 
skills, specialized inputs and so on. R&D, though capital 
intensive, also demands the application of highly qualified and 
creative scientists and engineers. Mask making and wafer 
fabrication are capital intensive also, and require highly 
skilled technical labour. However the latter is distinguished 
from the former by the fact that it requires, in addition, 
significant numbers of semi-skilled workers, particularly as 
operators of the 'diffusion' furnaces. Assembly has been 
predominantly a labour intensive process given over almost 
entirely to unskilled labour, although in recent years 
automation has begun to take place. Final testing, though 
increasingly capital intensive and requiring significant inputs 
of technical labour, also requires reasonable amounts of 
unskilled labour. " (Henderson, 1987, p. 8) 
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Taking a purely quantitative dimension, all the jobs 
described above, whether R&D or assembly, are "high 
technology" by virtue of their constituting part of the 
production process of a high technology product, 
semiconductors. Yet, it is quite clear from Henderson's 
work that the technological content of each job (defined in 
terms of the social construct "skill") ranges from almost 
negligible to very high indeed. This point warns us, in the 
first instance, that the geography of high technology so 
far described must be treated cautiously for it is clear 
that not all the jobs in the count are high technology. 
But, this is merely a reiteration of an earlier point made 
in Chapter Two, where indeed the converse situation, of 
jobs of high technological content being excluded by virtue 
of their sectoral classification, was also raised. 
Applying this point to the industrial geography already 
described can, however, involve an implicit assumption. 
That is, the assumption that jobs of varying technological 
content are spread throughout the country in equal 
proportion to the quantitative numbers to be found in each 
location. But, the unevenness of high technology has been 
continually emphasised and this particular instance is no 
exception. In fact, the inclusion of the nature of 
jobs in the high technology equation serves to 
emphasise and deepen the picture of uneven 
development portrayed. 
The picture depicted has been one of a quantitatively 
dominant "South" (especially the South East) but with 
important concentrations of high technology industry to be 
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found throughout the remaining regions. The inclusion of 
the qualitative dimension, it will be seen, expands this 
picture by emphasising the qualitative, as well as the 
quantitative, dominance of the South East in the 
geography of high technology industry. 
Earlier, reference was made to the work of Massey (1984) in 
which (corporate) "spatial structures of production" have 
been conceptualised and described. Morgan and Sayer (1986), 
taking her lead, have also described how corporate spatial 
structures of production can, at the aggregate level, 
create a hierarchical spatial division of labour in 
which regions can be identified not by the number 
of jobs present but by the type of job present: 
"... different stages of production and parts of companies are 
separated out and located in the most appropriate places. 
Usually the control and conception ('top-end') functions of the 
company are restricted to the main metropolitan region while 
('back-end') production is widely distributed. This functional 
differentiation is reflected in the occupational profiles of a 
given industry in different parts of the country or, for the 
multinational firms, in different countries. The proportion of 
unskilled and semi-skilled workers is much higher in peripheral 
regions than in central regions, and the converse is true for 
management and technicians. " (Morgan and Sayer, 1986, p. 158) 
In essence, with the South East's dominance of the 
sectoral "high technology spatial division of labour" 
already portrayed, it will be shown that the region also 
dominates the hierarchical "spatial division of labour" 
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found within Britain's high technology industry today. 
A depiction of this spatial division of labour has been put 
forward by Kelly and Keeble (1988) in their work on 
computer electronics in Britain (see Figure 3.5). 
Fig. 35 The geography of computer manufacturing employment change in Britain, 1978-1984. 
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Firstly, in 1981, the South East dominated the sectoral 
spatial division of labour with 61.3% of computer 
manufacturing employment. The figure for computer software 
employment in 1984 was a similarly dominant 56%. This 
sectoral dominance was reinforced, however, by a dominance 
of the hierarchical spatial division of labour. Taking 
the occupational profile of the industry in 1984: 
"Some 64% of the industry's workforce in the South East is 
engaged in managerial, administrative and R&D activities, 
compared with only 35 and 40% in wales and Scotland 
respectively. Correspondingly, 45 and 36% of computer employees 
in Wales and Scotland are unskilled and semiskilled manual 
workers, compared with only 14% in the South East. North West 
England, historically a secondary core region for the industry, 
falls between these extremes. [Such figures highlight] The 
existence of a broad South-East/peripheral region 
[hierarchical] spatial division of labour in the computer 
industry" (op. cit., p. 9) 
The position of the various regions within the functional 
hierarchy of the computer electronics industry similarly 
has been revealed in the employment growth statistics for 
the industry. For between 1978-84 Berkshire and Hampshire 
experienced substantial employment growth made up almost 
entirely of R&D functions. This growth contrasted with that 
of Fife's, which was based upon an increase in manual 
operatives (Kelly and Keeble, 1988, p. 8, see also Figure 
3.5). This led Kelly and Keeble (1988) to conclude that: 
"These examples suggest a growing polarisation in the 1980s in 
103 
skill divisions-as between the South East core and the high- 
unemployment peripheral regions of wales and Scotland. " 
(op. cit., p. 8) 
A final point to reiterate is that this qualitative 
dimension to the uneven development of the industry 
reinforces the quantitative dimension of South East 
dominance already portrayed. As can be seen from Figure 
3.5, the South East may have an over representation of 
higher order functions but equally: 
"... the South-East's absolute dominance of production and 
employment nationally means that it also contains much the 
largest single concentration of unskilled manual workers (5200) 
in the industry, Scotland, the second largest, accounting for 
3900 and Wales 2100... " (Kelly and Keeble, p. 9, authors' 
emphasis) 
Morgan and Sayer (1986), in studying the electronics 
industry in Britain as a whole, have depicted a similar 
spatial division of labour and described the location of 
three particular regions within this division. Firstly, the 
quantitative dominance of the South East in 1981 is shown 
by its share of: 
"... 64.5 per cent of UK employment in electronic capital goods, 
64 per cent in consumer electronics, 59 per cent in computers, 
45.9 per cent in components, [and] 34.4 per cent in 
telecommunications... " (op. cit., note 7, p. 295) 
They go on to describe the non-metropolitan South East 
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(represented for them by the M4 Corridor) in terms of its 
position as a privileged location for HQ's, public and 
private R&D facilities and national and international 
marketing functions. Hence: 
"What most distinguishes the M4 Corridor from Central Scotland 
or South wales is its elite occupational structure and 
its 
dense decision-making network of activities... " (Morgan and 
Sayer, 1986, p. 166) 
However, Morgan and Sayer (1986) go on to point out that 
although the core functions of the electronics industry are 
located predominantly in the South East and its M4 
Corridor, this doesn't exclude other regions from such 
activities. Hence, they argue that Central Scotland 
(Silicon Glen) is not simply the "periphery" region it is 
often made out to be (see Kelly and Keeble above? ). Routine 
production does play a major role while leading-edge R&D 
work is not present but, for example, US multinationals 
located in Scotland are engaged in development work to meet 
the particular requirements of the European market (see 
Dunford, forthcoming; Haug, 1986 also). Similarly, Henderson 
(1987) has recounted the setting up of semiconductor wafer 
fabrication plants in Scotland by US multinationals. As was 
described above, this "middle-placed" aspect of the 
semiconductor production process involves highly skilled 
electronics engineers and technicians as well as "semi" and 
"unskilled" workers. 20 
20 Henderson (1987) also shows how through such foreign direct investment silicon 
Glen has become inserted within an international spatial division of labour, 
whose core is to be found in silicon Valley and periphery in such Third World 
locations as Latin America and Southeast Asia (see also Henderson and Scott, 1988; 
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South Wales, in contrast, is viewed by Morgan and Sayer 
(1986) as acting almost exclusively as a "production 
platform" such that: 
"As a result South Wales has more of a 'headless' occupational 
structure than Scotland, with relatively low numbers of 
technically skilled and managerial employees. " (op. cit., p. 170) 
So, the inclusion of the qualitative dimension to 
employment serves to accentuate the pattern of privileged 
position of the South East in the uneven development of 
Britain's high technology industry. Moreover, it reveals 
the form of this uneven development to be not only due to 
the South East's numerical dominance of Britain's high 
technology employment but, also, to be combined with the 
South East's functional domination as the location for 
control and conception functions. The region is the pivotal 
focus of Britain's high technology spatial division of 
labour. 
3.4 The Geography of High Technology: Uneven 
Processes of Development 
The above pages have portrayed the distinctive geography of 
high technology industry in Britain today. It is a 
portrayal of a pattern of uneven spatial development from 
which the South East, and most particularly the Western 
Crescent, emphatically emerges as the winner. But, whilst 
the construction of such a pattern is of crucial importance 
as a first step of analysis (it provides the object of our 
Sayer, 1986) 
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explanation), the aim of the thesis is an attempt at 
explanation of (elements of) this pattern and hence, an 
attempt to understand the processes creating this 
pattern. Thus, within this context, the (uneven) industrial 
geography of high technology must also be read as the 
spatial consequences of the (uneven) processes of 
development endemic in the structure of capitalism itself 
(Morgan and Sayer, 1988, p. 19). In fact, for some, this 
geography represents the spatial expression of a process 
of structural change labelled "high technology": 
"The historical geography of high technology industry thus 
presents us with a new set of detailed contingent expressions 
of capitalist development" (Scott and Storper, 1986, p. 2) 
Yet, exactly what process of structural change 
(development) is represented by high technology and, 
secondly, exactly how this process is working to shape the 
emergent form of uneven capitalist development described 
above is still unknown. Or rather it is yet to be 
discussed. For Chapter Two has already made clear that it 
is within theories of structural change that "high 
technology" attains its representation as a process of 
change. Hence, in the remainder of this chapter, three 
particular views of structural change, and the 
conceptualisations of "high technology" held within them, 
will be discussed. Moreover, this discussion will take 
place on the basis of how these views seek to explain the 
uneven spatial development of high technology industry. 
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3.5 Attempts at Explanation: Theories of Uneven 
Spatial Development 
A first point to make is that the following three 
theoretical viewpoints which will be discussed, although 
difficult to combine, must not, however, be seen as 
mutually exclusive. Rather, each theory encompasses a 
particular emphasis in its explanation of structural 
change. 
The "long wave" approach, which will be used to "set the 
scene", in particular emphasises the role of technological 
change, and has been criticised for so doing (Perez, 1983; 
Marshall, 1987). In contrast, the "flexible specialisation" 
thesis of Piore and Sabel (1984), in its attempts to avoid 
the "technological determinism" of long wave theory, has 
been accused of promoting an almost "behaviourist logic of 
structural change" which over-emphasises the transformative 
abilities of the individual (Amin and Robins, 1989; Williams 
et al., 1987). The final viewpoint for discussion presents 
the collection of theories loosely classified under the 
"French Regulationist approach" (Aglietta, 1979; Boyer, 1986; 
Lipietz, 1986; 1987). These theories encompass elements of 
both of the approaches already discussed, none more so than 
the theory of the New Industrial Spaces (Scott and 
Storper, 1986; Scott, 1988a; 1988b; Storper and Scott, 1988). 
Long waves (Kond ati .v cycles) of capitalist dog 1opm n 
The transition to the 5th Kondratiev 
In 1925, a Russian economist, Nikolai Kondratiev (1925), 
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sought to identify the existence of long term cyclical 
movements in economic indicators of capitalist development. 
Such a phenomenon, previously sketched by the Dutchman van 
Gelderen (1913), involved a "long wave" of economic 
development, cyclical in nature and inherent in capitalist 
production, consisting of both an "upswing" and "downswing" 
phase. Fifty years on, this notion of economic cycles of 
approximately 50 years duration has experienced a 
widespread revival, with continued and inconclusive 
attempts to test statistically for their existence (see, 
for instance, Verspagen's [19891 report on the most recent 
long wave conference). At the same time, an alternative 
view to that of rigidly fixed statistical cycles has also 
taken shape. This view conceptualises long waves as 
historically distinct periods of economic development of 
between 40-60 years whose timing and characteristics are 
due to the combination of various complex factors of socio- 
economic life (Freeman et al., 1982; Mandel, 1980; 1981; 
Marshall, 1987; Perez, 1983). 
Causality? The importance of innovation 
If the exact nature and actual existence of long waves is 
still the centre of much debate, so too is the likely cause 
of such cyclical patterns. Kondratiev's (1925) work was 
basically descriptive in nature and his nascent analysis of 
causality (based on investment patterns) unable to explain 
fully the transition from one long wave phase to another. 
However, if "waves" are to have any meaning it is crucial 
to be able to explain such transitions (Marshall, 1987). 
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It was the thinking of Schumpeter (1939) which extended the 
groundwork of Kondratiev and put forward a possible causal 
mechanism to long waves. Accepting the existence of long 
waves, Schumpeter (1939) took the view outlined above that 
each wave was unique in its features and combination of 
specific socio-economic factors. But, he also proceeded to: 
"... analyse those features of the system's behaviour which 
could generate fluctuations irrespective of their specific and 
variable form. The most important of such features in his view 
was innovation, which, despite its great specific variety, he 
saw as the main engine of capitalist growth and the source of 
entrepreneurial profit. " (Freeman, 1982, p. 208) 
Schumpeter (1939) argued that entrepreneurs, in their 
constant search for profit, would innovate to create new 
profit possibilities. Further investment would then follow 
the initial innovation, through the actions of a "swarm" of 
imitators and improvers, so creating an economic boom. This 
"upswing" would not last, however, as competitive processes 
engendered by this new investment would erode profit 
margins over time. But this would, in turn, set the process 
to repeat itself as entrepreneurs continued to innovate in 
a renewed quest for profits. It was this sequence of events 
which, in Schumpeter's view, could create business cycles 
of varying length, including a cycle of the length 
envisaged by long wave theory. 
Hence, Schumpeter's framework put forward a view of 
economic development based on new technical innovation. 
Economic development is a result of autonomous investment: 
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"... a process of reallocation of resources between industries. 
That process necessarily leads to structural changes and 
disequilibrium if only because of the uneven rate of technical 
change between different industries. Economic growth is not 
merely accompanied by fast growing new industries and 
the expansion of such industries; it primarily 
depends on that expansion. However, it is not just a 
question of the rapid expansion of new branches of industry 
but also of the transformation of methods of production in the 
older branches too. " (Freeman, 1986, p. 102, author" s italics, my 
emphasis) 
Hence, for Schumpeter and his followers, the process 
driving economic growth within the long waves is technical 
innovation, encompassed within new branches of industry. 
And, from a long wave approach, it is these new branches of 
industry which have subsequently been labelled as "high 
technology". It is the appearance and growth of high 
technology industries (representing a process of new 
technical innovation) which drives the upswing of an 
emergent long wave. However, it must be remembered that the 
particular industries high technology does represent is 
historically specific dependent on the long wave being 
discussed. In fact, usage of the label "high technology" 
has only become common in describing the new technological 
industries of the fourth and, particularly, the fifth 
Kondratiev waves. 
Long wave theorists view the first Kondratiev wave as based 
on the newly mechanised industries of textiles and iron 
working. This wave gave way to a second based on the 
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arrival of the railways and the rise to ascendency of steam 
power. The most recent fourth Kondratiev entailed the post- 
war boom based on the spectacular growth of the major 
("high") technologies and industries of electronics, 
synthetic materials, petro-chemicals and vehicles. But, 
once again, we are at a point of succession as the end of a 
decade of structural crisis heralds the end of the fourth 
Kondratiev and a move into the fifth wave based, it is 
suggested, on information technology. Within this wave the 
main "high technology" industries will be computers, 
electronic capital goods, telecommunications and software, 
with transformation of the economy occurring as the 
widespread diffusion of micro-electronics technology takes 
place (Freeman, 1987, Table 15). 21 
Thus, within (neo-) Schumpeterian long wave theory, "high 
technology" represents the structural process of technical 
innovation. But how, then, does the theory of long waves 
also represent a theory of uneven spatial development? The 
answer derives from the earlier recognition that uneven 
spatial development is the spatial portrayal of the uneven 
processes of development. Thus, the reasoning continues, it 
is the spatial unevenness of the process of innovation, 
the "geography of innovation", which has shaped the 
particular spatial impact of previous long waves and which 
21 It should be remembered, however, that Harris and McArthur (1985) have 
criticised the faulty use of the term "high technology" within long wave theory. 
They suggest this has led to the conflation of a variety of groups of technologies 
under the banner of "high technology" which, actually, can be distinguished 
through a more refined use of long wave theory (see Chapter Two, p. 54). 
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is structuring the "geography of the 5th Kondratiev" 
(Goddard et al., 1986; Hall, 1981; 1988; Oakey, Thwaites and- 
Nash, 1980; 1982): 
"Economic success lies with the country and the region and the 
city that can innovate. " (Hall, 1988, p. 55) 
And, concerning the fifth Kondratiev: 
"... tomorrow's industries are not going to be born in 
yesterday's regions... Britain's future, if it has one, is in 
that broad belt that runs from oxford and Winchester through 
the Thames Valley and Milton Keynes to Cambridge. " 
(Hall, 1981, p. 537) 
Thus, the emergent "geography of the fifth Kondratiev" is 
indeed depicted in the geography of Britain's "high 
technology" industry. 
But the question which then arises is why is the geography 
of innovation uneven. Why are some regions more innovative 
than others? It is at this point that the importance of the 
socio -institutional structure, within which 
technological innovation may or may not take place, is 
revealed. For Hall (1981) argues that the new innovative 
industries of the 5th Kondratiev are not to be found in the 
regions of previous growth (see above quote), because the 
socio-institutional structures of such regions are an 
inhibiting inheritance, if anything actually repellent, to 
the new industries of the emergent 5th Kondratiev. 22 
22 Interestingly, Gillespie and Thwaites (1988) have put forward an alternative 
113 
Rather, they are to be found within the regions of 
scientific research and scientifically-skilled labour. 
Yet, and rather ironically, the critical importance of the 
socio-institutional structure in structuring (the spatial 
impacts of) the process of innovation within Schumpeterian 
long wave theory precisely highlights the most insistent 
criticism of the theory. Namely, that of the theory's 
technological determinism which ultimately diminishes 
the importance of the socio-institutional structure in 
technological change. 
The criticism of technological determinism 
Schumpeterian long wave theory, in putting forward the 
self-regulating economic mechanism of technical innovation 
as the causal mechanism of long waves, is argued to 
relegate the social and institutional features of the 
broader economic system to playing a passive role, being 
profoundly changed by innovation but essentially acting 
merely as the environment within which innovation takes 
place (Harris and McArthur, 1985). Schumpeter (1937) argued 
for the importance of managerial and organizational 
innovations. Furthermore, the need for social and 
institutional conditions to emerge to facilitate the 
diffusion of new technology systems has also been stressed 
by Freeman et al. (1982). However, the social and 
to such an interpretation. In their view as part of the economic "creative gale of 
destuction" experienced by such regions, a similar process will take place within 
the socio-institutional framework. Hence, rather than acting as a barrier to 
development such socio-institutional structures may well be a fertile area of new 
ground ready to be worked. The "Japanisation" of South Wales could be just such an 
example of this phenomenon. 
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institutional can be nothing but subordinate due to their 
exclusion from the causal mechanism (Perez, 1983). 
Perez (1983; 1985), acknowledging the technological 
determinism of Schumpeter, sets out in her own work to 
avoid this determinism by arguing that Kondratiev waves are 
not a purely economic phenomenon. She conceptualises the 
capitalist system as comprising two main subsystems which 
have different rates of change. On the one hand is the 
laggard socio-institutional system and, on the other, a 
technoeconomic system encompassing a "technological style". 
By this term she means an "ideal type" of production 
organisation or best "technological common sense". 
Kondratiev waves, and the upswings and downswings of which 
they are constituted, are simply the visible signs of the 
harmonious or disharmonious complementarity achieved 
between the dynamics of the two subsystems. Disharmony 
represents structural crisis in that the introduction of a 
new technological style is hampered by the slower rate of 
change in the laggard socio-institutional system, whose 
structure is still geared to the requirements of the 
previously dominant technological style: 
"The structural crisis thus brought about is then, not only a 
process of 'creative destruction' or 'abnormal liquidation' in 
the economic sphere, but also in the socio-institutional. In 
fact, the crisis forces the restructuring of the socio- 
institutional framework with innovations along the lines that 
are complementary to the newly attained technological style or 
best-practice frontier. The final form the structure will 
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take.. . will however ultimately 
depend on the interests, 
actions, lucidity and relative strength of the social forces at 
play. " (Perez, 1983, p. 360) 
As Mahon (1987) writes, Perez's theorising continues 
Freeman et al's (1982) advancement of Schumpeter's original 
work. For further attention is brought to bear upon the 
ideological and organisational aspects of long waves and 
the process of innovation driving them, with the crucial 
question being asked as to which kind of institutional 
relations will be selected within which the process will 
take place. However, such a selection process reveals that 
Perez's work is still, ultimately, technologically 
determinist. 
For it must be stressed that social forces only come into 
play as they are forced to create a socio-institutional 
framework complementary to the new technological style 
(see quote above). Moreover, such complex social forces are 
seemingly able to create a complementary framework every 
fifty years. or so. Essentially, Perez's work still 
represents a reductionist and technologically determinist 
view of "social forces". Social forces, although varied, 
act within the parameters of complementarity to the 
technological style. However, what Perez fails to 
recognise, as does neo-Schumpeterian long wave theory as a 
whole, is that social forces themselves shape 
technology as well as being shaped by it. They do 
more than provide a (conducive or not) environment for 
innovation. 
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So, neo-Schumpeterian long wave theory is criticised for 
the seemingly unproblematical structuring of the "social" 
and "institutional" to "fit-in" with the new technological 
style. In particular, the initial separation of the 
economic and social spheres is unacceptable to a further 
group of long wave theorists who are informed by a Marxist 
viewpoint. For example, the mere "enabling" restructuring 
of the social and institutional spheres is, in contrast, 
seen by these theorists as representing exogenous social 
and political forces which determine the length and 
character of long waves. Waves, in turn, are viewed not as 
internally regulated cycles but specific historical 
periods. 
Marxist long wave theory 
Mandel (1980; 1981) combines the internally regulated 
economic cycles of Kondratiev with historical epochs of 
development seen as the outcome of external class struggle 
(Marshall, 1987). He argues that the major causal factor in 
long waves is fluctuation in the average rate of profit. 
Essentially, successive periods of "over-accumulation" by 
capitalists will lead to the tendency for the organic 
composition of capital to rise over time, so leading to the 
concurrent tendency for the rate of profit to fall. It is 
this internal mechanism for the tendency of the rate of 
profit to fall which explains the upper turning point 
within long waves. In other words, it explains the move 
from an expansionary phase to the "downswing" contraction 
phase. But, Mandel (1980) argues that there is no similar 
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internal economic mechanism to explain the lower turning 
point, there is no mechanism to trigger the move from 
depression into the "upswing". Rather, the trigger occurs 
through the intervention of exogenous social/political 
forces historically engaged in the class struggle. 
Particular "system shocks" allow a rise in the profit rate 
and the re-entry of the internal mechanisms of capitalism. 
Hence, Mandel has identified such exogenous triggers as the 
1848 revolutions which broadened the capitalist world 
market or other historical defeats of the working class. 
So, Mandel identifies the exogenous realm of the social and 
political as part of the mechanism of long waves but, just 
as Perez fails to explain the appearance of complementary 
socio-institutional innovations every 50 years or so, so 
Marshall (1987) criticises Mandel's view of class struggle. 
For the phenomenon of class struggle only appears at 
selective points in his approach, namely lower turning 
points, or approximately every 50 years. 
The labour process approach 
Yet Marshall argues that a fundamental contribution of 
Marxist theory, through writings on the "capitalist labour 
process", is the recognition of: 
,,... the process of (continuous] technical change and capitalist 
development as a (continuous] social process involving the 
reproduction, not only of the physical or technical means of 
production, but also of the social relationships between 
capital and labour which accompany them. " (op. cit., p. 58, 
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author's emphasis) 
Hence the social and political, like the economic and 
technical, are endogenous to the mechanism of capitalist 
development. And, as such, capitalist development can best 
be studied from a labour process approach, the labour 
process being the point of conjunction between the 
technical forces of production and the social relationships 
of production. Within such theory lies the ability: 
11 ... to relate the physical processes of technical and 
industrial change to the social structures within which these 
processes occur. " (Marshall, 1987, p. 58) 
Labour process theory views technology as merely one factor 
within the process of economic development and 
contextualises technological change within the wider social 
structures of which it is part. Indeed, it is the view of 
technology as independent of the wider social context which 
leads to the technological determinism of the neo- 
Schumpeterians (Marshall, 1987). Although these theorists 
recognise that technical change and its effects are at 
least partially dependent upon catalytic social and 
political forces (eg. Freeman, 1982; Hall, 1981; Perez, 1983; 
1985), such theory has still been criticised for its 
failure to relate the nature and form of technology to 
the nature of wider social forces (Marshall, 1987, p. 11). In 
other words, to recognise that social forces shape 
technology and the path of technological change. 
Marshall (1987) argues that technological change (including 
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the process of innovation) must be viewed as a (continuous) 
terrain of social struggle rather than merely a technical 
logic. Moreover, this recognition doesn't therefore exclude 
the discontinuous nature of technological change 
encapsulated in long wave theory but rather it allows 
Marshall (1987) to describe how: 
"... long waves unfold through historical processes of social 
change and conflict rather than in accordance with some 
pregiven pattern of technical change. " (op. cit., p. 70) 
For example, Marshall refers to the work of Benson and 
Lloyd (1983) who suggest that: 
"... it is not so much the discontinuous clustering of technical 
innovations stressed by the Schumpeterians which determines the 
pattern of long waves. Rather, it is the ebb and flow of class 
struggle over industrial organisation and technological change 
which both shapes and is shaped by the long waves. " 
(Marshall, 1987, p. 68) 
Long waves involve not only the periodic rejuvenation of 
capitalist accumulation but, by definition, the periodic 
transformation of the social relationships of such 
accumulation. The (negotiated) transformation of social 
relationships is part of the process of technical change 
and not merely a passive response to such change. 
Thus, it is historical transformations of the labour 
process, rather than changes in technology per se, which 
represent the hub of the process of economic development 
(Marshall, 1987, p. 86). And, thus, long waves are typified by 
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their labour process forms - machinofacture, manufacture, 
Fordism etc. - rather than the leading technologies of the 
period a la a neo-Schumpeterian stance. 
The 5th Kondratiev: Long wave of regional processes of 
development 
This recognition of high technology as a contested process 
of social as well as technical innovation similarly implies 
a different interpretation of its spatial impacts from that 
of the neo-Schumpeterians. For: 
"... the pattern of regional development is not a predetermined 
outcome of technical advance or global economic forces. On the 
contrary it is a fluid process in which regional social and 
political forces are to some extent able to exert a relative 
autonomy in shaping their own destinies. " (Marshall, 1987, p. 13) 
"... [This] is a perspective which identifies the role which 
uneven regional development plays in causing the long waves, 
rather than one which simply views regional differences as the 
outcome of pregiven global or abstract forces. " 
(Marshall, 1987, p. 10) 
Thus, Marshall (1987) criticises Hall's (1981) view of the 
geography of the 5th Kondratiev which: 
"... reinforces the notion that the social, economic and spatial 
effects of technological advance are predetermined and 
inevitable. " (Marshall, 1987, p. 230) 
In other words, Hall's (1981) reading of the spatial 
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impacts of Schumpeterian long wave theory reflects the 
major criticism of the theory itself in being 
technologically determinist. 
In contrast, Marshall (1987) is arguing two critical 
points. Firstly, and as outlined above, that the course of 
technological development, including its spatial effects, 
is not predetermined but rather the result of social and 
political conflicts around technological change. Secondly, 
however, such conflicts have a distinctly regional aspect 
to their nature. There are distinct processes of regional 
development at play, taking different forms in different 
times and places but which are constitutive of long waves 
of economic development and not merely the outcome. This 
does not preclude viewing long waves of economic 
development as entailing changing spatial hierarchies 
headed by a succession of leading industrial regions but, 
rather, it allows for the recognition that: 
"The succession of leading industrial regions have provided the 
basis for regional social and political movements which have, 
at critical moments, contested and to varying degrees 
determined the ensuing course of national and sometimes 
international development. " (Marshall, 1987, p. 228) 
Thus, although disagreeing with Hall (1981) about how the 
spatial impact of the fifth Kondratiev is being determined, 
Marshall (1987) is in agreement with Hall about the pattern 
this impact is forming. With the move towards a fifth 
Kondratiev it is clear that new forms of spatial inequality 
are emergent and are depicted within the geography of 
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Britain's high technology industry. Indeed: 
"The high technology sectors have been in the forefront of this 
process of spatial change. The spatial distribution of the UK 
semiconductor industry is marked by the decentralisation of 
deskilled manual assembly work to peripheral industrial 
regions, contrasting with the concentration of a highly skilled 
technical elite in newly industrialising areas outside the old 
industrial centres. " (Marshall, 1987, p. 233)23 
The concept of technological paradigms, as the central 
aspect of models of industrial development, is also to be 
found within the history of capitalist development put 
forward by Piore and Sabel (1984). Piore and Sabel 
theorise a "meta-history" of industrial development based 
upon a conceptual distinction between two types of 
production paradigm - mass production and flexible 
specialisation (craft production) (Williams et al., 1987). 
As an organisational form, the most recent period of mass 
production is depicted as an industrial system based upon 
giant corporations which use product-specific machines, 
tended by semi-skilled workers, in a routinised production 
process geared to the production of standardised products 
(Piore and Sabel, 1984, p. 4). In contrast, flexible 
specialisation describes a production system, often led by 
23 in fact, this is less a new form of regional inequality than a replication of 
an existing form but by the new "high technology" industries (see Massey, 1988). 
123 
networks of small and medium-sized firms, employing skilled 
craftworkers using new and sophisticated general-purpose 
(ie. "flexible") machinery to provide a wide range of 
customised goods for large but constantly shifting markets 
(op. cit, p. 5). 
Taking this view of industrial history, Piore and Sabel 
(1984) argue that the current crisis in capitalist 
accumulation is due to the previously dominant mass 
production paradigm having reached its limits of expansion. 
In essence, we have reached "The Second Industrial Divide" 
where, once more, the choice of industrial development path 
is open to us. Whilst Piore and Sabel (1984) argue that a 
choice is still to be made between either a re-formulated 
mass production system (multinational Keynesianism) or 
flexible specialisation, for many that choice has seemingly 
been made with the re-emergence of flexible specialisation 
heralded as the pathway out of crisis (Cooke, 1990; Hirst 
and Zeitlin, 1989; Murray, 1985; Sabel, 1989; Scott, 1988a). 
A number of processes of change, among them the appearance 
of "flexible" technology, are together argued to be 
precipitating a general shift towards the development path 
of flexible specialisation. 24 And it is in the guise of 
24 As Piore and Sabel (1984) point out, however, whilst such technology, 
especially the new computer-based technology, is capable of producing enhanced 
"flexibility", it may do so to a variety of degrees and in a variety of 
environments. Care must be taken to avoid the "technologically determinist" view 
that such gains in flexibility are due solely to new technologies which are 
inherently flexible. Rather, advances in manufacturing flexibility gained from 
the introduction of new technology are also attributable to other factors, such as 
their introduction within competitive environments favouring flexibility 
(op. cit., pp. 258-263). Indeed, Sayer (1989b) has taken up this point to show how 
such "flexible" technology may equally be applied within mass production 
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the new flexible technologies that the concept of "high 
technology" is held within the flexible specialisation 
thesis. For the emergent historical form of this production 
system is personified by: 
"... the high-tech industries and the traditional dispersed 
conglomerations in machine tools, garments, footwear, textiles, 
and the like - all revitalised through the fusion of 
traditional skills and high technology. " (Piore and 
Sabel, 1984, p. 279, my emphasis) 
Moreover, it is this structural shift to "flexible 
specialisation", built upon the "flexible/high" 
technologies, which is seen as holding major repercussions 
for the geographical organisation of production. For, 
embedded within Piore and Sabel's (1984) conceptualisations 
of systems of production, are conceptualisations of the 
spatial form which they take. In essence, such systems 
present more than a production logic; they also present a 
territorial logic. 
Thus, whilst the system of mass production has represented 
the giant (multi-national) corporation, structuring 
international space according to its internal organisation 
of production (see for example, Froebel et al., 1980) and 
expanding into new geographical markets in search of mass 
(eg. Japanese flexible mass production) as show any bias towards the production 
system of flexible specialisation. 
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demand for its mass produced products, the territorial 
logic of flexible specialisation is placed at the opposite 
end of the spatial spectrum, within the "industrial 
district" (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Sabel, 1989). 
The nineteenth-century's centres of flexible specialisation 
were to be found within such industrial districts as 
Birmingham and St. Etienne (producing guns and hardware), 
South East Lancashire (textiles) and Sheffield and Solingen 
(cutlery). In turn, with the move to centre stage once more 
of flexible specialisation, a new geography of production 
is emergent based on the "renaissance of regional 
economies" in the guise of a series of new or resurgent 
"industrial districts" of production (Sabel, 1989, p. 22) . 
Central to this renaissance are the new "flexible/high" 
technologies leading to not only the "high technology 
industrial districts" of Silicon Valley and Route 128 but, 
also, the districts of "high technology cottage industries" 
to be found in regions throughout Western Europe but, most 
famously, within the "Third Italy" (Piore and Sabel, 1984). 
Hence, it is on the basis of this re-emergent territorial 
logic of flexible specialisation, "the reconsolidation of 
the region as an integrated unit of production" 
(Sabel, 1989, p. 18), that the interpretation of Britain's 
changing geography of production, including the geography 
of high technology industry, may be made. 
Unfortunately (? ), it may only actually be within the 
geography of high technology that such an interpretation 
can be carried out, if at all. Take, for example,, -the 
edited collection by Hirst and zeitlin (1989) entitled 
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"Reversing Industrial Decline". This represents an analysis 
of Britain's economic decline and possible future 
corrective industrial policy, principally written by 
exponents of the flexible specialisation thesis. Yet it is 
noticeable that within this book's covers, whilst listing ä 
stream of newly formed or revitalised "industrial 
districts" from Denmark, France, Italy, Spain, Sweden and 
West Germany to the United States (Silicon Valley, Route 
128, Los Angeles, Orange County) and Japan, Sabel (1989) 
does not produce a single example of such a district from 
Britain. Cooke (1990), too, is seemingly forced overseas 
(Italy, Spain and France) to find examples from which to 
draw lessons for UK local economic policy. Indeed, the UK 
literature seems less an exposure of examples of industrial 
districts within the UK, than an analysis of how local 
economic intervention may be shaped, by the flexible 
specialisation model, to revitalise our traditional 
industries (for example, see Best (1989) on the North 
London furniture industry and Zeitlin and Totterdill (1989) 
on the British clothing industry). 
The geography of high technology may, however, hold out 
some hope for followers of the flexible specialisation 
thesis in the UK. Whilst the evidence is hardly conclusive, 
the "dispersed clusters" of high technology industry 
discussed earlier may possibly represent the first 
indications of the emergence of regionally-based industrial 
districts. Moreover, possible examples of high technology 
industrial districts exist within the literature. Hence, 
MacGregor et al. (1986) have charted the growth of high 
technology within the Newbury district (part of the Western 
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Crescent), although no attempt was made to identify a 
critical element of industrial districts, namely evidence 
of an "industrial community" (Piore and Sabel, 1984). 
However, evidence of such a "community" has been provided 
in the case of high technology agglomeration in 
Cambridge(shire) where there are: 
"... highly-localised clusters of new high-technology firms 
which exhibit dynamic growth through a process of 'synergy' or 
intense interaction between new firms and entrepreneurs, 
research institutions, local banks and finance agencies, and 
business service organisations... " (Keeble and Kelly, 1986, p. 80 
quoted in Keeble, 1989, p. 158) 
The "Cambridge Phenomenon" (Segal et al., 1985) may well 
represent Britain's premier example of a (high technology) 
industrial district. It is also clear, depending on your 
definition of "region", that the South-East's regional 
economy is partially based upon and, has arguably been 
regenerated by, high technology industry. 
Regimes of accumulation: The transition to a post- o di st 
The concept of historical periods of hegemonic dominance by 
a particular production paradigm is also encapsulated in 
the work of theorists of the "French Regulation School" 
(Aglietta, 1979; Lipietz, 1980; 1986; 1987). However, the 
technological model (or paradigm) describes only one set 
of relationships within any hegemonic model (or pattern) 
of development (Leborgne and Lipietz, 1988). 
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The technological paradigm describes the principles of 
organisation of the labour process (and not just the 
technology involved in the production process). Thus, 
during the recent "Fordist" model of development, such 
organisation was based on "Taylorist" principles, involving 
an extended technical division of labour and 
standardisation of duties, within a production process also 
characterised by its separation of conception and 
execution. Moreover, the combination of Taylorism with the 
new technology of transformation and, in particular, the 
new technology of transfer (Blackburn et al., 1985), created 
a system of production distinguished by the rise of 
"assembly-line" mass production (Leborgne and 
Lipietz, 1988) . 
The regime of accumulation describes the second set of 
relationships within any pattern of development. These 
relationships involve the macroeconomic principle governing 
long run compatibility between levels of production and 
levels of consumption during any historical period of 
accumulation. The form of Fordist production organisation 
described above created significant gains (in their day) in 
both productivity and volumes of goods produced. Such 
growth in productivity translated into a growth in 
purchasing power of workers, to the extent that increased 
growth in production was thus counterbalanced by equally 
significant growth in consumption (Leborgne and 
Lipietz, 1988) . 
The final set of relationships within a model of 
development concern the "regulation" of the articulation 
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between consumption and production. The mode of regulation 
consists of a set of institutions and social norms, 
procedures and habits to ensure the approximate unity of 
individual behaviour with the regime of accumulation 
(Lipietz, 1986). Thus, for example, the creation of the 
welfare system during the period of Fordism in the UK is 
viewed as having acted to guarantee minimum levels of 
(mass) consumption whilst wider state intervention, such as 
in housing, smoothed the reproduction of labour. 25 
Just as the theories discussed above encapsulate the 
concept of a recent "phase change" so, within regulation 
theory, it is argued that the previously dominant pattern 
of development, labelled Fordism, is in crisis. We are in a 
period of structural crisis and change and again the role 
of new technology is critical in, if not actually 
determinant of, the outcome. For Leborgne and Lipietz 
(1988) argue that the crisis of Fordism is attributable to 
a crisis within the technological paradigm (representing 
the technology itself and the labour process within which 
it is structured). It is the (incipient) "knock-on" effects 
of this paradigm crisis within the wider sets of 
relationships of the Fordist regime of accumulation which 
25 Just as (Schumpeterian) long wave theory has been criticised for its view of 
the socio-institutional structure as merely falling into complementary mode with 
the emergent technological paradigm, so the French Regulationists have similarly 
been criticised for their "functionalist" conception of the "mode of regulation": 
"However, we should not simply assume that the mode of regulation has the 
'function' of making the regime of accumulation work.. . Rather, a regime of 
accumulation and forms of regulation get stabilized together, because they 
ensure the crisis-free reproduction of social relations over a certain 
period of time. " (Lipietz, 1986, p. 20) 
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have, ultimately, been decisive in the regime's downfall. 
However, possible ways out of this crisis have been opened 
up by the emergent paradigm of the "flexible" technologies 
and, once again, it is within this guise that the concept 
of "high technology" may be found. The restructuring role 
of the new "flexible/high" technologies is again a 
foundation stone of this theory of structural change. 
However, these technologies are not only viewed as 
revolutionising production but also, more explicitly, as 
new products in themselves and hence the basis for new 
industries: 
"This [modern electronics] industry is both a centrally 
symptomatic sector of the new regime and a general precondition 
of augmented production flexibility in the economy at large. " 
(Scott, 1988b, p. 11) 
Indeed: 
"The new industrial ensemble based on high technology industry 
that has recently moved to centre stage. . . has similarly seemed 
to usher in a new regime of accumulation and a corresponding 
mode of social regulation. " (Scott and Storper, 1986, p. 2) 
Yet, whilst the role of high technology in the new regime 
seems assured, much argument still reigns over the exact 
persona of the heir apparent to Fordism (see Chapter Four 
for further discussion). Whilst most, not all, 
("regulationist") commentators do agree that its label may 
be that of "post-Fordism", a number of writers have gone 
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further by suggesting that the "post-Fordist" era may also 
be identified as a "new regime of flexible accumulation" 
(Cooke, 1988; Harvey, 1987; Martinelli and Schoenberger, 1989; 
Schoenberger, 1988; Scott and Storper, 1986; Scott, 1988a). 
Interestingly, the systems of "flexible production" 
emergent as part of the new regime include, but are not 
reducible to, elements of the system of "flexible 
specialisation" put forward by Piore and Sabel (1984). 
Flexible specialisation may be seen as only one of several 
alternative "flexible production" systems (Cooke, 1988; 
Leborgne and Lipietz, 1988; Lipietz, 1989; Martinelli and 
Schoenberger, 1989). 
Furthermore, just as flexible specialisation is seen by 
Piore and Sabel (1984) as encapsulating a particular 
spatial form, so the move to flexible production is 
similarly viewed as encompassing a set of spatial 
imperatives. Hence, also, just as high technology industry 
is conceptualised as a carrier of these new flexible 
production systems, so the spatial structure of high 
technology is viewed as symptomatic of the emergent 
geography of post-Fordist flexible accumulation. 
In recent years, several views of the likely configuration 
of the "geography of flexible accumulation" have been 
expressed (Cooke, 1988; Martin, 1988b; Martinelli and 
Schoenberger, 1989; Schoenberger, 1988; SCott, 1988a; 1988b). 
At an international level it is argued that a "spatial 
levelling process" may be occurring (Cooke, 1988). Cooke 
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(1988) has suggested that, within high technology, 
processes of international corporate networking, if not 
merger and acquisition, are extending the spatial spread of 
technological expertise. At the same time, this spatial 
spread is being both driven by, and grounded within, the 
growth of a series of international agglomerations, in what 
he has described as a "large agglomeration-economic effect" 
(op. cit., p. 295) . 
In similar vein, Schoenberger (1987; 1988) has argued that 
the restructuring of production organisation with the move 
towards flexible accumulation is leading to "... a spatial 
reintegration of production within and across firms... " 
(Schoenberger, 1988, p. 258) such that the role of 
agglomeration economies is once again to the forefront. 
However: 
"... an element of footlooseness enters into the picture 
insofar as the question of where production will be 
reconcentrated - and agglomeration economies constructed... " 
(Schoenberger, 1987, p. 208) 
That picture has, however, been most forthrightly drawn in 
the work of Scott and Storper (1986; Scott, 1988a; 1988b). 
In their view, the "geography of flexible accumulation" can 
be characterised by the appearance of the "New Industrial 
Spaces". These are a set of new or revitalised and re- 
emergent production agglomerations throughout Western 
Europe and North America, based upon the growth of the "new 
flexible industrial ensembles", and including the: 
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"... high technology industries and their associated phalanxes 
of input suppliers and dependent subcontractors... " (Scott, 
1988, p. 175) 
These New Industrial Spaces are, on the one hand, certain 
enclaves within older manufacturing regions. Examples 
include the film and printed circuit board industries of 
Los Angeles or suburban extensions of city regions, as in 
the case of the high technology agglomeration Route 128 
(Massachusetts, USA). On the other hand are the "sunbelt 
area and third development zones". That is, areas 
previously peripheral or semi-peripheral to Fordist 
industrialisation. Such areas range from the widely quoted 
Third Italy, encapsulating industries such as shoes, 
ceramics and metal engineering, to high technology 
agglomerations ranging from Silicon Valley (Santa Clara 
County, USA) to the Scientific City (the region immediately 
south of Paris) to Britain's M4 Corridor26 or Cambridge 
(Scott, 1988a, pp. 179-181). Thus, Britain's leading high 
technology regions also represent, in the eyes of Scott and 
Storper, leading regions of the emergent geography of 
flexible accumulation. 
26 Scott (1988a) identifies the M4 Corridor as running from Reading to London 
although on what evidence is uncertain. I suggest, however, that the work of Hall 
et al. (1987) has, in fact, rendered this conception of high technology 
agglomeration in Britain incorrect. Rather, Hall et al. 's (1987) work highlights 
that whilst the Reading-London corridor does represent a concentration of high 
technology industry it is in fact part of a larger agglomeration labelled the 
Western Crescent (see Chapter Five also). 
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So, this chapter has outlined the geography of high 
technology industry in Britain today, a geography of uneven 
development but at a variety of spatial scales. Clearly, the 
South-East dominates as the region of control, conception 
and execution. Yet intra-regional divides are also evident 
such that (strings of) individual counties, and even towns, 
within the South-East can be discerned as "cheek-by-jowl" 
winners and losers in the geography of high technology. 
Likewise, some winners may be found in other regions of 
Britain, in places like Silicon Glen, but, ultimately, many 
more losers may also be discerned. The chapter has then gone 
on to discuss the greater significance of this portrayal of 
uneven development. For it is, in part, a portrayal of the 
wider processes of structural change presently reworking the 
locational relations of industry. And thus, from contrasting 
points of view and most especially from within the New 
Industrial Spaces thesis, the geography of high technology 
is also viewed as symptomatic of a newly emergent form of 
capitalist uneven development. Whilst the exact processes of 
change driving this "paradigm shift" in the geography of 
production are disputed, there is one factor uniting the 
theories of uneven spatial development summarised above. 
That factor is the theorisation of a causal relationship 
between changes in the organisation of production and 
changes in the pattern of the spatial organisation of 
production. And it is within the following chapter that the 
particular logic of such a relationship will be scrutinised. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: Post-Fordist Industrial Location: A 
Theoretical Critique of the New Industrial' Spaces 
thesis 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter, having outlined the geography of high 
technology industry, turned in its latter stage to first 
attempts at gaining an understanding of this geography. In 
doing so, it turned to theories of structural change for 
explanation, for in seeking: 
"to explain 'where' you must be able to understand and explain 
'why' and 'how'. " (Massey and Meegan, 1985, p. 119) 
And the 'why' and 'how' can only be understood by 
recognising that: 
"Locational behaviour must be viewed as ultimately the product 
of processes acting outside the spatial sphere itself, 
understood as the result of the combination of spatial and 
aspatial forces. " (Massey and Meegan, 1982, p. 128) 
Hence, it is through theories of structural change in the 
economy that explanation of the emergent "space-economy" of 
high technology industry is to be sought. Within such 
theory lies explanation as to how the present period of 
economic restructuring is being translated into a 
period of spatial restructuring. Yet, in taking such a 
position, we presuppose a fundamental recognition of the 
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existence of a causal relationship between changes in 
the organisation of production and changes in the 
geography of production. Indeed, the nature and form 
(eg. direction and necessity) of the relationship between 
processes of production organisation and spatial form has 
been central to longstanding and historical debate within 
(industrial) geography. 
The different theories outlined in Chapter Three all 
encompass this relationship, in one form or another, 
between processes of change in the organisation of 
production, triggered and/or facilitated by "high 
technology", and changes in the pattern of spatial 
organisation of production. Indeed, within the New 
Industrial Spaces thesis, the high technology industries 
themselves are seen as symptomatic representatives of this 
relationship between process and pattern. Yet, at the same 
time, a lack of detailed conceptualisation and 
clarification of the actual causal process(es), "the 
logic", structuring the move from the non-spatial to the 
spatial realm is also evident within much of such theory. 
However, if we are to deepen our understanding of uneven 
development it is this causal logic which ultimately 
represents the "turnkey" of our understanding and it is 
this which is the focus of this research and the 
particular subject of this chapter. Moreover, it is the New 
Industrial Spaces thesis proposed by Scott and Storper 
which is the subject of this chapter. For, in advance of 
most theories of structural change and in answering the 
above criticism, it attempts explicitly to outline a logic 
which structures the move from the aspatial to the spatial. 
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4.2 The New Industrial Spaces27 
As was outlined in the previous chapter, the starting point" 
for the New Industrial Spaces thesis is the recognition of 
structural economic change, encapsulated for Scott and 
Storper by the transition to a new era of "flexible 
accumulation". This transition represents the move to a new 
historical form of "technological-institutional system of 
production" (Storper and Scott, 1988; Scott, 1988b). 
Acknowledging the resemblance of such systems to "regimes 
of accumulation" as proposed in the work of the French 
Regulationist School (Aglietta, 1979; Boyer, 1986; 
Lipietz, 1986; 1987), Scott and Storper view such systems as 
comprising four major elements: a set of production 
techniques; a characteristic form of organisation of 
production (inclusive of labour relations); a mechanism by 
which "surplus" is distributed and redeployed; and a 
process of aggregate demand (Scott, 1988b, p. 8). Through the 
history of industrial capitalism such elements have 
combined to create historically specific forms of 
technological-institutional systems, each system attaining 
a position of "domination" for some time as a more or less 
stable configuration, reinforced by a set of supportive 
social relations. In this context, the present period of 
structural change is viewed by Scott and Storper as the 
transition from the previously dominant "Fordist mass 
production" system to a new era dominated by a "post- 
27 Whilst the "skeleton" of the New Industrial Spaces thesis has been put forward 
in the joint work of Scott and Storper, in particular, it is the work of Scott 
which has "put flesh on the bones". Most especially, he has concentrated on the 
precise causal logic shaping the New Industrial Spaces and thus it is Scott's work 
which this chapter particularly focusses upon. 
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Fordist system of flexible production". 
The post-Fordist flexible production system is, it is 
argued by Scott and Storper, characterised by production 
techniques aimed at achieving rapid adjustability of 
products and production processes in response to highly 
contested, fragmented and unstable markets. Adjustability 
is achieved through enhanced flexibility of the technical 
and social relations of production. Evidence for this is 
the advanced extension of the social division of labour in 
the form of fragmented and specialised production units 
and/or labour relations and local labour markets 
increasingly organised around strategies of functional and 
numerical flexibility (Storper and Scott, 1988). In the 
transition to the post-Fordist flexible production system: 
"... two interrelated new pathways to industrialization have 
recently begun to take shape. One of them involves a 
restructuring of Fordist mass production (in virtually all of 
the major consumer durables industries) through various 
combinations of automation, subcontracting and reconstruction 
of the employment relation to achieve more supple work rules 
and labour market practices. Another important pathway has been 
opened up by the rise of a series of new flexible industrial 
ensembles (i. e. collections of sectors) over the 1970s and 
1980s. " (Storper and Scott, 1988, p. 9) 
Scott and Storper go on to identify these "new flexible 
industrial ensembles" as revitalized artisan production; 
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business services; and, as earlier suggested, high 
technology industry and its associated suppliers and 
subcontractors. Together, the appearance of these new 
ensembles and the restructuring of Fordist mass production 
are seen as accounting for the major part of present 
economic change, with the industrial pathway of flexible 
industrial ensembles viewed as particularly significant: 
"... because it accounts for a very rapidly increasing share of 
total employment and gross national product. " (op. cit., p. 10) 
Similarly, it is the emergence and spatial agglomeration 
of these new flexible industrial ensembles, represented by 
the "New Industrial Spaces" (such as those described in the 
previous chapter), which is of particular significance to 
Scott and Storper in characterising the emergent "geography 
of flexible accumulation" (Scott, 1988a). 
Hence, in summary, Scott and Storper outline the ways in 
which structural economic change (the move to flexible 
production) is precipitating the rise of a new form of 
industrialisation (flexible industrial ensembles) 
incorporating its own spatial dynamic (agglomeration) and 
geographical pattern of outcomes (the New Industrial 
Spaces). What is of particular interest here is, however, 
their explanation of the creation of this spatial 
dynamic. 
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The "spptial log "28 
Scott and Storper argue that the spatial logic of the New 
Industrial Spaces thesis can be traced from the fundamental 
dynamics of the capitalist process of production. These 
dynamics, it is suggested, revolve around the (technical 
and social) division of labour within production: 
"At the core of the industrial firm or plant 
is a set of labor 
processes... This notion is a crucial point of 
departure for any 
viable theory of the economic geography of production. " 
(Scott, 
1983a, p. 235). 
Moreover, and in keeping with the earlier point drawn from 
Massey and Meegan (1982): 
"... geographical developments and shifts relate to a very 
general system of dynamics within capitalist labour processes. 
These dynamics can only be comprehended as they themselves grow 
out of the (non-spatial) relations of production of capitalist 
society at large. " (Henderson and Scott, 1988, p. 41). 
The present transition from a Fordist to a flexible system 
of production entails a fundamental restructuring of the 
capitalist labour process. A restructuring of both the 
technical and social divisions of labour is creating new 
relationships both within, and particularly between, firms. 
28 Of course, when using the term "spatial logic", that is not to imply that 
"space" itself inherently holds causal powers. Rather the term is used to refer to 
objects (with causal powers) which are necessarily located within space. The point 
is that whether an object's causal power is activated and with what effect depends 
on contingent conditions which are themselves dependent on spatial form 
(Sayer, 1984, p. 133; see also Sayer, 1985a). 
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For Scott and Storper the importance of these changing sets 
of relationships is that they are creating spatial 
tendencies and, more particularly, the spatial tendency of 
agglomeration. The move to an era of flexible accumulation, 
in which the changing logic of production is increasingly 
predicated on "flexibility", represents a situation 
whereby: 
"... changes in economic conditions bring about intensified 
uncertainty and instability in production and increased 
competitiveness in final markets, internal economies of scale 
and scope within the firm begin to break down so that the 
entire production system is liable to display strong symptoms 
of horizontal and vertical disintegration. Such disintegration 
enormously enhances flexibility in the deployment of capital 
and labour for it permits producers to combine and recombine 
together in loose, rapidly shifting coalitions held together by 
external transaction linkages. " (Scott, 1988a, p. 176) . 
Hence: 
"One of the basic common traits of the flexible production 
ensembles that have recently made their appearance in modern 
capitalism"is their evident propensity to disintegrate into 
extended social divisions of labour, thus giving rise to many 
specialized subsectors. This process is a reflection of the 
tendency for internal economies to give way before a 
progressive externalization of the structure of production 
under conditions of rising flexibility, and it leads at once 
to a revival of proclivities to locational convergence 
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and reagglomeration. " (op. cit., p. 176, my emphasis). 
The key relation here is that an (aspatial) process of the 
"evident propensity to disintegrate into extended social 
divisions of labour" is causing a (spatial) process of 
"locational convergence and reagglomeration". This is the 
causal mechanism within the New Industrial Spaces spatial 
logic and it is founded upon Scott's incorporation of 
"transaction costs" into location theory (Scott, 1983a; 
1985; 1986a; 1988a; 1988b; 1989). 
The "transaction costs" mechanism of the logic 
Taking his theoretical foundations from Coase (1937), and 
incorporating the more recent continuation of this work by 
Williamson (1975,1981,1985) amongst others, Scott (1983a; 
1988b) views the production system as a transactional 
structure. The individual firm represents a set of labour 
processes organised through a system of internal 
transactions controlled by a managerial hierarchy. 
In turn, each firm is organised into a production network 
through external, market-governed transactions with 
other firms. Hence, firms can be viewed as on a functional 
integration/disintegration continuum and: 
"... production consists of units of vertically integrated 
hierarchical order separated from one another in a social 
division of labour. " (Scott, 1988b, p. 25, author's emphasis) 
More recently, with the empirical identification of 
"intermediate" organisational forms such as joint ventures 
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and strategic alliances (Cooke, 1988; Chesnais, 1988) and 
"quasi-vertical integration" (Leborgne and Lipietz, 1988), 
Scott has commented on the irregularity of this continuum 
because of the lack of a "sharp break" between internal 
(hierarchical) linkages and external (market) linkages. In 
such cases transactions are governed by more complex "rules 
of order" including various kinds of power relations 
(1988b, p. 24-5). 
Fundamentally, however: 
"When internal transaction costs exceed external transaction 
costs labor processes are highly susceptible to vertical 
disintegration. . . By contrast, vertical 
integration tends to 
come about where internal transactions costs are lower than 
external transactions costs. " (Scott, 1986, p. 220, author's 
emphasis) 
Hence, any move towards integration or disintegration 
involves a corresponding change in the ratio of internal- 
to-external transactions. 
Scott and Storper, in particular, have focussed on the 
widespread move to disintegration as part of the production 
logic of the new era. Moreover, they have argued that a 
spatial tendency of (re)agglomeration of production results 
from this process. Using transaction costs theory, they 
present a (necessary) logic linking transaction costs and 
location. The causal mechanism is situated within the 
conceptualisation of the firm as a network of internal and 
external linkages. For each (external? ) linkage is 
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recognised intrinsically to possess a "spatial" cost. 
Whatever form the linkage may take, or whatever mode 
through which it is achieved: 
"... all inter-industrial linkages incur costs that are a 
positive function of linkage length. " (Scott, 1988b, p. 3l, my 
emphasis) 
In other words, the greater the distance over which the 
linkage occurs, the greater the cost. Implicitly (or 
explicitly? ) also, "external" linkages, by virtue of being 
off-site, are more "spatially dependent". 
The transaction costs model implies that the process of 
"disintegration" involves a simultaneous process of 
"externalisation" as a greater number of external 
transactions are created. Thus, at this point, the 
essentially aspatial process of the (extension of the 
social) division of labour portrayed by Scott is 
transformed into a process incorporating a spatial 
tendency: 
"As the social division of labour moves forward 
[disintegration/externalisation], interestablishment 
transactional structures proliferate, and this immediately 
encourages certain kinds of costs to rise... The greater the 
spatial dispersion of producers, the more onerous these costs 
will be. The immediate consequence is that selected sets of 
producers with particularly elevated intragroup costs will tend 
to converge around their own geographical centre of gravity and 
thus to engender definite nodes of economic activity on the 
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landscape. " (Scott, 1988a, pp. 176-7) 
Simply put, the increased costs associated with increased 
external (as against internal) transactions will create a 
"spatial pull" whereby firms will tend to agglomerate to 
shorten the length, and hence the cost, of such external 
linkages. This, in Scott's view, is the key causal 
mechanism in the appearance of industrial agglomerations, 
particularly in todays post-Fordist times of the New 
Industrial Spaces, but also throughout industrial history. 
However, a caveat must be added to this general conclusion 
concerning the spatial pull of interestablishment linkages. 
For Scott (1988b) suggests that: 
".... agglomeration is usually a response to a selected critical 
set of interestablishment linkages: not all (or even most) 
linkages of establishments in a given agglomeration will 
invariably be confined to the local area and. . . many 
establishments will also have connections on a wider national 
and even international scale. "(op. cit., p. 32) 
Indeed: 
"This critical range would seem especially to be made up of 
transactions-intensive (hence high cost) linkages involving 
above all flexible, rapidly-shifting, small-scale, and non- 
standard connections between producers. " (Scott, 1989, p. 26, my 
emphasis) 
Again, external linkages may be viewed as more spatially 
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dependent than internal linkages but, in this case, on the 
basis of their nature. For external linkages are created 
precisely because of their highly "flexible" (but 
transaction-intensive and costly) nature. Moreover, it is 
precisely these sorts of flexible external linkages which 
are being created by producers in the transition to the new 
era of flexible production. Hence, also, the evidence of 
(re)agglomeration of production as part and parcel of this 
transition. 
The "agglomeration" mechanism of the logic 
The above mechanism is the key dynamic of the present 
spatial reagglomeration of production but further, and 
analytically linked to this dynamic, is a second mechanism 
Scott identifies which helps explain the continued 
"locational implosion" of these production agglomerations 
(Scott, 1988a, p. 178). That is, firms once (or already) 
located within the production agglomeration may also 
undergo a continued process of "externalisation" for just 
as: 
"... on the one side, the social division of labour provokes 
spatial agglomeration as a way of lowering external transaction 
costs; on the other side, agglomeration encourages further 
social division of labour and in-migration of new producers 
precisely because it lowers these costs... " (Scott, 1988b, p. 33) 
So, disintegration causes agglomeration and agglomeration 
causes disintegration. 
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Finally, the agglomeration economies described above which 
arise endogenously out of the organisation of production 
itself, are further strengthened by better known and more 
"theoretically traditional" forms of agglomeration economy. 
Scott, in particular, highlights two of these economies. 
Firstly: 
"With the rise of any industrial agglomeration, local labour 
markets are set in motion, and they too help to boost processes 
of spatial concentration and growth. " (Scott, 1988b, p. 33) 
With the rise of "flexible" industrial agglomerations, new 
forms of "flexible" local labour markets are also coming 
into being. Particular elements of such local labour 
markets cited by Scott (1988b) are increased labour 
turnover processes (job gains and losses and job switching) 
and highly developed labour market search activities by 
both employers and employees in response to such high 
turnover (op. cit., p. 33-38). From an abstract economic 
analysis of these processes Scott suggests that: 
... the flexibility of 
(such] local labour-market arrangements 
will tend to increase as a positive function of size [of labour 
market]. This also suggests, again, that flexibility in terms 
of production organization and flexibility in terms of 
employment relations will intersect with and reinforce one 
another in particular localities. " (op. cit., p. 38) 
So, Scott (1988a) concludes that: 
"There are therefore strong agglomeration economies in local 
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labour markets, -and 
these intersect with and underpin the basic 
agglomeration economies that arise out of the organizational 
structure of production. " (op. cit., p. 177)29 
A second form of "traditional" agglomeration economy can be 
derived from processes of community life and social 
reproduction, embedded as part of any particular community 
yet uniquely advantageous to the production system of that 
individual community. This aspect has been partly captured 
by Alfred Marshall (1920; 1932) in his description of 
industrial districts where "the secrets of industry are in 
the air" but Scott identifies other processes of social 
reproduction such as local educational establishments, with 
courses specifically geared to the needs of local 
production, and the role of the state, both central and 
local. Ultimately: 
"In any industrial locality, then, complex and socially useful 
patterns of socialization and community development tend to 
evolve, enlarging the entire stock of agglomeration economies, 
and thus, in many direct and indirect ways, helping to reduce 
the private costs of production. " (Scott, 1988b, p. 40) 
In conclusion, it is the transaction costs mechanism which 
provides, in Scott's eyes, the core of a causal logic of 
spatial agglomeration of production. Moreover, triggered by 
29 Scott is therefore implying a causal spatial relation within the workings of 
flexible local labour markets in addition to the causal relation arising out of 
the organisational structure of production. The particular focus of this thesis 
is, however, the spatial logic of the latter relation although criticisms of this 
logic (see later) may similarly be applicable to the spatial logic implied within 
the workings of local labour markets. 
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the rise of the flexible industrial ensembles, it is this 
explanatory mechanism which has come to the fore in the 
face of an emergent geography of flexible accumulation 
seemingly best characterised by its constituent 
agglomerations of production. However, this is not the end 
of the story. For although the logic of agglomeration has 
been explained there still remains the question of where 
such dynamic agglomeration is occurring today and why 
in 
particular regions and not others. 
For Scott (and Storper), the emergent geography of flexible 
accumulation may be termed the geography of the "New 
Industrial Spaces" (Scott, 1988a, p. 171). Their work explains 
how: 
"On the one hand, processes of vertical disintegration and 
interlinkage induce spatial agglomeration at particular sites 
which then also become foci of intricate local labour market 
and community processes. On the other hand, there would also 
seem to be a tendency for these sites to swarm within extensive 
spaces or regions offering broadly positive sociocultural 
conditions for production. " (Scott, 1988b, p. 41) 
Accordingly, such regions most typically represent: 
"... kinds of locational environments uncontaminated by previous 
historical experience of large-scale manufacturing activity and 
Fordist employment relations.. . In such environments new and 
experimental kinds of sociotechnical structures of production 
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can be established [ie. flexible production] with minimum local 
obstruction. This is doubly important where both avoidance of 
rigidity and the institutionalization of flexibility are 
primary goals. " (Scott, 1988a, p. 178) 
The New Industrial Spaces, as suggested earlier, are, at 
first sight, a group of disparate regions including inner 
city areas in large metropolitan regions; suburban 
extensions of such metropolitan regions; new "sunbelt 
areas" of high technology industrial development whether 
isolated urban sites or suburban technopoles; or large 
tracts of "semi-rural" Western Europe whose economies were 
often traditionally based on agriculture, trade and small- 
scale industry (Scott, 1988a, p. 179). However, what allows 
the grouping of such diverse regions, and acts as the 
definitive characteristic of the New Industrial Spaces, is 
precisely the structural dynamic of flexible 
industrialisation and reagglomeration of production 
evidenced by such regions: 
".... each of these areas represents a unique configuration of 
social and political life, which means that each is also caught 
up in a unique developmental trajectory. That said, a common 
underlying system of structural dynamics can be detected in 
virtually every case. These dynamics, as we know, revolve for 
the most part around the social division of labour, the 
formation of external economies, the dissolution of labour 
market rigidities, and the reagglomeration of production. " 
(Scott, 1988a, p. 181) 
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In summary, it can be seen that the New Industrial Spaces 
thesis in many ways represents the continued advancement of 
locational theory. Initially it identifies and brings 
together the growing empirical literature on regions 
representative of "the anatomy of job creation", not only 
in the UK but throughout the advanced Western economies. 
However, the thesis goes much further in its aims by 
attempting to theorise and explain the growth dynamics of 
these seemingly disparate regions. 
Firstly, the thesis rightly "downplays" the explanation of 
regional growth based on the simplistic ahistorical listing 
of location factors, often including unique anecdotes, and 
often only applicable to the development of particular 
"spaces". In contrast, the evolutionary spatial dynamics of 
such growth regions are theorised as a response to the new 
imperatives of production introduced as part of the 
structural transition to a system of flexible production. 
Hence, the thesis acknowledges that "locational behaviour 
must be viewed as ultimately the product of processes 
acting outside the spatial sphere itself" (cf. p135). 
With this critical aspect recognised, the New Industrial 
Spaces thesis explicitly attempts an explanation of its 
consequence; namely, that the translation of aspatial 
processes of change into geographical outcome must involve 
a causal ("spatial") logic. Furthermore, that explanation, 
in recognition of the charges of "determinism" levelled at 
previous causal relationships entailed in structural 
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theories of spatial change (see Chapter Three) allows for, 
on the one hand, the identification of a spatial tendency 
associated with structural change while, on the other, 
acknowledging the role of "contingency" in that the 
realisation of such a tendency will be: 
11 ... 
in practice greatly modified by the 
idiosyncrasies of local 
history and geography. "(Scott, 1989, p. 32) 
It is in the context of such an ambitious, forthright and 
far-reaching project, both theoretically and empirically, 
that the New Industrial Spaces thesis has been held up to 
the "critical light". 
4.3 The New Industrial Spaces Thesis: A Theoretical 
Critique 
A growing critique is now apparent, both specifically of 
the New Industrial Spaces thesis itself (Amin and Robins, 
1989; Lovering, 1990a; Martinelli and Schoenberger, 1989) 
and, more widely, of some of the concepts "borrowed" and 
used within the thesis (Amin and Robins, 1990; Gertler, 1988; 
Pollert, 1988; Rustin, 1989; Sayer, 1989b; Williams et al, 
1987). 
As already suggested, the particular interest of this study 
is the "spatial logic" of the New Industrial Spaces thesis 
and a critique will be put forward concentrating on three 
major research processes behind the creation of this logic: 
its conceptualisation; the empirical evidence for such a 
logic; and the methodology used in the collection of such 
153 
evidence. In addition, however, elements of a critique 
applicable to the theory as a whole will also be sketched. 
The most fundamental of debates encompassed by the New 
Industrial Spaces thesis is that it, like many of its 
contemporaries (eg. Lash and Urry, 1987; Leborgne and 
Lipietz, 1988; Lipietz, 1986; Piore and Sabel, 1984), 
incorporates the suggestion that the advanced capitalist 
economies have made the transition to a qualitatively 
different period of capitalist accumulation. Indeed, more 
specific to the New Industrial Spaces thesis is its 
description of this transition as a movement from the 
Fordist era of production to the post-Fordist era and, 
moreover, a transition to a particular form of the post- 
Fordist era, namely an era of "flexible production and 
accumulation". 
Firstly, argument still abounds as to the form and 
extent of any transition from Fordism to post- 
Fordism and, secondly, such argument is heightened 
by the implication that the form of any new post- 
Fordist era is already recognisable and, as such, 
may be labelled as an "era of flexible production 
and accumulation". 
A transition...? 
Taking the first aspect, what must be recognised at this 
point is the essential theory building process which has 
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taken place in constructing an argument for transition. 
Namely, the abstraction of structural processes from 
empirical "reality". At its most fundamental, it is this 
"reading" of the empirical which is"at the heart of the 
present debates concerning the theorised notion of a 
structural transition. As Gertler (1988) wrote in his 
recent overview of some of the alternative "readings": 
"Each argument relies upon its own particular understanding of 
industrial history. Indeed, the very existence of these 
alternatives reminds us that this debate over 'flexible 
accumulation' and its constituent elements is really a 
historiographic one at heart: that, just as the adoption of 
flexible technology is not unproblematic, neither is the 
interpretation of its history self-evident (Mink, 1987). 11 
(op. cit., p. 428) 
Similarly, Amin and Robins (1989) highlight a variety of 
possible alternative "readings" within their work, and 
suggest that the specific "reading" adopted within the New 
Industrial Spaces thesis is an: 
"... extremely simplistic and contentious understanding of 
historical change. "(op. cit, p. 2) 
Sayer (1989b) summarises the criticism being made by 
suggesting that the view of industrial history adopted by 
the New Industrial Spaces thesis is based upon a 
conceptualisation of capitalist industrialisation which, at 
its most extreme, is nothing more than a simple polemical 
contrast in the form of a "binary history". This history is 
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reliant upon the contrast between a (now recognised as) 
"rigid" Fordist system of mass production which has been 
superceded by a post-Fordist production system whose 
guiding principle is "flexibility". Opponents of this 
historical schema question the theoretical assumptions of, 
and the empirical basis for, its central concepts of 
"Fordism" and "post-Fordism". 
Sayer (1989b) argues that the starting point of the schema 
is the ability to define "Fordism" satisfactorily yet: 
"The sense and reference of this term is itself extraordinarily 
loose, particularly when used to denote a major epoch of 
capitalist industrialization. . . Thus the current debate has not 
even got the easier side of its binary opposition firmly 
anchored. " (op. cit., p. 667) 
with such "looseness", problems are apparent such as: 
11 ... 1) assuming mass production to be synonymous with 
inflexibility, period;... and 2) assuming that mass production 
and flexible production are alternatives. " (Sayer, 1989b, p. 672) 
Others have particularly questioned the empirical evidence 
for such theoretical concepts. Williams et al. (1987) in a 
strong critique of this "binary history" argue that 
empirically: 
"... mass production and flexible specialisation (a particular 
form of flexible production? ] cannot be satisfactorily 
identified in particular instances, even at the enterprise and 
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industry level. " (op. cit., p. 417) 
Similarly, Poltert (1988), whilst seemingly able to 
differentiate between production systems, does conclude 
that: 
"Types of technology, their organisation into different systems 
of production, and types of labour processes cannot be 
conflated into a single paradigm; the empirical evidence is far 
more complex. " (op. cit., p. 57) 
Hence, the argument runs, even at the height of "Fordism" 
empirical evidence suggests that "mass production" was 
never a generalised phenomenon but rather a system limited 
to a particular set of industries. Concomitantly, the much 
heralded "new" techniques of flexible production were also 
evident in a variety of other industries during Fordist 
times. Within the context of such empirical evidence, 
Poliert (1988), amongst others, has posed the question what 
is therefore "new" about flexibility and therefore "new" 
about the present period of production. 
30 
Such seemingly contradictory empirical evidence has also 
led others to analyse the mental processes of "reading" 
which have taken place in the creation of such industrial 
histories. Hence, Bonefeld (1987) has argued that an 
30 Interestingly. Poliert (1988) has gone on to answer this question herself. She 
views the celebration of "flexibility" as little more than an attempt to create, 
on capital's terms, a new ideology which accepts as inevitable the many 
disadvantages as well as advantages for labour associated with flexible 
production. In essence, she highlights the ambiguity of the term by asking the 
question "flexibility for whom? " which in her eyes reveals, amongst other aspects, 
the gender-blind nature of the term (see also Jenson, 1989). 
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element of tautological thinking in such readings can be 
recognised in that: 
"... first of all a model or norm is abstracted from disparate 
historical tendencies, and then it is in the light of this 
model that the significance of these same tendencies is 
assessed. " (op. cit., p. 124, quoted in Amin and Robins 1989) 
In essence, the Fordist period has been characterised as, 
and reduced to, a period of mass production. Yet, 
increasingly, signs of a tendency towards a new production 
system based on flexibility have been identified, 
absolutised as the dominant trend and projected forward as 
the "stable end-state" for the new historical phase of 
capitalism. It is then in the light of such an "end-state" 
model that those same tendencies can be evaluated and, 
unsurprisingly, identified as significant (Amin and 
Robins, 1989) . 
Ironically, the response to these criticisms can also be 
seen, in one sense, to rest upon the case that the critics 
have themselves used "selected readings" to create 
caricatures of the original texts. Whilst extreme 
conceptualisations of industrial history could be argued to 
rely heavily upon polemic, rather than empirical reality, 
other less virulent conceptual strains may not be so easily 
dismissed. For example, it is argued that the 
conceptualisation of Fordism held within the New Industrial 
Spaces thesis does not merely represent a particular 
production technique but rather a cohesive ensemble of 
social, political and economic features (ie. a 
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"technological-institutional structure of production and 
accumulation"). Hence, what characterised Fordist times was 
the qualitative "dominance" or "hegemonic" position of 
these features, of which the mass production paradigm was a 
part, and not the quantitative position per se of mass 
production (Schoenberger, 1989). 
31 
Therefore, the "quantity" of mass production is not the 
defining criterion and so, for example, it is wrong to 
suggest that the existence of flexible production 
in 
Fordist times highlights the reductionist theorising which 
has occurred and, more fundamentally, questions just what 
is "new" about flexibility. As Schoenberger (1989) writes: 
,,... the fact that the [flexible production] practices 
identified as new can be shown to have a history does not rule 
out the possibility that their weight and meaning is different 
in the current context. " (op. cit., p. 105) 
Indeed, the precise point is that the weight and meaning of 
these practices has been re-interpreted such that these 
practices are now acknowledged by some commentators as the 
restructuring force of contemporary industrial change 
and, ultimately, the guiding principle of a new capitalist 
era. In other words, it is precisely that these practices 
are now, themselves, moving to a qualitative (and possibly 
quantitative) position of "dominance". Hence, as Gertler 
31 However, exactly how you characterise "dominance" is also problematic. For 
example, is it simply a generally recognised "best practice" within production or 
possibly that production form prevalent in the propulsive sectors of the economy? 




"The principal debate now appears to rest not only upon the 
pervasiveness of flexible production, but also its significance 
within contemporary capitalist economies, no matter how 
prevalent it may be. " (op. cit., p. 109) 
... to flexible production? 
However, if the principal debate creates a distinction 
between those questioning or advocating "flexible 
production practices" as the exemplars of a qualitatively 
new period of accumulation, a second related disagreement 
is also evident amongst the advocates themselves as to 
exactly what these exemplary practices actually are. So, 
whilst some commentators argue over whether or not a 
particular instance is indicative of the move to a new 
system or merely adaptation of the existing system, others 
argue that the shift has already been made but such an 
instance is by no means all-encompassing or, indeed, 
definitive of the new era! 
For example, Lipietz (1989) whilst agreeing with the basic 
argument that a post-Fordist era is emergent, suggests that 
any attempt to identify the emergent era as that of an era 
of flexible accumulation is both premature and 
deterministic. The outlines of the new production era have 
yet to materialise fully and, more importantly, have yet to 
stabilise. New forms of production are in the ascendency 
but flexible production must be viewed as only one of 
several pathways. Rustin (1989) similarly argues against 
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equating one element of contemporary change with the whole: 
"Since socio-technical systems do not develop completely 
autonomously, but only in response to cultural definition, 
conflicts of social forces, and political decision, it is 
dubious in principle and possibly misleading in fact to make 
linear extrapolations from what might seem to be 'leading 
instances', or current trends, to the shape of the whole 
system. " (op. cit., p. 62) 
Hence, the New Industrial Spaces thesis, with its 
foundation upon the theorised move to a post-Fordist system 
of flexible accumulation, encompasses, for many, a: 
"... highly selective and singular interpretation of 
structural change" (Amin and Robins, 1989, p28, my emphasis) 
The evidence for, and problems of, such a selective 
interpretation become clear when discussing the 
repercussions of the shift to flexible production 
concerning the dynamics of industrial organisation and the 
division of labour within production. 
Organisational change: "External i sat i nn'# "disi ntegrati on" 
d "th t 1 i f th i i i an e ex en s on o e so _ a v sion d of a hor" 
If we are focussing upon the "spatial logic" of the New 
Industrial Spaces, it is clear that the significance of the 
new flexible production ensembles does not purely stem 
from: 
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"... their appearance in modern capitalism [but rather it] is 
their evident propensity to disintegrate into extended social 
divisions of labour". (cf. p. 141) 
For Scott and Storper it is the particular form of 
production organisation forwarded by the move to flexible 
production which has acted as the catalyst of the 
reagglomeration of production. It is the proliferation of 
external linkages as a result of the concomitant 
organisational processes of "externalisation", 
"disintegration" and "extension of the social division of 
labour", which they see as triggering the transaction costs 
mechanism and so creating the spatial tendency of 
agglomeration. 
However, j. one accepts the structural shift to 
flexible production, it will be argued that, 
firstly, the organisational response of 
"externalisation" of production instigated by this 
transition and, secondly, the subsequently derived 
processes of "disintegration" and the "extension of 
the social division of labour" do not represent an 
adequate account of all the possibilities for 
organisational change arising from such structural 
change. 
An interpretation of which organisational responses occur 
(and are possible) derives from the model of the firm 
within the New Industrial Spaces thesis. Subsequently, it 
will be argued that the inadequate organisational responses 
allowed for within the thesis stem from flaws to be found 
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within the "transaction costs" model of the firm. 
The firm is viewed as a set of production functions owned 
and organised through a set of internal linkages governed 
by managerial hierarchy. In turn, external market-governed 
linkages are held with other companies. Using this model of 
the firm, if a company takes over a function so that it 
becomes part of its internal network of production this 
represents the processes of "internalisation", 
"integration" and the "extension of the technical division 
of labour". Such organisational change has, in turn, been 
viewed as the characteristic organisational tendency during 
the previous Fordist period of production. 
In comparison, when a firm "divests" itself of a production 
function which it then subsequently buys in through 
external market-governed linkages this is viewed as 
representing the processes of "externalisation", 
"disintegration" and "extension of the social division of 
labour". Within the New Industrial Spaces thesis it is 
argued that this is precisely the dominant organisational 
change which is taking place with the move to an era of 
flexible production and accumulation. The "uncertain" 
environment for production is breaking down internal 
economies of scale within the firm, hence the 
organisational response of "externalisation" (cf. p. 141-2). 
The firm as a social organisation 
However, Lovering (1990a) argues that this chain of events, 
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whilst being "plausible" on the basis of certain documented 
instances, is stretched to become a "descriptive 
generalisation" within the New Industrial Spaces thesis. 
For he argues that: 
"Scott's theory assumes that uncertainty is necessarily 
translated into declining internal economies of scale [and 
hence externalisation]. But this assumption is not 
justifiable. " (Lovering, 1990a, p. 7, author's emphasis) 
In reality, the translation of such "uncertainty" can lead 
to rising or declining internal economies but the point is 
that such translation is dependent upon: 
"... the context of a range of economic practices and 
institutions. Scott's model of the firm under flexible 
accumulation presupposes a particular conception of economic 
uncertainty and firm decision making. 
In the real world the translation from economic uncertainty to 
firm behaviour is a social achievement, reflecting the 
political economy of a specific society. " (op. cit, p. 8, author's 
emphasis; see also Gordon, 1989, p. 27) 
In the world of the New Industrial Spaces, however, 
translation is based upon a (ahistoric) model of the firm 
as a "node of market exchange". 
"This conceptualisation strictly limits the possibilities for 
an analysis of the firm as a social organisation in a specific 
historical context. " (Lovering, 1990a, pp. 9-10) 
164 
The transaction costs model of the firm represents a "pure 
theory of exchange" (Thrift, 1990). Organisational dynamics 
are studied through a comparison of marginal costs in which 
the organisation (hierarchy) is only viewed as a response 
to market failure. Thus, as highlighted by Foray (1990): 
"... the transactional approach requires us to adopt an 
essential hypothesis (and which in a marginalist perspective is 
self-evident) relating to the perfect substitutability of 
internal and external kinds of resources or activities. " 
(op. cit., p. 6) 
Yet this does not satisfactorily represent the empirical 
realities of production. Such reality highlights that the 
integration of a resource into a firm tends to make this 
resource more and more specific in that, through the 
process of integration, it acquires new qualities specific 
to the socio-economic context. In addition, a learning 
process within the firm begins through the self-same 
process of integration. Hence, this recognition of "asset 
specificity" calls into question the assumptions of perfect 
substitutability and transferability in the model and 
highlights that transaction costs only account for the 
negative side of any exchange, namely "the economics of 
friction" (Foray, 1990). 
Moreover, the motor of organizational change for the firm 
must thus be viewed as the reduction of "exchange 
transaction costs". To apply such cost-based analysis 
empirically is fraught with difficulty and rarely 
achievable (Gordon, 1989, p. 26-7; Sayer, 1989b) but, 
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furthermore, and to return to the realities of production: 
"Cost-benefit analysis of procurement isolates only one element 
of a firm's structure of transactions... Reduction of all firm 
decision-making about the internalization or externalization of 
activities to cost calculations alone ignores technological, 
informational and social interdependencies within the 
production process that promote integration of activities 
regardless of relative cost curves (Walker, 1988). The "social 
embeddedness" (Granovetter, 1985) of both firms and markets is 
ignored. " (Gordon, 1989, p. 25) 
In essence, the model reduces the firm to an exchange 
mechanism and not a mechanism for production. As Sayer 
(1989b) suggests: 
"If firms are to survive and not merely minimize costs at a 
point in time they need to protect and develop the routines and 
knowledge on which their future depends (Hodgson, 1988), and 
this dynamic, evolutionary aspect of industrial organisation 
also needs to be considered in explaining vertical 
disintegration. Arguably this is a major factor in restraining 
firms' use of outsourcing and hence inhibiting vertical 
disintegration, even where short-term cost alternatives would 
suggest it... " (Sayer, 1989b, p. 680) 
Ironically, this point is no more relevant than when 
dealing with the dynamics of production within "high 
technology" industry. For, as Foray (1990) argues, the 
transactions view of production: 
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"... requires a universe of technological tranquility, in 
which techniques are definitively constituted and known, [and] 
the firm has no need to transform its organization 
(specification of resources, learning) in order to exploit them 
or respond to new productive problems. Here, the minimization 
of coordination costs can be considered as the motor of 
organizational dynamics" (op. cit., p. 7, my emphasis) 
Such a situation could not be more removed from the reality 
of production for high technology industry where the name 
of the game is often stated as "innovate or die". Linkages 
as relations of exchange are important for their actual 
content rather than their cost per se and, anyway, 
the ability to cost production functions is severely 
hampered by the uncertainty of knowledge as to just what 
those functions will actually entail (Gordon, 1989, pp. 25- 
27). 
The "transaction costs" model of the firm fails to 
conceptualise the firm as an organisation driven by a 
variety of "goals" derived from the act of doing 
production (eg capital-labour relation). The translation 
of the "economic uncertainty" of flexible times into firm 
behaviour characterised by "externalisation" may not be 
assumed. It may therefore also not be assumed that the 
"transaction cost" spatial mechanism of agglomeration will 
be triggered as a result of such behaviour. 
The "process chain" 
Secondly, if "externalisation" is accepted as the 
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organisational response, the model also implies the 
processes of "disintegration" and "extension of the 
social division of labour". The occurrence of these 
simultaneous processes, as we know, is critical in 
triggering the spatial mechanism of the New Industrial 
Spaces thesis. However, other increasingly apparent 
flaws within the transaction costs model of the 
firm reveal these simultaneous processes to be a 
"chain of events" and, moreover, a process chain in 
which one process is not the necessary precondition 
of another. 
Sayer (1989b) discusses how there are, in fact, two 
separately identifiable criteria used in defining the 
boundary of the firm in the above model. On the one hand, 
the criterion of "ownership" and, on the other, the 
criterion of "market or hierarchically-governed linkages". 
A problem has arisen because the model presupposes that 
"ownership" corresponds with "hierarchically-governed 
linkages" (the internal aspect of the firm representing the 
technical division of labour) and "non-ownership" 
corresponds with "market-governed linkages" (the external 
aspect of the firm and the social division of labour). 
However, "the scope for noncorrespondence" of the two 
criteria has expanded in modern industrial times 
(Sayer, 1989b) and so, therefore, has the "scope for 
noncorrespondence" within the "process-chains" of 
organisational change. 
This is particularly evident concerning a form of 
organisational change, an "externalisation" process, which 
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has been explicitly associated with the move to an era of 
flexible accumulation. Cooke (1988) and Martinelli and 
Schoenberger (1989) have highlighted a significant 
acceleration in the rate of formation of strategic 
alliances, joint ventures, consortia etc., between 
(particularly high technology) firms under the conditions 
of flexible production. The point is, however, that whilst 
these organisational forms represent external linkages 
between companies, they are not "market-governed" 
(Cooke, 1988; Gordon, 1989; forthcoming). Similarly, whilst 
such organisational forms may be viewed as an avenue by 
which a firm can possibly "internalise" a particular 
function, such as R&D or marketing, the extent of ownership 
of this function may range from "joint" to effectively 
none. 
Hence, using the model of the firm outlined above, these 
organisational forms represent neither integration nor 
disintegration. In fact, Cooke (1988) has gone on to 
describe these forms of industrial organisation, based on 
external linkages, as representing the process of "diagonal 
integration", whilst others prefer to use the term 
"vertical quasi-integration" (Leborgne and Lipietz, 1988). 
In effect, the relationship between firms within such 
organisational forms is ultimately viewed as being close to 
a technical division of labour (Sayer, 1989b). However, 
whatever these organisational relationships are eventually 
categorised as, the most important point is that whilst 
they represent a process of "externalisation", they do not 
also automatically represent a process of disintegration 
(or if they do it is a different form of disintegration 
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from that held by the model) and extension of the social 
division of labour. They reveal that the "correspondence" 
between certain processes of organisational change does not 
hold in all cases as implied by the transaction costs 
model. The "process-chain" is broken. 
Moreover, a second example of "noncorrespondence", the 
multi-site firm, highlights that the chain may, in fact, be 
more appropriately viewed as a set of individual 
interchangeable "process links" (if only a partially 
understood and defined set as yet). Despite continued and 
renewed arguments for the theoretical integration of "the 
impossible dichotomy of social relations and space" 
(Massey, 1984; Gregory and Urry, 1985), a third implicit 
aspect of the model of the firm laid out above is its 
spatial structure. In the eyes of the model, it is assumed 
that the firm is a single-site firm. Therefore, by 
implication, the technical division of labour is bounded 
within a single site and the social division of labour 
stretches between different firms and hence different 
sites. So, externalisation corresponds with disintegration 
and disintegration corresponds with extension of the social 
division of labour. 
Yet, one of the most distinguishing characteristics of 
modern capitalism is the appearance of the multi-site firm. 
Using the model such firms can be viewed, in one sense, as 
merely representing the spatial extension of the "internal" 
aspect of the firm to cover more than one site. Sites share 
the same owner and maintain hierarchically-governed 
relations between themselves. Effectively, such a situation 
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represents the extension of the technical division of 
labour over space. But, in other cases, multi-site firms 
exhibit the problem of "non-correspondence" whereby: 
"... the social division can penetrate inside different firms, 
where divisions make quite different and unrelated products 
selling in different markets and/or where there is market 
exchange between different divisions of a firm [such a 
situation may occur on an inter-plant basis or even an intra- 
plant basis]. " (Sayer, 1989b, p. 678, author's emphasis). 
In other words, market-governed relations imply a social 
division of labour within the firm whilst the criterion of 
ownership continues to imply a technical division of 
labour. 
Such various organisational forms as strategic alliances 
and particular multi-site company structures place a large 
questionmark over the actual ability of the transaction 
costs model of the firm to cope with, and distinguish, the 
increasingly varied forms of industrial organisation 
(change) in modern capitalism. For example, the particular 
process of organisational change represented by the recent 
empirical identification of strategic alliances is not 
accounted for within the model as it stands. Moreover, it 
is unclear how such organisational forms can be 
accommodated within the model. 32 As Gordon (1989) writes: 
32 Earlier, the recognition of such new organisational forms by Scott was 
acknowledged (pp. 142-3). However, exactly how such forms can be accommdated 
within the model of the firm is not explained. In fact, as argued here, a flaw of 
the model is precisely its inability to include such organisational forms. 
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"The options presented by orthodox linkage theory - internal 
organisation or market-regulated transactions between 
independent firms - far from exhaust the possible forms of 
economic coordination. Indeed, they represent alternatives 
whose significance is diminishing in fact. The market-hierarchy 
dichotomy precisely obliterates the vast and expanding realm of 
non-market cooperation and coordination between firms that has 
emerged as a practical response to the limitations of both 
market and hierarchy alike. " (op. cit., p. 28) 
Gordon's point may also be extended to argue that this 
dichotomy likewise obliterates the varied forms of co- 
ordination to be found within (particularly multi-site) 
firms as well as between them. 
At this point then, firstly, the theorised transition to 
flexible production has been debated. Secondly, it has been 
argued that this transition's motivation of a "process 
chain" of organisational change ultimately leading to the 
extension of the social division of labour is not 
automatic. Rather, it depends on a restrictive model of the 
firm and hence a restrictive model of organisational change 
by the firm. This process chain represents merely one of a 
series of possible forms of response by organisations faced 
with a new production environment. 
Organisational change: a variety of responses (implying a 
variety of spatial outcomes) 
Indeed, Martinelli and Schoenberger (1989) highlight a 
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critical organisational response which may be misread, 
arguing that: 
"... the increasing fragmentation of the productive system must 
not be confused with a fragmentation of capital and 
control... Counter and parallel to the fragmentation of the 
productive system there is a significant trend towards the 
further concentration of capital and control. "(op. cit., p. 18- 
19), 33 
Significantly, Martinelli and Schoenberger (1989) still 
view this trend as part of the organisational response to 
flexible production. The appearance of strategic alliances, 
joint ventures and so on are argued to represent a new 
competitive structure of "flexible oligopoly". Similarly, 
Cooke (1988) has viewed such organisational forms as part 
of a turn to "flexible integration" in production. 34 In 
other words, there is a contradiction between the 
fragmentation of production, highlighted by Scott and 
Storper, and subsequently interpreted as the move to 
disintegration and extension of the social division of 
labour and the (parallel? ) increased concentration of 
capital and control emphasised by other commentators and, 
in turn, interpreted as a move to integration and the 
(possible) continued extension of the technical division of 
labour. 
33 Martinelli and Schoenberger (1989). as well as recognising the extension of 
ownership across more than one economic unit, are also suggesting that "control" 
may be wielded by one unit over another without a formal relation of ownership 
necessarily being present (see also Leborgne and Lipietz, 1988, p. 274). 
39 In contrast, Shutt and Whittington (1987) have also revealed this trend as the 
outcome of a different set of organisational responses. Namely "fragmentation" 
strategies by large firms in response to (the) crisis (of Fordism). 
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This contradiction is, in fact, no better highlighted than 
within the "US" film industry. For whilst this industry 
represents one of the strongest empirical justifications so 
far for the transformation of an industry into a 
disintegrated and flexible production complex 
(Christopherson and Storper, 1986; Storper, 1989) it has 
recently been rocked as "Hollywood rides into-[the] Rising 
Sun" (Tran; 1990). Following hard on the heels of Sony's 
takeover of Columbia Pictures, Matsushita (the world's 12th 
largest company) has announced its takeover of MCA. 
Indeed, for Amin and Robins (1990), such an announcement 
merely serves to confirm their argument that, in fact, the 
combined trend of continued concentration and 
centralisation of capital is, if any trend of 
organisational change is, the trend of long term 
historical, and hence structural, significance. So much so, 
this trend fundamentally questions, in their eyes, the very 
shift to a new post-Fordist era: 
"... we are, in fact, witnessing a deepening of the historical 
trends towards global integration of local and national 
economies and the international centralisation of command and 
control. The dominant, though not uncontested, tendency is 
towards market homogenisation, industry globalisation and firm 
integration (Doz, 1987). " (op. cit., p. 7) 
However: 
"The new global corporations are following a range of 
strategies. They may, depending on the structure and dynamics 
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of particular sectors, refine 'older' forms of organisation 
involving direct ownership, forward and backward vertical 
integration, diversification into new profitable sectors and 
the internationalisation of production... 
In other sectors, we can, in contrast, see the opening up of a 
range of 'new' possibilities, which also involve further 
international spread and the deployment of new communication 
technologies, but on the basis of developing much more 
fluid 
intra-firm and inter-firm organisational networks. MNCs, 
particularly in expanding industries characterised by intensive 
research and volatile markets (eg. telecommunications, 
computers, electronics, pharmaceuticals, aerospace, 
transportation equipment [ie. the industries of the flexible 
high technology ensemble], appear to be devising new strategies 
in the face of rising R&D costs, rapidly changing and 
shortening product life cycles, greater risks of market 
failure, and the availability of technologies which allow 
greater task integration and easier communication between 
divisions... " (ibid, p. 10-11; cf. Financial Times Survey 
"European High Technology" 20.3.1990) 
It is clear that new organisational forms such as strategic 
alliances, whether part of "flexible production and 
accumulation" or the antithesis of it, represent a process 
(or processes) of organisational change which is (are) not 
satisfactorily, if at all, encompassed within the 
transaction costs model of the firm as it is presently 
constructed. 35 
35 In fact, much work is still required to "unbundle" the group of organisational 
forms represented by strategic alliances, joint ventures, consortium, etc., 
especially as it is already known that a variety of strategies lie behind their 
creation (Cooke, 1988; Gordon, 1989). 
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Whilst the model's omission of the variety of processes of 
organisational change is a problem in itself, its 
particular importance for the New Industrial Spaces thesis 
stems from the theory's view that changes in the 
organisation of production drive changes in the spatial 
organisation of production. For the theory it is the 
specific organisational responses (under flexible 
production) of "externalisation", "disintegration" and 
"extension of the social division of labour" which trigger 
the "spatial mechanism" of agglomeration. However, such 
responses must be viewed as only a (model-restricted) 
"selection" of those currently underway. It therefore 
becomes highly questionable whether the spatial 
implications of all the current changes in the organisation 
of production can be accommodated within the New Industrial 
Spaces based, as it is, upon this restrictive model of 
organisational change. 
Moreover, the continued complexity of modern industrial 
capitalism is revealing assumptions held within the 
transaction costs model to be increasingly untenable. Using 
it to decipher exactly where, and how, we draw the 
boundaries of the firm, and thus identify processes of 
dynamic organisational change (including those which 
trigger the "spatial mechanism") is becoming highly 
problematical. Fundamentally, however, the ability to 
define firm boundaries, and exactly how this is 
done, is the most critical element in to 
conceptualisation and operation of the locational 
mechanism of the New Industrial Spaces thesis. For 
the "spatial mechanism" is an integral part of the 
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firm once conceptualised within the transaction 
costs model. 
It..,.. -4-, -I merk r4 onto 
The boundary of the firm must be drawn before the 
"internal" and "external" linkages of any particular firm 
may be listed. This represents the critical moment in the 
conceptualisation of the firm and the spatial mechanism 
which is integral to it. For, as outlined earlier, the 
basis of the causal mechanism of location within the New 
Industrial Spaces logic is the argument that all linkages 
intrinsically possess a spatial cost and external 
production linkages possess a greater "spatial dependence" 
than internal ones. So, with an (assumed) increase in the 
proportion of external linkages ("externalisation") 
occurring in response to an (assumed) move to flexible 
production, the firm's linkage costs will rise. 
Subsequently, the pressures to reduce the spatial extent of 
these linkages may be recognised and, following the New 
Industrial Spaces thesis, acted upon by the individual firm 
through its location as part of an agglomeration. 
Furthermore, such a situation is deemed particularly likely 
if the firm's external production relations are 
characterised by high cost (transactions intensive) 
linkages involving highly flexible, uncertain and shifting 
connections, as is the reported case concerning the 
flexible industrial ensembles. 
However, just as, and because, the multi-site firm raises 
problems for the transaction costs model of the firm, so it 
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raises problems for the locational mechanism which springs 
from this model. For, within such firms, internal 
linkages occur within the firm but between sites. In 
other words, such internal linkages are dispersed 
spatially, just as those external linkages between 
different firms, so begging the question how these former 
linkages can be treated as any less spatially dependent 
than the latter. 
Just as two separate aspects have been identified which 
"determine" the greater spatial dependence of external 
linkages (pp. 143-46), so these aspects are used to explain 
this anomaly. Effectively, the New Industrial Spaces thesis 
"disallows" the existence of this particular form of 
internal linkage. Firstly, on the basis of all linkages 
possessing a "unit cost per distance", all internal 
linkages are assumed to be "on-site" hence highly 
spatially constrained. 36 In the initial conception and 
application of the model, "internal" has been equated with 
"on-site" by explicitly restricting the spatial model 
to single-site firms. The model is still useful, 
however, due to the many empirical situations where 
industries and regions are predominantly populated by 
single-site firms. Indeed, the New Industrial Spaces are a 
particular case in point: 
"In much of what follows, firms are treated as though they were 
without exception single-plant (or single-establishment) units. 
This restriction simplifies certain aspects of the succeeding 
36 The spatial scale being defined as relevant to the particular point being 
made. 
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discussion, and it certainly corresponds by and large to the 
empirically-given situation in the printed circuits and women's 
dress industries in the Greater Los Angeles Region today. Even 
so, it is a restriction that is clearly at odds with much of 
the reality of contemporary industrial enterprise, and any 
further elaborations of the present analysis will no doubt have 
to come more explicitly to terms with this issue. " 
(Scott, 1983a, p. 234-5). 
Such further elaborations have followed an interesting line 
and eventually lead to the second form of response to 
spatially dispersed internal linkages, this time based on 
the nature of such linkages: 
"The situation becomes even more complicated when we take 
into 
account the circumstance that firms may, 
in addition, be 
spatially disintegrated into multiple discrete establishments, 
each of them with many independent external transactional 
relations. " (Scott, 1988b, p. 25) 
Essentially, whereas previously firms have been assumed to 
be single-site and independent, period, further 
elaborations have recognised the possibility that 
individual sites within a multi-site firm may well be 
acting as if "independent" (single-site) firms, with each 
site possessing its own network of external, market- 
governed linkages. In other words, sites of multi-plant 
firms may be equated with independent firms. 37 
37 In fact, such treatment has been both explicit and implicit within Scott's 
empirical work. Concerning his work on orange County (Scott, 1986b), empirical 
investigation has revealed that in many cases "branches" do indeed have a high 
degree of autonomy so possibly justifying the equation. However, in other work, 
often involving aggregate data, the level of analysis used has been that of 
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Hence, the result of this second equation is that 
"internal" linkages that occur between sites owned by the 
same company actually become "external" linkages. Moreover, 
such linkages because they are external are more 
"flexible", "transaction-intensive" and hence costly. Once 
again, the problematic of the spatial dependence of 
"internal" linkages is (partially) solved by 
effectively theorising such linkages into non- 
existence. 38 
In effect, also, the form of multi-site firm organisation 
discussed earlier, whereby the social division of labour is 
seen to penetrate within the firm, is assumed. However, 
whilst such an assumption may be applicable to certain 
multi-site firms, it is questionable whether such an 
assumption can be made for all, or even the majority of, 
multi-site firms. 
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"establishments" with no acknowledgement that such establishments may well be 
under the same ownership, although possibly acting "independently" (see later this 
chapter). 
38 I suggest only partially solved because no explicit conception of the spatial 
dependence of linkages internal to the site is actually held within the model. 
They are generally held to be just "less spatially dependent than external 
linkages". But, for example, linkages could be "on-site" precisely because they 
are highly transactions intensive and hence "resistant" to spatial dispersion. In 
other words, the model does not allow a situation where the mechanism could work 
"within site" (and possibly within multi-site). In other cases, looking at the 
production process itself, the actual process may be hampered by its spatial 
separation. For example, a critique of science parks is precisely that the 
phenomenon is based on the artificial spatial separation of two inherently 
inseparable processes of production, namely conception and manufacturing (Wield, 
Massey and Quintas, 1988; Massey, Wield and Quintas forthcoming). 
39 In fact, Sayer (1989b) has recently lent some support to such a position, by 
suggesting the over-emphasis given to the ownership relation in determining the 
behaviour of multi-site firms. The rise of the "branch plant" as a stereotype in 
industrial geography may well be a case in point. However, the New Industrial 
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One further important "knock-on" effect of this assumption 
must also be emphasised. For if sites of multi-site firms 
are treated as "independent" then one process of their 
creation, namely the extension of the technical division of 
labour, becomes "null and void". The extension of the 
social division of labour ("within" as well as 
between firms) becomes the only process of "new 
establishment growth". This point is critical when 
discussing the empirical evidence thus far provided for the 
causal logic of the New Industrial Spaces (see later this 
chapter). 
So, after highlighting certain assumptions concerning the 
spatial dependence of linkages, the New Industrial Spaces 
thesis puts forward a spatial mechanism which is an 
integral aspect of the firm (as conceptualised using 
transaction costs). However, in what amounts to a "reverse 
logic of necessity", it will be seen that the thesis also 
puts forward a spatial mechanism with a necessary 
outcome, namely agglomeration. 
The mechanism's (non)operation... 
Firstly, if we accept the existence of the causal mechanism 
as integral to the definition of the firm, we need not 
accept that the mechanism operates each and every 
Spaces thesis effectively moves to the other extreme, replacing one multi-site 
organisational stereotype, the "branch plant", with another, "the independent 
branch". The point is how do we conceptualise the majority of multi-sites which 
sit somewhere between the two extremes? Sayer, himself, puts forward the idea of 
"modes of organization" where what matters is the emphasis placed upon the role of 
the market in governing relationships whether within or between firms. 
181 
time. 40 Certain conditions are required for the 
mechanism's activation. Indeed, Scott (1989) does set out 
those circumstances in which the mechanism will be 
activated. In other words, that "critical range" of 
transaction intensive production linkages (eg. small-scale, 
non-standard, flexible) whose costs particularly increase 
with distance. 
... to create agglomeration 
However, once the mechanism is activated, the argument 
continues that agglomeration will be the result. But this 
is not the case. Just as certain conditions are required to 
activate the mechanism so certain conditions are required 
for this activation to engender agglomeration. The 
mechanism's operation to create agglomeration is a 
contingent and not a necessary relation. The possibility 
exists that the causal mechanism may operate 
without creating the outcome of agglomeration. 41 
For example, despite doubt as to whether or not the 
transaction costs model can actually acknowledge the 
existence and repercussions of organisational forms such as 
strategic alliances, these organisational forms can be 
viewed as the "externalisation" of production by firms in 
response to the uncertainty engendered by structural 
40 "So although causal powers exist necessarily by virtue of the nature of the 
objects which possess them, it is contingent whether they are either activated or 
exercised" (Sayer, 1984, p. 99) 
41 "When they are exercised, the actual effects of causal mechanisms will again 
depend upon the conditions in which they work... Not surprisingly then, depending 
on conditions, the operation of the same mechanism can produce quite different 
results... " (Sayer, 1984, p. 99-100) 
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change. They are an integral element of the transition (to 
flexible production). Hence, these forms also represent an 
expansion of "flexible (? ) external linkages" within 
production. In other words, an expansion of those linkages 
which are viewed as driving the primary dynamic of 
agglomeration within the New Industrial Spaces. Strategic 
alliances may yet represent a process of "externalisation" 
under flexible production, triggering the spatial 
mechanism, and so driving the tendency of agglomeration. 
However, the tentative empirical evidence so far suggests 
that strategic alliances take a variety of spatial forms. 
Cooke (1988) concludes that: 
11 ... the spatial picture 
is one of locationally relatively 
unconstrained networking of information, R&D, marketing, and 
distribution, much of which is tied together by the burgeoning 
trend towards forming strategic alliances". (op. cit., p. 296, 
author's emphasis) 
His small study of a US biotechnology complex similarly 
found that most alliances were nonlocal (ibid). 
Gordon (forthcoming) discovered that an astonishing 90% of 
a sample of high technology SMEs in Silicon Valley were 
involved in alliances: 
" Alliance relations link SMEs almost exclusively with other 
large (80 percent), established (94.4 percent) high technology 
firms in an intricate global network. The majority of firms 
maintain partnering linkages at the local, national and 
international levels simultaneously. " (op. cit., p. 36, my 
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emphasis) 
The strongest evidence yet for the agglomeration of such 
linkages has been provided by Saxenian (1990). She has 
detailed the ways in which computer systems firms in 
Silicon Valley are consciously creating networks of long- 
term, trust-based alliances with their most innovative 
suppliers but again both within, and outside of, the 
region: 
"There is, however, a clear trend for Silicon Valley systems 
firms to prefer local suppliers and to build the sort of 
collaborative relationships which flourish only with 
proximity. "(op. cit, p. 32) 
Thus it is evident that strategic alliances and the like 
vary considerably in their spatial extent from the local to 
the global. The question is how can this be. 
The implication of the New Industrial Spaces logic is that 
spatially diffuse production linkages "fail to gain 
membership" of that "critical" set of production linkages 
which engender agglomeration: 
"The point here is not that such wider interactions do not 
occur, but that there is, in addition, some critical range of 
inter-industrial activities whose cost-distance relations 
encourage agglomeration of groups of producers into distinctive 
industrial districts and regions. This critical range would 
seem especially to be made up of transactions-intensive (hence 
high cost) linkages involving above all flexible, rapidly- 
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shifting, small scale, and non-standard connections between 
producers. " (Scott, 1989, p. 26) 
The point here, also, is that in terms of the operation of 
the mechanism, where the "outcome of agglomeration" 
is not present it is presumed that the conditions 
for the operation of the mechanism are also not 
present. Whilst that may be so. it may also be the 
case that the mechanism is operational but an 
outcome other than agglomeration transpires. The 
New Industrial Spaces thesis includes, in effect, a 
"reverse" logic of necessity. 
Thus, concerning strategic alliances, if one follows the 
transaction costs approach, the implication is that global 
alliances must somehow differ in terms of linkage type (ie. 
less transactions-intensive, flexible etc. ) to those 
alliances of local dimension, so explaining the non- 
operation of the mechanism. Whilst the above quote of 
Saxenian (1990) lends some support in suggesting that 
certain alliance relationships can only flourish with 
proximity, work by Hamel et al. (1989) on predominantly 
inter-continental alliances has equally revealed how such 
alliances involve a constantly evolving bargain requiring 
continual monitoring, appraisal and adaptation by partner 
companies, both individually and in unison. In other words, 
such global linkages arguably share many characteristics of 
transaction intensive "linkages of agglomeration" (whether 
alliance-based or not), not least of which is the shared 
driving force behind their creation, namely the search for 
external economies of scale and scope. 42 The conclusion 
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must be drawn that the mechanism is activated in cases of 
both local and global strategic alliances but only produces 
agglomeration in the former case. In the case of global 
alliances the mechanism is operative but "overridden" 
by other "contingent conditions". 43 
This fundamental point may be further illustrated by the 
work of Glasmeier (1988) and Gordon (forthcoming). In her 
studies of high technology multi-site firms Glasmeier 
(1988) has described a particular form of branch plant, the 
"technical branch plant". This form of branch plant 
encompasses its own product-related R&D, is involved in 
market relations with its parent and, as such, is viewed as 
a stand-alone profit centre by its parent. Such a plant 
would seem to represent an empirical example of those 
"branches" Scott has himself equated with independent 
single site firms. Yet on studying such a technical branch 
plant, located in Austin, Texas, Glasmeier (1988) concluded 
that: 
"In the case of Rolm in Austin, limitations on linkage and 
spin-off development arise because the Rolm-Austin plant is a 
technical branch plant whose parent is located in Silicon 
Valley. While ideally the Rolm-Austin plant would like to, and 
certainly could take advantage of local suppliers, it does not 
do so for the most part because input needs are satisfied 
42 Concerning the driving force for "linkages of agglomeration" see the earlier 
quotes of Scott (this chapter). For strategic alliances see the work of Teece 
(1980) quoted in Cooke (1988, p. 290). 
43 This point raises an important issue for "realist" based empirical research. 
That is, how may we distinguish situations where the mechanism is not operational 
from those situations where the mechanism is operational but overridden. 
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through the parent corporation which is strategically located 
in a dominant high tech agglomeration, California's Silicon 
Valley. " (op. cit., p. 295) 
In other words, despite the availability of local suppliers 
and hence (presumably) the ability to reduce the spatial 
cost of these supply linkages such a situation is precluded 
by the role of the parent. The mechanism would seem to 
be operative but "overridden". It may be argued that 
this is the case because the move to full "marketisation" 
has not taken place, hence the optimum conditions for the 
logic to apply have not been reached. Although the branch 
is viewed as a "profit centre" it is restricted by the 
parent as to the advantage it may take of (presumably) 
cheaper local linkages. However, this precisely highlights 
that certain conditions are required for the mechanism's 
activation, period, and its activation to produce an 
agglomeration outcome. The mechanism's operation is not 
automatic and nor is the outcome of agglomeration from its 
operation. 
The recent work of Gordon (forthcoming) provides a further 
example and, in so doing, returns our attention to the 
conceptualisation of the firm as a production organisation 
encompassing more than just a series of market relations. 
For in his work Gordon describes how the present 
environment of permanent innovation and rapid technological 
change is driving the formation of new forms of firm 
relationship within high technology industries. No 
individual firm is able to cope alone in such an 
environment and survival is based on a combined strategy of 
187 
specialisation and "integration" (disintegration?! ) into a 
network of interconnected firms providing complementary 
specialist services. In fact, this scenario mirrors that of 
the New Industrial Spaces thesis. However, where it differs 
is Gordon's (forthcoming) argument that: 
"The central problem for the individual firm is no longer a 
discrete series of traditional "make or buy" decisions, but the 
coherent allocation of its activities within the structure of 
internal operations, market exchange, and interdependent 
relations that comprise a chain of production... The logic of 
production must be defined not simply in terms of an efficient 
combination of factors but as a logic of interaction... " 
(op. cit, p. 38, author's emphasis) 
Whilst such a logic is creating new forms of economic 
coordination excluded from the traditional "make or buy" 
dichotomy, it also holds a critical impact on the 
(locational) behaviour of the firm. For: 
"Transaction-intensive and non-standardised relations also 
appear to sustain less geographically-dependent cost structures 
than is frequently thought or at the very least, the 
agglomerative tendencies inherent in transaction costs 
are outweighed by other production-oriented 
considerations. " (Gordon, forthcoming, p. 37, my emphasis) 
For the individual enterprise the critical issue becomes 
its positioning within networks of firms that constitute a 
chain of production, encompassing both the unique 
innovative capabilities of local innovative complexes and 
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entry into the global information networks of regional 
economies (ibid., p. 39). Whilst "transaction costs" may be 
an issue, particularly concerning the local element of the 
production network, it is clear that the significance of 
production linkages is, first and foremost, based on why 
they are created and who with, rather than costs incurred 
as a result of where they are created. 
In contrast to Gordon (forthcoming) and Glasmeier's (1988) 
work, Saxenian (1990) has provided evidence of the 
operation of the transaction costs mechanism to produce 
agglomeration. Interviewing computer systems firms in 
Silicon Valley, the following typical quotes of managers 
were gained: 
"Our purchasing strategy is that our vendor base is close to 
where we're doing business... We like them to be next door. If 
they can't, they need to be able to project an image like they 
are next door. " 
"In the ideal world, we'd draw a 100 mile radius and have all 
our suppliers locate plants, or at least supply depots, into 
the area. " (Saxenian, 1990, p. 17) 
The argument, then, is not to deny that agglomeration is an 
outcome of the "transaction costs" mechanism but rather to 
argue that it is not a necessary result of its operation. 
In effect, the New Industrial Spaces thesis incorporates a 
reverse logic of necessity in that the non-appearanne 
of agglomeration implies the non-operation of the 
mechanism. In fact, the mechanism may be "overriden" and 
Gordon's (forthcoming) and Glasmeier's (1988) work reveals 
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"conditions" in which this may take place. Moreover, they 
reveal conditions which are integral aspects of the firm 
yet are excluded from the transaction costs model. Gordon 
(forthcoming) refers to "production-oriented 
considerations" which arise from viewing the firm as node 
of interaction in a production chain rather than merely an 
efficient point of factor combination. Thus, he argues 
that: 
"More broadly, the conception of linkages as relations of 
exchange remains preoccupied with the costs and geographic 
scope, as opposed to the actual content, of inter-firm 
relations. " (Gordon, 1989, p. 27) 
Whilst this is a view recognised by Scott and Storper, the 
preoccupation implies that it is less clear whether they 
recognise that specific elements of this linkage content 
may precisely represent other "conditions (contingencies)" 
determining the operation and outcome of the mechanism. 
Gordon highlights the actual process of production but a 
further, and highly relevant, aspect is that of power 
relations. For whether exercised through ownership, 
hierarchically-, market- or "intermediately"- governed 
linkages, each site is necessarily placed within a system 
of power relationships through its linkages with other 
sites, just as it is necessarily placed within a 
transactional cost structure (Storper and Harrison, 1989). 
Moreover, it is clear that "power" within relationships can 
play a role in location. Thus, in the earlier discussion of 
Glasmeier's (1988) work on the Rolm branch in Austin, the 
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"parental" relation (ie. the power of ownership) precluded 
the use of local supplier linkages. In contrast, it has 
been shown how assumptions made when conceptualising the 
spatial model precisely remove such a (definitional) 
relation for "branch" sites. They are viewed as independent 
firms. 
This example is symptomatic of the model as a whole. For 
whilst Scott (see p. 143) acknowledges "various kinds of 
power relations" within quasi-hierarchical or quasi-market 
linkages, he fails systematically to allow for the fact 
that such power relations may influence the (non)operation 
and outcome of the locational mechanism. Linkages between 
sites are implicitly assumed to represent relationships of 
equal power. Yet, we merely need look at one form of 
linkage between a large customer and its dependent 
subcontractor to exemplify one possible (asymmetrical) 
power relationship. The point is, however, that such power 
may also play a role in the locational decision. 
For example, situations are increasingly being brought to 
our attention where the introduction of J. I. T. systems by a 
large firm is requiring a similar move by its suppliers to 
become part of a complete production system. It is also 
argued that the successful working of J. I. T. systems 
requires locational proximity (Estall, 1985; Holmes, 1985; 
Sayer, 1985b; Sheard, 1983). Hence, the dependent 
subcontractor is required to locate "close" to the major 
customer at the behest of this customer. In such a case the 
subcontractor's locational decision is circumscribed by the 
unequal power relationship contained within its linkage. 
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Whilst it may be argued that the ultimate reason for 
locational proximity returns us to transaction costs 
pressures mediated through the J. I. T. production system, 
the subcontractor's minority power within this production 
linkage cannot be overlooked. Its dependence on this 
customer (rather than many) shapes its locational decision. 
The point is that power is also a highly important ever- 
present aspect to production linkages (just as transaction 
costs are) which may or may not intervene in the 
(non)operation of the causal mechanism of location. 
Certainly, power may influence how we view the outcome. For 
example, the contractor-dependent subcontractor 
agglomeration linkage is considerably different from the 
linkage exemplified within the canonical industrial 
district. This latter form of agglomeration, often taken as 
exemplary of the New Industrial Spaces logic (see later 
this chapter), is viewed as representing networks of small 
family firms of equal position within an essentially non- 
hierarchical production system. In fact, in recognising 
this issue, Storper and Harrison (1989) have used the form 
of power relation (governance structure) as a 
discriminating variable in the creation of a typology of 
production agglomerations, and production systems more 
widely. 
Other mechanisms of agglomeration 
The corollary of the mechanism possibly producing other 
outcomes than agglomeration, is that agglomeration itself 
may be the empirical result of different mechanisms. Other 
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mechanisms may act to create a similar agglomeration 
pattern as that generally attributed to the "transaction 
costs" mechanism. 44 Indeed, Scott and Storper provide a 
variety of mechanisms of agglomeration within the New 
Industrial Spaces thesis (see pp. 144-49). 
For example, the thesis argues for agglomeration as a 
result of the "externalisation" process undertaken by firms 
to take advantage of the (agglomeration) economies 
potentially achievable through having other specialist 
firms "close". That is, firms already within the production 
network are likely to increase their external linkages to 
it. This represents the dynamic concept of "locational 
implosion" of an agglomeration. 45 However, the key dynamic 
of such agglomerations, in the first instance, is Scott and 
Storper's view that the drive by firms to become part of 
these networks, and hence gain from the economies of such 
networks, will create a spatial tendency for firms to 
cluster. In other words, linkages with the network will 
engender a "spatial pull" and become a crucial element in 
the location of firms within the spatial boundaries of such 
44 "When they are exercised, the actual effects of causal mechanisms will again 
depend upon the conditions in which they work... Not surprisingly then, depending 
on conditions, the operation of the same mechanism can produce quite different 
results and, alternatively, different mechanisms may produce the same 
empirical result. " (Sayer, 1984, p. 99-100) 
45 However, this "dynamic" of agglomeration does raise certain questions about 
the concept of agglomeration itself. For example, "externalisation" may simply 
represent the swopping of internal linkages for external linkages but these "new" 
external linkages, if based within the local production network, will be viewed as 
adding to the agglomeration. In reality, however, the same number of linkages 
(whether internal or external) will be found within the locality begging the 
question why the term "agglomeration" is applied in only the latter instance (I 
thank Doreen Massey for this point]. 
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networks. 
But, in the light of Scott and Storper's argument for a 
locational mechanism of agglomeration, a critical 
distinction between the two processes of agglomeration 
needs to be drawn. For in the former instance, linkages 
within the agglomeration are set-up post-location. Such 
linkages may well be of crucial significance to the 
continued well-being of the individual firm (and the 
production network). However, our concern in this instance 
is the role of linkages vis-a-vis the actual process of 
location, and it is clear that concerning this relationship 
such linkages are contingent. The reason for the firm's 
location lies elsewhere. That reason may possibly be the 
latter mechanism of agglomeration provided by Scott and 
Storper, whereby linkages are part of the location dynamic. 
In this case, linkages within the agglomeration are created 
pre-location or upon location and are an integral 
element in the firm's location. Thus, whilst the 
outcome of agglomeration occurs in both instances, 
the causal process is different to the extent that 
only in one case is the process actually causing a 
change in location. 
Problems of theory and method (Sayer, 1985c) 
In summary, whilst the necessary existence of the spatial 
mechanism as part of the (transaction costs) firm may be 
accepted, neither this mechanism's necessary operation nor 
its necessary operation to produce agglomeration is 
acceptable. 
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The New Industrial Spaces spatial logic certainly does not 
fall into the trap of "crude determinism" in arguing for 
the necessity of the mechanism's operation to create 
agglomeration. 46 However, it does contain what may be 
viewed as a reverse logic of necessity. For if 
agglomeration is not present it is therefore also assumed 
that the mechanism is not present (non-operative). But this 
is not the case. Rather, it is contingent as to whether or 
not agglomeration will result from the activation of the 
mechanism. Moreover, it is argued that greater 
understanding of such "contingency" is forthcoming if we 
view the firm as rather more than just a 
transactional structure representing also the 
organisation of the social relations of production. 
In effect, the logic falls into the trap of many 
theoretical stereotypes in practical use (Sayer, 1985c): 
"At a general methodological level, the basic failing of all 
these stereotypes is that they freeze, and then present as 
universal, relationships which are contingent and historically 
specific. They therefore combine problems A and B in section 2 
(pseudoconcrete analysis and misidentification of space and 
process)... " (op. cit., p. 17) 
The logic implies "pseudoconcrete analysis" in that it 
fetishises agglomeration (a transient and contingent social 
form) as the only spatial outcome if the transaction costs 
mechanism is activated under flexible production 
(Sayer, 1985b, p. 4). It implies the problem of 
46 At least, it does not do so theoretically. However, in its use of empirical 
evidence the theory moves perilously close to doing so (see later this chapter). 
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"misidentification of space and process" by identifying a 
particular process, the transaction costs mechanism, with a 
particular space, agglomeration. In fact, more directly, 
the logic implies "misidentification" by identifying the 
non-existence of the space (agglomeration) with the non- 
operation of the process (transaction costs)[op. cit., p. 51. 
In combination, this analysis of the mechanism and 
its operation therefore implies that rather than 
seeing agglomeration as the outcome of the 
transaction costs mechanism, period, it rather 
becomes a question of what weight we actually give 
to the transaction costs mechanism as one 
explanation (of several) of agglomeration. In other 
words, whilst the mechanism represents a coherent 
theoretical "logic of agglomeration", what evidence 
is there that it also represents an empirically- 
realised causal mechanism of agglomeration? 
Fundamentally, it is this evidence which will thus 
determine to what extent the spatial logic of the New 
Industrial Spaces truly represents the locational logic of 
the theorised (and hotly contested) transition to a post- 
Fordist industrial society. 
Also fundamental, however, is the form such empirical 
evidence must take in the light of this analysis of the 
operation of the causal mechanism. For the analysis implies 
that we cannot simply provide the logic of a mechanism 
(eg. transaction costs) and empirical evidence akin to the 
perceived outcome of the mechanism (eg. agglomeration). For, 
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in reality, the mechanism may or may not have operated in 
the particular instance to produce the particular outcome. 
Rather, empirical evidence must be provided which 
identifies the mechanism and its operation to produce the 
outcome. In other words, the nature of the causal 
process creating any (outcome) pattern must be 
investigated as well as the outcome, itself, 
described. 
The (empirical) appearance of new agglomerations of 
The preceding section has outlined how the process of 
spatial agglomeration has been theorised by Scott (and 
Storper) and questions have been raised concerning certain 
aspects of this theorisation. Furthermore, the section has 
ended by highlighting the critical importance of empirical 
evidence in confirming the "status" of the theoretical 
logic put forward. The following section deals with the 
empirical evidence, both for the pattern of spatial 
agglomeration and for the theorised causal process from 
which the pattern is said to have arisen. As such, two 
dimensions of this evidence will be focussed upon in 
particular. 
Firstly, the actual empirical evidence which is the content 
of the pattern will be discussed. However, as has already 
been emphasised, this evidence will also be evaluated for 
evidence of the causal process behind the pattern. Merely 
exhibiting the outcome, and assuming its appearance as due 
to a particular posited mechanism is not enough. Evidence 
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for the operation of that particular causal process in 
creating that particular outcome must also be provided. 
This requirement as to what the evidence needs to exhibit, 
that is both process and outcome, leads to the second 
dimension concerning the empirical evidence. That dimension 
is the method used in the collection of empirical evidence. 
For it is argued that particular, and different, research 
designs are required depending on whether evidence is being 
collated of a causal process or of a pattern of outcomes 
(Sayer, 1984) . 
Distinguishing marks: What are the empirical features of a 
New Industrial Space? 
As was the case when earlier detailing debates around the 
move to post-Fordism, so the empirical evidence for the New 
Industrial Spaces has been subjected to a variety of 
"readings". Once again, the interpretation of empirical 
evidence by Scott and Storper has been the subject of 
criticism (see, for example, Amin and Robins, 1989; 
Amin, 1989; Lovering, 1990; Murray, 1987). 
At one level, such criticism has arisen in the face of 
rather zealous classification and listing of a whole gamut 
of regions of growth throughout Western Europe and North 
America as New Industrial Spaces (Scott, 1988a). Yet, more 
specifically, the arguments are essentially about what 
exactly are the empirical features which represent the 
definitional characteristics of a New Industrial Space (and 
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most especially, but often overlooked, identify the causal 
processes which create such empirical phenomena). A more 
detailed discussion of the "empirical characteristics" used 
by Scott in the identification of a New Industrial Space 
takes place in the following chapter but, at this juncture, 
the conceptual definition providing a framework for such 
characteristics may be outlined. 
Essentially, the New Industrial Spaces refer to regions 
characterised by a localized production system 
incorporating a deep division of labour between producers 
but which also entail a supportive tissue of social 
practices and institutions. Each region represents a 
(rapidly growing) spatial agglomeration of firms combined 
through a dense network of linkages. These linkages occur 
both directly, through the production process itself, and 
indirectly, through the wider social and political, as well 
as economic, "environment" which is created by groups of 
closely related producers. In practice, such a definition 
has been widely equated with that of the "industrial 
district" and, in particular, that type represented by the 
"Third Italy" region (cf. Amin, 1989; Becattini, 1978; 
Brusco, 1982; 1986; Garofoli, 1984; Russo, 1985). Indeed, the 
"Third Italy" has been used by Scott (1988b) as an exemplar 
of a New Industrial Space. 
However, questions have been raised concerning whether or 
not such industrial districts are a widely generalized, or 
generalizable, phenomenon (Amin and Robins, 1989; 1990; 
Martinelli and Schoenberger, 1989). For many case studies of 
regional production systems claiming to represent 
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industrial districts have differed significantly in terms 
of sectors, firm size, production type, institutions, 
"environment", etc., leading to the suspicion that the only 
aspect which links such disparate regions is actually their 
position as regions of economic growth. Whilst such growth 
regions create a pattern of hope and success, at least for 
some of their inhabitants (Amin, 1989; Murray, 1987; Storper 
and Scott, 1988), the argument has continued that their 
association is merely that of success and not the shape or 
cause of that success (Amin and Robins, 1989). 
Two responses to such criticism are evident. Firstly, it is 
argued that the form of industrial district found within 
the "Third Italy" by no means exhausts the possible variety 
of empirical forms such districts may take. Hence, for 
example, the work of Storper and Harrison (1989) who: 
"Note that, in principle, industrial districts as we are 
defining them here are not restricted to cases where there are 
only small- and medium- sized units of production (ie. the 
'Third Italy' stereotype]; they can have a mix of small and 
large units. " (op. cit, p. l0, authors' emphasis)" 
Secondly, and related to the evidence of empirical variety, 
New Industrial Spaces have been theorised not as similar in 
terms of outcome but rather as structurally related regions 
each with its own individual and unique characteristics, 47 
and related by their shared causal dynamic. They are not 
carbon copies of the Third Italy and the forms of 
97 However, it should be noted that whilst variety in terms of type of 
agglomeration is allowed for, it was earlier seen how the tendency to 
agglomeration itself is theorised as a necessary outcome. 
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industrial district to be found within it, but they are: 
"... nonetheless analytically part of the same family tree. " 
(Storper, 1990, p. 2) 
In fact, the family tree, as already outlined, is defined 
by: 
"... the social division of labour, the formation of external 
economies, the dissolution of labour market rigidities, and the 
reagglomeration of production. " (Scott, 1988a, p. 181) 
However, one further point does need to be made at this 
stage. For whilst any New Industrial Space must be a 
localized production complex, a localized production 
complex need not be a New Industrial Space. For the New 
Industrial Spaces are the geographical (and historically 
specific) consequence of the present period of capitalist 
restructuring. Localized production systems, in contrast, 
are a recurrent empirical feature of the industrial history 
of capitalist development (Sabel and Zeitlin, 1985). The New 
Industrial Spaces merely represent the most recent 
("flexible") historical form of such complexes associated, 
in particular, with the rise of the new flexible industrial 
ensembles. 48 However, it is argued by Scott that all such 
localised production complexes throughout history do share 
the same causal dynamic(s) and: 
"... we can often best understand the evolutionary dynamic of 
localized production complexes (esop _cly those formed. 
48 1 thank Allan Cochrane, in particular, for this insight. 
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and forming, in the context of the new regime of 
flexible accumulation) in terms of an unremitting 
endogenous logic of the division of labour and (via external 
economies of scale) the formation of intense agglomeration 
economies. " (Scott, 1988b, p. 18, my emphasis in bold) 
But, if we recognise the validity of this argument, it then 
must shift our understanding of, and debates on, the 
empirical evidence. For within such a framework each New 
Industrial Space may indeed represent a concrete outcome 
significantly different in many "industrial 
characteristics" when contrasted with its relations. 
However, this is not the case concerning empirical evidence 
for the causal process of each region's growth. It is 
this process which is common to all the New 
Industrial Spaces and hence empirical evidence of 
this process must similarly be present for all the 
spaces. 
Thus, whilst one can argue about the data which is used to 
characterise the "empirical outcomes" (ie. whether or not 
the data is similar and common between regions), and 
argument does abound, of more significance is the evidence 
provided of the causal process (the transaction costs 
mechanism? ) which is creating the phenomenon which we are 
attempting to characterise. For evidence for this mechanism 
and its operation must be clearly available in each and 
every example of a "space". Once identified it then becomes 
a question of deciding whether the mechanism and its 
spatial outcome is the result of the present "flexible" 
restructuring of-capital or that of a historically 
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different period. However, and as already suggested, 
providing proof of a causal mechanism involves 
significantly different research tools than when providing 
evidence of an outcome. 
The following section will therefore outline the 
(lack of) evidence for the operation of the causal 
mechanism (or at least the lack of presentation of 
such evidence) within those regions specifically 
pinpointed as New Industrial Spaces par excellence. 
More fundamentally, however, it will show that 
those attempts so far to gain such evidence for the 
causal process have been doomed to failure from the 
start. For the methodology employed in these 
attempts simply cannot produce the particular form 
of evidence required, namely evidence of the 
operation of a causal mechanism. 
Evidence for an (agglomeration) outcome 
Scott has undertaken almost a decade of empirical research 
into a variety of production agglomerations (initially 
defined both by industry and spatial region, although of 
course intrinsic to the New Industrial Spaces is the 
coalescence of industry with space into a single entity). 
These agglomerations range from his earliest work, such as 
on the women's dress industry and printed circuits industry 
in Greater Los Angeles, to most recently, the Third Italy; 
the Scientific City (Ile de France South); Silicon Valley; 
a return to the printed circuits industry of Southern 
California as a whole; and a study of other high technology 
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technopoles also to be found within Southern California 
(Scott, 1983b; 1984; 1988b; 1989; Scott and Kwok, 1989). The 
initial basis of all this research has been to map the 
concentration of establishments of a particular "flexible 
industrial ensemble" within a particular region. By doing 
so, Scott has clearly identified some of the most important 
production agglomerations of the advanced Western 
economies. He has clearly identified a series of 
"agglomeration outcomes". 
A particular example is that of his work on Silicon Valley, 
an agglomeration of semiconductor producers in Santa Clara 
Valley, California (Scott, 1988b). Scott initially describes 
the growth, and rise to structural prominence, of the 
semiconductor industry within Santa Clara Valley (Silicon 
Valley). Between 1964 and 1985 employment in the 
semiconductor industry (SIC 3674) of Silicon Valley rose 
from 3,994 to 47,069 (op. cit., Table 7.5). Hence, by 1982, 
employment in the industry accounted for 18 per cent of all 
manufacturing employment. 
Further, Scott highlights in his study how this modern 
flexible sector par excellence (op. cit., p. 78) is a 
foundation for a greater high technology flexible ensemble 
within the region. Taking the core high-technology complex 
as four SIC sectors (machinery; electric and electronic 
equipment; transportation equipment; and instruments and 
related products), Scott traces the employment growth of 
these industries from 23,774 in 1962 to 228,873 in 1982, 
representing an increase from 31 per cent to 81 per cent of 
total manufacturing employment. Within this core, the 
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semiconductor industry has increased its share but, as 
Scott notes, numerically, the electronic computing 
equipment industry now employs a greater number of workers. 
However, semiconductors have undoubtedly acted as the 
"propulsive" sector providing the foundational dynamic to 
the larger high technology ensemble, including electronic 
computing equipment, now present in Silicon Valley. 
Once the role of the semiconductor industry in the history 
of Silicon Valley has been depicted, Scott then goes on to 
describe the importance of Silicon Valley in the industrial 
geography of the US semiconductor industry. The first 
aspect he notes is the growth of the semiconductor industry 
irrespective of its geography. Employing 23,4000 in 1958, 
by 1982 the industry employed 1,665,000 (op. cit., Table 
7.1). However, a geographical breakdown of these figures 
shows two particular shifts over time in the spatial 
distribution of this employment (op. cit., Table 7.2). 
Firstly, in 1958 it was clear that the geographical centre 
of the industry was not Silicon Valley but the Northeast of 
the US. In 1958,63.6% of all employment in the industry 
was located in New England and the Mid-Atlantic states. In 
comparison, California contained only 19.9% of employment 
in the industry at this time (op. cit., p. 82). By 1982, 
however, California had increased its share to 28.7% of 
employment, in a period when the industry as a whole saw 
dramatic employment growth, giving the state the largest 
concentration of employment in the country. In comparison, 
the states of New England and Mid-Atlantic had seen a 
significant reduction in their percentage share (not 
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numbers) of the country's semiconductor employment. 
This relative decline was not due only to the growth of 
California as the spatial focus of semiconductor industry. 
The second geographical shift which had occurred was that 
of locational dispersal such that by 1982 a pattern of 
wider geographical distribution of semiconductor employment 
was evident. Hence, there were significant centres of 
semiconductor employment to be found in Texas and Arizona 
as well as other new locations such as Florida and East 
North Central (Table 7.2). Yet, as suggested above, this 
process of dispersal had occurred simultaneously with 
greater concentration, of employment within California. And 
within California is found Silicon Valley which has become 
the internal centre of this geographical concentration such 
that, by 1984,69.2% of California's semiconductor 
employment was to be found in Silicon Valley (op. cit., 
p. 82). 
Hence, Scott shows how Silicon Valley has over the last 
decades become the geographical centre of one of the most 
significant industries of the last few decades, namely 
semiconductor production. In turn, he goes on to identify a 
wider set of agglomeration characteristics created through 
this growth. 
"Disintegration causes agglomeration and agglomeration 
causes disintegration" so he identifies the: 
"... phalanx of specialized input suppliers and subcontractors 
who constitute one of the important sources of agglomeration 
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economies in the region. " (Scott, 1988b, p. 94) 
Moreover: 
"The agglomeration economies of Silicon Valley have been 
further intensified by the development of large populations in 
local urban communities. These populations are the basis of 
extensive labor markets in electronics personnel. " 
(op. cit., p. 92) 
These local labour markets coincide with the wider 
imperatives of the new "flexible" production era in being 
distinctive by their fluidity. The social formation within 
the region is such that on the one hand, there exists a 
large pool of skilled technical and engineering workers who 
are high-waged but also mobile. On the other hand, and 
exhibiting the bifurcated employment structure within the 
Valley's semiconductor industry, is a large proportion of 
Hispanic and Asian immigrants who act as a constantly 
expanding pool of (flexible) low-waged, unskilled non- 
unionized workers (op. cit., p. 92). 
Silicon Valley, it may be concluded, has become the most 
potent of recent examples of (high technology and flexible) 
production agglomeration. The remaining question is whether 
or not it is a New Industrial Space. For the question 
remains as to what is the causal process of this outcome 
and, indeed, all the "agglomeration outcomes" Scott 
describes. 
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Evidence for a (transaction costs) causal mechanism 
Scott puts forward two forms of evidence for the growth 
dynamics of production agglomerations which confirms them, 
in his eyes, to be New Industrial Spaces (Scott, 1988b). 
Firstly, in the case of Silicon Valley, Scott has shown how 
the steady growth in the region's semiconductor employment 
over the period 1964 to 1985 has been accompanied by a 
similarly steady growth in the number of establishments 
from 7 in 1964 to 136 in 1985. Furthermore, he describes 
the expansion of other selected high technology sectors in 
the region which are associated with semiconductor 
production. Hence, such growth represents the key "trigger" 
process of the extension of the social division of labour. 
Whilst the evidence does suggest the extension of the 
social division of labour an initial reservation must be 
raised. As highlighted earlier, this reservation is based 
on the conceptual difference between establishments and 
firms. Hence, some of this establishment growth is almost 
certainly attributable to "branches" and therefore may be 
attributable to the spatial extension of the technical 
division of labour, rather than the extension of the social 
division of labour. However, it may also be recalled from 
earlier, that such a possibility is effectively "theorised 
away" within the logic of the New Industrial Spaces by a 
number of means, although exactly what form applies in this 
instance is difficult to tell. 
Moreover, notwithstanding this reservation, the more 
appearance of (a pattern) of increased numbers of 
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establishments within the "spatial confine" of 
Silicon Valley, does not provide any information as 
to the locational process(es) which has created the 
pattern. However, in Scott's eyes, and following through 
the necessary spatial logic of the New Industrial Spaces, 
the "fact" that most (? ) of an agglomerated set of 
establishments appear to have been created through the 
process of the extension of the social division of labour, 
suggests an "externalisation" process has taken place, and 
implies that the transaction costs mechanism will have been 
triggered so leading to their agglomeration. 
So, for example, in a partial survey (numbering 80 
establishments) of the numerically growing (flexible 
production) industry of biotechnology in the Ile De France 
(Scientific City) region, Scott (1988b) maps two clusters 
of between 10 and 15 establishments. From this he concludes 
that: 
"The biotechnology industry (or at least parts of it) in the 
Scientific City thus appears to be in the incipient phases of 
spatial nucleation and differentiation. It is probable that 
these tendencies are based on increasing interunit 
linkage... though only scattered and partial evidence is 
currently available. " (op. cit., p. 74) 
The evidence is indeed extremely partial, although Scott 
does identify what would be required as "conclusive" 
evidence, namely inter-unit linkages. However, and in 
concurrence with Gordon (forthcoming), it needs to be 
stressed that: 
209 
"Theories of industrial recentralization have tended to base 
their speculations upon purely presumptive linkages between 
firms in the same locality. Most often, these arguments are 
tautologous, the fact of agglomeration serving as evidence for 
the existence of inter-firm linkages. Contiguity, however, does 
not generate synergy of linkage as a matter of course and firms 
may locate in the same area for reasons that have nothing to do 
with linkage requirements. " (op. cit., p. 2-3) 
Providing evidence of agglomeration (the outcome) does not 
provide evidence of the process behind such agglomeration. 
More so, evidence of "externalisation" does not provide 
evidence of the causal process. Firstly, it says nothing 
about whether those external linkages created are local or 
not (ie. is the agglomeration a localised production 
complex or a "conglomerate" of spatially clustered firms) 
and, secondly, it says nothing about whether any local 
linkages created actually played a role in the location 
process of the firm (eg. the difference between linkages 
created pre- or post location). Such evidence merely 
infers causality, on the basis of a pre-theorised 
logic. 
In the worst "eulogies" on the New Industrial Spaces, 
little more evidence than simply the fact of spatial 
agglomeration and the availability of "agglomeration 
economies", such as specialised research institutes, is put 
forward to support the theorised causal mechanism. But 
Scott has acknowledged the need to provide evidence of 
local inter-unit linkages, evidence of a local production 
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network, through which the mechanism does (or at least can) 
act and in some of his work has attempted to do so. 
Evidence of such linkage networks, in Scott's eyes, also 
represents the second form of evidence of the causal 
process. 
Hence in his work on Silicon Valley, having described the 
agglomeration, Scott set out to exhibit how those 
semiconductor establishments to be found within the Valley 
differed in characteristics from those found elsewhere in 
the USA (Scott, 1988b). Such differences are subsequently 
argued to be attributable to the unique agglomeration 
economies to be found within the Valley and both drive, and 
are the product of, the local production complex. 
After compiling an almost complete list of on-shore 
semiconductor producers within the USA, numbering 590 
establishments, Scott sent a postal questionnaire to each 
entry. This questionnaire covered employment, technology, 
outputs, external linkages, ownership, etc., and achieved a 
response rate of 10% or 60 establishments, although full 
information was not provided by all the returns. He then 
undertook discriminant analysis of the returns to identify 
any differences between the two groups, Silicon Valley 
producers and non-Silicon Valley producers, for a large 
variety of variables, and on sample numbers ranging from 
15 up to 44. 
From his work, Scott was able to identify characteristics 
specific to the Silicon Valley producers which would imply 
transactional structures made up precisely of those "inter- 
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industrial critical linkages" of which spatial costs are a 
significant element (ie. flexible, rapidly-shifting, small- 
scale and non-standard): 
"First, the revealed high percentage of research and 
development workers employed by Silicon Valley semiconductor 
establishments suggests that this region is a hotbed of 
technological innovation (both in processes and products) for 
the industry as a whole. Second, the relatively large diameter 
wafers used by Silicon-Valley producers is testimony to their 
leading-edge status... Third, the finding that merchant 
producers are strongly attracted to Silicon Valley whereas 
captive plants are overwhelmingly located elsewhere is 
symptomatic of the peculiar external transactional relations of 
these two types of producers... Fourth and last, and in direct 
corroboration of all the above, we find that Silicon-Valley 
producers sell a much higher proportion of their merchant 
output to customers in their immediate vicinity than do 
establishments in other parts of the country. " (Scott, 1988b, 
p. 100) 
Hence, Scott concludes that: 
"This indicates that semiconductor production in Silicon Valley 
is in part sustained by a closely knit web of intraregional 
transactional relations among many different independent but 
functionally related producers. This result adds further 
credence to the argument concerning the transactional economies 
to be derived from locating in the specialized production 
complex of Silicon Valley. " (ibid. ) 
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Scott has provided evidence of a local production complex 
and the agglomeration economies which may be derived from 
it. Unfortunately this is all he does. Even though a 
pattern of local linkages is now known to exist, this still 
does not meet the second and essential point made earlier. 
The evidence still says nothing about whether or 
not these linkages played a role in the locational 
dynamic of these establishments. 
Essentially, only a more detailed (and necessary in its own 
way) picture-of the "outcome" has been provided. Not only 
has the pattern of spatial clustering of firms been 
depicted but, also, shown through a pattern of linkages, is 
the fact that these firms are not merely discrete production 
units, but are actually connected within some form of local 
production network. However, the mere existence of linkages 
between (spatially close) firms says nothing about the 
process of their creation. In turn, if the process of 
linkage creation is still to be revealed, then so 
too is the alleged working of the spatial mechanism 
which is an integral part of this process. Simply put, 
in the example of Silicon Valley or any others he has 
undertaken, Scott has failed to ask whether or not local 
production linkages have or have not played a role in 
establishments' location decisions. Rather he has merely 
provided evidence of the existence of such linkages. 
To reiterate the point made earlier, the nature of the 
process (linkage creation), and not merely the perceived 
outcome (aggglomerations of linkages), must be investigated 
and empirical evidence provided on this basis if we are to 
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accept the locational mechanism of the New Industrial 
Spaces. However, to gain such evidence requires an 
"intensive" research methodology. Continued "extensive" 
research on the "outcome" is incapable of producing such 
evidence. Rather it is producing a more complete picture of 
the "outcome" but which cannot prove the process behind such 
an outcome. Instead, an agglomeration is being identified 
and described. Subsequently, this agglomeration is being 
explained through the use of transaction costs theory. 
Finally, the fact of agglomeration is being used as evidence 
for the transaction costs theory of location. In the end, 
Scott is using as proof what he is trying to explain. 
This investigation of the New Industrial Spaces thesis has 
revealed that its spatial mechanism of transaction costs 
represents a (theoretically) possible causal process of 
agglomeration. More importantly, however, this 
investigation has also shown that in many such cases this 
mechanism is unlikely to provide a satisfactory 
explanation, both in terms of the selective organisational 
change required to bring the mechanism into the field of 
play and exactly what conditions it will find on entering 
the field. Ultimately, the mechanism's relevance as an 
explanation of the agglomeration of production rests upon 
the empirical evidence for its operation. Unfortunately, 
such evidence has been found to be lacking, principally on 
the basis of what form such evidence must take to be 
eligible for adjudication. With this in mind, the following 
chapter outlines the research design adopted by this study 
in the quest to discover the causal process(es) driving the 
growth of Britain's premier high technology production 
agglomeration. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: The Empirical Exploration: What To 
Look at and How 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter outlined certain weaknesses of the New 
Industrial Spaces thesis and, most particularly, the 
limited empirical justification, so far, for this theory. 
Yet, if the theory is to be greeted as an advancement of 
our understanding within industrial geography, the need for 
further empirical evidence is great. More than mere 
"impressionistic" evidence of the theory's empirical 
relevance, above and beyond Silicon Valley and the Third 
Italy, involving more than identification of "new" 
agglomerations of production, is still required. Most 
especially, and as explained in Chapter Four, conclusive 
evidence of the New Industrial Spaces spatial logic, even 
within the spaces par excellence, is still elusive. 
Thus, this chapter outlines how such an exploration for 
evidence of a high technology New Industrial Space within 
Britain was undertaken. An exploration structured by the 
foremost aim of providing empirical evidence of the causal 
processes (the spatial logic) driving the "space's" growth. 
5.2 Why High Technology? In Britain? 
As one of the three flexible industrial ensembles 
identified by Scott and Storper, earlier chapters have 
already signified both the structural and symbolic 
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importance of high technology industry to Britain's 
economic future. In Chapter Three the significance of the 
industry in relation to uneven development in Britain today 
was also highlighted. However, much of the work available 
on Britain's high technology, especially that carried out 
by journalists and promotional myth-makers, has 
particularly followed and promulgated the symbolism of high 
technology. Moreover, the work available has often 
uncritically encompassed theoretical notions and 
generalisations. So, for example, the concept and 
identification of a British "sunbelt" stems directly from 
the use of such stereotype terminology to describe aspects 
of the geography of high technology industry in the USA. 
Yet, as Pinch et al. (1989) argue, the use of notions such 
as "sunbelts" has involved: 
"... generalising from specific features of a particular society 
[USA]. In realist terms then, the 'sunbelt' concept might be 
thought of as a classic 'chaotic conception'. " (op. cit., p. 6) 
Today, the sunbelt notion is being engulfed by a new 
American import, the concept of the "New Industrial Spaces" 
(see, for example, Marshall, 1989). Hence, Scott and 
Storper's work involves claims for several regions of 
Britain which they have proclaimed as British examples of 
the New Industrial Spaces (eg. M4 Corridor, Cambridge). This 
transfer of the New Industrial Spaces terminology to 
Britain, whilst re-invoking the concerns of Pinch et al. 
(1989) produced by the last theoretical import, 
simultaneously provides an investigative opportunity to 
strengthen the empirical weakness of the theory and our 
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knowledge of Britain's high technology success stories. 
5.3 The Exploration of a British High Technology 
New Industrial Space 
The starting point of any possible exploration is the 
identification of such a New Industrial Space. Scott 
(1988a) has identified two possible examples: a shortened 
M4 Corridor running from Reading to London; and Cambridge. 
However, by what process has he arrived at these particular 
"spaces"? How do you identify a (high technology) New 
Industrial Space? 
Spotting a New Industrial Space: distinguishing 
The steps of identification may be extracted from the 
example of Silicon Valley and other exemplary New 
Industrial Spaces discussed by Scott (1988b; see also 
Chapter Four). In summarised form, most fundamental to 
identification is the depiction of the growth of a (high 
technology) "flexible industrial ensemble" within a 
"space". Thus, in this particular instance, a preliminary 
requirement is to clarify exactly what industrial sectors 
would be included in a "high technology flexible industrial 
ensemble". What do Scott and Storper mean by "high 
technology" industry? 
"High technology industry is composed of a wide variety of 
different sectors of production. It includes, for example, 
pharmaceuticals, bioengineering, advanced metallurgical 
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industries, electronics, military and space hardware 
production, and so on. More often than not these sectors differ 
markedly from one another in terms of their physical 
constitution, employment characteristics, and outlets. They are 
unified by their common dependence (directly or indirectly) 
upon advanced scientific and engineering knowledge, and by 
their imbrication within capitalist relations of production" 
(Scott and Storper, 1986, p. 1) 
Moreover: 
"... the central symptomatic sector of the whole (high 
technology] complex is the electronics industry. This includes 
electronics in the narrow sense as well as electronics in the 
broader sense as represented by sets of sub-assemblies and 
fully-assembled systems (such as computers, communications 
equipment, guided missiles, space vehicles, and so on) in which 
electronic devices are the basic active components. Electronics 
is central because it provides the means of accomplishing work 
(above all measuring, calculating, controlling, and information 
processing) without the intermediation of mechanical aids. " 
(Scott and Storper, 1986, p. 3, authors' emphasis) 
Thus, the first stage of identification is to pinpoint 
those "spaces" experiencing'significant growth of "high 
technology" industry. In particular, this growth must also 
be linked with the process of extension of the social 
division of labour. Subsequently, the "space" may then be 
analysed in the context of the economic geography of the 
industry as a whole. In other words, whilst high technology 
may be important to the space is the space important in 
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terms of the industry. Does the space represent a 
significant agglomeration of high technology industry? 
These steps of identification pinpoint "probables" which 
are then likely to be confirmed by identification of 
particular agglomeration economies. Thus, further 
investigation of the agglomeration as a production network 
may be carried out or the possibility of specialised local 
labour markets and conducive socio-institutional structures 
(eg. "something in the air") explored. However, the 
conclusive step of identification, and one argued to be 
missing from Scott's empirical work and thus the list 
above, is the provision of evidence of the causal processes 
creating such agglomeration characteristics (see Chapter 
Four). 
Possible sightings: Britain's high technology New 
Thus it is through the above (or similar) steps of 
identification that the M4 Corridor and Cambridge have been 
pinpointed as examples of British high technology New 
Industrial Spaces by Scott (1988a). However, such 
identification has been hotly disputed by other 
commentators (Lovering, 1990a; Rainnie et al., 1988): 
"Weakest of all is the evidence for the emergence of new 
marshallian industrial districts in the UK. The areas within 
the UK which have been cited by enthusiasts as 'new industrial 
spaces' are the M4 corridor and Cambridge (eg., Scott, 1988[a]; 
Sabel, 1988; Mulgan, 1989). But if there is any research which 
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demonstrates that these zones fit the description of a genuine 
industrial district (spatially agglomerated production 
complexes together with their dependent labour markets and 
intercalated human communities; Scott, 1988[a]; 176), it has yet 
to be published (see for example, Morgan and Sayer, 1988). " 
(Lovering, 1990a, p. 167) 
Lovering's comments, although rather forthright, do 
highlight the importance of debating, and not accepting, 
the labelling of these areas as New Industrial Spaces. Part 
of this debate may stem from disagreements about what the 
labels, such as "industrial district", actually mean (see 
Chapter Four and Amin and Robins, 1989), yet, in 
contradiction to Lovering (1990a), Chapter Three included a 
quote from the (published) empirical work of Keeble and 
Kelly (1986) on Cambridge which possibly does sustain the 
view of the town as a "high technology industrial district" 
(see also Keeble, 1989). However, in defence of Lovering, 
other work by Saxenian (1989) on Cambridge has refuted this 
analysis. Or rather it has suggested "Cambridge as 
industrial district" to be a short-lived phenomenon. 49 
The labelling of the M4 Corridor as a New Industrial Space 
is, however, more complicated and intriguing because it 
reveals the sheer persistence (and damage) of mythology. 
For there are actually two criticisms of this labelling 
that Lovering (1990a) could be making. Firstly, there is a 
99 In so doing, Saxenian's (1989) work highlights the argument of many that the 
"industrial districts" may well, in fact, not be the "end-state" form of post- 
Fordist industrial development but, rather, a temporary or transitional phenomenon 
of the move to post-Fordism (Amin and Robins, 1989; Martinelli and 
Schoenberger, 1989) 
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strong argument to be made for the banning of the term M4 
Corridor as a highly misleading representation of the 
geography of Britain's premier high technology industrial 
agglomeration. Secondly, and the criticism being made, once 
the area of high technology agglomeration labelled the M4 
Corridor has been properly identified, its characteristics 
are not those of a genuine "industrial district". 
Chapter Three discussed the comprehensive work of Hall et 
al. (1987) which refuted the concept of an M4 Corridor. Or 
rather it severely curtailed the concept's geographical 
coverage but, in hindsight, should have renounced the term 
totally. For Hall et al. (1987) concluded by identifying: 
"... a Western Crescent, rather than a western Corridor. 
Nevertheless, the biggest and fastest-growing concentration 
within this Crescent does lie to the west of London. Thus, we 
do have an M4 Corridor, but a short, concentrated one - focused 
on Berkshire and north Hampshire - superimposed on a Western 
Crescent of economic growth. The analysis presented here does 
not identify the long M4 Corridor - from west London to South 
Wales - that is popularly assumed. " (op. cit., p. 5) 
Similarly, in the work of Morgan and Sayer (1988) referred 
to by Lovering, the authors initially used the concept of 
an elongated (and widened? ) M4 Corridor including Avon, 
Berkshire, North Hampshire, South Oxfordshire and North 
Wiltshire (op. cit., Table 11.1). Subsequently, however, the 
authors also concluded that the notion of an M4 Corridor is 
misleading and argued that: 
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"Berkshire has had the lion's share of the industry in the 
corridor and it is only here that it seems reasonable to speak 
of an electronics agglomeration. " (Morgan and Sayer, 
1988, p. 215) 
By corroborating the work of Hall et al. (1987), it could 
have been expected that Morgan and Sayer's work would have 
seen the "jettisoning" of the term M4 Corridor once and for 
all. For Hall et al. (1987) outlined that the M4 Corridor 
did not exist precisely because, in reality, it represented 
little more than the county of Berkshire which happened to 
be bisected by the (new) M4 motorway50. Instead, the term 
has migrated overseas in a form that only partially 
acknowledges this work by defining the M4 Corridor New 
Industrial Space as running from Reading to London (Scott, 
1988a). 
In fact, what Hall et al. 's (1987) work additionally 
revealed is that if all of the county of Hampshire was 
analysed, rather than only the northern part of the county 
arbitrarily "inserted" into the M4 Corridor, Hampshire's 
high technology employment in 1981 was 33,807, nearly 
15,000 more than that of Berkshire (although Berkshire had 
experienced a better recent growth rate, see Table 
3.3, p. 75). Moreover, the location quotient of employment 
concentration for Hampshire of 2.00 was almost identical to 
Berkshire's figure of 2.08 (see Table 3.2, p. 74). Indeed, 
Hall et al. (1987) also found that in terms of absolute 
numbers of high technology workers employed and 
concentration of high technology employment, both these 
501n fact, they also included north Hampshire in the shortened M4 Corridor yet, 
ironically, and highlighting the sheer inconsistency of the term, the M4 does not 
actually pass through the county at all. 
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counties were out-performed by Hertfordshire which could 
not possibly be associated with the M4 Corridor (see Table 
3.2 and 3.3). 
Thus, that is why Hall et al. (1987) concluded their study 
of high technology agglomeration in Britain by arguing for 
a Western Crescent running from Surrey through Hampshire 
and Berkshire into Hertfordshire. That is also why the 
continued use of the term M4 Corridor to describe Britain's 
premier high technology industrial agglomeration is both 
misleading and incorrect and why labelling the M4 
Corridor as a New Industrial Space is therefore 
also incorrect. 
However, if we accept this argument concerning the 
terminology (and rather vainly hope that the death-knell of 
the term M4 Corridor has been sounded), it is not 
unreasonable to presume that the area Scott really implies 
by a shortened M4 Corridor is, most particularly, 
Berkshire. It is clear that Berkshire is a leading high 
technology county of Britain and hence the labelling of 
this county as a New Industrial Space may have some 
justification. Indeed, using an interpretation of Morgan 
and Sayer's (1988) work somewhat at odds with Lovering's, 
evidence may be available: 
"[Berkshire] is quite different both qualitatively and 
quantitatively from leading American agglomerations like 
Silicon valley and orange County in California, each with over 
200,000 electronics employees... [and although] there have been 
spin-offs in the corridor their success has been limited. At 
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the same time, Berkshire includes much less manufacturing in 
electronics - particularly in recent foreign entrants - than is 
found in the American agglomerations. This probably accounts 
for the fact that while local inter-firm linkages are much more 
common than in South Wales (thanks largely to the prevalence of 
less routinized activities in the corridor) they do not compare 
with the dense networks of linkages characteristic of Silicon 
Valley and Orange County (Scott and Angel, 1986; Scott, 1986b; 
Glasmeier, 1986) . 
Generally, the electronics agglomeration emerging in Berkshire 
appears to cohere more on the basis of its local labour market 
for top technical and managerial skills than on inter-firm 
linkages. " (Morgan and Sayer, 1988, p. 215-6) 
Thus, there is a certain amount of ambiguity concerning the 
possibility of Berkshire as a New Industrial Space. For 
whilst Berkshire represents a leading high technology 
production agglomeration, including an above-average 
proportion of new and small firms, Morgan and Sayer (1988) 
question its cohesion as a localized production 
complex. The complex seemingly does not cohere directly 
through inter-firm linkages and thus the existence of the 
New Industrial Spaces spatial logic, founded upon inter- 
firm network production organisation, is dubious. Yet seen 
as an increasingly important component of that spatial 
logic is the role of local labour markets (Chapter Four; 
Scott, 1990, personal communication), and Morgan and Sayer 
(1988) do raise the possibility of "indirect" coherence of 
the agglomeration based upon a specialist local labour 
market. Moreover, their research on the county revealed the 
awareness of this labour market by employers and, 
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critically, the importance of this factor in locational 
decision-making. And it is this aspect of empirical 
evidence, evidence of the theorised New Industrial Spaces 
spatial logic, which Chapter Four has argued as critical in 
any conclusive identification of a New Industrial Space and 
yet is sparse even within those "exemplary spaces" such as 
Silicon Valley. 
However, leaving the possibilities of Berkshire per se 
aside, it must be remembered that the county is actually 
only one high technology county within a series of South 
Eastern counties comprising, not the M4 Corridor but 
rather, the high technology industrial agglomeration known 
as the Western Crescent. Moreover, within this 
agglomeration it is arguably the (neglected) county of 
Hertfordshire which leads the way. 
Table 3.3 (p. 75) reveals that in 1981, after Greater 
London, Hertfordshire had the greatest number of high 
technology workers of any county in Britain, totalling over 
45,000. This easily doubled the high technology employment 
figure for Berkshire and, furthermore, this also 
represented a greater concentration of high technology 
employment than that found in Berkshire. In fact, 
Hertfordshire's location quotient of 3.60 placed it clearly 
at the head of a. league table of British counties in which 
Berkshire came fifth with a figure of 2.08 (Table 
3.2, p. 74) . Moreover, Figures 3.1 (p. 78) and 3.2 (p. 79) 
reveal continued (modest) growth of the county's high 
technology employment. Thus, whilst much attention has been 
focussed upon the county of Berkshire as the core county of 
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a largely illusory M4 Corridor (see for example Hall et 
al., 1987; Macgregor et al., 1986; Morgan and Sayer, 1988), it 
would seem that the impressive growth of high technology 
industry in Hertfordshire has gone largely unnoticed by 
industrial geographers within Britain, let alone across the 
Atlantic. If we are to identify a high technology New 
Industrial Space within Britain, the county of 
Hertfordshire, as part of the wider Western Crescent 
agglomeration, presents itself as an outstanding candidate. 
5.4 The Plan of Exploration of "High Technology 
Hertfordshire" 
The initial stage of the exploration will involve the 
comparison of Hertfordshire vis-a-vis the New Industrial 
Spaces model, in a similar fashion to that adopted by Scott 
(see earlier, this chapter). Essentially, the question is: 
does the candidature of "high technology Hertfordshire as 
New Industrial Space" represent a fair test of the theory. 
What "distinguishing characteristics" common to both 
Hertfordshire and the model enable the county to be viewed 
as a possible example of a New Industrial Space? 
Thus, initially, the industrial history of Hertfordshire 
will be traced which has led to the county's depiction as 
part of the Western Crescent high technology agglomeration. 
This will be undertaken through the use of secondary 
sources but, also, a postal questionnaire scan, to reveal 
both the present status of high technology industry within 
the county and further historical evidence of the 
ensemble's development. Furthermore, evidence of those 
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other agglomeration characteristics associated with the New 
Industrial Spaces, such as specialist local labour markets 
and unique and advantageous "industrial atmospheres", will 
be sought. 
However, following on from the methodological critique put 
forward in Chapter Four, it must be recognised that this 
exploratory stage merely allows the descriptive 
compatibility of the Hertfordshire agglomeration's 
characteristics and those of the New Industrial Spaces 
agglomeration model to be gauged. Fundamentally, it does 
not provide evidence of the causal dynamic(s) creating 
those (agglomeration) characteristics. It does not, and 
cannot, provide evidence of the spatial logic(s) driving 
the agglomeration. Yet it has already been outlined how it 
is this common causal logic which is, ultimately, the 
definitional bond of the disparate regions classified as 
New Industrial Spaces. 
Providing evidence of a (pattern of) local production 
network, local labour market or industrial atmosphere is 
not enough. Evidence must be provided of these components 
operating as a spatial logic driving the 
agglomeration such as, for example, firms being drawn 
into the county (or being unable to leave? ) because "this 
is where it's at" or to tap a scarce and critical labour 
source. Most particularly, evidence must also be sought of 
the critical and foremost dynamic of the New Industrial 
Spaces (and the dynamic upon which this exploration will 
concentrate). In other words, evidence of a particular form 
of industrial organisation, a local production network, 
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creating a "centripetal" force of location as firms seek to 
reduce transaction costs through "convergence around their 
own geographical centre of gravity" (see Scott, 1988a; 
quoted in Chapter Four). 
In the search for this critical empirical evidence the 
questionnaire will provide evidence of "outcomes". Viewed 
most simply, such outcomes are "high technology firms 
agglomerated within Hertfordshire". But, as we know from 
Chapter Four, such outcomes may or may not be commensurate 
with those outcomes theorised as exemplary of a New 
Industrial Space and its causal mechanisms. However, the 
questionnaire will significantly strengthen the empirical 
work thus far carried out by Scott. For it will also be 
able to identify those particular outcomes suggested as 
evidence for the workings of the causal mechanism, namely 
those establishments located in the region who stipulate 
that local production linkages were significant in 
their location decision. In other words, the 
questionnaire will identify particular outcomes 
representing a process of cause and effect commensurate 
with that hypothesised by the New Industrial Spaces thesis. 
As was explained in Chapter Four, Scott has failed to ask 
the (fundamental) question as to whether or not local 
production linkages have played a role in the location 
decisions of individual establishments. Rather, his own 
empirical work has identified agglomerations of 
establishments and (more recently) linkages between such 
agglomerated sites. He has subsequently assumed that such 
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sites are located because of such linkages. In other words, 
he has assumed that all establishments in agglomerations 
with local production linkages are "outcomes" of the New 
Industrial Spaces spatial logic. However, this must be 
recognised for what it is, an assumption, and to overcome 
this the postal questionnaire will ask a question 
concerning the role of local production linkages in 
location. Hence, a sub-set of particular outcomes, 
"establishments whose local production linkages played a 
significant role in location" rather than a set of outcomes 
"all establishments with local linkages (which thus played 
a role in location)" will be distinguished. 
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But, even if this more stringent identification of outcomes 
is achieved by the postal questionnaire, it cannot, by 
itself, prove the causal mechanism of these outcomes. For 
it merely indicates a process of cause and effect, 
it does not say what mechanism drives this process. 
This, as we have seen, is the further assumption of the 
model. For although it is known that such outcomes are due 
to a process based on local production linkages, the nature 
(mechanism) of this process (ie. how it works) is not yet 
known. Rather the assumption is made that such outcomes are 
due to a particular (theorised) causal mechanism of 
"transaction costs". In fact, the nature of the causal 
process is yet to be discovered and, moreover, a second 
stage of exploration is required to make this discovery. 
This second stage of the exploration will involve semi- 
structured interviewing of chosen "case study" firms. 52 
51 That is, if such outcomes do exist empirically rather than just theoretically. 
52 The "study of individual agents in their causal contexts" (Sayer, 1984, p. 222). 
In other words, the study of establishments within an agglomeration network. 
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Thus, the plan of exploration involves a long range scan by 
postal questionnaire and gathering of secondary data 
followed by a "landing" to carry out a series of case-study 
interviews. The use of such a two-stage design 
significantly strengthens (methodologically) that empirical 
exploration thus far undertaken of the New Industrial 
Spaces. For, firstly, it provides precise identification of 
outcomes, that is, effects of a particular process and, 
secondly, it allows exploration of the nature of the 
process producing such outcomes. 
5.5 The Long Range Scan 
As outlined above, this stage involved two exploratory 
techniques. On the one hand, it embodied the collation of 
evidence from other explorations of the region. On the 
other hand, it involved the direct sourcing of data through 
the use of a postal questionnaire survey. 
It may be recalled that this element of the exploration had 
two major aims. Firstly, to gain a snapshot of the present 
agglomeration of high technology industry in Hertfordshire 
as the most recent period in the industrial history of the 
county. Secondly, to identify the existence of a causal 
process to this contemporary agglomeration, in preparation 
for further investigation of the causal process through a 
series of case studies. 
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The creation of a firm listing 
The initial problem to be faced was that of gaining a 
comprehensive listing of high technology firms in 
Hertfordshire to scan. Particular requirements were that 
the listing distinguish establishments, rather than firms 
per se, on the basis of a S. I. C. code for each entry. 
Despite the problems with the S. I. C. system discussed in 
Chapter 2, it is still the best (if not the only) 
classification system avilable providing the level of 
coverage required. 
A variety of possible sources for a comprehensive listing 
were investigated such as company registrations, VAT 
registrations, County Council lists, Chambers of Commerce 
member lists, trade directories, telephone directories, 
etc. All of these had both strengths and weaknesses but it 
became clear that none of these sources alone could provide 
a comprehensive listing of high technology firms in 
Hertfordshire. Their combination, although difficult due to 
the variety of sources of base information, could possibly 
have allowed the construction of some form of list. 
However, in the course of carrying out such initial 
enquiries an organisation called HERTIS (Hertfordshire 
Information Services) was discovered, which provided the 
listing on which the survey was eventually based. 
Hertis53 
Hertis was set up approximately 30 years ago as a 
53 Information taken from an interview with Vivienne Winterman, Hertis. 
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federation of all the public libraries, further education 
libraries and other public information service 
organisations in Hertfordshire. It provides an information 
service free to any person or business in Hertfordshire and 
is funded by the County Education Department. In addition, 
it contains specialist departments such as the Information 
for Industry Unit situated at Hatfield Polytechnic. This 
unit receives a small grant to provide a free service to 
Hertfordshire's population but otherwise is a self- 
financing unit. In essence, it provides specialist 
information searching and retrieval for over 350 
subscribing members (firms) as well as undertaking one-off 
contracts. Some of its services are based on providing 
information from the Hertfordshire Business Databank which 
it set up almost 10 years ago, and it is from this databank 
that the firm listing was drawn. 
The Hertfordshire Business Databank 
At the time of finding the Databank it listed more than 
3,500 Hertfordshire businesses, classified by S. I. C. code, 
providing the name of a contact person (generally the chief 
executive, managing director or person of equivalent rank) 
and address of the establishment. Additional information on 
some establishments such as year in which trading began in 
Hertfordshire, employment numbers and turnover figures was 
also available. However, immediately prior to gaining a 
list of firms from the organisation, the Databank was 
"updated" through an agreement with Dun and Bradstreet (an 
international business information organisation), whereby a 
merging of the two organisations' data led to the 
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significant expansion of the Databank to include over 
12,000 firms. This raised certain issues for the 
exploration. 
Firstly, this highlighted that the original coverage of the 
Databank was in fact poor. However, following the update, 
Hertis believed the coverage to be between 60-65% with 
almost total coverage of limited companies. They had no 
knowledge of whether this coverage varied across industrial 
sectors, although it could be reasoned that certain sectors 
(eg. mature, high cost entry) would have a higher coverage 
due to the likelihood of a higher percentage of limited 
companies. This partial coverage must be acknowledged but, 
in the face of the variety of other possible sources 
providing equally partial coverage, the Database still 
ranked as the best information source available at the 
time. 54 
Secondly, problems arose with the data provided by the 
Databank immediately following its updating. This was due 
to the operational difficulties of merging two databases. 
For example, certain sectors saw a massive expansion in the 
firm population. For my purposes, and of great importance 
to the research, this either suggested that these sectors 
59 Hertfordshire County Council has in previous years carried out a census of all 
firms located on designated industrial estates. Such information has been 
published and, in the past, added to the Hertfordshire Databank. Recently, 
however, the Council has taken a position of acting as a rival to the now 
"private" Databank providing its own listing and information service. In 1989- 
1990, the Council also undertook a census of all business activity within urban 
areas, the aim being to combine the results of this survey with those from the 
industrial estates census to produce a comprehensive listing of industrial 
activity in Hertfordshire (over 90% coverage was the figure quoted). 
Unfortunately, this information will be available too late for my research. 
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had seen spectacular growth rates or, as proved to be the 
case, this "growth" was due to increased coverage. In 
contrast, other sectors saw a reduction in their firm 
population. Again the question arose as to whether this was 
due to a process of "restructuring" leading to closure of 
establishments or the reclassification of firms into 
different sectors rather than firm deaths. Further 
explanation of these contradictions by Hertis made clear 
that reclassification was indeed the major cause, although 
a few firm deaths had taken place. Finally, there was the 
possible problem due to Dun and Bradstreet being an 
international company. In view of this fact, when dealing 
with multi-site firms would their information include dates 
and employment figures for individual sites in 
Hertfordshire as against whole firms? The answer was that, 
in the main, figures would be for the company as a whole. 
However, in certain instances where several individual 
sites for a company were separately listed then figures 
would be based on sites and not whole firms. In view of the 
importance of delineating between single-site and multi- 
site firms, the postal questionnaire addressed this 
information gap within the listing (see later). 
Thus, in July 1989, Hertis provided a listing of 
establishments within Hertfordshire within a chosen set of 
1980 S. I. C. Activity Headings (Table 5.1). 
The Choice of "High Technology" Sectors 
The choice of sectors (see Table 5.1) followed the 
definition of "high technology" put forward by Scott and 
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Storper (1986) (pp. 216-7). In particular, the decision was 
taken to concentrate on "electronics" (in its widest sense) 
viewed by Scott and Storper as the "central" and 
"symptomatic" industry of the "high technology ensemble". 
Moreover, this selection of sectors also incorporated those 
electronics sectors which Hall et al. (1987) identified as 
forming the agglomeration of the Western Crescent but, in 
addition, the choice included computer services, a sector 
not recognised within the figures used by Hall et al. 
(1987), but now viewed as an essential and integral sector 
of the high technology ensemble. 
The high technology sectors under exploration 
idincr Description 
3302 Computers and electronic data processing 
equipment manufacture 
3441 Telephone and telegraph equipment manufacture 
3442 Electronic instruments and control systems 
manufacture 
3443 Radio and electronic goods manufacture 
3444 Electronic equipment (passive) components 
manufacture 
3453 Electronic equipment (active) components and 
electronic consumer goods accessories 
3640 Aerospace equipment manufacture 
8394 Computer services 
Initial examination of the listing raised several important 
issues. Firstly, some establishments were listed with more 
than one S. I. C. code. In other words, if the establishment 
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was engaged in activities and products encompassing more 
than one S. I. C code this was listed. This is in comparison 
to government statistics, for example, which classify each 
establishment by major activity only. As was explained 
in 
Chapter Two, this is a weakness of the S. I. C. system for 
not all persons on the site may be directly involved 
in 
this major activity, but the assumption made is that this 
is the only activity taking place at that site. 
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Concerning the listing, an establishment was included if 
any activity carried out on that site came under one of 
the selected Activity Headings. Hence, in the cases where 
establishments were assigned more than one classification 
code, a similar assumption to that in government statistics 
was made that this activity was the major activity on the 
site. What this assumption entails can be exhibited by the 
use of an example. One establishment was coded 8394 
(Computer services) and 6190 (Other wholesale distribution 
including general wholesalers). The firm is, in fact, a 
computer software bureau and computer stationery 
wholesalers. The activity 6190 is not, however, viewed as a 
high technology activity but rather a distribution 
activity. The firm is included in the listing because of 
its computer software activity. But the listing does not 
reveal what the percentage split between the two activities 
55A favoured example of such a problem is administration departments linked to 
manufacturing plants, say biscuit production. Recent examples of "new" firms 
highlight that they have been created from the "externalisation" of such 
administrative functions by manufacturing companies. These jobs are classified 
within a different (service) sector but are, in effect, a transfer of jobs 
previously classified under "biscuit production". Howells (1987), for example, has 
identified how two of western Europe's largest computer service companies were 
previously the internal computing bureaux of two large industrial concerns. 
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is within the establishment. In other words, it could be 
75% software, 25% wholesale or 75% wholesale and 25% 
software. 
A further aspect of the listing arose where establishments 
were engaged in more than one of the high technology 
activities identified. The establishment was listed under 
whichever Activity Heading was requested first, in this 
case, the numerically lower number. So, for example, where 
an establishment was engaged in Electronic Data Processing 
(3302) and Computer Services (8394) it would be listed 
under the former. This aspect, along with the previous 
point, must be borne in mind where analysis of results by 
individual sector takes place. However, such analysis is 
not prevalent for, as has been emphasised throughout, the 
importance of the sectors individually lies in their being 
constituent of a "high technology ensemble", an inter- 
sectoral complex of firms engaged (and linked? ) in some 
aspect of high technology production. Hence, in the case of 
the firm above engaged in computer services and computer 
stationery wholesaling, the latter activity may well 
constitute an important aspect of the high technology 
complex as a whole without, strictly speaking, such an 
activity ever being defined as high technology. 
The Survey Sample 
The listing provided the names and addresses of 578 
establishments. Further investigation revealed that a small 
percentage of entries were duplicated (4%) and these were 
removed leaving a remaining 554 entries. The distribution 
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of establishments between Activity Headings may be seen in 
Table 5.2. 
TABLE 5.2 Numbers of establishments by Activity Heading 
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Clearly the most striking feature of this distribution was 
the dominance of the Computer Services sector which 
outnumbered all of the other manufacturing sectors put 
together. Also, the establishment total of 554 was of such 
a size that it precluded a 100% survey, on the grounds of 
time and money, hence it was decided to survey a 
numerically manageable sample of the establishments listed. 
Two possible alternative logics seemed immediately to 
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present themselves as to how to choose the sample. Firstly, 
a random 50% sample of all sectors could be taken so a 
total of 277 establishments would be sampled (or a 60% 
sample and 332 firms). The major drawback of this 
alternative, however, was that samples of certain sectors 
would involve small numbers, even less than 10 in some 
circumstances. If a low response rate then occurred only a 
couple of questionnaire returns would possibly be achieved 
from a particular sector. In other words, the smallness of 
certain sectors would be turned into a disadvantage when in 
fact such smallness could be seen as advantageous. For a 
100ä survey of such sectors, a practically possible 
alternative, would allow for the possibility of the whole 
sectoral picture to be discovered (allowing for partial 
coverage and non-response). 
Hence, this led to the second possibility, and the 
alternative that was taken, which was to undertake a 100% 
survey of all the "small" sectors. As can be seen from 
Table 5.2 all the sectors, bar Computer Services (8394), 
had 70 or less establishments within them. Thus a complete 
100% survey of all these sectors involved surveying only 
228 establishments. This could then be combined with a 
sample, say 30% (98 establishments), taken from the 
computer services sector to achieve a (barely! ) manageable 
sample of 326 establishments. Although this alternative was 
taken it is, however, open to the criticism that once again 
manufacturing is being "prioritised" over services. Yet the 
fact that Computer Services was included in the initial 
choice of high technology sectors represented an advance on 
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previous work undertaken on high technology. Moreover, the 
sector still represented the largest sector to be surveyed 
numbering almost 100 establishments. 
The Survey Questionnaire 
Earlier discussion has revealed that the questionnaire was 
to act as the first stage in a two-stage exploration and 
its form was accordingly shaped by this methodology. The 
questionnaire's first essential aim was to provide a 
"snapshot" of high technology establishments in 
Hertfordshire and their firm characteristics, especially 
those characteristics previously theorised as central to 
the locational process. As outlined in Chapter Four, 
ownership linkages and their spatial form were highlighted 
as a particular characteristic which to some extent had 
been ignored in the previous work of Scott. 
The second aim was to discover the reasons for these sites' 
location within Hertfordshire and hence identify, or at 
least "signpost", the lbcational processes at play. In 
particular, in following the essential locational logic 
argued for within the theory of the New Industrial Spaces, 
the questionnaire aimed to address the question of whether 
or not production linkages had played a role in the 
location decision of individual establishments. In respect 
of this aim, the initial identification of the locational 
process would then be expanded through the second stage of 
exploration involving follow-up interviews designed to 
investigate, in greater depth, the identified process of 
location. 
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As such then, the questionnaire was about surveying a large 
group of sites to gain basic information. Hence, the 
questionnaire was deliberately kept to a minimum length 
with the hope of gaining an increased response rate in 
return, a hope which was realised with a 69% response rate 
being achieved. The questionnaire was piloted and, indeed, 
this stage taken to experiment with the exact format of 
particularly crucial questions. 
From looking at Figure 5.1. (P. Quest. Pilot 1), it can be 
seen that the questionnaire opens by splitting respondents 
by "ownership linkage" between a "branches/subsidiaries" 
group and an "independents" group, the latter group being 
directed on to Question 2. Question 1 then further 
investigates the ownership linkage of the establishments 
within the branches/subsidiaries group, as well as 
gathering "characteristics" information such as date 
when trading began in Hertfordshire and the spatial 
structure of the firm within Hertfordshire. Where a spatial 
structure internal to the county exists (ie. more than one 
site), the question finishes by asking if "production 
linkages" occurred between these different sites and, 
most crucially, whether such linkages have played a role in 
the locational decision of the site. Question 1, then, 
immediately splits sites by ownership linkage, an important 
aspect overlooked by Scott, and attempts to investigate if 
the locational logic ascribed by Scott as occurring between 
firms is actually present within firms as well. 
Question 2 partly performs a similar function to that of 
Question 1, but for establishments within the 
i-- i G- 3 
TheOpen 
University 
ACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 
icholas Henry 
rý--t 
-IERTFORDSHIRE ESTABLISHMENTS QUESTIONNAIRE 
Are you a branch or subsidiary? 
Please name your parent company 
Where is your HQ sited? 
What year did this branch/subsidiary start trading in Hertfordshire? 
YES/NO (If no, go to 2) 
Are there any other of your company's branches within Hertfordshire? YES/NO 
Do you have a strong customer/supplier linkage (including subcontracting) or any other 






Were any of these linkages important to the location of your establishment in Hertfordshire? 
Please state which linkages. 
............................................................................................................................................... 
................................................................................................................... (Go to 3) 
As an independent company do you own/part own any other companies: 
............. 
in Hertfordshire YES/NO ............. outside of Hertfordshire YES/NO 
Please name those companies ............................................................................................... 
When did your company start trading in Hertfordshire? ...................................................... 
What are the main functions carried out within your establishment? (please tick): 
- 
HQ 
- Production of a direct product/service' 
(1 Delete as applicable) F7 
- Research and Development for your direct product/service' F7 
- Design for your direct product/service' 0 
- Marketing for your direct product/service' 
- All the functions listed above a 
- Other (please specify) ............................................................................................................ 
4) Is your largest supplier (including subcontracting) located within Hertfordshire? Y/N 
If yes please name this company ............................................................................ 
Is your second largest supplier (including subcontracting) located within Herts? Y/N 
Is your largest customer located within Hertfordshire? Y/N 
If yes, please name this company ........................................................................... 
Is your second largest customer located within Hertfordshire? Y/N 
5) How important were these linkages to your establishment's decision to locate in 
Hertfordshire? 




- Not important at all 
6) Could you briefly list what were the most important factors to your establishment's 






Once again I thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. 
A prepaid addressed envelope is attached for its return. 
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"independents" group. It investigates this group's 
ownership as well as gaining information as to the 
characteristics of the establishments. 
Question 3, where both groups "join" once again to complete 
the remainder of the questionnaire, continues the 
investigation of the characteristics of the sites by 
asking what functions are carried out on each site. 
Question 4 moves on to investigate in greater detail the 
production linkages of each site, asking for the names 
and location of each establishment's largest suppliers and 
customers. 56 Given the likely sensitivity of respondents 
to answer a question which provides commercial information 
of this nature, two alternative forms of the question were 
devised and piloted (compare Figure 5.1 and 5.2 [P. Quest. 
Pilot 2)). As can be seen in Figure 5.1, Question 4 
provides the essential information as to whether or not 
production linkages occur internally or externally to 
Hertfordshire, but maintains an element of anonymity as to 
exactly who these linkages are with. In contrast, the 
alternative Question 4 in Figure 5.2 provides greater 
information in identifying exactly where, and with whom, 
production linkages are situated, whether internal or 
external to the county. 
Question 5 is the question which it is argued has not yet 
56 "Largest" production linkages were identified so as to follow Scott's most 
recent work on Southern California (Scott, 1989p Scott and Mattingly, 1989; Scott 
and Drayse, forthcoming). However, it will be seen that Question 6 of the 
questionnaire allowed for other {ie. not the largest) production linkages to be 
listed if the respondent viewed them as significant in their location decision. 
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HERTFORDSHIRE ESTABLISHMENTS QUESTIONNAIRE 
Are you a branch or subsidiary? 
Please name your parent company 
Where is your HQ sited? 
What year did this branch/subsidiary start trading in Hertfordshire? 
YES/NO (If no, go to 2) 
Are there any other of your company's branches within Hertfordshire? YES/NO 
Do you have a strong customer/supplier linkage (including subcontracting) or any other 






Were any of these linkages important to the location of your establishment in Hertfordshire? 
Please state which linkages. 
............................................................................................................................................... 
................................................................................................................... 
(Go to 3) 
2) As an independent company do you own/part own any other companies: 
............. 
in Hertfordshire YES/NO ............. outside of Hertfordshire YES/NO 
Please name those companies ............................................................................................... 
When did your company start trading in Hertfordshire? ..................................... 
3) What are the main functions carried out within your establishment? (please tick): 
- HQ 
- Production of a direct product/service' c1 ncleu, pplic b1e) 
- Research and Development for your direct product/service' F-I 
- Design for your direct product/service' a 
- Marketing for your direct product/service' 
- All the functions listed above 
- Other (please specify) ............................................................................................................ 
4) 
5) 
Please give the name and town location of your two largest suppliers 
(including subcontracting) eg. Henry's Electronics, Milton Keynes 
Please give the name and town location of your two largest customers. 
How important were these linkages to your establishment's decision to locate in 
Hertfordshire? 






- Not important at all 
I1 
6) Could you briefly list what were the most important factors to your establishment's 






Once again I thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. 
A prepaid addressed envelope is attached for its return. 
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been asked by Scott, to the detriment of his empirical work 
on the New Industrial Spaces. Once establishments have 
provided information on their production linkages from the 
previous question, establishments are asked to indicate 
exactly how important these linkages were in their 
locational decision. Question 5 explicitly identifies a 
particular "location factor", a factor representing what is 
argued is the locational dynamic to the New Industrial 
Spaces, and prompts a response as to the importance of this 
factor to the establishment's location. 
In contrast, Question 6 is a deliberate "catch-all" 
question concerning the location decision of the 
establishment. It simply asks respondents to identify, 
without prompting, what were the factors in their location 
decision. Hence, in one aspect it acts as a back-up to 
Question 5 allowing further confirmation, and expansion, of 
expressions made in the previous question. However, it also 
allows for the possibility of other location processes to 
be identified, including those other "agglomeration" 
factors prioritised within the New Industrial Spaces 
thesis. 
The Pilot Survey 
An initial pilot sample of 59 establishments was chosen 
which represented the same proportion of establishment 
"types" as found in the listing. For example, 
establishments were firstly chosen on the basis of sectoral 
coverage and size, further combined with independent or 
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multi-site status (where known), date of firm birth (where 
known) and "industry leader" status (where known). 
An equal mix of questionnaires with the alternative forms 
of Question 4 were sent out in August 1989, accompanied by 
a covering letter (Figure 5.3) and a pre-paid self- 
addressed envelope. Reminder letters were sent in early 
September (Figure 5.4) and follow-up phone calls made to 
those non-respondents still outstanding after the reminder 
letter had been sent. A response rate of 77%, representing 
36 returns, was achieved for the pilot survey, broken down 
as in Table 5.3. 
TABLE 5.3 Response statistics for the pilot survey 
HQ. I 
SAMPLE 59 (100) 
RESPONSES 36 (77) 
NON-RES. 11 (23) 
'GONE AWAYS' 12 (20) 
These figures split as a 78% response rate from 
manufacturing sectors (sample = 40), representing 25 
returns, and a 73% response rate for the service sector 
(sample = 19), representing 11 responses. The "gone away" 
figure for manufacturing of 20% compared with a similar 
figure of 21% for services. 
Hence, the pilot questionnaire was successful. It gained a 
high response rate, both in total and for rates to 
individual questions whose response rates matched those for 
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Telephone (0908) 274066 
Faculty of Social Sciences 
Direct Line (0908) 65 
Telex 825061 
Fax (0908) 653744 
August 1989 
Dear 
I am a researcher in the Urban and Regional Research Group 
based at the Open University, Milton Keynes. The area of my 
research concerns why high technology firms are located, 
and are continuing to locate, . within Hertfordshire. In 
particular, I am interested in the production and ownership 
linkages establishments have with each other, especially 
within Hertfordshire. 
The results of the short questionnaire attached will be 
combined with interviews with a selection of firms and 
interested bodies such as the Chamber of Commerce and local 
authorities, to gain a view of the local support networks 
for high technology industry in Hertfordshire and their 
role in location. 
I am aware of the constraints on your time and the 
importance of such time and therefore, have kept the 
questionnaire to a very short and simple double-sided page. 
I would be extremely grateful if you would participate in 
this research project by completing the questionnaire and 
returning it in the pre-paid envelope. I should emphasise 
that YOUR REPLIES WILL BE TREATED IN THE STRICTEST 
CONFIDENCE AND YOUR ANONYMITY MAINTAINED IN ANY 
SUBSEQUENT PUBLISHED RESULTS. 
Yours sincerely 
iz* 1 G-%-> ºZ4.5.4- - 2la, A«1rJD£Z lr¬. -r- tt2 
The Open 
University 




Telephone (0908) 274066 
Faculty of Social Sciences 
Direct Line (0908) 65 
Telex 825061 
Fax (0908) 653744 
September 1989 
Dear 
I sent you a questionnaire in mid-August. The majority of 
these questionnaires have now been returned but I 
unfortunately do not seem to have received a reply from 
yourself. 
Presuming that my questionnaire arrived, I am aware that it 
may well have been put aside for more immediately urgent 
matters or indeed, if lucky, until your return from 
holiday! 
However, I write to ask that you now take the five minutes, 
all that is required, to complete the questionnaire and 
return it to me in the envelope provided. 
The responses so far have been of immense interest and I 
eagerly await those few still outstanding. 
Once again I remind you that strict confidentiality 
will be maintained. I would also'like to stress my hope 
that, in time, the results of this research will be of use 




the questionnaire as a whole. Following on from the 
successful response rate the two versions of Question 4 
elicited similar response rates, yet the second alternative 
provided greater information and thus was chosen for use in 
the main survey. A further sub-question was also added to 
the main survey questionnaire concerning the numbers 
employed by each establishment. The initial listing had 
provided incomplete data on employment numbers and 
responses to the date of birth question suggested some 
inaccuracies within the listing concerning this 
information. Hence, in the light of the good response rate, 
and the additional question adding minimally to the length 
of the questionnaire, it was included in the main survey. 
Minor design alterations were also made to the 
questionnaire format to produce the questionnaire used in 
the main survey (Figure 5.5). 
An issue of concern from the pilot survey was, however, the 
"gone-away" figure encountered, with 20% of those 
establishments sent questionnaires no longer in business at 
that site for one reason or another. In fact, the range of 
explanations as to the categorising of establishments as 
"gone away" is itself of interest in highlighting the 
variety of processes of economic development within any 
local economy (see later, this chapter). In a context 
whereby only a 30% sample of the Computer Services sector 
was to be surveyed in the first place, it was felt that to 
then have the possible number of respondents reduced by a 
further 20% due to "gone-aways" was unsatisfactory. Hence, 
the decision was taken to try and identify, in advance, any 
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HERTFORDSHIRE ESTABLISHMENTS QUESTIONNAIRE 
1) Are you a branch or subsidiary? YES/NO (If no, go to 2) 
Please name your parent company .............................................. 
Where is your HQ sited? .............................................. 
What year did this branch/subsidiary start trading in Hertfordshire? ........................... 
How many people are employed in this branch / subsidiary? ........................... 
Are there any other of your company's branches within Hertfordshire? YES/NO 
Do you have a strong customer/supplier linkage (including subcontracting) or any other 




Were any of these linkages important to the location of your establishment in Hertfordshire? 





2) As an independent company do you own/part own any other companies: 
- in Hertfordshire YES/NO - outside of Hertfordshire YES/NO 
Please name those companies ............................................................................................... 
When did your company start trading in Hertfordshire? ...................................................... 
How many people do you employ in your company? .............. 
3) What are the main functions carried out within your establishment? (please tick): 
- HQ 
- Production of a direct product/service1 
(1 Delete as applicable) 
- Research and Development for your direct product/service' 
- Design for your direct product/service' 
- Marketing for your direct product/service' 
- All the functions listed above 
- Other (please specify) ............................................................................................................ 
PTO 
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"gone-away" establishments. Telephone directories, 
directory enquiries and telephone calls where required were 
used in order to achieve this. The result was that 53 
establishments were identified and removed from the listing 
as "gone-aways" prior to the main survey. 
Finally, two questionnaires were initially returned 
uncompleted with the establishments concerned suggesting 
that they were not "high technology". The questionnaires 
were re-sent with an additional question asking what 
products were made on site and which industry did the 
establishment believe it was engaged in. One 
questionnaire was subsequently returned indicating that 
the establishment was involved in an activity classified 
under the Activity Headings pre-selected as "high 
technology", even though the respondent did not 
personally believe the high technology "status" accorded 
to his establishment. This instance would seem to 
exemplify one of the problems of the S. I. C. system 
discussed in Chapter Two, whereby not all firms within a 
high technology sector are necessarily involved in a high 
technology production process. 
The Main Survey 
This stage of the survey was undertaken at the end of 
October 1989. The pilot survey had previously indicated 
that reminder letters produced little additional 
response and, hence, follow-up phone calls were made 
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instead approximately 3 weeks after the questionnaire 
was sent. If necessary, the questionnaire was re-sent 
following these calls and in these cases a further 
follow-up phone call made if required. 
After the removal from the initial listing of duplicated 
entries, 19 "gone aways" identified in advance, and 
excluding the 40 establishments already sampled, 
questionnaires were sent out to the remaining 169 
establishments listed within the manufacturing sectors. 
For Computer Services, the removal of duplicated entries 
left 326 entries. A 30% sample amounted to a sample of 
98 establishments. With 19 establishments already having 
been sampled in the pilot this left a main survey of a 
further 79 establishments. A Computer Services sample 
was chosen - after 34 pre-identified "gone aways" had 
been removed - which generally reflected the sector's 
listing as a whole in terms of size and age of 
establishment. Included in this were 5 particular firms 
especially chosen due to their being "leading" names in 
the sector or where results from the pilot sample had 
indicated their linkage in some form to an establishment 
already surveyed. Tables 5.4. (a), (b) and (c) outline 
the return statistics for the main postal survey and 
Tables 5.5. (a), (b) and (c) for the main and pilot 
survey statistics combined. 
252 
TABLE 5.4 Response statistics for the main survey 
(a) Manufacturing Establishments 
M2, I 
SAMPLE 169 (100) 
RESPONSES 89 (63) 
*NON-RES. 52 (37) 
'GONE-AWAY' 28 (17) 
* Includes 1 refusal 
NB. It should be noted that the "gone-away" figure is low 
because of the removal of 19 entries identified as "gone- 
away" previous to the posting. The inclusion of these 19 
entries gives the true "gone-away" figure of 25%. 
(b) Service Establishments 
up. % 
SAMPLE 79 (100) 
RESPONSES 52 (76) 
NON-RESP. 16 (24) 
'GONE-AWAY' 11 (14) 
NB. Again, it should be noted that the percentage figure 
for "gone-away" is low as 34 known "gone-away" entries were 
removed prior to the posting. 
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(c) All Establishments 
HQ. I 
SAMPLE 248 (100) 
RESPONSES 140 (67) 
*NON-RESP. 69 (33) 
'GONE-AWAY' 39 (16) 
* Includes 1 refusal 
NB. It should be noted that the percentage figure for 
"gone-away" is low as 53 known "gone-away" entries were 
removed prior to the posting. 
TABLE 5.5 Response statistics for the complete 
survey (main and pilot combined) 
(a) Manufacturing Establishments 
ZI4ý. .1 
SAMPLE 209 (100) 
RESPONSES 114 (66) 
*NON-RESP. 59 (34) 
'GONE-AWAY' 36 (17) 
* Includes 1 refusal 
NB. It should be noted that the "gone-away" figure is low 
because of the removal of 19 entries identified as "gone- 
away" previous to the posting. The inclusion of these 19 
entries gives a true "gone-away" figure of 24%. 
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(b) Service Establishments 
Ho. I 
SAMPLE 98 (100) 
RESPONSES 63 (76) 
NON-RESP. 20 (24) 
'GONE-AWAY' 15 (15) 
NB. Again, it should be noted that the percentage figure 
for "gone-away" is low as 34 known "gone-away" entries were 
removed prior to the posting. 
(c) All Establishments 
SAMPLE 307 (100) 
RESPONSES 177 (69) 
*NON-RESP. 79 (31) 
'GONE-AWAY' 51 (17) 
* Includes 1 refusal 
NB. It should be noted that the percentage figure for 
"gone-away" is low as 53 known "gone-away" entries were 
removed prior to the posting. However, a guestimate of the 
figure can be made. In the pilot survey, a "gone-away" 
figure of 20% was experienced for both "manufacturing" and 
"all" sectors. In the main survey the "gone away" figure 
for manufacturing rose to 25%, giving a 24% figure for the 
whole of the manufacturing listing. Therefore, it would be 
fair to suggest a "gone-away" figure of between 20 to 24% 
for the postal survey as a whole. 
255 
In conclusion, the return statistics show that 256 
establishments were surveyed with 177 responses received, 
representing a high response rate of 69%. This level of 
response compares very favourably with that achieved by 
Scott and his co-workers in their investigations of 
agglomeration. For example, Scott (1988b) achieved a 
response rate of 10.2% or 60 establishments when studying 
the semiconductor industry of Silicon Valley. In his 
studies of the printed circuit boards industry of Southern 
California with Kwok (Scott and Kwok, 1989), a response rate 
of 17.6% (36) was gained, whilst a study of the region's 
aircraft and parts industry eventually gained 46 useable 
responses after an intitial mail-shot to 986 establishments 
(Scott and Mattingly, 1989). 
For this study, response rates by sector were headed by 
Computer Services, producing a rate of 76%, with two other 
sectors, Electronic Data Processing (73%) and Telegraph and 
Telephone Apparatus (75%), gaining rates above the sample 
average of 69%. Only two sectors, Aerospace (57% but if 
include refusal = 65%) and Electrical Instruments (44%) 
failed to gain a response rate greater than 60%. In both 
these cases, small sample numbers imply that the addition 
of only a couple of further responses would have taken them 
above the 60% level. 
Gone-Aways 
The "gone-away" figure for the complete survey was quite 
high, the percentage rate being in the low 20s, but as was 
suggested earlier, this set of establishments proved 
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interesting in itself. For the set did not only comprise 
those establishments whose post was returned as "gone 
away", with subsequent efforts to trace them proving 
fruitless. 
A series of other instances also transpired within the 
"gone-away" grouping revealing, amongst other aspects, a 
variety of economic processes occurring within the local 
economy. For example, one of the most obvious processes was 
that of the firm being in the hands of the liquidators, a 
reminder, if needed, of deaths as well as births of firms 
in even the most bouyant of sectors. Other closures had 
occurred in multi-site companies where the company had made 
a selective decision to close the site, sometimes, but not 
always, transferring the jobs elsewhere. This would seem to 
indicate the continued loss of jobs through restructuring 
processes highlighted by the work of Massey and Meegan 
(1982). In other cases the establishment was discovered to 
be a "dormant company", nothing more than a registered name 
in a file in a solicitor's office or a postal address for a 
company located outside the region. Such cases are examples 
of where quantitative statistics alone can lead to spurious 
conclusions. 
In a further case the establishment had been part of a 
company whose major activity was in high technology 
industry. However, it had recently been the subjgct of a 
management buy-out/divestment and the product of the 
particular site would not now lead to its classification as 
high technology industry. This anomaly arose from the 
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research tools used and others also occurred. Hence, the 
listing had asked for all high technology establishments 
located in Hertfordshire. In an interesting anomaly it 
transpired that the locational reference had been that of 
postal address but that postcodes do not necessarily 
identically match local government administrative 
boundaries. Hence, several returns were excluded because 
although these establishments had a Hertfordshire postcode 
they were, in fact, located in Cambridgeshire, to the east 
of Royston (itself located just within Hertfordshire) to be 
precise. 
The "arbitrary" drawing of the research's spatial boundary 
as the local government administrative area of 
Hertfordshire and its implications is discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter Seven, but the issue of postal address 
also has a particularly interesting twist. Recent work has 
highlighted that postal address may well be a locational 
factor in itself, especially for high technology firms 
(Massey, Quintas and Wield, forthcoming; Saxenian, 1989). 
Many high technology firms located in Cambridge have 
suggested the status aspect to having a Cambridge address. 
Indeed, firms located within the postal boundary of 
Royston, and hence given a Hertfordshire address, have been 
sufficiently "miffed" to have recently attempted to have 
the address changed to that of a Cambridgeshire code. 
A similar situation arose from one of the questionnaire 
responses concerning telephone number. The company wished 
to move right out of central London but wanted to retain a 
London telephone code. Premises were found for them and to 
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their surprise the site was within Hertfordshire, the 
company initially believing the premises were in Middlesex 
and that 01 numbers were not available in Hertfordshire! 57 
5.6 Summary 
Thus this chapter has outlined a plan of exploration of a 
possible British New Industrial Space. The design of this 
exploration, as a project of two stages, may be seen as a 
direct result of the critique of empirical studies of New 
Industrial Spaces put forward in Chapter Four. 
In highlighting the initial steps of identification of a 
high technology New Industrial Space, the chapter revealed 
that the neglected county of Hertfordshire, part of the 
Western Crescent agglomeration, represents a prime 
candidate for the title British New Industrial Space. Thus 
the exploration began to investigate this candidature, with 
stage one, a scan of Hertfordshire, being successfully 
undertaken. The first aim of the scan was to furnish 
further and updated evidence of a production agglomeration 
of high technology industry in Hertfordshire (in all its 
characteristics). It is the results of this scan, gained 
from both the postal survey and the gathering of other 
secondary data, which are discussed in the following 
chapter as the hypothesis "High Technology Hertfordshire: A 
New Industrial Space" is interrogated. 
57 How they view the fact that their STD code will now be 081 is uncertain! 
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6.1 Introduction 
"Hertfordshire lies, geographically and probably in its own 
estimation, head and shoulders above London -a favoured county 
in terms of its situation on the map, its relative prosperity 
and its "green mantle" of countryside. " (Financial Times 
2.4.86) [see Figure 6.1] 
Hertfordshire, a county of 630 square miles, has just 
seen its population break the one million mark. Whilst 
the county town of Hertford only has a population of 
approximately 25,000 the most densely populated part of 
the county is the south-west area centred upon Watford 
(see Figure 6.2). This area's population stands at over 
150,000, whilst other major areas of population in the 
county are Hemel Hempstead and, moving east, St. Albans 
and Stevenage, all of which house approximately 80,000 
people. Of the county's population, almost half are 
economically active and the county's employment total 
stood at almost 393,000 in 1987. In contrast, 
Hertfordshire's unemployment rate of June 1989 stood at 
2.5% in comparison to the South East region's rate of 
4.4% and Great Britain's figure of 6.8% (Planis, 1989), 58 
58 These rates are calculated using a Hertfordshire County Council 
definition of unemployment. The "official" DOE figure for the county 





The county's "favoured" situation includes its 
comprehensive communications network. North-South trunk 
routes passing through the county include the Ml, Al(M) and 
M11 and, running West-East, the M25 provides easy access to 
the national motorway network. Alternatively, the county is 
traversed by four mainline rail routes, all electrified, 
and new stations have recently been opened. Air travel is 
catered for by either Stansted Airport or Luton 
International Airport, with Heathrow Airport less than an 
hour's journey away. 
A second advantage is the county's historical connection to 
London, with a variety of "country seats" bearing witness 
to Hertfordshire's location as only a day's ride from 
London during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In 
present times, research has continued to identify the 
advantage of "proximity to London" not merely through the 
modern equivalent of country seats based upon commuting on 
the electrified rail network (see Hamnett, 1990) but, also, 
due to London's continued role as a market and centre of 
government59 (Wray et al. 1974; HCC, 1984; also Chapter 
Seven) . 
Yet the growth of Hertfordshire as a major population 
centre and, as will be seen, site of production is a 
phenomenon of this century. Between 1911 and 1951 
Hertfordshire's population doubled in size to about 
610,000. Indeed, between 1931-51 the county experienced the 
59 It will be seen that the combination of these factors, government 
as market has been of particular importance to Hertfordshire's 
prosperity. 
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fastest population growth rate in England, a mere quarter 
of which was due to natural increase (Wray et 
al., 1974, p. 15). 60 Such impressive growth did not wane in 
the post-war (WWII) era either. Between 1951 and 1971, 
Hertfordshire posted a further 65% growth in its population 
whilst its employment similarly grew by 67% (H. C. C., 1984). 
However, over sixty years of almost continuous growth in 
the county gave way to a period of uncertainty and 
instability during the 1970s and early 1980s, as the 
national economy went into a period of restructuring 
characterised by the deepest recession for fifty years. 
6.2 An Industrial History of Hertfordshire 
The 'Ilight industries" of the 20s and 30s 
Coming into the twentieth century, the traditional 
industries of Hertfordshire were agriculture, malting and 
brewing and the now defunct domestic industry of straw 
plaiting. In addition, two further industries (which still 
are) of importance to the county were the industries of 
paper making and printing. However, as Wray et al. (1974) 
commented: 
"This is a county that, because of its lack of mineral wealth 
(other than gravel) and its geographical position, was 
completely untouched by the first industrial revolution" 
60 The early part of the following summary of Hertfordshire's 
economic history is predominantly drawn from the work of Wray et al. 
(1974), the culmination of a four year research project upon post-war 
planning and industry in Hertfordshire. Much of the section covering 
the 70s and early 80s is taken from Hertfordshire County Council's 
(1984) review of its structure plan, "Ten Years After". 
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(op. cit., p. 15)61 
Such a situation rapidly changed during the 1920s and 
1930s, however, as the geographical focus of national 
industrialisation moved to Greater London and the West 
Midlands through the growth of a series of new industries 
such as electric power, chemicals, synthetic materials and 
engineering based on the internal combustion engine 
(Hall, 1981). In particular, Hertfordshire became the 
location for a wide range of representatives of the new 
industries, often relocating from London (a process 
accentuated during the war years for strategic reasons). 
Examples of such firms were Addis Ltd (brush and plastics 
manufacture; 1920) and the British American Optical Co. Ltd 
(1931). 
Moreover, whilst firms were attracted by the availability 
of labour consequent on the county's population growth, 
inward investors were also encouraged by the establishment 
of the two garden cities of Letchworth and Welwyn. Firms 
locating in the "cities" included J. M. Kent and Sons 
(bookbinding); British Tabulating Machine Co. Ltd (now 
ICL); Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) in 1933; The 
Westinghouse Morse Chain Co. Ltd and Royal Exchange 
Insurance. The garden cities also attracted foreign direct 
investment through American-owned firms that set up with 
increasing frequency in the South East during the inter-war 
years. Such examples were Spirella Company of Great Britain 
61 As Allan Cochrane pointed out, whilst the county did not 
represent a site of production for the first industrial revolution 
it was, however, an important site of class formation during this 
period (eg. Hobsbawn, 1969, pp. 80-83). 
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Ltd (1910) and Norton Abrasives who located in 1931 (Wray 
et al., 1974; postal questionnaire returns). One other 
company also migrated to Hertfordshire during this period 
and represents the first beginnings of what is now one of 
the bedrock industries of Hertfordshire. In 1934 the De 
Havilland Aircraft Company (now Hawker Siddeley) located in 
Hatfield. By 1986, the aerospace industry directly 
employed over 20,000 workers in Hertfordshire, representing 
13% of the industry's total UK workforce (Lovering, 1987, 
Table 9, see later this chapter also). 
Yet it should be noted that the growth of industry in 
Hertfordshire during this period was not purely due to 
inward investment. Firms which introduced new industries to 
the county were also being set-up locally. For example, 
W. L. Thurgood (Coachbuilders) Ltd. (1925), Jack Olding 
(Industrial) Ltd. (construction equipment; 1935), Geo. W. 
King (cranes, hoists and automatic machinery; 1937) and 
Murphy Radio Ltd which set up in Welwyn Garden City. 
Hence, by 1948, the nineteenth century industries of 
agriculture, brewing and malting had been superceded in 
importance by newer industry. Paper and printing still 
retained its position as a major employer with over 15,000 
employees or 6.8 per cent of all employment in 
Hertfordshire. However, engineering now accounted for 8 
per cent of all employment closely followed by vehicles 
and aircraft with 7 per cent (Wray et al., 1974, Table 
2.1). 
266 
The Post-World War II Boom 
The beginning of this period marked not only continued 
growth of existing industry in the county but, also, a 
continuation of the role of Hertfordshire as destination 
point for the exodus of people and industry from London. 
The fundamental difference, however, was that the 
accomodation of such "overspill" occurred within a new 
planned framework. 
The series of post-war Royal Commissions, Committees and 
Acts of Parliament, which investigated strategic issues 
such as the geography of the industrial population and 
created a modern planning system to deal with such issues, 
set the framework for the planned development of 
Hertfordshire (see Cullingworth, 1982). Indeed, 
Hertfordshire's planned growth during this period 
epitomised an era of interventionist policy, both at the 
regional and county level. 62 
To meet the strategic role set for Hertfordshire, of 
continued accommodation of a planned overspill of 
population and industry from London, four new towns were 
designated for Hertfordshire between 1946 and 1948 - Welwyn 
Garden City, Hatfield, Hemel Hempstead and Stevenage. At 
the same time, any manufacturing growth (requiring factory 
62 Hertfordshire also acts as an example of the failure of much of 
this policy. For example, Wray et al. (1974) conclude that, even 
during this period of "tight" planning control, the county 
contributed as much to the alleviation of London's overspill problem 
through unplanned growth as it did through its planned New Towns 
(op. cit., p. 110). 
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space above 10,000ft2) within Hertfordshire or the South 
East more generally required an Industrial Development 
Certificate (IDC). Overall, during this period, policy was 
against the provision of such certificates-except in 
designated new or expanded towns and any additional growth 
would be re-directed to the Development Areas through this 
"push" factor and the additional "pull" factor of capital 
grants available to companies in such regions. However, 
IDCs did not cover smaller industrial developments and it 
soon became clear that continued new building in the county 
for firms outside the area, especially from London, was 
putting undue stress on the county's infrastructure. Thus, 
from 1955, new building for manufacturing industry was 
restricted to occupation by local firms in South West 
Hertfordshire and, by 1963, this restriction had been 
extended to cover the whole county (Wray et al., 1974). 
A similar story followed for office development. Whilst 
decentralisation of London offices was encouraged during 
the 1960s, particularly through the government Location of 
Offices Bureau, in 1965 relocation into Hertfordshire and 
any new building of offices over 3,000ft2 in the county was 
restricted by the need to gain an Office Development Permit 
(ODP). Just as with IDCs, however, such permits failed to 
curb smaller office developments and thus, by the early 
1970s, a new county office policy was proposed to curb 
development only to those "offices serving the local 
community" (Wray et al., 1974, p. 63). 
So, by the early 1970s, and the Second Review of the County 
Development Plan, Hertfordshire had become an area of 
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restraint of industrial and office development. 
Indeed, by this time, three of the four major areas of 
planned growth (ie. the New Towns) were already "full" and 
had seen their Development Corporations wound up. Thus, the 
plan review of 1972 proposed to continue the overall 
planning policy of restraint in the face of the major 
problem of continued industrial expansion, not through new 
arrivals but rather, through the growth of existing firms. 
An attempt to relieve this development pressure led to a 
policy statement that: 
"The County Council-will encourage Hertfordshire firms 
seeking re-location to settle in the new growth areas proposed 
in the 'Strategic Plan for the South East'... This 
recommendation would accord with the County Council's aims for 
Hertfordshire to become an exporting authority on a par with 
Greater London. " (quoted in Wray et al., 1974, p. 71) 
In summary, the post-war period saw a massive expansion of 
both population and industry within Hertfordshire, a 
continuation of the pre-war trend. However, although this 
expansion had been initially planned as the accommodation 
of London's overspill, its rate was such that by the 1960s 
strong attempts were being made to restrict the growth of 
both population and industry. Indeed, in the face of only 
limited success in such restraint policies due to continued 
endogenous growth, by the 1970s Hertfordshire was viewing 
itself as a provider of "overspill" itself rather than 
accommodater. This turn-around from receiver to provider 
can be viewed as the outcome of Hertfordshire's astonishing 
ability during the post-war period to attract the new 
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growth industries, an ability not least due to the 
designation of four of the country's earliest new towns 
within the county. 
Between 1948-71, Hertfordshire experienced a 59% increase 
of employment in its secondary sector representing an 
increase of over 70,000 jobs to 166,000 jobs. With tertiary 
sector employment increasing by 14.6% to over 174,000, the 
county posted an overall job growth of 28.9% (Wray et 
al., 1974, Table 5.6). Indeed, taking a sub-period of 1961- 
71, whereas overall employment in Britain decreased by 
1.2%, the county experienced a growth rate of 17.7% with 
the county's new towns witnessing a growth rate of 28.1%. 
A more detailed breakdown of the industrial structure of 
the county in 1971 by Wray et al. (1974) revealed quite 
starkly the problem faced by local planners in the late 60s 
and early 70s in their attempts to restrict industrial 
growth. For, by 1971, every major national (manufacturing) 
growth industry between 1948-71 was represented in 
Hertfordshire bar one, coal and petroleum products, and 
Hertfordshire had a higher proportion of employment in all 
these industries than the country as a whole 
(op. cit., p. 115). Vehicles had grown to become the largest 
manufacturing sector in the county employing over 26,000 or 
7.5% of total employment, almost wholly in the aircraft 
and aerospace industries (op. cit., Table 7.1). Following 
closely, and partially linked to the aerospace industry, 
was electrical engineering accounting for 7% of total 
employment. Ranking third was the traditional industry of 
paper, printing and publishing employing nearly 22,000 
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workers followed by mechanical engineering employing 
over 20,000 or 5.9% of total employment. Other important 
manufacturing sectors included other manufacturing 
industries with 4.6% of total employment; the rapidly 
growing chemicals and allied industries, particularly 
pharmaceuticals, employing about 14,000 or 4% of all 
employees in the county; metal goods not elsewhere 
specified with 11,000 employees and instrument 
engineering employing 9,000 or 2.6% of all 
Hertfordshire's employed population. 
Such growth of manufacturing employment, impressive though 
it may have been, was, however, outstripped by that which 
occurred in the tertiary sector during this period. Of all 
the tertiary sectors whose employment grew nationally, 
Hertfordshire experienced even greater growth. So, for 
example, insurance, banking, finance, business 
services grew by 167.9% within the county to over 10,000 
and professional and scientific services grew by 
66.4% such that it employed over 50,000 people, 15.29% of 
Hertfordshire's total employment. 
Today, a large part of the above list of major industrial 
sectors in Hertfordshire would be included in one list or 
another of high technology industry. Moreover, this 
historical picture of the county, as an area of rapid 
industrial growth (critically important as a site of 
accumulation for the nation as a whole) must be viewed as a 
legacy. A legacy which, despite the uncertain times of the 
1970s and 1980s ahead, laid the basis for a renewed period 
of high technology industrial growth. 
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Following Hertfordshire's rapid post-war growth and, 
subsequently, the need to restrict such growth, moving into 
the 1970s the assumption was maintained that the future 
would involve the continued restriction of development 
pressure. Such a policy of restriction similarly agreed 
with wider regional objectives which now assigned the 
county a restraint role. Hence, Hertfordshire's future 
economy was viewed primarily on the basis of continued 
support of local firms and the discouragement of any in- 
migration, with a general period of "stabilisation" for the 
county envisaged (H. C. C., 1984, p. 4-7). 
However, such restrictive policy was to be first brought 
into question when the recessionary period of 1974-6/7 
challenged the fundamental assumptions (from the post-war 
era) of continued national and local economic growth. In 
line with national trends, Hertfordshire's unemployment 
rate rose sharply from 0.8% in 1974 to 3.1% in 1977, 
although these figures still stood significantly below the 
equivalent regional and national figures for 1977 of 4.4% 
and 6.0% respectively (H. C. C., 1984, Figure 1). 
Paradoxically, despite the increased numbers of unemployed, 
reports still abounded of chronic labour shortage and any 
skilled workers made redundant were quickly re-employed. In 
fact, during this period there was a marked recruitment of 
labour by local high technology firms such as Marconi, EMI 
Medical Instruments and BAC (op. cit., p. 10). Such reports 
confirmed a policy response which viewed the rise in 
unemployment as a short-term phenomenon, with any 
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relaxation of restrictive policy likely to damage the 
longer term balance between population and employment. 
Thus, when the county structure plan was submitted in 1976, 
the key assumption of a vigorous local economy was still in 
place and Hertfordshire was viewed both at county and 
regional level as an area of continued restraint or "low 
growth" (op. cit., p. 15). 
But the expected recovery from recession nationally was 
weak and short-lived, with the onset of a further major 
recession between 1979/1980-82. Yet, whilst the national 
economy struggled to recover from the first recession, 
Hertfordshire's economy quickly did so, reinforcing the 
belief of a vigorous economy. Unemployment fell, vacancies 
rose and skill shortages continued to be reported. Indeed, 
a county council report in 1978 expressed the continued 
pressure for development and employment growth from the 
electronics and computer sectors in the county. 
Furthermore, such development pressure was not only 
occurring through the expansion of major firms within the 
area such as Marconi Avionics63 but, also, as recognised 
in the County Annual Monitoring Position Statement No. 5 
(1979) : 
63 Interestingly, the wide-ranging role the Ministry of Defence 
plays within industrial policy is highlighted by the application for 
both floorspace and subsequent employment expansion by local firm 
Marconi Avionics. Such expansion was required due to the firm winning 
contracts from the MOD concerning the Nimrod and Tornado aircraft. 
However, this growth conflicted with county industrial policy but the 
council's opposition was withdrawn when the firm's application was 
supported by the Ministry of Defence on the grounds of national 
interest. 
273 
"... smaller electronics/computer firms are already showing very 
high growth rates and the environmental and accessibility 
attractiveness of the county could easily 'over heat' those 
areas in Hertfordshire where the electronics industry is 
concentrated. " (quoted in HCC, 1984, p. 20) 
Abölition of ODPs and national industrial policy which 
identified and encouraged the (especially "high technology 
orientated") small firm sector, merely added to the 
concerns of the county that its policy of restraint could 
be undermined. Indeed, even as a further recession began to 
take hold with the closure of some large manufacturing 
firms during 1979/80 (eg. Kodak, KL Foundries and Borg 
Warner), potential distress was seen as short-term with the 
abandoned premises offering possibilities of conversion to 
meet great demand for small premises in the county 
(HCC, 1984, p. 22). 
However, even Hertfordshire was unable to ride-out the 
acceleration of structural change which occurred as the 
recession intensified in the early 1980s. Between April 
1980 and March 1981, unemployment in the county rose by 
over 120% to reach 5.5% and, by 1982, had reached 7.5% 
(H. C. C., 1984, p. 29). Although this rate still compared 
favourably to the national figure of 10.1%, the eventual 
response to sustained job loss involved the relaxation of 
aspects of the county's industrial development restraint 
policies and in a significant, and symbolic, move the 
county published a promotional leaflet entitled 
"Hertfordshire - County of Opportunity" in 1983. 
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As with the situation nationally, a particular feature of 
the rise of unemployment was its basis in substantial 
manufacturing job loss and the closure of a number of large 
firms in the county such as Bowaters, Rank Radio and John 
Dickinson. However, what was particularly to identify 
Hertfordshire in comparison to other counties was that 
whilst the structural change which was taking place was, on 
the one hand, producing large scale job-loss in a wide 
range of older, traditional manufacturing industries, on 
the other hand, the county was experiencing the growth of 
newer "technologically-based" industries. Whilst a rapid 
increase in unemployment was occurring, planning 
applications continued to suggest significant levels of new 
floorspace and employment with continued demand for small 
premises and the redevelopment of sites vacated by the 
closure of large firms (H. C. C., 1984, p. 28-31). 
The county's reaction to this structural change did not 
merely involve the relaxation of the policy of restraint. 
For example, in 1983, the county also approved its first 
specific policy towards "high technology" industrial 
development. In the same year, the Annual Monitoring Report 
(H. C. C., 1983) also concluded that prospects for economic 
growth in the county looked promising with a significant 
increase in "high technology" developments within the 
county and, by 1984, the ubiquitous notion of a "science 
park" development had been raised (H. C. C., 1984, p. 33-35). 
Indeed, the shift in policy emphasis and the entry into the 
vocabulary of such terminology as "high technology" and 
"science parks", marked the recognition of significant high 
technology industrial development within the county, what 
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has been described as the "third wave" of economic 
development within the region (Rainnie et al., 1988). At the 
time of Rainnie et al's report, the county council were 
claiming that half of all industrial development in the 
region was in industry defined as "high technology" and, 
for example, in 1987 around 90% of all manufacturing 
proposals approved in Welwyn/Hatfield and Stevenage were in 
"high technology" (quoted in Rainnie et al., 1988, p. 4). 
This post-recession re-orientation of the county as the 
location for high technology industry was confirmed by a 
series of survey articles in the national press which used 
titles such as "Hertfordshire: Holding on to its 
place in the sun" (Financial Times 2.4.86) and 
"Hertfordshire: The high tech renaissance" (Financial 
Times 27.5.88) [see also Estate Times, 1.7.88; Chartered 
Surveyor Weekly, 3.11.88]. Furthermore, the perceived 
growth of a high technology ensemble within the county was 
confirmed by a series of reports which declared 
Hertfordshire as the "high technology county of Britain" 
(Begg and Cameron, 1987; 1988; Hall et al., 1987). 
For example, a ranking of counties by relative 
concentration of high technology employment, in which GB 
100, ranked Hertfordshire first with a score of 244 (Begg 
and Cameron, 1987). The much vaunted Berkshire was placed 
second scoring 195. Moreover, the authors' further 
disaggregation of the figures by urban area produced 
confirmation of Hertfordshire's position. In a ranking of 
Great Britain's 161 urban areas the lowest placed of 
Hertfordshire's seven representatives was Hertford in 41st 
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position. In other words, all Hertfordshire's urban areas 
were placed in the top 25% of high technology urban areas 
in Britain. In addition, the list was headed by Stevenage 
with Welwyn/Hatfield placed third. Interestingly, 
Begg and 
Cameron (1988) dissected these overall employment rankings 
by employment in "high technology manufacturing" as against 
"high technology services". Both the above towns held their 
positions principally due to the presence of massive 
high 
technology manufacturing employment (ie. British 
Aerospace). However, four of Hertfordshire's seven urban 
areas also had above average concentrations of high 
technology services. 
In essence, during the late 1970s and particularly through 
the 1980s, as the county came to recognise the growth of a 
high technology ensemble within its boundaries so, at the 
national level, the importance of the county (the "space") 
to the geography of high technology in Britain was 
similarly being acknowledged. However, although such 
recognition did not occur until the 1980s, it is 
crucial to realise that it was the culmination of a 
much longer trend of development of high technology 
industry in the county. Indeed, the seeds of this 
development were planted at least as early as 1934 with the 
attraction of De Havilland to Hatfield. As Rainnie et al. 
(1988) explained: 
"The dynamics of the local [Hertfordshire] economy can largely 
be explained by the linked development of two sectors - one a 
long term phenomenon, the other more recent. The first being 
defence and defence related firms (particularly those concerned 
277 
with aircraft production), and the second high technology 
industries64. " (Rainnie et al., 1988, p. 2) 
Hertfordshire and the defence industries 
In 1983, a list of Hertfordshire's top ten employers 
revealed that the majority were within the defence 
industries, predominantly aerospace and increasingly of 
importance within the industry, electronics. 65 The list 
included the UK's largest defence equipment producer, 
British Aerospace, as well as other major defence companies 
such as GEC/Marconi, Rolls Royce and Lucas Aerospace 
(Rainnie et al. 1988, Table 1). Moreover, measured by the 
number of defence industry sites within a county/regional 
council in 1985, Hertfordshire was placed fourth with over 
10% of national sites (P. Southwood, 1985; quoted in Speller 
and Kraithman, 1987) leading to an estimate of the number of 
direct jobs the defence industries provide in Hertfordshire 
as being 25,000 or over 6% of the county's total employment 
(Rainnie et al. 1988). 
64 This represents a possibly confusing use of the term "high 
technology industries" for aerospace and defence firms are, in fact, 
industries usually defined as "high technology". However, the 
distinction serves a useful purpose in differentiating between two 
periods of high technology development within the county. That is, 
between "old" high technology industries such as aerospace and those 
"newly emergent" high technology industries such as computer 
services. 
65 At the close of World War II avionics were virtually non-existent 
within combat aircraft. They now account for up to 40% of combat 
aircraft costs (Simpson, 1988). Indeed, Hayward (1987) has suggested 
that the cost share of electronics in combat aircraft is likely to 
increase to over 50%. 
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The aerospace industry 
Hertfordshire is one of the top counties in Britain in 
terms of numbers employed in the defence industries, with 
over half of these jobs being within the aerospace 
industry. Yet, as was noted earlier, Hertfordshire's 
aerospace industry was effectively born in 1934 with the 
relocation of De Havilland from Edgeware to Hatfield. Even 
in the five years prior to the second world war the 
industry experienced rapid growth with De Havilland 
increasing its Hatfield workforce from an initial 900 to 
4,280 (Rainnie et al., 1988). By 1943, aircraft production 
was Britain's largest industrial operation and in 1949 the 
sector was the county's second biggest manufacturing 
employer (cf. p. 265). 
Further developments in the industry post-war enhanced the 
county's position. In 1953, English Electric Aviation 
(later to become BAC) relocated to Stevenage from Luton. In 
the 60s the De Havilland company was incorporated into 
Hawker Siddeley Aviation and these sites, as well as those 
of BAC, joined by sites set up with the arrival of Handley 
Page into the county. Hence, by 1971, there were 16 
factories in the county with the aerospace industry 
accounting for 7.5% of total employment (cf. p. 269). In 
1977, Hawker Siddeley Aviation was nationalised along with 
Hawker Siddeley Dynamics, BAC and Scottish Aviation to form 
British Aerospace (BAe), the biggest individual aerospace 
manufacturer in Western Europe and now (after 
privatisation) one of Britain's largest private industrial 
employers. Today, BAe is the largest employer in 
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Hertfordshire but the solidity of this employment has 
become a matter of deep concern. 
British Aerospace (BAe) 
A recent study of BAe identifies three broad phases of 
restructuring of the company since its creation in 1977 
(Bristol City Council et al., 1988). The first phase stemmed 
from BAe's formation and essentially involved "putting the 
label BAe on" the variety of parts which made up the 
company. Considerable duplication of facilities and staff 
arose with the company's creation from the amalgamation of 
four firms but, in the context of sharp increases in MoD 
procurement, BAe continued to make significant profits 
through its major activity of defence equipment production. 
The second phase in the company's development was linked to 
the appointment in 1980 of a new Chairman, Sir Austin 
Pearce, whose role was to prepare the company for 
privatisation. However, this period also marked the first 
signs of a change in the company's market orientation which 
may be viewed as a product of changes in the nature (and 
size) of British procurement policy, changes principally 
aimed at achieving commercialisation and 
internationalisation of the defence industries 
(Simpson, 1988) . 
Firstly, during a seven year period beginning in 1978-79 
and ending in 1985, a substantial rise in defence 
procurement expenditure occurred. This increased 
expenditure particularly favoured the aerospace and 
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electronics industries which account for half of all 
defence procurement (Simpson, 1988, Table 1). Indeed, it is 
estimated that the MoD alone accounts for about 45% of the 
output of the aerospace industry (Lovering, 1987). But, 
since 1985, defence expenditure has been declining in real 
terms. Secondly, government policy has increasingly aimed 
at internationalisation of the defence industries through, 
on the one hand, state sponsored international 
collaboration in the design, development and production of 
weapons systems and, on the other, export market 
penetration. Thirdly, greater competition and cost 
effectiveness has been introduced into defence procurement 
through the increased use of competitive tendering and the 
gradual switch from cost-contracts to fixed-price 
contracts. Simpson (1988) describes this as an ongoing 
attempt to "commercialise" relationships between 'defence 
firms and the MoD. 
Thus, for BAe, this period marked the first threatening 
signs concerning its major traditional market, UK defence 
procurement, with increased competition and greater cost- 
effectiveness required in a shrinking market. At the same 
time, the company also responded to other changes in 
procurement policy. Thus it became involved in a series of 
collaborative international projects and commenced a re- 
orientation of its role to that of an aggressive, world- 
oriented company, rather than an "agency" of the Ministry 
of Defence (B. C. C, et al., 1988). 
The third phase can be viewed somewhat as the continuation 
of the company's re-orientation, but involving a shift of 
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gear as the company has entered "the commercial and market 
era". In fact, the company has reshaped radically to the 
point of changing, to some extent, just what it "is". Since 
Professor Roland Smith's arrival as Chairman in 1987 the 
company has bought the Royal Ordnance Factories, a German 
military optics company, a Dutch construction company, 
Sperry, a share in the software house Systems Designers 
(subsequently merged with Scicon) and a US simulator 
company Reflectone. In 1988, BAe also acquired the Rover 
car company. BAe now has a series of collaborative projects 
with virtually every other major aerospace company in the 
world as well as many other firms, particularly within the 
electronics industries. Indeed, rumours have abounded of 
BAe's desire to link up with a major electronics company 
and discussions have been held with a variety including 
GEC, Thorn EMI and the French company, Thomson. 
As the company enters the 1990s it is concentrating on, and 
investing in, a chosen set of core activities represented 
by the separate divisions or "autonomous management 
companies"; Rover, Civil Aircraft, Military Aircraft and 
Guided Weapons and Electronics. The company's major 
priority has been, and still is, to maintain its position 
in military markets. Indeed, prior to the acquisition of 
Rover, over 70% of BAe's sales and almost all the company's 
profits were accounted for by military production (Harbor, 
1987). Reduced UK defence spending and internationalisation 
of the defence industry has implied that an increasing 
share of these sales and profits are now accounted for by 
overseas sales. Between 1981-87, the company's exports as a 
percentage of sales increased from 61.8 to 68.7%. Over the 
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same period, export sales of guided weapons and 
electronics, as a percentage of divisional sales, increased 
from 32% to 48% (B. C. C. et al., 1988, Table 5). This is 
significant when placed within the context that, in 1987, 
the guided weapons and electronics division alone accounted 
for 92% of the company's profits (op. cit., Table 7). 
However, although pre-tax profits have fluctuated between 
£120m and £180m between 1984-87, after taxation and 
exceptional items the company actually made a loss in 
1987.66 
Over the 1980s, employment in "traditional" BAe plants fell 
by over 7,000. Between 1980 and 1986, numbers employed 
dropped from 79,300 to 74,900 despite the inclusion of 
3,000 employees with the acquisition of Sperry's in 1981 
(B. C. C. et al., 1988, Table 4). However, by the following 
year, employment had jumped to 93,000 employees through a 
series of company acquisitions. Within the context of 
increasing competition in tightening markets, especially 
and most crucially within military markets, the primary aim 
for each operating division has been announced as increased 
efficiency with a drive to cut costs by a third by 1992. A 
variety of methods to achieve this aim are to be used 
including shedding labour. It is within the context of this 
continued restructuring and rationalisation by the company 
that worries about its employment base in Hertfordshire 
have been expressed and recently realised. 
66 In 1990, BAe increased profits before tax and exceptional items 
by 37% to £400million on turnover up 16% to £10.5 billion. Pre-tax 
profits rose 13% to £376 million due to exceptional profits in 1989 
(Times 27.2.91). 
283 
BAe in Hertfordshire 
At the beginning of 1988, BAe employed over 14,500 
employees in Hertfordshire concentrated in four major 
production sites and representing three divisional 
headquarters. The major sites were split evenly between 
Stevenage and Hatfield. 
The Six Hills site at Stevenage was, and still is, the 
Divisional Headquarters for the Dynamics Division, 
responsible for land launched anti-aircraft and anti-armour 
defensive weapons systems such as the highly successful 
Rapier defence systems. The other Stevenage site is 
Divisional Headquarters for the Space and Communications 
Division and as such is the largest organisation of its 
kind in Europe. Projects include a variety of satellites 
such as the Inmarsat-2 series of maritime communication 
satellites, Skynet 4 military communications satellites and 
European Communication Satellites (ECS) for the European 
Space Agency. The division is also working in conjunction 
with Rolls Royce on "Hotol", a new type of space vehicle, 
essentially an unmanned aeroplane in space. 
Hatfield encompasses the original site of the de Havilland 
Group and is the Divisional Headquarters of the Civil 
Aircraft Division. It is the centre of BAe's current major 
civil aircraft venture, the Type 146 regional jet airliner. 
The fourth site in 1988 was the other Dynamics Division 
site in the county at Manor Road, Hatfield. Amongst other 
projects it was the centre for air-launched missiles and 
the design and development of a new generation of 
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propellers for the Advanced Turboprop airliner. 
But, in March 1988, British Aerospace announced plans to 
streamline the company with an expected loss of 5,000 jobs 
(none compulsory) over the following 12-18 months. The 
Dynamics Division, in particular, was targetted to lose 
3,500 jobs, mostly through the rationalisation of 
manufacturing activities (B. C. C. et al., 1988, p. 3). In a 
restructuring which has had a variety of both positive and 
negative consequences for the Hertfordshire sites, there 
has been a marked northwards shift of manufacturing whilst 
the South has seen its position as region of research, 
design and development and advanced engineering reinforced 
(op. cit., p. 14). Although not an explicit aspect of the 
company's strategy, this geographical division of labour 
mirrors and reinforces that depicted for high technology 
industry as a whole in Chapter Three. 
Whilst the Dynamics Division site at Stevenage has seen a 
consolidation of its guided weapons work, with its 
employment standing at 7,000 at the end of 1989 
(questionnaire response), a major blow has been the closure 
of the Manor Road site in Hatfield which had previously 
employed approximately 2,500 workers. It is estimated that 
1,200 of these jobs will be transferred to the Dynamics 
Division at Stevenage leaving a net job loss of 
approximately 1,100 (Rainnie et al., 1989). In addition, a 
planned reduction in employment at the other Hatfield 
(Civil Aircraft) site, from 4,500 to 3,400, will take place 
up to 1994. However, Hertfordshire has not been hit by the 
latest series of (compulsory) redundancies announced by the 
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company at the end of 1990. Approximately 5,000 jobs at 
Preston and Kingston will be lost within its Military 
Aircraft division and 500 more will be lost within its 
Rover subsidiary at Longbridge, Birmingham (Beavis et 
al., 1990) . 
67 
Thus, although the aerospace industry may increasingly be 
moving towards a "leaner" profile, it is, and has been, the 
bedrock of Hertfordshire's high technology industry, the 
industry's growth stemming from as far back as the inter- 
war years. In fact, the eight postal questionnaire returns 
for the sector reveal this long history with the average 
date of commencement of trading in the county being 1959 
for aerospace, compared to an average of 1976 for all high 
technology sectors. Today, six of these establishments, 
including two of BAe's remaining three major production 
sites in the county and Lucas Aerospace, employ over 10,000 
workers. All the establishments bar one carried out some 
form of HQ function with 50% of the sites carrying out all 
the possible "production functions" listed. R&D and 
manufacturing are carried out in 63% of the respondents 
with design and marketing carried out in 75% of the 
establishments. In essence, the postal survey merely served 
to confirm the (historical) importance of the aerospace 
agglomeration in Hertfordshire, not only through sheer 
numbers employed but also, qualitatively, in terms of the 
actual type of jobs available, with the full range of 
"production" functions being represented in the county. 
67 On 21st March 1991, BAe announced a further 4,700 redundancies in 
its commercial aircraft and missile divisions (Guardian 22.3.91). 
Hatfield is to lose a further 1,470 jobs leaving 3,400 and the 
Dynamics site at Stevenage is to lose 500 jobs. 
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The (defence) electronics industry 
Yet the historically close, and increasing, links between 
the aerospace industry and parts of the electronics 
industry must not be forgotten. For example, approximately 
one-third of the value of military aerospace equipment 
today is in electronics and, in the situation whereby the 
domestic electronics industry as a whole posted a £1b trade 
deficit in 1984, the most defence-oriented electronics 
sector, radar and electronic capital goods, still achieved 
a trade surplus (Lovering, 1987). In fact, it is the 
combination of the aerospace and certain electronics 
sectors which constitutes the "defence industries" and just 
as with, and partly due to, the aerospace industry, the 
history of the electronics industry in Hertfordshire is an 
extended history. This is no better illustrated than by 
Hawker Siddeley Dynamics, a spin-off from the original 
(aerospace) De Havilland site at Hatfield, the firm being 
set up in 1940 and now employing 220 people (questionnaire 
response). 
In fact, by 1949, the engineering sector as a whole 
(inclusive of electronics) was the largest manufacturing 
sector in the county (cf. p. 265) and the co-existence of 
the electronics and aerospace industries meant that: 
"The county was going to enter the post war period with an 
already well developed share of "high technology". In 1951 the 
county had a high tech location quotient of 2.2, the second 
highest in the country after Middlesex (Hall, op cit., p. 91). " 
(Rainnie et al., 1988, p. 9) 
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By 1971, after a period of continual growth in the county's 
employment, the aircraft and aerospace industry and 
electrical engineering were still the two largest 
manufacturing sectors in the county, accounting for over 
14% of total employment. This growth continued during the 
following decade so that by 1981, Hertfordshire had 45,000 
high technology jobs (Hall et al., 1987). This number 
included the consolidation of the pharmaceuticals industry 
within the county, which now employs about 5,000 people in 
17 firms (Rainnie at al. 1988), but the majority of 
employment was to be found within the county's aerospace 
and electronics industries. It is at this point in time 
that Hertfordshire was identified as the "high technology 
county of Britain" (see Table 3.2, p. 74; Begg and 
Cameron, 1987). 
The basis of this position was the "defence industries". 
Whilst the county's location quotient for aerospace 
employment in 1981 was a still highly significant figure of 
5.5-6 (see Table 3.4, p. 95), the county had seen continued 
growth of its high technology employment through the 
expansion of defence electronics in particular. During the 
period 1975-81 only one of Hall et al's (1987) chosen high 
technology manufacturing sectors, the heavily defence- 
oriented radio, radar and electronic capital goods sector, 
experienced job growth nationally. Nearly 50% of this 
national growth, accounting for almost 5,000 jobs, occurred 
in Hertfordshire alone (op. cit., Fig. 3.10). Today, examples 
of major defence electronics companies, apart from the 
"aerospace" companies such as BAe and Lucas Aerospace, 
include various GEC Avionics' divisions located at 
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Borehamwood but also, for example, the Sonar Systems 
division at Welwyn Garden City, located in 1978 and at 
present employing 130 people. Another GEC company, and one 
of the county's major employers, is GEC-Marconi with 
separate plants at Borehamwood and St. Albans. Further major 
defence electronics companies are Fernau Avionics which 
located in the county in 1972 and employs 70 workers, Racal 
Acoustics employing 220 people and a branch of the major US 
company Tektronix Inc., set up in 1968 and now employing 
230 workers (questionnaire returns). 
Yet Hall et al's (1987) work also showed that although the 
basis of Hertfordshire's position as a leading high 
technology county was the defence industries, its position 
was not solely reducible to these industries. For their 
work, as well as confirming the presence of the 
pharmaceuticals sector within the county, also identified 
the presence of the electronics industry in its entirety. 
In other words, not merely defence electronics but also 
civil electronics and, especially, the presence of the new 
computer industries. In fact, the problems of defining and 
distinguishing between electronics, "defence electronics" 
and other "defence industries" such as aerospace is acute. 
Lovering (1987) pragmatically takes employment figures for 
the electronics, aerospace and R&D sectors when reviewing 
defence electronics employment in the South East. In this 
instance, having reviewed the aerospace sector in 
particular and pinpointed examples of major defence 
electronics companies within the county, questionnaire 
results gained for the electronics industry in general 
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(inclusive of "defence electronics") will be presented. For 
it became clear that the majority of electronics companies 
in the survey were, at the most, involved in defence 
electronics in only a minor form, although equally the 
employment figures for such firms did not match those of 
the major defence electronics companies already mentioned. 
Hence, 70 questionnaire returns were received from 
establishments within the S. I. C. electronics group 344 
(Activity Headings 3441-4) and Active Components and 
Electronic Sub-assemblies (Activity Heading 3453). Total 
employment in 51 of these establishments equalled 5,685, 
representing an average employment per site of 111 people 
and highlighting the importance of employment within the 
electronics sector. Again, over 50% of the establishments 
were engaged in all the possible "production functions" and 
no one production function, from R&D to marketing, was 
carried out in less than 73% of the establishments, 
highlighting the variety of jobs as well as their numbers. 
The average date of first year of trading was earlier than 
that for the whole survey, the respective figure being 1972 
in comparison to 1976 as a whole. 
However, one major element of the electronics industries 
has been excluded from the above analysis and that is the 
computer hardware sector (AH 3302). Although Lovering 
(1987) has indicated how parts of this sector are involved 
in defence contracts, such as the Hertfordshire-based firm 
McDonnell Douglas Information Systems, the sector is 
predominantly recognised as involved in civil electronics. 
In terms of Hertfordshire's position as a high technology 
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agglomeration, the computer industry must also be 
recognised as having played a dynamic role, a role 
independent from that of the county's defence electronics 
sector. 
In 1981, Hertfordshire had a location quotient of 7-7.5 
in 
electronic computers, a concentration of employment 
in the 
county even greater than that of the aerospace 
industry 
(see Table 3.4). in the previous decades, just as with the 
"defence electronics" industry, there had been a stream of 
continued location of some of the major electronic 
companies within the county such as GPT (GEC) Computers 
(1950? ), Rank Xerox (1965), Unisys (1966), British Olivetti 
(mid 60s), I. T. L. (1967), Bull (1970), Eberle GMBH (1972) 
Digital Equipment Corporation (1975), McDonnell Douglas 
Information Systems (1977) (questionnaire responses)68. 
Also to locate in Hertfordshire with several sites was 
Britain's largest indigenous computer corporation, ICL, 
which was formed in 1968 through a series of mergers and 
rationalisations. 
Between 1975 and 1983 the computer hardware industry 
nationally exhibited the fastest growth of employment and 
output of any manufacturing industry in Britain, with its 
job growth between 1978-84 amounting to 3,759 or 5.5% 
(Kelly and Keeble, 1988, Table 1). Within Hertfordshire, 
responses from 36 establishments in the industry were 
68 Unisys closed their branch at the end of 1989 and relocated it to 
their Milton Keynes site. Rank Xerox are in the process of relocating 
to another of the company's sites in Mitcheldene, Gloucester. 
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received with 30 of the respondents employing over 5,600 
staff, representing an average employment per site of 189 
employees. Almost 50% of the sites were branches, divisions 
or subsidiaries (as against 37% for all sectors) and over 
50% of these were foreign-owned yet, for example, R&D was 
carried out at 76% of the sites as was production and 
marketing. The average date of establishment equalled that 
of the whole survey's average, 1976, highlighting a 
distinct period of development of the computer industry 
more recent than the county's defence industries. However, 
this is not the complete story for the other aspect of the 
computer industry, and integrally linked with the hardware 
sector, is the software branch. Just as the computer 
hardware sector experienced employment growth, so between 
1974 and 1984 the computer services sector also recorded 
greater job growth of 13,678 or 69% (Kelly and 
Keeble, 1988, Table 2). 
Hall et al. (1987), as was discussed in Chapter Two, only 
studied high technology manufacturing industries and thus 
only revealed the concentration of computer hardware 
manufacturing employment in Hertfordshire. But Howells 
(1987) has depicted how: 
"... those areas that have specialized in and benefited from 
computer service activity have been attractive residential 
localities mainly in southern England. Overall, the South East 
region had 55.9% of all computer service jobs in Britain in 
1981. " (op. cit., p. 496) 
It was to be expected that Hertfordshire would be one of 
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the beneficiaries of growth within the computer services 
industry as a whole and this was duly revealed by the 
questionnaire survey (and the firm listing on which the 
survey was based). Interestingly, the survey also revealed 
the sector as having characteristics distinct from those of 
the hardware sector. 
Firstly, of the 63 respondents, 76% were independents and 
only a handful foreign-owned. Secondly, the 46 
establishments answering the question revealed an 
employment level of 977, representing average employment 
per establishment of only 21 people. The largest employment 
figure was only 130, considerably lower than the average 
employment figure per establishment for the whole survey of 
189, and over two-thirds of computer service establishments 
employed 20 people or less. Hence, in comparison to the 
hardware sector, Hertfordshire's computer services sector 
is predominantly a group of small to medium-sized 
independents. Interestingly, whilst R&D (61%) and design 
(59%) were less prevalent production functions than in the 
computer hardware sector, 92% of establishments were 
involved in marketing. The sector's growth must also be 
viewed as a recent phenomenon with the average date of 
establishment being 1981, compared to 1976 for both the 
computer hardware sector and the whole survey. 
Thus, it is clear that Hertfordshire is a significant 
location for the computer industries. Moreover, the county 
has acted as a geographical microcosm of the fundamental 
corporate and organisational change which has overtaken the 
British computer industry as a whole, change some would 
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argue which epitomises an overall structural shift 
discernible in the British economy. 
As Kelly and Keeble (1988) have described, the industry has 
witnessed internationalisation through the growth in 
output, employment and market share of foreign owned- 
multinationals, especially US companies. Secondly, larger 
indigenous British multi-plant firms have experienced 
severe problems of uncompetitiveness in this 
internationalising market leading to rationalisation and 
job-shedding. Thirdly, the industry has experienced the 
significant growth, especially since 1975, of new, small 
and rapidly growing independent firms. New firm formation 
reached a peak during the period 1965-83 in 1979 when 
nearly 50 new and currently surviving firms were formed 
(Keeble and Kelly, 1986, p. 83). However, the 1980s have also 
seen a growing number of takeovers and acquisitions of 
these new independents, particularly by foreign firms. 
Hence, overall, the industry has witnessed an absolute and 
relative growth of small, (often) new firms in conjunction 
with the decline in employment and output share of large 
multi-plant firms. 69 
69 A slight note of caution should be raised for not all the new 
small establishments are new firms per se. The work of Shutt and 
Whittington (1987) has already been referred to to show how 
"fragmentation strategies" have created new small establishments out 
of larger firms. Howells (1987), for example, has described how: 
"Some of the key computer service and software operations in 
Europe have arisen out of internal computer service departments 
which then become subsidiaries, divisions or profit centres 
embedded within the corporation, or sometimes externalized 
through a sell-off of management buy-out. " (op. cit., p. 498) 
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Questionnaire results and other evidence confirm the 
presence of these restructuring processes within 
Hertfordshire's computer electronics sector and their 
significant impact on the economic structure of the county. 
Firstly, ever since the inception of the Garden Cities, the 
county has been attractive to international firms, and US 
companies in particular, locating in the South East. The 
earlier list of multinational electronics companies located 
in the county can be expanded to include not only US 
companies such as DEC (1975), McDonnell Douglas Information 
Systems (1977), Unisys (1966), Rank Xerox (1965), Boeing 
(1975) and more recently Nantucket (1986), but also a 
range of European representatives such as Eberle GMBH 
(1972), British Olivetti (mid 60s) and the Irish company 
Memory Computer (1989). 
Secondly, in plotting the geography of computer 
manufacturing employment change between 1978-84, Kelly and 
Keeble (1988, Fig. 3) depict: 
"... two main zones of growth in the 1980s, much the more 
important of which takes the form of a broad western arc or 
crescent around London from Cambridge to Southampton, 
centred on Berkshire. " (op. cit., p. 8, my emphasis) 
However, one county of the "Western Crescent" stands out 
for its experience of significant job loss over the 
period, that county being Hertfordshire and that job loss 
being almost exclusively the result of massive job shedding 
by ICL, Britain's major indigenous computer manufacturer 
The case study AB is just such an example of an "externalized" 
internal department. 
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(now bought out by Fujitsu). Between 1980 and 1985, the 
company experienced a job loss of over 10,500 employees 
representing 41% of its 1980 peak workforce. Plant closures 
occurred in the North West and the North Midlands but 
redundancies also occurred in Hertfordshire (Kelly and 
Keeble, 1988, p. 12). This job loss not only cast a shadow 
over a generally bouyant local economy but also served to 
mask the creation of new jobs in a resurgence of new firm 
formation within the computer industry, both nationally, 
and within the county. 
While Keeble and Kelly (1986) identified peak years of new 
firm formation in the computer industry as between 1977-80 
(op. cit., Table 4), so Hertfordshire County Council's Annual 
Monitoring Reports for these years were expressing concerns 
over the continued development pressure from smaller 
electronics/computer firms in the county (cf. pp. 272-73). 
Hence, on mapping new computer firm employees and formation 
rates, Kelly and Keeble (1988) show Hertfordshire as a 
county of new computer firm employment growth with a new 
firm formation rate (NFF) over the period 1975-84 of 1.2 
compared to the UK average of 0.7. Although in 
Hertfordshire's case producing a numerically small amount 
of jobs, nearly 500 approximately, especially compared to 
greater job loss from one computer firm alone in the 
county, namely ICL, as Kelly and Keeble (1988) are right to 
express, the structural significance of this growth of new 
high technology firms must not be underestimated. 
Further evidence of the recent growth of new high 
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technology firms has been gained from the postal survey of 
Hertfordshire's computer services sector. Of the 52 
respondents indicating their date of establishment, 
44 
located in the county between the years 1979-89.70 
However, in line with Kelly and Keeble's (1988) findings, 
several of these have subsequently been taken over, 
principally by US companies (see also Saxenian, 
1989). The 
growth of this small firm high technology sector thus 
represents the latest chapter in the history of 
high 
technology industrial agglomeration in the county of 
Hertfordshire. 
6.3 Hertfordshire: A High Technology Production 
Agglomeration 
Hertfordshire is without doubt one of, if not the, leading 
high technology counties of Britain. Its prominent position 
today is, however, based on an extended history of layers 
of high technology industrial development in the county 
(see Figure 6.3). Such growth was initially founded upon 
the growth of aerospace and associated defence electronics 
industries in the post-war years, and especially centred 
around a handful of large defence contractors. This high 
technology ensemble continued to expand with the growth of 
70 Although this figure is for "locations" rather than new firms per 
se (although the majority of locations were new, small independents) 
and is biased in that the respondents represented only those firms 
still located (surviving) in the county, it still represents the 
significant growth of a small, high technology sector in the county. 
It should be added that there is a possibility that a few of the 
firms surveyed by myself were also those surveyed by Kelly and Keeble 
(1988). However, it is clear that the survey results reinforce the 
impression gained from Kelly and Keeble's work rather than merely 
repeating it. 
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the new pharmaceuticals industry (Rainnie et al., 1988) and 
the further expansion of the electronics (both defence and 
consumer) industries, expansion in which foreign 
multinational investment has played a significant role. 
Recent years have, however, witnessed a new (third) wave of 
high technology industrial development in the county based 
upon the location of a series of new and/or small firms, 
particularly within the rapidly expanding computer service 
sector. At the same time, the county's traditional high 
technology industries have been undergoing a period of 
restructuring involving a variety of processes including, 
for example, rationalisation on the one hand and the 
creation of strategic alliances and joint ventures on the 
other. 71 Today, the centrality of high technology industry 
in Hertfordshire's economy is clear. In a postal survey 
where a mere 133 establishments provided employment 
figures, total employment exceeded 25,000 giving an average 
employment figure of approximately 189 workers per 
establishment. In 1983,23,000 firms were registered for 
VAT in Hertfordshire (Rainnie et al., 1988) thus, even 
assuming that all the surveyed firms were large enough to 
register (which they were not), less than one hundredth of 
1% of a restricted group of high technology firms accounted 
for between 5-6% of Hertfordshire's employment. Moreover, 
these establishments represented "nodes" at the top end of 
the industry's hierarchy. Whilst 80% of establishments 
included some form of HQ function (63% independent and 18% 
subsidiaries or divisions72), 65% of establishments also 
71 A recent example is the long-running saga of GEC and Siemen's 
"joint" takeover of Plessey. 
72 Numbers do not exactly tally due to rounding-off. 
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carried out R&D and just under half carried out all the 
production functions listed. 
Thus, it is to be expected that such a long history of high 
technology agglomeration in the region will also be 
reflected in a variety of agglomeration economies. 
Other Agglomeration Characteristics 
Hertfordshire's high technology "local" labour markets 
In Chapter Two it was seen how one common indicator used to 
define "high technology" industry is the above average 
employment of professionally qualified engineers, 
scientists and technologists (PESTS). Also discussed was 
the evidence provided by Lovering (1987) and Kelly and 
Keeble (1988) that this group's proportion of high 
technology employment has been increasing in recent years 
(see also Lovering, 1990b). However, the growth in demand 
for this key stratum of high technology workers is far in 
excess of their supply, and an increasingly severe 
(nationwide) "skills shortage" is being experienced within 
the "electronics" industry. In 1985,25% of firms in an 
Engineering and Industry Training Board (EITB) reported 
serious difficulties in recruiting graduates (quoted in 
Rainnie et al., 1989, p. 5) . By 1987,50% of an EITB sample 
reported vacancies for electronics and software staff 
(quoted in Lovering, 1987, p. 9). Similarly, the National 
Computing Centre predicts a shortfall of between 80,000 and 
90,000 skilled workers by the mid 90s (quoted in Rainnie et 
al., 1989, p. 5) . 
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The outcome is that these highly qualified and skilled 
workers have increasingly been able to dictate where they 
want to work and firms have had to respond to these 
preferences. Research has identified one of the most 
prominent characteristics of this social group to be its 
individual members preference to reside within the rural 
South East, in other words, the ROSE counties: 
"Electronics companies claim that they cannot attract the kind 
of people they need to the North, or to urban areas (Boddy, 
Lovering and Bassett, 1986). This is a major reason why high 
technology is mostly in the South... Employers say they find it 
easier to attract scarce groups in areas where there are 
several other potential employers, so employees can avoid 
becoming dependent on one dominant local company... The shortage 
of appropriately skilled labour is a major influence on 
location in the modern defence industry... " (Lovering, 1987, 
p. 12) 
In a self-reinforcing mechanism the existence of this 
labour stratum within the rural South East attracts 
employers which, in turn, attracts this labour stratum. 
Further evidence suggests that this stratum is also the 
major origin of new high technology firm founders adding to 
the employment concentration of high technology within the 
region (Kelly and Keeble, 1986). Thus, within the Western 
Crescent counties resides Britain's major concentration of 
scientists, engineers and technicians, a principal source 
of agglomeration economy for high technology firms and a 
significant factor in their locational dynamics (Keeble, 
1987; Keeble and Gould, 1985; Kelly and Keeble, 1988; 
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Lovering, 1987; see later also, Table 8.1). 
And within the Western Crescent lies Hertfordshire. But the 
evidence for a "local" high technology labour market within 
the county, over and above that gained from its position 
within the Western Crescent, is scarce. This is, however, 
as much to do with a lack of research on the possibility 
per se than any negative conclusions gained from research 
investigating such a phenomenon. Ever since the "key 
worker" policies of the New Towns, and as early as 1966, 
the County Council have been aware of Hertfordshire's 
"over-representation" of managerial and professional 
workers, the county's figure of 22.2% comparing to the 
England and Wales figure of 15.35% and the South East's 
18.6% (Wray et al., 1974). In 1981, almost 10% of the 
county's 865,000 residents held degrees or professional 
qualifications, giving the county a "qualifications index" 
of 138.2 where Great Britain equalled 100 (Estate Times 
1.7.1988). However, this figure was partly attributed to 
the large number of Central London commuters living in the 
county. 
The Training Agency's 1988 County Labour Market Assessment 
for electrical/electronic and mechanical engineering 
reported a 50% increase in professional engineers and 
managers between 1979-1986. In the same year, a further 
survey for the Training Agency revealed serious recruitment 
difficulties in the county amid "skill shortages". Indeed, 
the problem of skill shortages has been a recurrent theme 
for the county, especially during the 80s. Yet such skill 
shortages must be treated with care. For, as Rainnie et al. 
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(1989) point out, these recruitment difficulties covered 
over 50 job titles and ranged from software engineers to 
labourers. In other words, a lack of "bodies" (especially 
young ones) rather than a lack of skills per se were 
behind many of the difficulties. 
Nevertheless, in Rainnie et al. 's (1989) investigation of 
skill shortages in high technology industries in 
Welwyn/Hatfield, 75% of firms reported problems in 
recruitment although those problems again included clerical 
and administrative staff. In other words, problems of 
"skill shortages" which had nothing to do with the firm's 
engagement in high technology production. However, the 
report did find the most acute shortage of workers to be 
graduate engineers and skilled electrical workers. Yet: 
"It is important to note that in neither case was this viewed 
as being a national problem. Both cases then are not strictly 
skill shortages, but rather a regional labour market problem 
brought about principally by house price differentials. " 
(Rainnie et al., 1989, p. 12) 
Thus, we have a rather confusing picture. Hertfordshire is 
undoubtedly "blessed" with an over-representation of those 
key high technology workers who are in short supply. It is 
clear that such workers also act as a strong magnet of 
location for the high technology industries. Yet, on 
location within such labour markets, firms are still being 
faced with a shortage of such labour and, in turn, a series 
of dis agglomeration economies are increasingly apparent. 
For Rainnie et al. 's (1989) report goes on to describe 
303 
widespread practices of staff poaching, a wage price spiral 
and the impossibility of attracting staff to the area due, 
principally, to high house prices. Such practices, 
moreover, are spilling out of the "key worker" stratum to 
cover a wide range of skills, especially those of clerical 
and administration staff who have been attracted by the 
London labour market. 
Hertfordshire's high technology "environment" 
The county council is acutely aware of the county's high 
technology economy and policy is geared to its continued 
growth and success. A Financial Times report described how 
the council: 
"... is taking steps to attract and secure new industry 
particularly in the high technology sector. These include 
electronics, aerospace, research and development, instrument 
engineering, pharmaceuticals and computer services. " (Financial 
Times 2.4.86) 
In alterations to its Structure Plan in 1986, the council 
put forward a policy for small firm accommodation such that 
the presumption would be towards giving planning permission 
for such development, even outside of designated areas. 
Furthermore, despite a surfeit of industrial land, specific 
land of a "quality" for "specialised technology" functions 
was additionally identified (H. C. C., 1986). As part of the 
Strategy for High Technology, and with visions of the M4 
Corridor in mind, the council, in conjunction with a series 
of districts, has also announced the "Al(M) Corridor" 
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initiative to attract development to the series of 
districts straddling the motorway. 73 
Hertfordshire's educational infrastructure is similarly 
geared up to the needs of local (high technology) industry. 
Symbolic (in name and action) of this relationship is De 
Havilland College, one of 12 further education colleges in 
the county. Major specialisms exist in engineering 
technology (electronics and robotics) and business data 
processing. It carries out specialist courses for local 
industry such as a part-time HNC in software engineering 
initiated to meet the needs of GEC Avionics, a course which 
was equipped by local companies including GEC, British 
Aerospace and Hawker Siddeley amongst others (Financial 
Times 27.5.1988). The county's showpiece educational 
institution is, however, Hatfield Polytechnic. In 1986, in 
a Times Higher Education Supplement poll of Britain's top 
500 employers of graduates, Hatfield was the top 
Polytechnic for both sciences and arts. Science subjects 
which were highly rated included mechanical engineering, 
electrical and electronic engineering, chemistry, 
mathematics, computing and biological sciences 
(H. C. C, 1988). In addition to providing a steady stream of 
technology graduates, the polytechnic also provides short 
courses for local industry including, for example, stress 
engineering and CAD courses for British Aerospace and 
software engineering and microprocessing courses for 
Marconi (Financial Times 27.5.1988). 
73 Further information on the nature and success of this initiative 
is soon to be forthcoming from Julie Charlesworth of the Local 
Economy Research Unit, Hatfield Polytechnic. 
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Hatfield Polytechnic also provides consultancy expertise 
through "arms-length" firms such as Polyfield Services and 
Polyfield Electronics. These add to a research and 
development environment already endowed by institutions 
such as the world renowned Warren Springs (Industrial 
Research) Laboratory, the British Standards Institute (BSI) 
testing facility at Hemel Hempstead and several government 
research laboratories, not including those research 
facilities of private companies located in the county such 
as the Wellcome Foundation, Glaxo, GEC, BAe, ICL, McDonnell 
Douglas and BICC Technologies to name but a few. 
Thus, in conclusion, this chapter provides evidence that 
Hertfordshire does indeed share some of those 
characteristics common to the New Industrial Spaces. The 
county has experienced continued growth of a high 
technology production ensemble such that it may now be the 
premier high technology county in Britain. Placed within 
Britain's major high technology agglomeration of the 
Western Crescent, and a recipient of the wider 
agglomeration economies that this inclusion brings with it, 
high technology growth in the county has most recently 
involved the proliferation of a variety of new, small, and 
dynamic firms. 
Yet one essential question still remains and, indeed, it is 
the question raised earlier as pertinent to all the New 
Industrial Spaces thus far identified. Namely, what exactly 
are the causal dynamics creating the agglomeration 
characteristics which have just been described. For, 
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ultimately, it is the causal dynamics of agglomeration 
which are the definitional bond of the New Industrial 
Spaces. In Chapter Four those dynamics put forward within 
the New Industrial Spaces thesis were identified and, in 
particular, the dynamic of "transaction costs" arising from 
production linkages concentrated upon. Hence it is evidence 
of this dynamic, as the most recent dynamic of high 
technology industrial agglomeration within Hertfordshire, 
which we must seek in our quest for "High Technology 
Hertfordshire: A New Industrial Space". 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: All That Glistens Is Not Gold or 
Appearances Are Deceptive 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has confirmed the importance of high 
technology industry to Hertfordshire's (and, in turn, the 
nation's) economy. Possessing the agglomeration 
characteristics of the New Industrial Spaces, 
Hertfordshire's outward appearance would seem to 
substantiate the claim that it is a New Industrial Space. 
Indeed, evidence similar to that put forward in Chapter Six 
has been more than enough for other regions' entry into the 
New Industrial Spaces "elite". However, Chapter Six ended 
with the argument that appearance is not enough 
Evidence for the causal process(es) driving 
Hertfordshire's high technology economy is still to 
be provided and it is only the presentation of such 
evidence that will allow confirmation (or not) of 
Hertfordshire as a New Industrial Space. It is the 
dynamics of Hertfordshire's high technology industrial 
growth (and particularly evidence for the "transaction 
costs" dynamic) which this chapter will address. 
7.2 High Technology Hertfordshire: The Dynamics of 
Development 
The starting point is to recognise that just as specific, 
and qualitatively different, periods of high technology 
development can be delineated throughout the county's 
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recent history, so qualitatively different dynamics to this 
growth can, similarly, be discerned over the same periods. 
Historically, the development of high technology industry 
in the county can be seen to follow the model of "layers of 
cumulative advantage" (uneven development) suggested by 
Breheny and McQuaid (1988) for the Western Crescent high 
technology agglomeration as a whole (see Table 7.1), but 
with strong local contingencies playing a role. 
Hence, Breheny and McQuaid (1988) view the historical 
origins of the Western Crescent as linked to the 
development of the electrical industries in West London as 
early as the 1920s and 30s, although the industries were 
still heavily concentrated in Greater London at the 
beginning of the 1950s. This same period witnessed the 
establishment and growth of the military-industrial complex 
as firms converted to military production, with Breheny and 
McQuaid arguing for the significance of this relationship 
in the subsequent (relative) spatial dispersal of the 
industries from the 1950s onwards. They describe how many 
companies' choice of new decentralised locations was 
influenced by the need for ready access to the Defence 
Research Establishments, themselves biased in location to 
the west and south-west of London (op. cit., p. 328-329). In 
turn, Hertfordshire was also the recipient of two of these 
research establishments and the centrality of defence 
spending in the growth and sustenance of Hertfordshire's 
high technology industry has already been demonstrated, 
although its role in actual location patterns is possibly 
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The second aspect of the historical origins of the 
Crescent 
put forward by Breheny and McQuaid 
is that of the role of 
planning policy and infrastructure investment. This aspect 
may, in contrast, be of even greater relevance when 
discussing Hertfordshire. The role of Abercrombie's Greater 
London Plan in the planned decentralisation of London's 
population and industry to, in particular, New Towns such 
as Bracknell is particularly highlighted (op. cit., p. 
330). 
Indeed, Begg and Cameron (1988) have further revealed the 
important correlation between New Towns in non-assisted 
areas and the location of high technology industry. 
Hertfordshire acted as a major recipient of this planned 
decentralisation with the early designation of no less than 
four New Towns, along with expanded town schemes, and in 
addition to the garden cities already in existence 
in the 
county. The result was an increase in the county's 
population and employment of over 65% in the twenty years 
from 1951. 
During this period another linked arm of planning policy, 
Industrial Development Certificates (IDCs), was also in 
operation and was to prove advantageous to high technology 
employment in the Crescent, including Hertfordshire. 
Breheny and McQuaid (1988) describe how: 
"The post-world war II 'ceilings' on factory expansion helped push 
firms or plants short distances (15-50 miles) out of northwest 
London. In addition, due to their good export record, and possibly 
because of their importance for defence, electronics companies 
found it easier than other companies to obtain Industrial 
311 
Development Certificates in the prosperous South East and in new 
towns close to London (Keeble, 1968,18). To generalise, it could 
be argued that IDCs pushed what were to become the declining 
sectors into development areas, while allowing the advanced and 
future growth sectors to remain in the South East. " (op. cit., 
p. 330) 
An example of such an occurrence advantageous to 
Hertfordshire was the expansion of Marconi Avionics 
described in Chapter Six. 74 
Thirdly, the policy of strict restraint of development, 
except in designated areas such as the New Towns, to 
maintain the county's "green mantle" has been the 
fundamental post-war principle of planning policy in 
Hertfordshire and no less so, in the Crescent counties more 
generally. The outcome has been the retention of pleasant 
"semi-rural" environments, environments which have proved 
to be particularly attractive both as locations for the new 
high technology companies and, as suggested earlier, their 
workforces. 
Furthermore, at the same time as various planning policies 
were combining to help lay the foundations of the uniquely 
advantageous situation of the Western Crescent today, so 
other state investment was adding to this advantage. 
74 Another example is PD: 
"In 1964 our most important customer was based in Tottenham and Cheshunt 
(Herts) was the nearest place we could obtain (an) IDC. Please note that our 
largest production unit is now in Ivybridge, Devon because in 1974 we were 
refused (an] extra gas supply at Cheshunt. Hence (we] were forced to establish 
a further factory elsewhere. " (questionnaire response) 
This also represents a clear example of how the state may play a determinate role 
in the location of industry (whether planned or not). 
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Breheny and McQuaid (1988) stress the establishment, post- 
World War II, of Heathrow as the country's major 
international airport such that, by the 1970s, an influx of 
US companies had confirmed the Crescent as an 
internationally important location. At the beginning of the 
1970s the M4 was also opened (subsequently giving its name 
to describe Britain's up and coming high technology region) 
and in 1976 the first Inter City 125 ran westwards out of 
Paddington station. Hertfordshire, in turn, has seen its 
mainline routes electrified and the M25 opened giving 
access to all the major radial motorways emanating from 
London. Several of these motorways, such as the M1, A1(M) 
and M11 already run through the county and further 
investment for their upgrading has recently been announced. 
The M25 has also improved access to Heathrow and Gatwick 
airports whilst nearby Stansted Airport is undergoing 
expansion as a result of its designation as London's third 
airport (Observer 3.6.1990). 
It is these foundations and continued advantages of the 
Western Crescent which have proved attractive to high 
technology industry over a long period of time. Especially 
significant, however, is the acknowledgement by Breheny and 
McQuaid (1988) of the recent growth of small high 
technology firms in the Crescent, starting in the 70s, but 
continuing throughout the 80s, and coincident with the 
Western Crescent itself being recognised. It is also this 
time-period of growth which led to the (M4 Corridor) region 
being labelled by Scott as a New Industrial Space 
(Scott, 1988a, p. 179) and it is this most recent period of 
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growth upon which the research will particularly focus. For 
if we are to believe the causal dynamic expressed in the 
New Industrial Spaces thesis, the most recent period of 
high technology economic development within Hertfordshire 
is to be explained by the mechanism of self-reinforcing 
disintegration and agglomeration. Concomitantly, it is upon 
the investigation of the causal processes entailed in the 
county's most recent period of high technology industrial 
development that confirmation of "High Technology 
Hertfordshire: New Industrial Space" awaits. 
The investigation, however, is two-fold in its aims. For 
not only is the causal process of Hertfordshire's recent 
growth "in the dock" to allow judgement of the county's 
claim to be a New Industrial Space but, the claim for 
validity of that causal process itself, as the force 
structuring the (post-Fordist) geography of production, is 
also under scrutiny. 
7.3 Production Linkages and The Location Process: A 
Framework for Analysis 
It is at this point that the second aspect of the postal 
questionnaire becomes relevent. Within Chapter Six results 
from the questionnaire were used to provide additional 
evidence for the development of a high technology 
agglomeration within Hertfordshire. But, as was outlined in 
Chapter Five, the postal questionnaire was also designed to 
aid our investigation of the causal dynamics of the pattern 
of agglomeration it was itself describing. 
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For we may view each individual establishment which 
returned the questionnaire as an "outcome". Each 
establishment is the result of a locational process and, in 
combination, these establishments make up the phenomenon of 
high technology industrial agglomeration in Hertfordshire. 
Hence, the outcomes may in fact be defined as "all high 
technology establishments within the agglomeration". Within 
the New Industrial Spaces thesis a causal mechanism 
(necessary to the structure of the firm) has been described 
which explains agglomeration. Thus, crudely put, the logic 
follows that because each outcome (firm) is, by definition, 
part of an agglomeration, and within the thesis a necessary 
causal mechanism has been put forward to explain 
agglomeration, then every firm, by virtue of its 
"membership" of the agglomeration, has located due to that 
mechanism. Putting the thesis in a slightly more refined 
form, because the mechanism operates through external 
production linkages of firms, production linkages have 
subsequently been identified between agglomerated firms to 
provide evidence for the mechanism and its operation. 
Hence, those outcomes of particular relevance can be re- 
defined as "all establishments in the agglomeration with 
'local' linkages". 
Yet, as argued in Chapters Four and Five, such evidence is, 
in fact, inconclusive concerning the causal mechanism. For 
the evidence is still only for outcomes (ie. the pattern), 
even if this set is better defined. We can agree that such 
outcomes could be expected if the mechanism were to have 
operated, but we cannot discount that such outcomes could, 
in fact, be due to another mechanism which creates outcomes 
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the same as those predicted for the New Industrial Spaces 
transaction costs mechanism. To put it another way, are the 
linkages held by such establishments the cause of their 
location or a result of it? 
Thus, the second aspect of the postal questionnaire 
involved more than just identifying outcomes as "all firms 
with local production linkages". It also asked a question 
concerning the locational mechanism of these outcomes. By 
asking whether or not production linkages did play a part 
in the location decision, a definition of the outcomes as 
"all firms with ('local') production linkages which played 
a role in their location" was achieved. Hence, a group of 
outcomes identifying not just a pattern but a process of 
cause and effect was gained. But, although indicating a 
process, this group still does not explain how that process 
has operated. At this point, there is no evidence to 
suggest that the mechanism of the process is that of 
transaction costs as against any other possibility such as, 
for example, power relationships. This, as explained in 
Chapter Five, is the point of entry for the second stage of 
the research design, the interviewing of selected (case- 
study) outcomes. Through such interviews investigation of 
the nature (operation) of the mechanism of the process may 
be undertaken. 
However, before moving to this stage of the research we 
will return to the results, in terms of outcomes, gained 
from the postal questionnaire. For whilst the case studies 
investigated the validity of the causal mechanism as a 
structuring force in post-Fordist industrial location per 
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se, the postal questionnaire results, first and foremost, 
delineated whether or not the mechanism had been a major 
dynamic of the growth of Hertfordshire's high technology 
industry in particular. 
7.4 Linkages and Local Production 
The 177 questionnaire returns represented Group A of the 
outcomes, namely "all establishments located within the 
agglomeration". The analysis of Group A then followed a 
sieve process as outlined above. Hence, the next analytical 
stage involved differentiating members of Group A by 
whether or not they had production linkages within 
Hertfordshire. This was (principally, but not solely [see 
later]) achieved using Question 4 of the questionnaire 
which asked establishments to note down the locations of 
their largest two suppliers and largest two customers. 
This first stage of the sieving process split Group A into 
two sub-groups. Group Y representing "all establishments 
with at least one local (where local was defined as within 
Hertfordshire) production linkage" and Group N which 
included all those establishments which did not have any of 
their four supplier/customer linkages asked for within 
Hertfordshire. Excluding the 18 establishments which 
provided insufficient information to allow their 
classification, Group Y numbered 67 establishments or 42% 
and Group N numbered 92 establishments or 58% of those 
eligible members of Group A. Hence, less than half of 
the establishments surveyed had a major production 
linkage within Hertfordshire. 
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However, the question remains as to what the above 
conclusion actually tells us. For whilst this conclusion is 
a "fact", as with so many facts, the question is what 
interpretation should be placed upon it. In this particular 
context, the question we are asking is whether or not the 
figure of 42% proves or disproves that Hertfordshire is a 
"localized production system". The immediate problem is, 
however, that we do not know what the definitional 
benchmark figure is which allows identification (or not) of 
a "localized production system". Facing this situation, 
further analysis of the linkages was undertaken in an 
attempt to gain greater insight (see Table 7.2 (a), (b) and 
(c) ] 
From Table 7.2 it may be seen that whilst 42% of 
establishments had a major production linkage 
within Hertfordshire, only 19% of all the linkages 
identified were internal to Hertfordshire. These 
further figures also allow comparison to be made with other 
work on production linkage patterns within New Industrial 
Spaces. Thus, Scott and Mattingly (1989) found that 82.3% 
of the top 3 supplier linkages of (39) Southern Californian 
aircraft and parts manufacturing establishments were within 
Southern California. Similarly, for the Southern 
Californian electronics industry (33 establishments), Scott 
and Drayse (forthcoming) discovered that 91.5% of the top 3 
subcontractor linkages for each establishment were within 
the region. 
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TABLE 7.2 The intra-county "major" production 
linkages of high technology establishments in 
Hertfordshire 
(a) Supplier Linkages 
No. of respondents 177 
No. of supplier linkages reported 274 
Reported linkages as % of total possible linkages 77% 
No. of supplier linkages within Hertfordshire 46 
% of reported supplier linkages within Herts. 1796 
(b) Customer Linkages 
No. of respondents 177 
No. of customer linkages reported 294 
Reported linkages as % of total possible linkages 83% 
No. of customer linkages within Hertfordshire 62 
% of reported customer linkages within Herts. 21% 
(c) All Production Linkages 
No. of respondents 177 
No. of linkages reported 568 
Reported linkages as % of total possible linkages 80% 
No. of linkages within Hertfordshire 108 
% of reported linkages within Hertfordshire 19% 
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Other pieces of work providing some insights into the 
linkage pattern figures gained for Hertfordshire include 
work done by Breheny and McQuaid (1988) on the Thames 
Valley and the work of Gordon (forthcoming). In Breheny and 
McQuaid's case, they questioned 44 Berkshire electronics 
companies concerning the advantages and disadvantages of a 
Thames Valley location. They found that 18% suggested 
"access to local suppliers" as an advantage whilst 40% 
pinpointed "access to local customers". 
Most recently, Gordon (forthcoming) has carried out a 
detailed investigation of industrial linkages within a New 
Industrial Space, the region chosen being none other than 
the antecedent of the model, Silicon Valley. His research 
involved the: 
"... systematic study of innovation and the socio-spatial 
organization of inter-firm linkages in [but also external to] 
Silicon Valley. " (op. cit., p. 3) 
Forty firms were questioned about a much broader set of 
inter-firm "production" linkages than previously taken 
within Scott's work or, indeed, this piece of research. 
Furthermore, questions were asked about both the 
quantitative and qualitative aspects of these linkages. The 
research produced a variety of spatial patterns of 
production linkage. For example, sources of capital 
(excluding the firm's own internal sources) were found to 
be evenly divided between local (Silicon Valley) and non- 
local sources. Over 92% of the firms maintained relations 
with equipment suppliers within the region compared to only 
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50% which had a relation with suppliers external to the 
region. In contrast, excluding non-firm supply, 63% of all 
principal component inputs for new product development 
were sourced outside Silicon Valley. 
75 Moreover, local 
component sourcing was found to be overwhelmingly 
concentrated in "non-technology intensive inputs" whereas a 
disproportionate amount of specialized inputs were sourced 
from outside the region. In the few cases where linkages 
occurred between firms and academic institutions, such 
institutions were more likely to be outside Silicon Valley. 
Over 94% of firms had "external" sales channels and 38% had 
exclusively external sales, seven times the number of firms 
with purely local distribution. Yet, where local clients 
existed they played a more important qualitative role 
with over 47% of firms stressing the importance of local 
clients in conceptualizing new products. 
To combine all these different pieces of empirical evidence 
provides a rather confusing picture but, if comparison is 
made between the (major) supplier linkage figures of Scott 
and Drayse (forthcoming), Scott and Mattingly (1989) and 
those for Hertfordshire, the concentration of intra- 
regional supplier linkages found within Southern 
75 There is a slight questionmark over this figure concerning Gordon's exclusion 
of firm supplies. Generally, these are taken as those supplies available from on- 
site (ie. internal to the firm) such as finance capital, making your own components 
and knowledge held by individuals. The distinction is an important and useful one 
but, again, the question of single site and multi site firms is overlooked. The 
survey sample firms were "predominantly" independent which implies that some may 
have been multi-site. However, if, as is likely with multi-sites, supplies could 
be gained by Silicon Valley site's from other company sites outside the region 
would such supplies be viewed as "externally sourced" or "internal to the firm"? 
Either way, such "supply linkages" are qualitatively different in their nature. 
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California, at over 80% in both cases, is over four times 
the figure for Hertfordshire of 17%. However, whilst the 
figure for Hertfordshire is not directly comparable to the 
"access to local suppliers" figure of 18% gained by Breheny 
and McQuaid (1988) in another Western Crescent county, 
Berkshire, it is of the same dimensions (furthermore, both 
these studies also found intra-regional customer linkages 
of greater significance than supplier linkages). 
Hence, the initial conclusion to be reached must be 
that this particular study has found limited 
evidence that the transaction costs dynamic is 
realised empirically. If the dynamic does exist, 
its role as a dynamic of production agglomeration 
is minor within Hertfordshire. The evidence for 
"Hertfordshire as a localised production complex" 
(let alone a complex caused by a particular 
transaction costs process of agglomeration) is not 
convincing. 
" . om _ba 
ks" or caveats 
Local linkages: Never mind the quantity, feel the quality 
Yet such an interpretation must be treated with care. For 
this interpretation is based purely on a quantitative 
assessment of linkages, that is, the percentage to be found 
"locally". Although Scott's co-authored work on Southern 
California revealed a dominance of intra-regional linkages 
in that particular region, such quantitative dominance is 
not a pre-requisite for the identification of a "localised 
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production complex". As Scott has stressed (see Chapter 
Four), if firms are members of a localised production 
complex. it does not imply that all the linkages of such 
firms are local. Rather, the argument is that such firms 
will have linkages at a variety of spatial scales, some 
local and some not, but those which are most "costly" in 
their upkeep are likely to be local and, indeed, the 
"localisation" of such linkages is likely to have been the 
raison d'etre of the firm's location in the region. 
However, such local linkages need not be (and are unlikely 
to be? ) more numerous than linkages outside of the region. 
Hence, even within the linkage patterns of a "localised 
production complex", intra-regional linkages may be 
outnumbered by those external to the region. 
Related to this point is the argument that intra-regional 
linkages are also likely to be of particular significance 
to only a certain segment of industry (ie. f lexible 
industrial ensembles). In the context of this study, that 
particular segment is supposedly composed of firms which, 
amongst other things, are new, small-to-medium-sized, hi- 
tec and "independent". 76 The point is, however, that such 
a segment (ensemble) itself may (or need? ) not necessarily 
be dominant within the local economy within which it is to 
be found. 77 In other words, the local (high 
76 Scare quotes are used to highlight the definition of "independence" for in 
Scott's eyes this definition would include "branch" sites. Such sites would be 
presumed to act as if ownership and control were on-site (ie. as independent 
firms). 
77 Scott and Storper have argued this point concerning flexible production 
ensembles as a whole (see Chapter Four earlier). That is, these ensembles do not 
need to be quantitatively dominant within Western production to still exist and be 
of structural importance. It is less clear, however, whether the implications of 
this point concerning the quantitative position of such ensembles within New 
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technology) economy may well contain as part of its 
structure a flexible ensemble, and hence a 
localised production complex, but that does not 
necessarily imply the characterisation of the local 
economy .a 
localised production complex. Once 
again, quantitative analysis of the percentage of local 
linkages within the "whole" local (high technology) economy 
could provide a low percentage figure without precluding 
the possibility of a local production network. 
However, it should be noted that such a situation would 
also ultimately lead to a questioning of the empirical 
significance of the New Industrial Spaces within the 
geography of (post-Fordist) production. For if the flexible 
industrial ensembles constituting local production networks 
are not even dominant within the New Industrial Spaces 
themselves and, as argued by the New Industrial Spaces 
theorists, the flexible industrial ensembles are not 
quantitatively dominant within (Western) production as a 
whole, the (qualitative) argument for their structural 
importance eventually breaks down on the basis of such 
ensembles/networks sheer empirical insignificance. 
In the case of Hertfordshire, the study took a sample of 
firms defined by their "high technology" production 
activity alone, and not in conjunction with their size, 
age, etc. Hence, it could be argued that the result of 
linkages external to the region outnumbering those internal 
to the region could be expected. The argument would follow 
that if a sub-sample of new, small and independent high 
Industrial Space local economies has been addressed. 
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technology firms was taken (ie. an archetypal flexible 
industrial ensemble), a higher percentage of intra-regional 
linkages would be gained. In fact, the results from 
Hertfordshire lend support to such an argument. Avoiding 
the problems involved in delineating "new", "small" and 
"independent" firms, it was found that Group Y (those 
establishments with linkages in Hertfordshire) was made up 
of smaller and newer establishments than those 
establishments comprising the sample as a whole. The 
average date of birth for Group Y was 1979 with 
establishments averaging an employment of 38 persons. In 
contrast, the respective figures for the sample as a whole 
were 1976 and 190 persons. 
However, this merely serves to accentuate the point raised 
above concerning the actual quantitative significance of 
the flexible industrial ensembles and the New Industrial 
Spaces which they constitute. This research looked at high 
technology firms in Hertfordshire. Earlier, in chapter two, 
the problems of defining just what is "high technology" 
were discussed but those sectors chosen for study would 
commonly be agreed upon by commentators as high technology 
"par excellence". Moreover, the sectors chosen also 
represented the core sectors within the definition of a 
high technology "flexible industrial ensemble" suggested by 
Scott and Storper (see Chapter Five). Hertfordshire, 
itself, was similarly chosen as representing part of 
Britain's premier high technology agglomeration. If the 
reality of "high technology Hertfordshire" proves to be 
sectors whose characteristics are at odds with those of the 
archetypal flexible industrial ensemble (eg. large and old 
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firms) and as a result only low levels of intra-regional 
linkages were discovered, this cannot be held up as a 
criticism of the research. Rather, it serves as a warning 
of the pitfalls and problems of unguarded generalisation of 
theoretical concepts (and often definitionally flawed ones 
at that) from region to region and sector to sector. 
The above argument concerning quantitative dominance does 
have important implications concerning the initial 
characterisation of Hertfordshire's high technology 
economy. For the analysis of linkage patterns above 
clearly suggests that "localised production" is 
only playing a minor quantitative role within the 
county's high technology economy. Hence, it can be 
concluded that to label high technology 
Hertfordshire a local production complex is wrong. 
However, from the previous discussion, it is also 
clear that it would be a mistake at this stage to 
dismiss outright the existence of such a complex , as 
part of the county's high technology economy 
(especially as a significant minority of firms did have 
local production linkages). 
Just what is "local"? 
Just as a possible response to the initial conclusion could 
be to argue that the high technology industry of 
Hertfordshire does not actually represent a flexible 
industrial ensemble, so a similar response could challenge 
the spatial level of the analysis, based on the definition 
of "local" taken. For example, Scott's work with Mattingly 
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and Drayse effectively took the definition of "local" as 
Southern California. In contrast, it can be argued that to 
use the administrative county of Hertfordshire to delimit 
the extent of a production network is to use an essentially 
arbitrary and restrictive boundary. 
Work on the New Industrial Spaces is merely the most recent 
to document that relations of production occur at a variety 
of spatial scales and are (highly) unlikely to coincide 
with administrative boundaries. Concerning Hertfordshire, a 
particular challenge may be made on the basis that high 
technology industry in the county, rather than acting as a 
production entity in its own right, is actually part of the 
wider high technology agglomeration of the Western 
Crescent. Hence, if we are seeking to identify a spatially 
delimited production network that search should be 
undertaken not at the spatial level of Hertfordshire but 
rather at the level of the "Crescent". 
TABLE 7.3 Hertfordshire's high technology industry: 
A regional geography of its "major" production 
linkages 
cus. SUS. BLIP 
South East 62% 60% 61% 
- Greater London 29% 13% 21% 
- ROSE 33% 47% 40% 
Overseas 18% 15% 16% 
Each of the remaining UK regions <4% <6% <4% 
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Table 7.3 outlines a regional geography of the production 
linkages of Hertfordshire's high technology establishments. 
Firstly, it shows the total dominance of the South East as 
the region of high technology production with 61% of all 
the linkages mapped and over 40% of linkages within the 
ROSE counties. 78 Indeed, at this level of spatial 
aggregation the percentage of "local" supplier linkages, 
at 60%, moves considerably closer to those figures of 80%+ 
gained for Southern California. Secondly, the figures for 
all production linkages highlight that, viewed from high 
technology establishments in Hertfordshire, the South East 
is the only major region of high technology production 
within the UK, with over 40% of the remaining (39% of) 
linkages actually located outside the UK. No other UK 
region had greater than 4% of all linkages whilst 
"overseas" accounted for 16%. Thirdly, if the localised 
production complex took the form of an archetypal 
industrial district this "overseas" figure could be 
expected, and read, as evidence of the district's exporting 
to an international market. Yet it transpired that almost 
as many of these overseas linkages were supplier linkages 
(15%) as customer linkages (18%). A final aspect of the 
figures worth noting is Greater London's particular 
importance as a market. Whereas 13% of its linkages to 
Hertfordshire were supplier relationships over twice as 
many, 29%, were customer linkages. 
The regional geography of production linkages shows the 
78 The question is, however, whether or not a similar exercise in Silicon Glen 
would also reveal a concentration at the level of Scotland or a number of linkages 
to the South East for example. 
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clear dominance of the South East region. But Hall et al's 
(1987) work, which coined the term the Western Crescent, 
highlighted that the Crescent did not encompass all the 
counties of the South East. This conclusion was confirmed 
by an analysis of the geography of production linkages held 
within the South East region (see Table 7.4). 
TABLE 7.4 Hertfordshire's high technology industry: 
A geography of production linkages held within the 
South East. 
Supplier Links Customer Links All Links 
County H. Q. I N-Q. I ýIQ I 
Greater London 31 22% 74 46% 105 35% 
ROSE 109 78% 86 54% 195 65% 
- Hertfordshire 40 29% 43 27% 83 28% 
- Berkshire 19 14% 6 4% 25 8% 
- Essex 15 11% 6 4% 21 7% 
- Buckinghamshire 10 7% 7 4% 17 6% 
- Hampshire 7 5% 10 6% 17 6% 
- Bedfordshire 7 5% 3 2% 10 3% 
- Surrey 3 2% 7 4% 10 3% 
- Oxfordshire 3 2% 2 1% 5 2% 
- West Sussex 3 2% 2 1% 5 2% 
- Kent 













TOTAL 140 100% 160 100% 30 0 100% 
Greater London topped the list with 35% of all the linkages 
within the South East whilst Hertfordshire, itself, 
accounted for a further 28% of linkages. The four counties 
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of Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, Essex and Hampshire each 
accounted for between 6-8% of linkages leaving the 
remaining 6 south eastern counties with only 10% of 
linkages between them. As in the work of Hall et al. 
(1987), the counties of West Sussex, East Sussex and Kent 
were effectively excluded from this high technology 
production agglomeration. 
Within the South East region, Greater London dominated 
customer linkages with 46% of all customer linkages. 
Hertfordshire followed with 27% and then Hampshire with 6% 
of south eastern customer linkages. The spatial spread of 
south eastern supplier linkages was less concentrated with 
Hertfordshire having the most (29%). Greater London 
followed with 22%, a value less than half the comparable 
figure for its' customer linkages, and Berkshire and Essex 
both achieved double figures of 14% and 11% respectively. 
Further evidence for a Western Crescent was revealed by 
mapping the top 15 "counties" with high technology 
production linkages to Hertfordshire establishments (see 
Figure 7.1). Whilst the evidence for a Western Crescent can 
be seen, with the furthermost south east corner of England 
totally excluded (as are several M4 Corridor counties), the 
mapping does provide a more diffuse picture of a Crescent, 
extending both eastwards and northwards into Essex and 
Cambridgeshire, Bedfordshire and particularly (Milton 
Keynes in) Buckinghamshire. 
The top 10 destination points of major production linkages 
COUNTY No. of all % of all 
Greater London 105 21 
° Hertfordshire 83 17 
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Hertfordshire's high technology industry: 
a geography of the top fifteen destination points of 'major' production linkages 
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In summary, evidence for a high technology agglomeration 
akin to the Western Crescent depicted by Hall et al. (1987) 
was gained from spatial analysis of the production linkages 
of Hertfordshire's high technology establishments. In fact, 
the argument for a high technology "Crescent" in preference 
to a "Corridor" was strengthened. Less clear cut, however, 
is the issue as to whether or not this Western Crescent 
agglomeration represents. a spatially limited production 
network. For, even by including Greater London, over half 
of all production linkages were still situated outside of 
the Crescent. 79 Indeed, within the listing three 
"counties" clearly stood out, Greater London, "overseas" 
and Hertfordshire itself, the county accounting for 17% of 
all linkages80 and 28% of those within the south east. 
Thus, despite taking a variety of spatial levels for 
analysis of linkages and accepting that quantitative 
dominance of local linkages is not a necessary pre- 
requisite, the evidence for a (dominant) local production 
complex is still elusive. 
79 Further investigation of the possibility of a Western Crescent network took 
place through the case study interviews (see later, case study JO in particular). 
This investigation was based on the principle that if establishments were part of 
a network it could be expected that these firms' other linkages, such as to labour 
markets, communities, etc., could also be expected to be encompassed within the 
same spatial parameters. In other words, the Western Crescent would appear as a 
(conscious or sub-conscious) spatial framework for a variety of external 
relationships of such establishments. 
80 This figure is different to that given in Table 7.2 because whilst it was 
known whether or not linkages were within Hertfordshire, the "destination" of all 
the linkages was not known and these linkages were therefore excluded from the 
mapping exercise. 
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Production linkages: Does "major" equal "critical"? 
A further response to this conclusion can be made on the 
basis that few local linkages have been found because the 
research study has actually been looking for the wrong 
linkages. In other words, "major" suppliers and customers 
are not the "critical interestablishment linkages" which 
establishments seek to localise. Rather: 
"This critical range would seem especially to be made up of 
transactions-intensive (hence high cost) linkages involving above 
all flexible, rapidly-shifting, small-scale, and non-standard 
connections between producers. " (Scott, 1989, p. 26) 
An initial riposte could be to point out that if this is 
the case then Scott's co-authored work on Southern 
California may similarly be flawed. The leading exponents 
of the transaction costs model also studied "major" 
linkages defined, by them, as the top three suppliers and 
subcontractors. However, such a response is inadequate 
because it would still not explain the difference in 
results obtained between the two pieces of research. 
Indeed, the criticism as it stands does not explain the 
difference in results for it would seem that in the case of 
Southern California "major" linkages actually have been 
localised. If the transaction costs model is taken as the 
cause of this process (which it is by Scott) it therefore 
implies that, in the case of Southern California, 
major linkages do indeed represent critical 
interestablishment linkages. 
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The results for Hertfordshire, in contrast, clearly show 
that (the majority of) "major" production linkages have 
not been localised. The implication could be, therefore, 
that in this empirical example, these linkages do not 
represent "critical interestablishment linkages". In fact, 
this is only a half-truth, for a significant minority of 
major linkages (19%) were actually found to be local and 
thus could be deemed as critical. However, this analysis 
continues to fall into the (empirical) trap discussed in 
Chapter Four, namely that'a linkage is actually deemed 
critical or not dependent upon its spatial 
characteristic. In other words, if a linkage is "local" 
(whether big or small) it is presumed "critical in 
location" and the mechanism presumed to have operated. In 
contrast, if a (major) linkage is external to the region, 
the mechanism is presumed to be non-operational and thus 
the linkage not "critical". 
But what must be acknowledged is that linkages are 
critical, first and foremost, not due to their spatial 
element but their importance to the production process of 
the firm: they are linkages "critical in production". 81 
This importance may come from a linkage's size, uniqueness, 
inherent instability, or any combination of these or other 
characteristics but, moreover, some of these "critical in 
production" linkages may also be "distance sensitive". 
For example, Scott suggests those linkages which are small- 
scale, flexible and non-standard. Thus, those linkages 
which are "distance sensitive" and "critical to 
81 A question to ask is, however, how you decide which aspect of production is 
"critical" and which is not. 
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production" then may also become "critical in location". 
Firms may look to locate close to the source of such 
linkages. 
However, an elision (inclusive of a causal mechanism) has 
occurred in that empirical work which has provided a 
pattern of "local production linkages". For such linkages, 
by virtue of them being "local", are deemed "critical in 
production" and thus "critical in location". But, for 
example, Gordon's (forthcoming) work reveals how local 
linkages need not be critical in production and thus need 
not be critical in location. Moreover, putting it the other 
way, if linkages are "critical in production" then they 
firstly need not be localised because they may not be 
distance sensitive or, secondly, the impetus to localise 
these linkages may be overridden by other production 
considerations. "Critical interestablishment. linkages" is a 
context-dependent notion. In this investigation, the 
context is the location process; thus we want to 
identify those linkages critical in location and why 
they are so. 
Thus, in this study, the postal questionnaire did actually 
ask if the production linkages identified by the 
respondents were critical in their location, even if the 
question only referred to a particular set of production 
linkages, namely their two largest suppliers and customers. 
In addition, however, Question 6 of the questionnaire also 
allowed respondents to identify other linkages they felt 
were important to their location (ie. other critical 
linkages) such as non-major production linkages, local 
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labour pools or aspects of an industrial community, to name 
but a few possibilities. 
To recap then, the analysis of production linkages can be 
summarised as revealing that a minority of high technology 
establishments within Hertfordshire have major local 
production linkages. Whether or not such local production 
represents a cohesive network of firms, as part of 
Hertfordshire's high technology economy, is yet to be 
determined. We still do not know whether such local 
linkages are "critical to production" for the 
establishments concerned. Similarly, evidence as to whether 
or not such a network of linkages exists at the spatial 
level of the Western Crescent is also ambiguous. Moreover, 
the linkage results studied so far do not reveal, firstly, 
whether or not the linkages identified were also "critical 
to location" and, secondly, are so due to the locational 
process of transaction costs suggested by Scott (or, 
indeed, any other possible mechanism concerned with 
production linkages). All that is known is that the dynamic 
can only have played a minor role (in terms of outcomes) in 
the agglomeration of high technology industry in 
Hertfordshire. 
However, before we turn to investigating "linkages and 
location", some further comments will be made on the 
research methodology of linkage analysis used above and the 
results it obtained. For the application of the 
research methodology has given valuable empirical 
insight into the conceptualisation of the firm and 
its linkage pattern within the New Industrial 
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Spaces thesis, and industrial geography more 
generally. Just as the argument above has highlighted the 
context-dependence of "critical linkages" so, in the 
following, it will be shown how the conceptualisation of a 
"linkage" itself is a context-dependent process, whether or 
not the linkage is subsequently deemed to be critical. 
7.5 "Empirically-Informed Theoretical Research" 
(Not Just Theoretically-Informed Empirical 
Research)! 
By referring back to Table 7.2 (c), it may be seen that 
only 80% of all the possible supplier and customer linkages 
requested in the survey questionnaire were actually 
provided by respondents. In fact, considering that the 
question entailed respondents revealing what could be 
viewed as commercially sensitive information, especially 
concerning the names of their largest customers, greater 
non-disclosure of such linkages could have been expected. 
Moreover, the response rate gained for customer linkages of 
83% was actually higher than that for supplier linkages 
(77%). Closer inspection of this surprising result revealed 
a series of "biases" or "issues" implicit within the 
theoretical conception of the firm and its position within 
the production process. 
Firstly, the greater response rate figure for customers as 
against suppliers was actually a misleading result. The 
listing of suppliers gained a reduced response rate because 
certain respondents argued that they did not actually have 
any suppliers. The response "we are a service industry 
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therefore the question does not apply" occurred several 
times. Such a response does, however, raise the issue of 
our definition of "supplier" and, more widely, our view of 
the production process. 
Within studies of manufacturing industry, "suppliers" 
have traditionally been identified as a backward linkage in 
the production process providing, for example, components 
for assembly or raw materials for transformation. Yet, for 
certain service establishments in this research no such 
backward linkages existed (or at least not in the form as 
found within manufacturing). The production of a service 
was argued to begin at that site. Hence, if such 
establishments have no supplier linkages this has major 
implications for a theory of location based on production 
linkages for, in such cases, it is only through customer 
linkages that any theorised mechanism can possibly work. In 
fact, this finding is not so startling, for traditional 
theories of location for the "service industries" have 
always stressed their logic of location as being close to 
the "market". 
Yet a response by an establishment that "it does not have 
any suppliers" needs further consideration on different 
grounds. For, presumably, what is actually implied is that 
no suppliers are viewed as integrally connected to the 
production process of the establishment (they are not 
critical in production? ). The establishment does have 
"suppliers", such as of stationery and office furniture for 
example, but these are suppliers which are viewed as 
"ancillary" (or at least of a different nature) . Within the 
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survey several respondents took this view of certain 
suppliers and hence, as suggested, did not list any 
suppliers. 82 However, in other responses, such "ancillary" 
suppliers were listed as the major suppliers. Thus, 
respondents named travel agencies, printers, stationery 
distributers, etc. as well as sub-contractors and 
components suppliers. Often, such ancillary suppliers were 
also "local". So, in a quantitative analysis of linkages as 
carried out above, these linkages assumed an equal 
importance with local subcontractors; such linkages became 
part of a local production complex. A question to ask is 
whether or not this position can be justified. Whilst the 
provision of such services through these linkages would be 
readily accepted by many as part of the advantages of 
agglomeration (and were mentioned as such in several case 
study interviews), can they also be viewed as key in the 
production and (hence) location logic of those 
establishments holding such linkages? 
In the past, the answer would probably have been no, based 
on the principle that service industries were, almost by 
definition, "ancillary" to the production process. Indeed, 
the argument would have been that manufacturing firms would 
not need to locate near to such services but rather, 
representing the market as they do, services would locate 
near to them. Interestingly, this could be viewed as a 
82 Interestingly, the use of recruitment agencies (or internal personnel 
departments) would traditionally be viewed as just such an "ancillary" service. 
However, in a "knowledge-based" society where, for example, R&D is now viewed as 
integral to production, the "supply" of skilled personnel could be viewed as 
increasingly integral to the production process just as "widgets" were in the 
past. 
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"transaction costs dynamic" but for a set of firms called 
"services" rather than, say, high technology industry. But, 
and significantly, from the viewpoint of the manufacturing 
establishments such a dynamic would be part of a post- 
location agglomeration dynamic, in that the arrival of 
local ancillary services could subsequently lead to the 
creation of local linkages on the basis of reduced 
transaction costs. This may represent a form (if not 
actually the exact form) of the "agglomeration causes 
disintegration" dynamic alluded to by Scott (see Chapter 
Four). However, a further point to note would be that if 
purely quantitative evidence of local linkages by such 
manufacturing establishments was collected and taken as 
evidence for the transaction costs mechanism, the actual 
mechanism of causality and direction of causality could be 
interpreted wrongly. Firstly, differentiation between pre- 
and post-location linkages could not be made and secondly, 
interpretation of such linkages as pre-location would 
suggest their importance in location to manufacturing 
establishments. Further research might reveal that the 
creation of such linkages occurred post-location. Moreover, 
the direction of causality could be reversed in that it is 
the ancillary services, and not manufacturing, which would 
be attracted to locate "close" (to the market) to create 
local linkages. This reaffirms the criticisms made in 
Chapter Four and highlights again the need to investigate 
the process of linkage creation and not merely the 
existence of linkages, to decipher whether or not a linkage 
is "critical in location". 
However, the initial answer that "service" linkages would 
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necessarily be unimportant concerning production and 
location may no longer be so clear cut. For whilst it is 
true that traditional theory has viewed "services" as 
predominantly ancillary to production within the "basic" 
industries, more recently the "service" sector has been 
placed under greater scrutiny with an unbundling of the 
term taking place (eg. Greenfield, 1966; Daniels, 1983; 
Gershuny and Miles, 1983; Producer Services Working 
Party, IBG, 1986; Allen, 1988; Wood, 1991). One line of 
differentiation has been to identify certain service 
sectors, labelled the "producer services", by their role as 
central elements within the "production process" of 
manufacturing (and services). Such services, just as 
the traditional component supplier in manufacturing, 
provide an intermediate input to other producers which is 
crucial to such producers subsequent ability to produce a 
product for the end consumer. The point is that such 
services, just like more traditional suppliers, are an 
important (critical? ) aspect of the production process. In 
fact, they may possibly be "critical" and "distance 
sensitive" enough for producers to locate near to them to 
reduce the spatial costs of such linkages. 
The high technology computer services sector represents 
just one such example of a service industry meeting 
"intermediate demand", as do certain "business services". 
It is these service sectors which have also been identified 
by Scott and Storper as members of "flexible industrial 
ensembles", prone to the same locational logic of 
agglomeration more commonly associated with manufacturing 
industry. The fact that Scott and Storper only (? ) include 
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such "services" is significant because their distinguishing 
aspect is that of their market or "customer linkages". 
Whereas the market for services was traditionally the "end 
consumer" and this represented the customer linkage, the 
customer linkage for these producer services takes a 
different form. The customer is part of an intermediate 
market and only an indirect connection to the end consumer 
is held. Just as the definition of "supplier" is context- 
dependent, so too is the definition of "customer". 
The context dependence of linkages was also identifiable in 
other cases where suppliers and customers were not, on the 
face of it, listed. It was highlighted in Chapter Four that 
ownership and control relations are essentially omitted 
from any analysis of linkages within Scott's work. This is 
achieved by treating all establishments as "independent". 
However, such treatment proved simply to be unacceptable 
(inapplicable) within the context of Hertfordshire. For 
just as "missing" linkages included situations where the 
respondent believed none existed due to their particular 
production process, other linkages were perceived not 
to exist because they were viewed as "internal" to 
the firm. Some of those establishments identifiable as 
branches and subsidiaries responded to Question 4 of the 
survey in the following ways: 
"I don't know of any suppliers that supply directly to me" 
"All [suppliers] via head office" 
"Not meaningful" 
"We have no customers as the unit is here to feed into other parts 
of the company. " 
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Chapter Four discussed the theoretical "reductionism" that 
has led either to the exclusion from previous analysis of 
these "internal" production linkages or their inclusion as 
"external" linkages of "independent" sites. In contrast, 
the questionnaire used in this research explicitly 
recognised the existence of such "internal" linkages. 
Moreover, it recognised that such linkages could actually 
be local. More than one branch could exist within the 
locality and production linkages could exist between them. 
Fundamentally, however, if such a local production linkage 
(but internal to the firm) could exist, it also implied the 
possibility that the locational mechanism of transaction 
costs (within the firm) may also be applicable. And this 
proved to be the case (see case study JC later). Hence, 
whilst the existence of branches which are not independent 
(and the existence of multi-site firms which branches are a 
part of) is an empirical fact, which it was earlier argued 
raises serious doubts about the explanatory power of the 
transactions costs approach in (post) modern industrial 
times, evidence was gained which suggested that the 
mechanism may actually be extended to explain the 
locational behaviour of some of these establishments. 83 
Such evidence was available because a further set of 
linkages exclusive to branches/subsidiaries was identified, 
separate from those linkages asked for in Question 4. For, 
as part of Question 1 of the questionnaire, identification 
of any (not necessarily the largest) production linkage 
within Hertfordshire between sites of the same firm 
83 Although it must be noted that the operation of the mechanism in this instance 
is not due to the -trigger" process of the extension of the social division of 
labour. 
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occurred (ie. local 'internal' production linkages). The 
question identified where any branch was acting as a 
supplier or customer to another branch within 
Hertfordshire. In fact, from responses to Question 1,19 
branches and subsidiaries (12% of the survey sample and 29% 
of all branches and subsidiaries surveyed) were identified 
with other branches within the county. Moreover, 8 (42%) of 
these held a production linkage with a sister branch. 
However, it must be noted that these branch linkages were 
not the only form of branch linkage identified. As has 
already been stated, instances where suppliers/customers 
were listed as HQ etc. under Question 4 were also 
identifiable. Furthermore, whilst such linkages were 
clearly distinguishable as "internal", in other 
cases this distinction was not made by the 
respondent. Hence answers to Question 4 also included 
names of parent companies and HQ's, sister companies, etc. 
In other words, the distinction between internal and 
external suppliers and customers was (empirically) blurred, 
and thus, as suggested in Chapter Four, also blurred was 
the (theoretical) distinction to be made between the social 
and technical division of labour in production, a 
distinction critical for the New Industrial Spaces thesis. 
This example serves further to emphasise the point already 
made of how purely quantitative linkage analysis is 
problematical as seemingly equal linkages may actually have 
different meanings. 
In summary, the implications raised concerning Scott and 
Storper's work were that a first step has been taken by 
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breaking the sectoral classification boundaries and 
recognising "ensembles" constitutive of both manufacturing 
and services. Yet our knowledge of the relations and 
processes of production which occur within such ensembles 
is still extremely limited, with the use of traditional 
terminology as suppliers and customers requiring much 
greater thought and clarification. Essentially, this 
research showed the context-dependence of such terms. To 
return to the critique in Chapter Four, qualitative 
analysis of linkages must also take place to understand the 
"meaning" placed upon production linkages. That "meaning", 
itself, is only achieved through understanding the process 
of linkage creation. And, in the context of the transaction 
costs model (and thus the New Industrial Spaces thesis), 
such "meaning" implies the significance of the process 
of linkage creation as part of the location process 
of the firm. 
7.6 Linkages and Location 
As outlined in Chapter Five, Question 5 of the 
questionnaire specifically confronted the issue of linkages 
and location. It asked whether or not those major 
production linkages previously identified by each 
establishment were significant in the establishment's 
location decision. Furthermore, Question 1, as well as 
identifying ("internal") linkages between sister branches 
within the county also asked whether or not these linkages 
were important in any branch's location. Thus, the 
questionnaire identified a causal group of "outcomes", a 
pattern identifying a process of cause and effect. 
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Excluding two establishments which did not answer Question 
5, from 157 respondents thirty-four establishments or 
22% stated that "major" (and/or internal) 
production linkages were significant in their 
decision to locate in Hertfordshire. Hence, these 
thirty-four establishments stated the operation of a 
production linkage dynamic of location. Thirty-one 
identified the importance of "major" production linkages 
and four the importance of "internal" linkages, thus 
implying that one branch had both "internal" and "external" 
production linkages within Hertfordshire which it stated 
were important in its location. 
In summary, if we assume that all these establishments 
represent the operation of the transaction costs causal 
mechanism and its agglomeration outcomes in Hertfordshire 
and bear in mind that it is the alleged existence of this 
dynamic which defines a New Industrial Space, the results 
confirm that high technology Hertfordshire cannot be viewed 
as a New Industrial Space although, subsumed within the 
local high technology economy, elements of a New 
Industrial Space may exist. 
The group of "31+4"! A closer examination 
A characteristic outcome? 
Members of this group all stated that production linkages 
were important to their locational decision. A first 
question to ask was whether or not this group of outcomes 
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also held particular common characteristics. For example, 
Scott's work had highlighted size, age and "independence" 
of establishments as of particular importance in 
differentiating firms responding to the transaction costs 
dynamic. Were these outcomes different from those 
establishments-in the sample as a whole concerning these or 
other particular characteristics? Alternatively, was there 
a characteristic common to them all, such as age or size? 
Did they represent a common outcome attributable to the 
mechanism? 
within the group of 34 sites all the sectors in the sample 
were represented, led by the Computer Services (8394) 
sector with 11 sites and Electronic Data Processing (3302) 
with a further 8 representatives. Even with such small 
sample numbers, there were no extreme variations from each 
sector's proportion of the returns as a whole. The split by 
ownership also closely mirrored that of the respondents as 
a whole, the figures for independents being 65% and 63% 
respectively. In fact, such a finding could be interpreted 
as supporting Scott's assumption that ownership plays an 
insignificant part in the mechanism with branches behaving 
the same as independents. From the 27 sites which provided 
an employment figure, the total number employed was 3,362 
representing an average employment per site of 138 persons, 
compared to the respondents employment average as a whole 
of 189 persons. The range was large, however (just as in 
the respondent group as a whole), stretching from 1 to 
2,250 persons employed. Removal of this top figure reduced 
the average employment per site to 42 persons but the range 
was still from 1 to 360 persons employed. The average date 
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of set-up was 1980, four years later than the average for 
all respondents, whilst the range of set-up dates stretched 
from 1963 to several sites established in 1988 and 1989. 
In summary, whilst the members of the group of 
"31+4" were slightly younger and smaller than the 
whole respondent body, this study confirmed the 
conclusion also reached by Gordon (forthcoming) in 
his work on Silicon Valley: that firm 
characteristics such as age, numbers employed, 
ownership, sector, etc., did not reveal a 
particularly cohesive "set" of establishments or, 
indeed, a typical firm which would be a 
representative outcome of the locational dynamic of 
transaction costs agglomeration. In contrast, what was 
striking about this group of outcomes was their variety 
concerning such characteristics. In fact, whilst the 
study had identified a better defined set of 
possible outcomes of the transaction costs 
mechanism (by asking whether linkages actually 
played a role in location), this had resulted in a 
set of outcomes of greater, not less, variety 
(including a multi-site form not previously 
identified). The implication is that any attempt to 
suggest the existence of the transaction costs mechanism on 
the basis of a consistent set of "similar" establishments 
is likely to fail. For what bonds such a (causal) group of 
establishments, and may precisely link, for example, large 
and small firms alike, is their shared process of location 
and not their similarity of firm "characteristic". 
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Identifying the mechanism of the process 
Yet, at this point, we still do not know exactly what form 
of location process this is. Or rather we know that it is a 
process driven by production linkages but we do not know 
how it works. Scott suggests the process works through the 
transaction costs of a particular set of "flexible" 
linkages and provides a theoretical explanation of how this 
would be sö. But, as yet, we have no evidence which raises 
this particular explanation of the workings of the 
mechanism above other possibilities. The means to gaining 
an answer are, however, clear. Firstly, by recognising that 
what binds these outcomes is the role of their production 
linkages in the locational decision (ie. the process), then 
our analysis should be based on identifying exactly what 
are those linkages which are so "critical" to these 
establishments location. Secondly, once the properties of 
these linkages have been identified, exactly how these 
linkages relate to the constitution of the establishment 
and its location can be investigated. In other words, the 
nature of the mechanism and its operation. 
Continuing the analysis along the lines indicated above 
involved the use of two different sources of information. 
Firstly, there were the returns from the postal 
questionnaire detailing the "firm characteristics" of the 
site, the site's production linkages and the importance of 
these linkages and other factors in the site's location. 
These returns enabled the identification of the form of 
linkage "critical" to the establishment's location. 
Secondly, in order to investigate the operation of the 
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mechanism through particular critical linkage 
relationships, selected case studies were undertaken. 
The case studies involved a visit to the establishment site 
and semi-structured interviewing of the questionnaire 
respondent or a nominated proxy of similar standing within 
the company. 84 Firstly, the interview involved a more 
detailed and wide-ranging discussion and explanation of the 
questionnaire response given by the establishment. Thus 
initial questions concerned the company's foundation, 
history, ownership, financial relationships with other 
firms, products, etc. The process of actual location of the 
site within Hertfordshire was also probed. All (and not 
just major) supplier and customer relationships of the site 
such as where they were located, whether large or small, 
specialist or standard, etc., and, in particular, the role 
of distance in such relationships, were discussed in 
detail. Furthermore, the interview continued with a 
discussion of all those other elements argued by the New 
Industrial Spaces thesis as part of any agglomeration 
dynamic. Thus, questions were asked concerning other less 
formal linkages or forms of co-operation with other 
companies and private and public institutions, whether 
local or not, held by the establishment and the concept of 
the "industry in the air" was also raised. Fundamentally, a 
prolonged discussion concerning the relevance of the 
establishment's location in (high technology) Hertfordshire 
took place. A discussion which investigated both positive 
and negative aspects of this location for the establishment 
and included a hypothesised scenario in which the company 
84 See Appendix at end of chapter for a copy of the contact letter (Figure 7.2) 
and interview schedule (Figure 7.3). 
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would be forced to leave the county. 
Whilst 13 case study interviews were undertaken, 19 
establishments were actually approached for interview. Of 
those 6 not interviewed, 2 refusals were received, one 
point blank and one citing heavy workload as the company 
had just gained one of the biggest orders in its history. 
Two further respondents agreed in principle to an interview 
but due to lack of time, heavy work pressures, etc., these 
interviews were never carried out. Of the remaining two 
establishments approached, one simply had "gone away" since 
completing the questionnaire leaving no obvious trace. The 
final establishment was a subsidiary which was taken-over 
between the time of the survey and follow-up interviewing. 
The respondent (the Managing Director) had since left the 
company. 
However, prior to the interviewing of case study 
establishments (and the reason why they were chosen; see 
individual accounts below), the identification of (forms 
of) production linkages "critical in location" needed to be 
undertaken. 
"Critical" production linkages 
The computer services company KV, set up in 1985, only had 
one major production linkage in Hertfordshire which was a 
supplier linkage. In addition, however, it identified its 
other major supplier, McDonnell Douglas, as being less than 
10 miles away in Bedfordshire and furthermore, the company 
351 
listed "local suppliers" as a key factor to the 
establishment's location in Hertfordshire. In this case, 
the role of local supplier relationships in the 
location process seemed to be undeniable and it is this 
aspect of the company which led to its further choice as a 
case study. 
Another company with both its major suppliers in 
Hertfordshire was the small computer electronics firm, KA, 
which also set up in the mid-80s. In addition, one of its 
major customers was also Hertfordshire-based, thus three of 
the company's four major production linkages were in 
Hertfordshire. As a new, small, independent high technology 
company with local production linkages an immediate 
hypothesis was whether or not this company was part of an 
industrial district. Yet this is not the complete story 
told by the questionnaire response. Firstly, KA's major 
Hertfordshire customer was not another small firm but Rank 
Xerox, a major US multinational electronics firm. Whilst 
the size of this company may not actually be relevant 
dependent on the definition of an "industrial district" 
taken, it is true to say that the canonical industrial 
district does not have any multinational players within its 
ranks. 85 The issue of size is raised here because of its 
common use as a proxy for power within firm relationships. 
85 Sabel (1989), in particular, does argue that this may be changing with 
multinationals deliberately locating within districts to gain from these small 
production networks. However, in the case of Rank Xerox, the site located in 
Hertfordshire in 1965 and now employs 1500 people. Its particular location was due 
to taking over the existing premises of another subsidiary, Rank Bush Murphy. 
Moreover, this site is about to be relocated to Mitcheldene in Gloucester (postal 
questionnaire return). 
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As was outlined in Chapter Four, the property of power, as 
well as spatial cost, is similarly intrinsic to any linkage 
and, moreover, the power distribution between partners in a 
relationship is fundamental to the form of that 
relationship and, possibly, its spatial structure (Storper 
and Harrison, 1990). Concerning the particular relationship 
between Rank Xerox and KA, it could have been, for 
example, a relationship of equal partnership or KA as 
dependent subcontractor of Rank Xerox. In both cases, a 
local production linkage may be determining the 
location of KA but the implications of the two are 
significantly different. In the former, the concept of 
the industrial district may not be violated although the 
connection is with a major multinational. This connection 
could even be viewed as the connection of the district to 
the international market. In the latter situation, although 
the pattern suggests an industrial district, the reality is 
different. KA is dependent on Rank Xerox. In turn, both of 
KA's major local suppliers may be dependent upon it. 
Hence, the "industrial district" is not a production 
network with a flattened hierarchy but rather a network of 
dependent suppliers and subcontractors whose future is tied 
in to, and determined by, that of a major multinational. 
This reality may be no different from past historical 
industrial concentrations of the steel, car and ship- 
building industries amongst others. The history of rapid 
decline of such regions is also a reality, as is the 
imminent move of Rank Xerox out of Hertfordshire. Thus, 
this raises the question of whether we are looking at what 
some commentators describe as the future path of economic 
development or a possible repetition of the past with all 
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its inherent problems. 86 
Secondly, the original assumption that these three linkages 
are the "critical" relationships, because they are 
local, may also be wrong. For the company's second largest 
customer was London-based and when describing the most 
important factors in its location the respondent listed 
"close to London" (ie. not Hertfordshire). An implication 
from this could be that Hertfordshire may well be supplier 
to, and part of, a London-based production complex. If we 
stand by the view that it is the spatial property of a 
linkage which determines its importance in the location 
process, then this finding suggests that any definition of 
"local" should be on a spatial scale inclusive of London 
and Hertfordshire (see further discussion below). 
Thirdly, however, the firm's location in Watford was 
stated, first and foremost, as due to the Managing 
Director's place of residence being Watford. This 
response raised further queries. For if residence is the 
basis of the firm's location decision, then what role in 
location could production linkages have played? However, if 
one questions whether or not it is mere coincidence that 
86 In fact, the future may hold a new variant of this (past) dependent industrial 
district. For many major global companies are now pursuing the goal of reduced 
numbers of suppliers through single-sourcing and other strategies. One case study 
establishment which supplied Ford of Detroit described the company's wish to have 
less than 100 parts suppliers. This meant that the particular case study company 
in question, although at present a supplier of Ford'a, would no longer necessarily 
be able to deal directly with Ford. Rather, it would be forced to deal with one of 
the "100" who were able to provide a number of different parts, possibly in the 
form of sub-assemblies, to Ford despite the likelihood that such a company would 
be a direct competitor. The spatial repercussions and forms of "industrial 
district" arising from such policies may be varied if not unfathomable! 
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this company set up in computer electronics within a region 
regarded as at the core of such industry, then a role may 
be found. For it may be that the knowledge of, or potential 
for, production linkages in Hertfordshire was the catalyst 
for the firm's creation to begin with. Such an instance 
would fit the dynamic of continued extension of the social 
division of labour and agglomeration described within the 
New Industrial Spaces thesis. 
In fact, ALS may have exemplified just such an instance. 
This data processing company set up in 1966 and also stated 
residential location as the initial reason for its 
Hertfordshire location. However, in following the thinking 
as to why, in particular, a data processing company should 
be set up in the region, the respondent also noted as 
location factors the: 
11... pool of supplier expertise and subcontractors all at the 
leading edge of technology and methods - [and there being] 
enough of them! [And the] availability of workforce expertise 
from existing industry. " (postal questionnaire response) 
So it is clear from the example of KA that a variety of 
interpretations of the operation of the causal mechanism, 
with differing implications for the nature of the 
"outcome", is possible from the pattern of linkages 
outlined. However, without knowledge of the process 
of creation of such linkages no single 
interpretation can be prioritised. Despite the company 
resembling the archetypal "small firm in an industrial 
district", the operation of the causal mechanism of its 
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location and its actual membership of an industrial 
district was still unknown and it is on this basis that it 
was chosen as a case study. 
Another company in the group, V, had both its major 
suppliers in Hertfordshire. Yet these supplier 
relationships, on closer inspection, transpired to be with 
a travel agency and an office furniture supplier (ie. non- 
critical). To return to the earlier discussion on the 
definition of suppliers, these could be taken as 
"ancillary" suppliers not unique to Hertfordshire. Or 
rather these suppliers were unlikely to be a specialist 
service present due to the concentration of high 
technology industry, rather than industry per se, within 
the area. In turn, it was unlikely that these supplier 
linkages determined. the location of V in Hertfordshire 
despite their being "local" in nature. V's major 
customers were specialist space agencies in London and West 
Germany and thus "convenience to the motorway networks and 
the airports" was its major location factor. 
However, the fact that the company's ancillary supplier 
relationships were internal to Hertfordshire may also not 
have been coincidental. The advantages of proximity of such 
services to clients is a known factor in the creation of 
such linkages. Hence, it may well be that this is an 
example of the transaction costs mechanism and its 
agglomeration dynamic in that V's choice of (ancillary) 
suppliers was locally based. But, highlighting an earlier 
discussion in this Chapter and Chapter Four, such linkages 
are created post-location and hence the dynamic of 
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agglomeration is of a different form, for it is a derived 
dynamic. Crucially, this dynamic is a result of the 
primary growth of high technology industry in the region 
and not a self-sustaining dynamic in its own right. The 
supplier linkages identified were in Hertfordshire and part 
of the agglomeration of Hertfordshire but they gave a false 
picture of local production. These linkages were not "high 
technology production" linkages and part of the high 
technology dynamic but were, in reality, dependent upon 
that dynamic. Such local linkages were "red herrings" in 
explaining the firm's location. 
Company Q further served to highlight the dangers of 
prioritising linkages in analysis purely due to their 
spatial pattern (ie. in this case being in Hertfordshire). 
For the linkages important to this company's location were 
not those it held internal to Hertfordshire but its 
customer linkages, which were external to Hertfordshire. 
Its local supplier linkage was with a stationers. In 
contrast, its customer linkages were with City institutions 
in Central London. 87 Hence, "easy access to Central 
London" and "cheaper and pleasanter than Central London" 
were two of its location factors. 
A further point to make concerning both V and Q is that 
their location factors (derived from their customer 
linkages) were not unique to Hertfordshire. "Access to 
Central London and/or the airports" could equally be 
achieved by locating in Berkshire or Surrey for example. 
87 Thus highlighting a process of cumulative growth as two "flexible industrial 
ensembles", high technology and business services, coalesce. 
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Hertfordshire's high-technology economy gained from its 
position as part of a London-based production complex 
(eg. the City), and a production linkage dynamic was acting 
in these instances, but these firms' location in 
Hertfordshire as against say Berkshire was due to other 
contingent factors. Thus, in Q's case, the first location 
factor listed was the owners/directors' residence in 
Hertfordshire. 
This scenario similarly applied, at an even greater spatial 
scale, to the electronic data processing subsidiary DIL. 
This was an acquisition still headed by the founders, who 
were living within Hertfordshire when they set up the 
company in the county in 1980. Its major suppliers were 
global chip manufacturers supplying through "agents" but 
its customers were banks and building societies 
headquartered in London. Proximity to "major clients in 
London" was listed secondary to residence as the most 
important location factor. 
Another electronics company, SCS, also listed both its 
largest customers as City institutions. However, it was 
supplied (with circuitry) by a Hertfordshire company and 
its other supplier was STC in Harlow (Essex), which the 
questionnaire survey revealed to be a leading supplier of 
components to Hertfordshire's high technology industry, as 
well as a customer in several cases. In turn, this raised 
the possibility of STC acting as node to a production 
network which included Hertfordshire, although the spatial 
extent of such a network and the role of distance, if any, 
within it is a matter of conjecture. The possible role of 
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major companies as core entities of a production complex 
(or the "market") has already been hinted at, particularly 
concerning KA's link with Rank Xerox. It will be returned 
to later in reference to Hertfordshire's major high 
technology employer, British Aerospace. 
However, to return to the suggestion that Hertfordshire is, 
in fact, supplier to London-based markets such as the City 
and it is the spatial aspect of these customer linkages 
which are important to location, other examples-'of London- 
based markets were also evident. Hence AB, a further case 
study, had no linkages in Hertfordshire but had both its 
major customer linkages with London-based (but national) 
architects and thus listed its major location factor as 
Hertfordshire being near to London. Similarly, PDE citing 
the "push" factors of a London location, had relocated into 
Hertfordshire but with the knowledge that it remained near 
to its major customer located in London. Furthermore, 
consistent with the growing literature on the role of 
defence expenditure in (the south east's) regional 
development (Lovering, 1985; Markusen and Bloch, 1985; 
Breheny, 1987; Hall et al., 1987, Lovering and Boddy, 1988) 
MIL stressed that "MOD central purchasing was Whitehall" 
and Hertfordshire was "close to London for meeting MOD and 
foreign clients [United States Armed Forces]". Thus, 
Hertfordshire represented a location providing spatial 
proximity to (a variety of forms of) the "market". 
Further forms, which also exemplified the importance of 
ownership and control linkages and their inter-relationship 
with production linkages, were depicted by the branches 
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within the group of outcomes. c4L, a computer bureau owned 
by one of the nationalised industries, located a branch in 
Hertfordshire in 1986. The branch employs 3 people. Its HQ 
was in Staffordshire and its function as a branch was 
purely that of "marketing" its services. Hence, customer 
linkages were integral to its existence and, in turn, its 
location. However, Hertfordshire alone did not represent 
the market but rather, as the company stated: 
"The bulk of our new business is generated in the South-East, 
therefore Watford, Herts. is an ideal base for a sales team to 
work from. " (postal questionnaire return) 
In other words, Hertfordshire was important for its 
strategic position as giving access to the South East. A 
similar example was JO, also a branch set up in 1986. 
However, in this case, Hertfordshire was strategically 
located as it provided the ability for the branch: 
"To effectively cover our marketplace of the Northern Home 
Counties & M4 Corridor. " (postal questionnaire return) 
In addition, this outcome effectively identified the 
Western Crescent as a discrete entity, providing possible 
evidence for an production complex at that spatial scale. 
To investigate this possibility, JO was chosen as a case 
study. Also distinguishing these examples was the fact that 
the locational mechanism had to work through their 
customer linkages. For both of them stated that they had no 
suppliers, in part determined by their functioning as 
branches. 
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CML was a "part-process" site (Massey, 1984) carrying out 
what is traditionally viewed as the downstream end of 
production, namely marketing. So also did DEQC, a branch 
of a major US multinational electronics company with 
several branches and an HQ within the UK. This particular 
branch, set up in 1975 and employing 360 people, was solely 
engaged in marketing with no supplier linkages listed. The 
branch ALA undertook production, marketing and liaison 
with customers such that its Hertfordshire location 
provided: 
"Good communications and transport with easy links to HQ and (the] 
majority of customers [the major ones being in London, Hitchin and 
Northampton]. " (postal questionnaire response) 
All its supplies were, however, via head office in Norfolk. 
Thus, this set of outcomes highlighted instances where 
other linkages of the establishment, namely ownership and 
control, determined in some form or other the 
establishment's function, subsequent production linkages 
and hence the operation of the locational mechanism. In so 
doing, they highlighted the already discussed problems of 
equating branches with independent establishments. In 
particular, this equation also excluded the possibility of 
branch establishments which had "internal" production 
linkages within Hertfordshire which played a role in their 
location. 
APCSL, a subsidiary formed in 1972, is one such example. 
Set up within the same building as a fellow subsidiary, it 
shared the facilities and other advantages from such an 
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arrangement as bulk-buying and the cross-over of staff 
expertise. However, the most important location factor 
listed was the: 
"Close link with fellow subsidiary AP whose customer base is 
around Hertfordshire. " 
In addition, the establishment also argued for the 
importance of Hertfordshire giving access to its own 
supplier and customer linkages. 
In the case of JC, an R&D branch employing 65 people, it 
was the fact that a fellow Hertfordshire branch was its 
major customer which dictated its location in 
Hertfordshire in 1988 (and its choice as a case study). The 
original Hertfordshire branch, employing 250 people, had 
only located within the county in 1984. With no major 
production linkages in Hertfordshire and these linkages 
playing no role in its location, the establishment listed 
access to airports, London and other routes and the ability 
to attract highly skilled staff as its location factors. In 
addition, however, and in stark contradiction to its fellow 
branch, it was also stated that the fact that none other of 
the company's numerous branches were located within 
Hertfordshire: 
"... was important as we wished to stress our independence & 'stand 
alone' nature. " (postal questionnaire response) 
JC represented a situation where the "market" was internal 
to the company and hence, coincidentally, internal to 
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Hertfordshire. In similar vein it was earlier suggested 
that the market could actually represent one major 
(external) firm (which happened to be? ) located in 
Hertfordshire. Within Hertfordshire the major firm is 
undeniably BAe. 
Thus FOL, involved in the fibre optics industry, was set 
up in Stevenage in 1982 and employed 8 people. With no 
major suppliers in Hertfordshire its customers were the MOD 
and BAe, Stevenage. The question remained as to whether it 
was an independent small firm or a dependent 
supplier/subcontractor. 
MD proved a fascinating example of the role of customer 
linkages in location. This was a branch of a US 
multinational headquartered in Los Angeles and employing 
thousands in the US. Located in Hatfield in 1985, this 
branch employed 3 persons. Its major suppliers were 
external to Hertfordshire and it named only one major 
customer, BAe at Hatfield, which it cited as the only 
reason for its location in Hertfordshire. Moreover, work 
for BAe had been carried out in the US since 1982 and hence 
before the branch's establishment in Hatfield. Whilst this 
site's location was undeniably due to its relationship with 
BAe, without knowledge of the process of linkage creation 
the exact workings of the mechanism were still a mystery. 
For example, was the branch set up to liaise on existing 
contracts or to gain more and hence, was its location based 
on the insistence of the customer, BAe, or a decision by 
the supplier? In which direction was the causal mechanism 
working? But, however the mechanism worked, it was working 
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over a vast geographical distance and between two major 
multinationals rather than two "family firms within an 
industrial district". This company proved a compelling 
choice of case study. 
Whilst major company sites located in Hertfordshire, and 
hence Hertfordshire, represented the "market" for the 
latter establishments discussed above, none of the examples 
of outcomes so far discussed actually involved a conception 
of the market which would create linkage patterns typical 
if an "industrial district" existed: namely, other small 
high technology firms within Hertfordshire. Possible 
examples of such firms did exist however in the "outcomes" 
group. 
GLC, set up in 1980, could be viewed as the firm closest 
to the heart of the New Industrial Spaces theorists. For 
this was a one person printed circuit board manufacturer 
based in Letchworth with his major supplier and customer 
also in the town. In turn, the firm's location factors were 
"business local to customers" and "lived locally". 
KD, employing 36 and located in Welwyn Garden City, also 
appeared to be an undoubted example of the process of 
disintegration and agglomeration depicted by the theory. 
Both its largest customers were located within 
Hertfordshire, the largest actually within Welwyn Garden 
City. Its location was stated as due to the need to retain 
its labour force. This paradoxical location factor was 
explained by the fact that the company was a "planned" 
spin-off, in 1977, of another Welwyn Garden City company 
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founded in its original form in 1937. A further unplanned 
spin-off from this original company proved to be none other 
than KD's largest customer. Other returns from the 
questionnaire survey confirmed that KD was actually only 
one of several planned spin-offs, all located within Welwyn 
Garden City with common shareholders and directors. Hence, 
KD also became the subject of further study. 
Summary 
One of the most surprising elements of the group of "31+4" 
(those establishments who stated that production linkages 
had played a role in their location) was that over a third 
of the establishments did not have a major production 
linkage in Hertfordshire. Furthermore, in some cases (such 
as "ancillary" suppliers) where a major linkage internal to 
the county was held, this linkage proved not to be the 
"critical" linkage in the establishment's location 
decision. Firstly, this illustrated the earlier argument 
about the danger of prioritising a linkage simply because 
it was "local" in nature (that is, fitted the definition of 
local taken). Knowledge of the spatial characteristic of a 
linkage, even a linkage identified as part of a local 
production network, is not enough to ascribe locational 
causality to that linkage. However, the research had been 
deliberately designed such that, in these cases, it was 
known that particular linkages, identified were "critical 
in location". Thus, the diversity of "spatial length" of 
these linkages revealed that the production linkage 
process of location, although grounded in 
Hertfordshire, was operating at a variety of 
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spatial scales. Put another way, "local meant different 
things to different people". 
Moreover, the process was operating through a variety of 
production linkages, both supplier and customer, both 
external and internal (ie. within multi-site firms). 
Finally, in all these cases, the question still remained as 
to whether or not it was the transaction costs mechanism 
driving the location process. In other words, was the 
"distance sensitive" nature of these linkages or some other 
linkage property driving the process? Answering this 
question involved moving to the case study stage of the 
research but, prior to this, important preliminary 
conclusions could be drawn about the agglomeration pattern 
known as "high technology Hertfordshire". 
"High technology Hertfordshire": Some preliminary 
It is clear from studying the group of "31+4", only just 
over a fifth of the respondents, that high technology 
Hertfordshire is, in fact, constituted by a variety 
of combined and overlapping high technology 
production complexes. Examples of such complexes include 
the multinational and its "local" suppliers, whether these 
suppliers are themselves multinationals or part of one of 
several small firm production networks (so are these all 
industrial districts? ); a variety of London-based 
production complexes such as that focussed on the City; the 
Western Crescent complex; and internationalised defence and 
aerospace production increasingly guaranteed through inter- 
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firm collaboration. Moreover, complexes based on a derived 
dynamic of agglomeration may also be discerned, as the 
presence of such a high technology agglomeration has acted 
as a market for a series of further (locally-based) "high 
technology" and "ancillary" services. 
Together these complexes constitute the "high technology 
Hertfordshire" production agglomeration but, from the 
evidence of "major" production linkages, not a tightly 
integrated production network. To that extent, high 
technology Hertfordshire represents an aggregate, "a group 
of distinct things gathered into a whole". Yet these 
establishments, signifying a variety of production 
complexes, also represent a causal group, for these 
establishments all share a location dynamic based on their 
production linkages. However, the lack of an integrated 
production network implies that, in contrast to the theory 
of the New Industrial Spaces, that dynamic is only in a 
minor way driven by a localised production network. 
Rather, the dynamic is operating at a variety of spatial 
scales which include Hertfordshire in their dimensions. 
Exactly how the dynamic is operating was revealed through 
the case studies. 
7.7 Case Studies of the "31+4": The Mechanism of 
Location 
As outlined earlier, the case studies were chosen to 
investigate the operation of the process in particular 
instances. The investigation was based on deciphering the 
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role of transaction costs within the mechanism of location 
and, from the outcomes depicted above, several 
establishments appeared to be characteristic of "small 
firms in an industrial district". Thus, examples of these 
were chosen as case study "archetypes" for investigation of 
the transaction costs mechanism per se and wider 
investigation of the possibility of a "high technology 
industrial district" in Hertfordshire. As may be recalled 
from earlier analysis, such a possibility had not been 
ruled out, merely the fact that if such a district existed 
it was a quantitatively minor aspect to the county's high 
technology economy. 
Case Study KA: "I don't know but I know a man (sic) who 
can" 
Firstly, there was the company KA, with three of its four 
production linkages within Hertfordshire. The exact role of 
such linkages in its creation/location was still uncertain 
however, since KA's major location factor had been 
suggested to be the founder's residence. The process of 
creation of the company and its production linkages needed 
to be revealed. 
In a classic example of "disintegration cum agglomeration", 
it became clear that it was no coincidence that this 
computer electronics company had been set up in the core 
region for such industry. The founder (and interviewee) had 
previously worked for several major electronics companies 
in the county and, whilst with one of these companies, he 
had become aware of a major (local) competitor who needed 
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support for a particular product. Thus, in 1984, he set up 
KA at his home in Watford to provide support in the form 
of test programmes and diagnostic software. It was the 
knowledge of a potential local production linkage 
that was the key to the company's creation. 
At the same time, the founder was also aware that situated 
in Watford he was in the core of a high technology region, 
which he described as "Britain's Silicon Valley": 
"Northern home counties is a beautiful location. " 
"There is six-ton of electronic businesses both small and large in 
this area. " (personal interview) 
The respondent's conception of a high technology region was 
also held at the spatial scale of Hertfordshire and even 
the business park on which the company was located. In 
fact, KA was the first tenant of a park which was 
suggested to be 90% electronics-based companies. The view 
of a high technology production agglomeration was further 
confirmed by the company's supplier base. Its two major 
suppliers were both located in Hertfordshire and this 
similarly proved to be no coincidence. One of these 
companies was actually an individual with whom the founder 
had previously worked, and it was this knowledge of key 
people and companies and the fact that they were local 
which were the critical properties to supplier linkages: 
"We sub out work. Who do I sub out work to? People I know, 
companies I know. Invariably I am going to know local companies 
and I'm going to know local guys [sic]. And because they are local 
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it's probably why I'm going to do it. " 
"Yes, yes. The game I am in is talent orientated. I've got a pool 
of local engineers who will either work weekends, work evenings... 
or on contract and they come in here and like they hover from 
company to company. Local! That's very true, very true. If I've 
got a big contract in, the size of us, what I'd have to do is sub 
it out to those who are competent. Those who I knew I could give 
the job to. Yes, I've got that resource, that's why we are here. " 
Why local suppliers? 
"Geographical location sticks out, because he's just round the 
corner! " 
KA was part of, and gained from, a local specialist high 
technology production network. It included both major 
and/or specialist suppliers and, furthermore, such linkages 
were greater than tightly defined production linkages. Both 
formal and informal "linkages of co-operation" existed with 
local companies: 
"That happens all the time. Yes with small local businesses, yes 
with big companies. A classic one, I wanted a logic analyser. I 
can't afford one. Rank Xerox [second largest customer] have got 
one. I go to Rank Xerox, my friend there, and say listen man, can 
I borrow a logic analyser. Yes, sure man, it's collecting dust 
here at the moment, we're not using it. " 
Another example also involved a token financial investment 
by KA in a company in the (adjoining) county of 
Bedfordshire. The company had set up at a similar time and 
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both were still surviving but the relationship was not, in 
reality, based on finance: 
"A beautiful, mutual symbiotic relationship! Very complementary. 
He wasn't in my area of the market, I wasn't in his but they 
overlapped. We worked together. Yes, I made him rich because I 
introduced him to Telecom". 
"(The relationship is an) intellectual relationship. Intellectual 
property. In our game, electronics, your biggest asset is your 
staff and your knowledge. If you have got talent you're laughing. 
If you know talent you're laughing. If you know talent and you're 
capable of talking to talent you are laughing. So what we do is we 
pool each others' knowledge. I've got a particular area, a problem 
on. Ah, I've come across this before, this is what you do. I don't 
know, I know a man who can! " 
It was clear that KA tied into a local high technology 
production network in terms described within the New 
Industrial Spaces thesis. It could be considered as part of 
an "industrial district" (driven by large firm customers). 
Indeed, when asked what the company would most miss if 
forced to move from the area the answer was: 
"I'd miss my talent, my contacts, my local contacts. The sort of 
company we're in I need talent and I need local talent. " 
The point to make, however, is that, prior to the 
interview, RA's membership of such a district was 
questionable as KA's customers are, predominantly, major 
electronics/telecommunications companies. Its (post- 
Fordist? ) relationships with these customers, highlighted 
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by its ability to borrow specialised and expensive 
equipment from one of them (see above) transpired to be far 
removed from the "dependent subcontractor" typology. 
However, that distinction could not be made from the 
identification of a "local" linkage alone. 
Case Study KD: The family of firms 
The process of disintegration and agglomeration in 
Hertfordshire was also exhibited by the example of KD. 
The origin of the company stemmed from DEV of Welwyn Garden 
City, set up in 1937. This company provided colour sorting 
equipment for the food industry but, during the fifties, 
realised that the product's future was bleak. Therefore, 
the company began talks with a team from AEI, a major 
medical electronics company, which itself was undergoing a 
restructuring process. The result was the creation of an 
instruments section within DEV, manufacturing electro- 
cardiograph recorders and led by a team previously employed 
at AEI. The subsequent success of this product switch 
eventually made DEV the target of a buy-out by an American 
multinational. However, the buyer was only interested in 
certain parts (products) of the company such that the 
demise of DEV led to two further spin-offs, C and D. 
Subsequently, in 1972, a company called RMD of Hertford 
became one of D's major customers. This company was, in 
turn, historically associated for it was an earlier spin- 
off from DEV led by an ex-sales manager of the now defunct 
DEV implants division. RND, in collaboration with Edinburgh 
Royal Infirmary and an innovative doctor in the US, had 
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created a new and advanced body monitoring system. It was 
knowledge of the people who had previously worked at DEV 
which led the company to turn to them, and therefore the 
spin-offs they now ran, to manufacture various parts of 
this system. 
However, it was in the late 1970s that the disintegration 
process really took of. In 1977, a further series of 
"planned" spin-offs from D and C, itself in financial 
difficulties, occurred. A "manufacturing arm" KD was 
created led by the previous works manager of D, and D and 
RMD subsequently became the major customers of KD. Other 
spin-offs also occurred led by members of the original team 
from AEI who had joined DEV. In 1977, OR was formed to 
manufacture pen chart recorders for body monitoring systems 
by the engineer of the original AEI team. In 1978, FI was 
formed by the team's mechanical engineer. It produces 
precision engineered components for, in particular, medical 
electronic devices. In 1980, TE was created to manufacture 
tape recorders for the body monitoring system of RMD. This 
company, in turn, was led by an original draughtsman of the 
team. Finally, one other aspect also linked these 
companies together, they all located in Welwyn 
Garden City. 
But other spin-offs have not done so. The original managing 
director of DEV, after selling the company, moved to 
Jersey. Subsequently, a manufacturing arm of the group was 
set-up in Jersey. LE, a manufacturing arm of OR led by an 
apprentice from D, is also located on an industrial site at 
the airport, whilst a further sales arm is based in Jersey, 
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led by the son of DEV's ex-managing director. Thus, the 
"Hertfordshire Handful" have exhibited a vigorous 
disintegration process similar to that identified as 
integral to the origins of Silicon Valley (ie. the Shockley 
Eight) and the Cambridge Phenomenon. 
However, there are subtle but important differences. To 
take the case of KD, it is an electronics sub-contractor 
with 80% of its business tied up with RND. It does not 
have 
a product in its own right and the firm network described 
above is primarily based on the production of a particular 
product for RND. RMD have recently announced their 
intention to take production in-house which, ultimately, 
will leave this group of small firms without a product. 
88 
The response of KD has been to seek work elsewhere and its 
nature as a sub-contractor has implied the search 
principally involving approaching other large companies 
requiring subcontract work to be done. Whilst the firm 
network may well stay intact through ownership linkages the 
suggestion is that the nature of the network is undergoing 
change away from networked production linkages. 
Interestingly, an alternative strategy, based on what has 
been learnt from the work on industrial districts, would be 
88 This (particular) turn of events goes against the general trend of 
disintegration of production argued for by Scott and Storper. Interestingly, the 
respondent suspected that the logic of PZD was based on its hopes to go public in 
the near future. Despite its international reputation as a design and marketing 
organisation, fears were held that its non-involvement in any form of 
manufacturing may be viewed negatively. The point is that this represents an 
example of a production strategy far removed from any account of transaction costs 
and their role in integration or disintegration of production. Indeed, it could be 
taken as a further example of the oft-quoted complaint that the financial 
considerations of the City take precedence in the strategies of our industrial 
companies. 
374 
collaboration between the firms to create a product. 
Indeed, considering their history of close association and 
the "dynamism" argued for within such small firm networks 
it may be viewed as significant that this strategy has been 
ignored in favour of a continued large firm subcontractor 
role. 
Secondly, the spatial concentration of the production 
network within Hertfordshire, and even Welwyn Garden City, 
was broken through the creation of spin-offs in Jersey. 
What precipitated this, however, was the residential move 
of a key person. If the transaction costs mechanism was 
present it was "over-ruled" by a key linkage of, 
effectively, skilled labour. An individual moved to Jersey 
and despite the presence of a complete family of firms 
within Welwyn Garden City and a wider high technology 
agglomeration of Hertfordshire and beyond, and the presumed 
transactional cost advantages of such a situation, a 
subsequent "sponsored spin-off" was set up in Jersey on the 
basis of this individual's move. Indeed, the importance of 
skilled labour was supported by the only location factors 
expressed by KD and the other spin-offs who responded to 
the questionnaire. Hence, OR stressed the presence of an 
established labour force and KD the need to retain key 
people. 
The possible advantages of location within a high 
technology agglomeration were subsequently discussed with 
KD and provided some further interesting insights, as well 
as a possible explanation for its future business strategy. 
Firstly, the question of a local supplier base was raised. 
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Neither of KD's major suppliers was based in Hertfordshire 
(although one was in an adjoining county) but the location 
of these particular linkages was viewed as unimportant: 
"RR were not selected because they were local, Bedford's just 
down the road. They were selected by our buyer largely because of 
the good deal she could get. " 
This good deal involved competitive prices, extra time to 
pay, good service, etc. Distance did not play a significant 
part in these linkages but, interestingly, this may have 
been explained by the fact that all the major components 
suppliers employed local representatives and hence 
overcame any notion of distance: 
"we've selected them because of the deal they've offered rather 
than their location. Location with suppliers just really doesn't 
matter very much... All these companies have their own local rep. 
who you are dealing with so it doesn't really matter where the 
components are stocked and made up and posted from. That doesn't 
really come in to it very much. " 
Thus, whilst the concept of "local" may indeed be important 
in production, as Scott suggests the type of linkage held 
with suppliers is highly relevant. For in the case of KD 
its major suppliers overcame the requirement of "proximity" 
by the supplier maintaining a local presence without 
actually being located in the area. The locational 
mechanism of transaction costs could be overcome or at 
least severely curtailed in its impulses by such a strategy 
(for particular supplies). 
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In contrast, KD was also aware of, and heavily used, local 
suppliers for one-off bits of manufacturing. The local area 
did supply a specialist and large pool of suppliers and 
subcontractors: 
"In fact, because the electronics industry is, I think, 
predominant in the south eastern corner of England... 
Hertfordshire... has a very large electronics manufacturing 
contingency. So you know what happens, the ancillary industries 
build up in the area don't they. One of the problems of moving 
somewhere else is that that doesn't exist. " 
"[There is a specialist pool of subcontractors] that has grown up 
around the industry because there are some very large electronic 
manufacturing companies here... Of course, the support industries 
grow around them and we have the use of them. " 
"The basic reason they are here is because they can get work, 
there is work here. And the bulk of the work comes from these very 
large multinational companies and I think that companies like ice, 
I think we would have difficulty finding people with these 
specialist skills if some of the big boys [sic] weren't in the 
area. " 
However, the support industries used by KD (which the 
respondent argued included not only high technology 
subcontractors but also other ancillary services such as 
courier deliveries) were viewed as derived from the 
presence of large multinationals, not any small firm 
production network. This point was confirmed on discussion 
of the concept of "high technology industry being in the 
air": 
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"If there is an atmosphere about Hertfordshire which is associated 
with electronics, I've never really felt it, I've never noticed 
it. I think that is something that is beginning to blur into what 
we were talking about earlier. That industry develops around those 
one or two very large giants in the electronics field. Now it may 
be nice to say that there is a lovely atmosphere in the air but if 
you took those four or five majors and moved them to the middle of 
Cheshire, I think you'd find that the atmosphere followed them 
very quickly. " 
KD's description of high technology agglomeration 
was not that of a small firm production network but 
rather a large firm subcontracting network. In fact, 
the presence of large firms caused KD severe problems of 
labour shortage due to poaching by these firms. This had 
led the company to consider relocation, with South 
Humberside highly favoured (including by the key 
personnel). Questioned on the loss of contact with local 
suppliers it was suggested that South Humberside was a good 
choice because recently one or two large electronics 
companies had located in the region. Just as a supplier 
base had been built around the electronics multinationals 
of Hertfordshire so a similar situation would be taking 
place in South Humberside. Such suppliers would, in turn, 
be of use to KD. Moreover, the increased distance between 
KD and its customers was not seen as problematical. Thus, 
the suggestion was of little, if anything apart from 
inertia, tying the company to Hertfordshire despite its 
recognised agglomeration advantages. Again, the transaction 
costs advantages might be "overcome", in this case through 
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particular problems of labour recruitment which had raised 
the possibility of relocation. The difference of outcome 
between KD and the previous example of KA was striking. 
Case Study KV: The specialist labour spin-off 
If it is the presence of multi-national companies which is 
the driving force of the growth of high technology in 
Hertfordshire, this force took a variety of forms including 
the classic disintegration mechanism of firm spin-off. KV 
was a spin-off from McDonnell Douglas, located only 10 
miles away, and its major supplier linkage. The founders 
had previously been selling McDonnell Douglas hardware to 
large government organisations, in particular, the MOD. 
However, a repeated request from clients for software 
engineers and contractors had seen them set up their own 
business to meet this demand along with that for bespoke 
software. 
The first people KV employed were predominantly previous 
McDonnell Douglas employees and the hardware they used was 
McDonnell Douglas. Indeed, McDonnell Douglas itself became 
a customer. Interestingly, their first offices were also 
rented from another local electronics company, itself a 
contact from a previous relationship when working at 
McDonnell Douglas. "Local suppliers" were listed as an 
important location factor and it transpired that "supplies" 
in this case, as with KA, principally meant "talent". 
It was revealed that Kv was involved in a web of informal 
agreements with other local, small software houses. These 
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were based on sharing resources, principally people. A 
company could take on work and "front" it whilst calling on 
the skills of employees of other firms. Indeed, it was not 
unknown for such labour to be included in employment 
statistics when dealing with clients! At other times, when 
work was slack, employees would similarly be offered to 
other firms. The most striking aspect about this local 
labour market, however, was further informal agreements not 
to poach staff. This went as far as informing other firms 
if they were approached by employees of such companies. The 
respondent argued that these practices had to be local 
due to their informal nature. Indeed, a formal joint 
venture between KV and another local software house had 
ended in failure. The "costs" of being local in this case 
were simply the ability or inability to create flexible and 
informal linkages critical to the company's survival. In 
turn, the company was tied in to the region by the 
residential locations of its founders and "staff" ie. the 
local labour market. 
However, such a situation was changing for the company 
itself was undergoing a transformation. The provision of 
software engineers on contract was a high risk business 
which the company was moving away from. Instead, it was 
engaged in the creation of "products", combined hardware 
and software packages to then sell. This, in turn, meant 
that it was deliberately pulling out of the informal 
networks it had been part of. For, in order to protect such 
products, confidentiality was of utmost importance and 
those companies whose staff had previously been used on an 
ad hoc basis now represented competitors, not co-workers. 
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Hence, Hertfordshire as a local supplier base was 
increasingly irrelevant especially as McDonnell Douglas, 
still a major supplier of hardware, had now moved to 
Woking. 
Case Study AB: "It makes no difference at all" 
In the case of AB, which exemplified a further form of 
"spin-off", the role of transaction costs in the location 
mechanism was minimal. The origin of the company was its 
creation as a computer department in 1974/5 within the 
major London-based architectural practice, GMWP. Its major 
product is C. A. D. systems, initially for architectural 
practices but increasingly for design departments of major 
retailers. The department grew so big that in 1980 a 
subsidiary company, GMWC, was created and in 1985/86 a 
partial management buy-out occurred and the company was 
renamed AB. It now employs 60 people. 
AB's location in Hertfordshire in 1980 was based, firstly, 
on the fact that the senior staff assigned to the new 
subsidiary, whose jobs had previously been located in 
London, predominantly lived in Hertfordshire. Secondly, 
GMWP had an outpost office in Hertfordshire and for a time 
this office was shared. Thirdly, Hertfordshire provided 
access to the top UK architectural practices based in 
London, including GMWP which is still the largest customer. 
This was the critical production linkage in AB's general 
location but it was not critical to AB's specific location 
in Hertfordshire. 
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Discussion of the role of distance in the company's major 
supplier linkages with firms in Milton Keynes and Bristol, 
possibly signifying a high-tech agglomeration on the basis 
of the Western Crescent/M4 Corridor, elicited the response: 
"It makes no difference at all... It's the companies as opposed to 
where they are based. " 
Similarly, concerning the possibility of a specialist 
supplier base in Hertfordshire: 
"There is nothing that we use which we couldn't find elsewhere. 
And I could state it the other way around. There is very little 
that we buy locally that we buy because it is local. " 
"we are much more interested in the product that is produced than 
the fact that they [the supplier] are just around the corner. Our 
market is worldwide and therefore our selection of suppliers is 
worldwide as well. " 
However, despite the move into a worldwide market, the 
major market was architectural practices and major 
retailers headquarters which were predominantly located in 
London and the South East. Thus, the continued need for 
proximity to the market and principally London was stressed 
by AB and, moreover, this proximity was argued as the only 
positive aspect to the company's present location in 
Hertfordshire. Thus, despite the company's high 
technology product, AB's location had little to do 
with high technology and its agglomeration within 
Hertfordshire. Rather, Hertfordshire gave access to 
a London-based market. 89 
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It may be argued that some form of transaction costs 
mechanism was operating in this need for proximity. 
However, such a form would seem to be merely a restatement 
of the traditional spatial pull (location factor) of the 
market. It is clear that no transaction costs mechanism 
based on the emergent production logic of local flexible 
supplier linkages was present. 
Case Study JO: A derived dynamic of high technology? 
In contrast, Hertfordshire and its strategic position as 
central within the high technology agglomeration of the 
Western Crescent was the market for the branch, JO. This 
company, the UK market leader with 8 branches nationwide, 
specialised in the provision of technical human resources 
to the computer industry, both contract and permanent 
staff. The computer industry, by their definition, included 
data processing installations for retailers, financial 
organisations, etc., as well as the electronics and defence 
industries per se. Its presence highlighted the derived 
dynamic of agglomeration raised earlier. For the respondent 
emphasised the fact that the company "reacted to the 
market" and "set up here because the others are here. " They 
responded to the client's perceived need for a local 
presence: 
"If you are in a service industry I guess your clients want to be 
89 AB did go on to argue, however, that time would see this requirement decline: 
"Distance is important but, in fact, we as a company are making it less 
important. When we made the decision two years ago to go international we 
had to develop ways in which from [Hertfordshire) we could support around 
the world. And by doing that we also enable ourselves to support people in 
the UK more easily, remotely. " 
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able to reach out and touch you or hit you or congratulate you or 
whatever. " 
Again, the critical production linkage was that of 
proximity to the market (and not the requirement for a 
specialist supplier base) but in this case the market was 
inclusive of high technology Hertfordshire. Thus: 
"The only reason we would move from Hertfordshire is if there was 
no longer an industry (ie. market] here we could serve. As long as 
there is business for us to do here we would stay here. (However, ] 
if they all moved, we'd go as well. " 
Case Study MD: Transaction costs - transatlantic and to 
your door 
As we learnt earlier, the only reason for MD's location 
in Hertfordshire was its customer link with BAe Hatfield. 
Indeed, in the interview the respondent stated that the 
company had had no knowledge whatsoever of Hertfordshire 
when it located in the county in 1985. MD's Hatfield 
branch employs 3 people whilst the division as a whole 
employs about 1,000 with sites in San Diego, Irvine and Los 
Angeles. The division provides technical documentation, 
principally a parts cataloguing service, for the aerospace 
industry. 90 MD had been providing this service for several 
years to BAe, whose engineers inputted parts specifications 
onto punch cards or magnetic tape which were then sent to 
90 On average, a single airplane consists of about 80 million parts and due to 
continual development, maintenance and safety reviews no one plane is ever the 
same. To create a parts list is a major and skilled operation. 
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the US to be catalogued by MD. On a visit to one of these 
US sites, representatives of BAe were shown MD's on-line 
input computer systems and subsequently asked for this 
service to be provided in their Hatfield site. Thus, MD 
set up a branch site at Hatfield to undertake this task. To 
maintain its independence (the branch also deals with minor 
enquiries from other european aircraft manufacturers), ND 
declined the offer to locate at BAe Hatfield but set up 
less than 3 miles from the site and still within Hatfield. 
For MD this location provided a physical presence allowing 
(the often required) daily contact with the customer, 
including the ability to "problem-solve" any difficulties 
with the on-line system. 91 As an example of the ability to 
identify the actual cost of particular transactions, the 
branch also deliberately situated within the same telephone 
exchange as BAe. This was important because the host 
computer at the branch has 5 communication links to the BAe 
site, rented at £250-300 each line per year. To move out of 
the telephone exchange district (just a few miles) would 
see the cost of each line jump to approximately £2000! 
The site principally acts as nothing more than a "data 
capture" site, with information sent to the US to be 
processed. Yet this process is increasingly being viewed as 
problematical, in terms of delay and complications, such 
that MD has been considering setting up a local data 
processing, as well as capture, facility. In other words, 
despite the technological capability to create and use an 
international division of labour, a transaction costs 
mechanism has been operating to create pressure for 
91 In an interesting twist to the creation of production networks, bID is now 
fitting this system into BAe's subcontractors. 
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"agglomeration". But, and confirming the need for 
particular conditions to be met for the mechanism to 
operate to produce agglomeration, the company has not 
succumbed to these pressures. The principal reason is that, 
despite a history of aerospace in the area (eg. De 
Havilland located in Hatfield in 1934) and technical 
documentation activities within BAe, a severe lack of 
skilled labour has meant that the company has been unable 
thus far to advance its plans. Thus, the mechanism was 
operative concerning the original location of M. Indeed, 
it operated over a vast geographical distance and between 
two major multinational companies. However, it has 
subsequently been overridden by "other production 
considerations". Moreover, it has been overridden by a lack 
of skilled labour, whereas the growth of such a labour 
market would be an expected key element of any (New 
Industrial Space) agglomeration. 
Case Study JC: The branch linkage 
The final case study of the group of "31+4" investigated 
the process's operation within a multi-site firm. JC, 
employing 65 people, located in the county in 1988. It is 
the R&D branch for the "technologies" group, itself 
comprised of nine divisions yet, in turn, one of only five 
main operating groups of a leading British engineering 
company. As outlined earlier, (all) JC's customers are 
other divisions of the company with which it has "market" 
relations as JC has its own operating account. What it 
does not have is a trading account and thus no customers 
outside of the company. One of these other divisions and a 
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major customer is another branch in Hertfordshire and 
regular exchange of personnel and information both formally 
(costed) and informally takes place. Furthermore, it was 
this "customer linkage" which was integral to JC's 
location in Hertfordshire: 
"But Hemel Hempstead in particular, historically it's close to x 
[other branch]. There is this interchange that's going on here. " 
Thus, the transaction costs mechanism was found to be 
working within a multi-site firm structure. However, it 
should be added that the respondent also argued that the 
branch was actually totally divorced from high technology 
production going on within the county. Its customers were 
internal and its major suppliers worldwide. 
This point was further investigated after outlining the 
concept of the "industrial districts" to the respondent, 
and the arguments of Sabel (1989), amongst others, that 
multinationals are now keen to be part of such phenomena. 
Sabel's argument that decentralising multi-nationals are 
looking to locate units within districts was particularly 
significant in the context that JC was one of several 
"decentralised" R&D sites created with the break-up of the 
company's central R&D site in West London. However, just as 
with JC, these other "centres of excellence" located at or 
near existing production sites. The possibility of JC's 
location in order to integrate into a local high technology 
supplier base was viewed as irrelevant on two counts. 
Firstly, a questioning of exactly what Hertfordshire could 
offer as a high technology agglomeration and secondly, the 
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ethos of the company anyway and, thus, the likelihood of 
its taking advantage of such a situation. 
"I know [the] M4 Corridor has a reputation for electronics supply. 
I know the back-end of Edinburgh and Glasgow, particularly 
Edinburgh... Yes, if I was say a disc-drive manufacturer I'd want 
to be close to all the sources of supply for those special little 
widgets that I needed to make the disc drive work. But I don't 
think that's the case with where we are at the moment, I'm pretty 
certain of saying that. " 
In fact, of particular interest was the respondent's view 
as to exactly what high technology in Hemel Hempstead is 
all about, especially as the estate on which the company is 
based is one of the largest industrial estates in 
Hertfordshire, boasting a who's who of high technology 
companies. The respondent argued: 
"These buildings are like tombstones. This is what the whole thing 
amounts to, you know, prestigious new development for Y. Y is 
doing very well. Look at what they are doing, look at how much 
they are building. And in 5 years time that site will be empty, or 
it will be leased off to some other company or it will be hived 
into business units and rented off. We've got a classic emporium 
here in Hemel. The Z building... the "Emerald Palace"! That is 
absolutely the epitome of the present British industrial rise of 
Hemel Hempstead. Go to Hemel Hempstead and build a bloody great 
palace. That's exactly what they've done. Its more to say, [to] 
signify how well they are doing as a corporate giant ... But its a 
very different culture from the one you've proposed about this 
small network type configuration. " 
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The reality of the company's impact on the locality was: 
"We impinge locally on the community by being here. But, yes we 
have needs, we have the fact that we need a catering service, we 
need somebody to come and do the gardens and wash the windows. But 
we do not support a little infrastructure of small [high 
technology supplier] companies... " 
"I don't think we would participate from the way the business is 
structured. Whatever we do is done very much with costs in mind, 
purely business relationships... we couldn't have this flexible 
working arrangement. It's totally different. " 
Rather, the future strategy of the company lay in its 
internationalisation through global networks: 
"That does go on. Those are very important. No underrating those. 
Those strategic alliances are such that they really dictate the 
future of organisations like JC. It is the international 
acquisitions and the international nature of business now that 
those are really the key building blocks of a strategic plan for 
something like M. Getting into North America, acquisition of 
companies in Europe.. . They are building market share, they're 
being competitive through economy of scale. . . Very strategic, very 
long term, very international. There's no part of the globe which 
seems to be quiet and unaffected by this. " 
Yet the respondent could still see the logic of the 
transaction costs mechanism: 
"Wherever there's regular meetings, progress reviews and 
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deliverables that are going back and forwards, its by far and 
away best to have somebody on your doorstep if you've got 
it, if 
you know about them. I'm not disputing the fact that logically 
it 
should be done! However, the driving force has always seemed to 
be, the objective is, to produce the widget. But looking at the 
saving and the cost and the sensible attitude of 'let's go and 
look on Kings Langley [local] industrial estate' or 'let's go and 
look at something nearby'... it's not part of the rationale here 
for some reason, as I said before. It should be done and it could 
be done if there was a higher profile given to it. If we were hit 
with regular newsletters from the Hertfordshire Chamber of 
Commerce'or some august body that says, 'hey, look, do you know 
what's on this estate'. Even a newsletter for this estate. Its a 
vast estate. " 
Thus, in the most telling of comments, the respondent 
concluded that: 
"We've had great industrial centres like Manchester and Liverpool 
but there has been communities in those places and I think that is 
what is sorely lacking now. Simply for the reason that we no 
longer talk to anybody in this road. This is an industrial estate, 
we are an industrial company. But it would be alien if we were to 
go across and talk to McDonnell Douglas about a communications 
problem. " 
JC's location was partly the result of a transaction costs 
mechanism operating "internally". However, the operation of 
that mechanism externally, to impinge upon the local 
economy, was clearly not a consideration. In effect, rather 
than a branch exhibiting the "cathedral in the desert" 
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syndrome, JC could be seen as a "cathedral in an oasis". 
Concluding remarks 
Thus, case studies of members of the group of "31+4" reveal 
a wide variety of instances where major production linkages 
are important in the location process. However, this 
production linkage dynamic is as much to do with "access to 
the market" as the need for the "just round the corner 
specialist supplier". The market itself may be "high 
technology industry in Hertfordshire", and thus indicative 
of cumulative growth, but in other instances the 
characteristic of being "high technology" and/or "located 
in Hertfordshire" were incidental in the creation of the 
production linkage. 
What is most striking about the production linkage dynamic 
of location is the variety of outcome gained. Whilst 
location in Hertfordshire was the result, the articulation 
of the establishment into "high technology Hertfordshire", 
if it occurred at all, occurred in a series of forms, only 
some of which were critical to the continued well-being of 
the establishment. Thus, the picture of high technology 
Hertfordshire revealed is that of a complicated combination 
and overlapping of production complexes exhibiting a wide 
range of structural relations to the local economy. 
However, there is one further aspect to this picture; its 
partiality. For this picture is based upon the respondent 
group of 1131+411, a group which represents less than one- 
quarter of the questionnaire respondents. Thus, whilst a 
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detailed and intricate analysis of the principal location 
mechanism of the New Industrial Spaces has been carried out 
in this chapter (so fulfilling the major aim of the 
research), only a minor part of the agglomeration high 
technology Hertfordshire has been explained. In the 
following chapter further explanations for this 
agglomeration, arising from analysis of the remaining 
questionnaire returns, will be discussed. 
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Direct Line (0908) 65 
Telex 825061 
Faculty of Social Sciences 
Fax (0908) 653744 
September 1990 
Dear , 
You may recall that several months ago you kindly completed a 
"Hertfordshire Establishments" postal questionnaire as part of 
my research into the concentration of high technology industry 
in Hertfordshire. 
As explained then, the postal questionnaire was the first stage 
of a research project aimed, in particular, at describing and 
explaining the production and ownership linkages establishments 
have with each other, especially within Hertfordshire, and the 
role of such linkages in location. The second stage of this 
project involves more detailed interviewing of selected firms 
along with local organisations such as the Chamber of Commerce, 
County and District Councils etc. 
Following an unprecedented response rate to the questionnaire 
of over 175 establishments or 70% of the initial sample, 
preliminary analysis of the returns and subsequent choice of 
case study firms has now taken place. In the light of this I 
write once again, for your questionnaire return proved most 
interesting in the context of the survey as a whole, and I 
would very much wish, if possible, to use your company as one 
of my selected case studies. 
Meeting such a request would entail an hour or thereabouts of 
your time (whenever and wherever! ) to allow in-depth discussion 
of certain aspects of your firm. Issues which would be covered 
during the interview would include, for example: 
- The firm's origin and present ownership structure. 
- The initial location decision of the firm. 
- Certain characteristics of the firm such as its size, 
products/services and generally "what goes on at the site". 
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- The form and nature of relationships with suppliers and 
customers, and other firms generally. 
- The existence, nature and form of any relationships with 
other institutions such as the local council, Chamber of 
Commerce, higher education establishments, enterprise centres, 
etc. 
- Change in the firm and its external relationships, both past 
and likely, and the driving forces behind such change. 
- The discussion of 'all the above aspects would take place 
within the overall context of the firm's location in 
Hertfordshire and exactly what is to be gained from this 
location. That is, what is it that Hertfordshire offers or, 
conversely, what would you most miss if you had to move from 
Hertfordshire! 
I must emphasise that your participation would be most 
gratefully appreciated as well as, I hope, mutually beneficial 
in that one of the research's ultimate aims is to identify just 
what the present relationship between high technology and 
Hertfordshire is, and to formulate policy suggestions in the 
light of this. 
Finally, I should also reiterate that, just as with the initial 
questionnaire, any information provided by yourself during the 
interview will be treated in the STRICTEST CONFIDENCE and 
your anonymity maintained in any subsequent published results. 
If you have any immediate queries or would like to discuss this 
matter further please do not hesitate to contact me on the 
above number. Otherwise, I will be in contact shortly to 
discuss your further participation in the research programme. 
Yours sincerely, 
Mr. Nicholas Henry BSc(Hons) 
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MAJOR LINKAGES AND LOCATION 
Q1. The first set of questions are concerned with gaining 
information on the firm's origin and its present ownership 
linkages. 
- Who founded the firm, why, and how, did it come into 
being? 
- What is the present ownership structure of the firm? 
- Do any other companies own a stake in your company? Who 
(where), how much and why? 
- Did your firm's location play a role in the investment 
decision of these other companies? 
- Does the firm have any financial interests in any other 
companies? Could you describe these (eg. joint venture? ), 
give the name and location of the company and the reasons 
behind your company's investment? eg. forward/backward 
linkages 
- IF YES, Did the location of any company invested in play 
a role in the investment decision? 
Q2. A section concerning the location decision of the 
company. 
- Is this site the original location? Where was original 
location? 
- Were any other locations (outside of Herts [SE? ]) 
considered OTHER THAN ...? If yes, where and why? Why not 
choose them? 
If no, why not? 
WHY did you locate in ...? 
- PROBE location factors listed in questionnaire return 
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Q3. This set of questions deal with the firm's basic 
characteristics. 
- What is your major "product" and hence what industry 
would you view your firm as engaged in and how would you 
"describe" that industry if asked to provide an overview of 
it? 
[Get a description of industry? eg. dynamic, large/small 
dominated, technologically advanced, expanding... ] 
- Please briefly describe and outline "what you do" in 
producing your major product. 
Q4. The following are questions concerning your supplier 
relationships. 
In your questionnaire return, you gave your two largest 
suppliers as ... 
- How did you "find" these suppliers? 
- Did distance from yourselves have any influence in 
your decision of choice of suppliers? If so, what 
influence and why? [Is their a minimun/maximum distance? ] 
- What were the selection criteria used in the choice of 
these supplier/s? eg. cost, quality, responsiveness 
innovation, reliability, capacity, 
- Alternatively, did the location of any particular 
supplier influence the location of your firm and, if so, in 
what way and why? 
- Are you aware of any of your suppliers having 
deliberately located close to you? 
if we change tack slightly, are satisfactory suppliers 
easily found within Herts, SE, UK for non-standard, one- 
off inputs? 
In this sense, are (or could) all your needs be met by 
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local (eg. Hertfordshire) suppliers? Does the area supply a 
"specialist pool"? 
- How would you describe your relationship with your 
(major) suppliers? ie. long term supplier relationships or 
does specialist pool allow continual refinement of 
suppplier base 
eg. Possibly need to think through a continuum between 
commercial (market) and co-operative ... 
[subcontractor, special, crucial, important, close, stable, 
functional, problematic, dominant, have adopted a dual- 
sourcing policy, two-way etc] 
- Reasoning behind relationship outlined... 
- Any financial, contractural stakes eg. joint ventures, 
shares, licensing etc... (already covered earlier? ) 
- Does the firm have a standard policy towards all 
suppliers or do relationships vary between suppliers and if 
so, why and how? That is, what decides the form of 
relationship with a supplier (the importance of the 
input/dominance)? 
- Does the distance of the supplier from yourselves play 
any role in the type of relationship the firm has with the 
supplier? 
Q5. This following section is similar to the previous but 
concerns customers. 
In your questionnaire return, you gave your two largest 
customers as ... 
- This suggests that Hertfordshire, itself, does/does not 
provide a satisfactory market for your products/services 
(GET % FIGURES FOR SALES IN HERTS? ) Could you place 
geographical boundaries on your "market" OR is the "market" 
more easily defined in terms of sectors/particular firms? 
- Did distance of yourselves from these customers 
have any influence in the creation of this linkage? 
If so, what influence and why? [Is their a minimun/maximum 
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distance? ] 
- What were the selection criteria used in the choice of 
yourselves as suppliers? eg. cost, quality, responsiveness 
innovation, reliability, capacity, 
- Did the location of any particular customer 
influence the location of your firm and, if so, in 
what way and why? 
- Are you aware of any recent geographical shift in terms 
of the general location of the market, both existing and 
potential? (ANY SHIFT IN MARKET CHARACTERISTICS GENERALLY) 
- How would you describe your relationship with your 
(major) customers? 
eg. Possibly need to think through a continuum between 
commercial and co-operative... 
- Reasoning behind relationship outlined... 
- Any financial, contractural stakes eg. joint ventures, 
shares, licensing, franchising etc... 
- As well as a market for your products are customers used 
as sources of informational/knowledge input? eg. in the 
conception of a new product would discussions with 
customers take place. Or would the initiative for new 
products possibly come directly from the customers 
themselves? 
- Does the firm have a standard policy towards all 
customers or do relationships vary between customers and if 
so, how and why? That is, what decides the form of 
relationship with a customer (the importance of the 
input/dominance)? 
- Does the distance of the customer from yourselves play 
any role in the type of relationship the firm has with the 
customer? 
Q6. Has the company undergone any major change in the past 
three years or so in product, suppliers, customers, 
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product, production process, internal organisation, etc. 
- If so, has this caused any shift, whether positive or 
negative, in the company's perception of its location ? 
Q7. This section is to investigate any other linkages/ 
forms of cooperation which the firm may have with other 
(local) firms other than those of ownership and production 
already investigated. 
- Are you involved in any forms of formal or informal co- 
operation with other (local) firms eg. joint 
R&D/production, use of buildings, machinery, training, 
shared facilities, licensing, franchising etc? 
- Please describe the nature of these, who they are with 
and why they have been set-up. 
- Do you have any intention to foster/increase any such 
linkages? 
- Do you have any formal or informal links with 
institutions both public and private eg. council "Al 
campaign", chambers of commerce, trade unions, Hertis, 
enterprise centres, higher education establishments, MSC 
(now TECS), etc 
- Please describe the nature of these, who they are with 
and why they have been set-up. 
- Do you have any intention to foster/increase any such 
linkages? eg. TECS 
- Did the potential for any or all of the above linkages 
play any influence in the firm's location decision? 
- Can you identify any actual/potential linkages which can 
in some senses be viewed as unique to Hertfordshire? 
Q8. This section aims to find out the nature of the 
relationship between the firm and its present location in 
Hertfordshire. 
- What do you view as the advantages available from your 
firm's present location in Hertfordshire (SE)? What does 
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the location offer to the firm? 
- PROMPT NOTION OF "INDUSTRY IN THE AIR" 
- What do you view as the disadvantages of your location? 
- Does the present location have any 
advantages/disadvantages in terms of distance from 
suppliers? 
- Does the present location have any 
advantages/disadvantages in terms of distance from 
customers? 
- Have you ever considered, or are you likely to consider, 
relocation outside of the region? If so where and why? If 
not, why not? What would you most miss if you had to 
move from Hertfordshire? 
Q9. Finally: 
- How do you view the firms' future? What do you see as 
possible "potentials"? What do you view as "essential" to 
its future? Similarly, can you highlight any constraints to 
the firms' future well-being? 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: Further Explanations For "High 
Technology Hertfordshire": The Remaining Majority 
8.1 Introduction 
So far, our explanation of the growth dynamics of high 
technology Hertfordshire, based as it is upon the 
transaction costs mechanism, is far from complete. For it 
has dealt with less than a quarter of the high technology 
establishments surveyed. So what of the other three- 
quarters of the sample? If major production linkages were 
not important to their location why was this so and, 
therefore, what was important to this group's location in 
Hertfordshire? 
Firstly, it could be that "major" production linkages were 
not "critical in location" but other local linkages were. 
In other words, the criticism raised in Chapter seven that 
the survey may have been looking at the wrong linkages 
could be correct. Although Chapter Seven revealed that 
certain major linkages were critical in location for a 
particular set of establishments (ie. the group of "31+4"), 
maybe the bulk of such "critical" production linkages were 
not of this kind. For example, 40 (32%) of the 126 
establishments in the remaining (majority) group did 
actually have a major production linkage within 
Hertfordshire but none were viewed as critical in their 
location. Possibly, the production linkages which were 
"critical in location" were not "major" but other types of 
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local linkage and, hence, their non-identification meant 
the operation of the mechanism in these cases was totally 
overlooked. 92 
Alternatively, maybe the transaction costs of any kind of 
production linkage simply were not a factor in the location 
of these establishments; the mechanism was not operational. 
Or, finally, the possibility exists that the transaction 
costs mechanism may have been operating but was simply 
subsumed within other dynamics of location which ultimately 
determined the locational outcome. As already suggested, 
the same outcome may be created by different (or combined) 
causal processes. An outcome which fits the New Industrial 
Spaces model may be caused by a process different from that 
hypothesised. So, did this remaining group represent an 
only partially-successful research design, evidence of a 
locational mechanism of little actual empirical relevance 
or a combination of the two? 
The way ahead to the answer lay within Question 6 of the 
questionnaire. It may be recalled that this simply asked 
for the most important location factors of the 
establishment. No location factors were prompted except, 
sub-consciously(? ), the role of major production linkages 
which had already been investigated in the preceding 
questions. Establishments responded in a "prompt-free 
environment" listing those factors which they saw fit. 
Inclusive of this was the ability to identify other 
production linkages if they were relevant, whether 
92 Whether this is the case or not, this group of 40 firms also highlight the 
dangers, once again, of prioritising linkages purely because of their being local 
(or big) in nature. 
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major or minor. In fact, it has already been seen in 
Chapter Seven that in the cases of KV and AIWA the 
respondents did just that, referring to "local suppliers" 
as location factors. Thus, Table 8.1 lists those location 
factors identified by high technology establishments in 
Hertfordshire (excluding the group of "31+4"). 
TABLE 8.1 The location factors of high technology 
establishments in Hertfordshire 
Location factor No. of times listed 
Residential location 55 
Communications 37 
- Road 20 
- Air 9 
- Rail 6 
- Ports 1 
- Not specified 1 




Spatial policy eg. New Towns, IDCs, 
Spin-off from local parent 
Acquisition 




No reason given 
Total 















So what interpretation may be made of this list of location 
factors? 
8.2 Other Processes of Location 
Firstly, residential location was the most important 
location factor for this group of establishments, 
representing 30% of the total number of location factors 
identified by individual establishments. Moreover, in 43 
cases (34% of the group) this was the only location factor 
listed. This finding proved similar to that of Breheny and 
McQuaid (1988) for their study of high technology industry 
in Berkshire (also, concerning Cambridgeshire, see 
Keeble, 1987; 1988; 1989; Keeble and Gould, 1986): 
"When considering why firms have located in Berkshire, it is 
useful to distinguish new single plant establishments from 
branches of foreign or U. K. firms. Twenty-four of the firms 
interviewed fell into the first category. The reason for the 
initial location of the new firm in 21 cases was simply that it 
was within commuting distance of where the founder lived when he 
(unfortunately, all he's) finished his previous employment. Hence, 
if one wants to understand why a new firm starts in a general 
location (as opposed to a specific site) then residence is 
important. " (Breheny and McQuaid, 1988, p. 332) 
But Breheny and McQuaid (1988) did not consider residential 
location as a location factor for branches. In contrast, 
this study found that residential location was also 
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important in the location of several branches, operating 
through several avenues and highlighting the danger of 
reductionism inherent in the term "branch". 93 
Firstly, where a branch was created through "virgin 
development", the residential location of the UK director 
or a key employee could still determine the location of the 
branch. Such was the case, for example, with Eberle GMBH's 
branch set up in 1972 and Nantucket UK Limited, a Los 
Angeles based multinational which opened a branch in 
Hertfordshire in 1986 (postal questionnaire returns). 
Secondly, a "branch" may be created through acquisition. 
Whilst the location of the acquisition may or may not play 
a role in the investment decision (see case study PB 
later), several respondents of such branches still 
identified the residential location of the original 
founders as the key location factor. The firm, DIL, 
identified within the previous set of outcomes was one such 
example, as was Cybermation, a company founded by ex- 
members of Hatfield Polytechnic, which has subsequently 
become a branch of the US company Dynatech Corporation 
(postal questionnaire return). 
In the context of the New Industrial Spaces thesis, 
however, residential location may be a critical location 
factor because it predominantly signifies a process of new 
firm (as against establishment) formation. It is precisely 
this dynamic of disintegration (where it leads to the 
extension of the social division of labour) which the New 
93 The term, used to describe an outcome, unless interpreted carefully may lead 
to the conflation of a variety of different casual processes which may create a 
"branch". 
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Industrial Spaces thesis argues drives the process of 
agglomeration. So, if, as earlier in the case of KA, it is 
the knowledge of local linkages and the phenomenon of "high 
technology industry in the air" which is the dynamic to the 
foundation and location of these firms, the transaction 
costs mechanism may well be applicable in such cases. 
Thus, just as in Chapter Seven, further case studies were 
undertaken to investigate the location mechanism. 
Establishments VA and PB, both of whom stated that their 
only location factor was residential location, were chosen. 
A further interesting aspect of these establishments, 
however, was that they also had "major" production linkages 
within Hertfordshire but had not said that these linkages 
were important in their location. Indeed, in the case of 
VA, it was only one of two companies which had three of 
its four (asked for) major production linkages internal to 
Hertfordshire. 
VA 
This computer services firm, employing 8, was set up in 
1987 by an ex-employee of the technical publications 
department of BAe, Stevenage. Its initial aim was "to sell 
computer hardware and software to local industries" 
concentrating, in particular, on after-sales service and 
support. Its major product is accountancy software 
packages, enhanced to fit the particular needs of the 
client, but VA has also expanded into typesetting, 
graphics and technical publications for local business 
(including aerospace). Both of the company's major 
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customers were located within Hertfordshire and this was 
explained by the company's target market which was stated 
as local industry within a 30 mile radius of its location. 
VA's major suppliers were a local printers (run by old 
friends who had started the business at a similar time to 
VA) and a supplier, based in Newcastle, who provided the 
standard accountancy software package to then be "enhanced" 
for clients. Further investigation of VA's supplier and 
customer linkages revealed that the company was, in fact, 
part of a local production network: 
"We've got somebody who does all our print for us. Likewise, if we 
have any requirements that they want we will do it for them. There 
is another company locally that [we use] if we have a major 
installation and we can't fulfill all of the parts of the 
installation process ourselves (ie. we haven't got the manpower 
available at the time to do the cabling). And likewise they often 
buy our services back off of us. So, thinking about it, yes, if I 
were to look at my customer list against my supplier list there 
are a fair few that we work both ways on. We work for them, they 
work for us.... You know we could get an order in today and be able 
to cope with that installation quite easily. Get another one in 
tomorrow and the customer wants it done at the same time as the 
first one [but] you can only cope with so much at one time. We 
could pick up the phone and they could come to our help 
immediately which is good. They are all local. " 
Furthermore, such local production had also involved the 
company in a joint venture with a software house in 
Stevenage which it had met through the council-run 
"computer users club". However, discussion of the greater 
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concept of "high technology industry in the air" met with 
the response: 
"I don't think it would really affect us because we have such a 
wide (but local! ] span of client. It can be anything from a 
hairdresser down the road up to a steel company. " 
"The type of system we're prepared to put in and support-any 
particular industry wouldn't really matter to us. " (personal 
interview) 
And this provides a critical insight into the nature of 
this disintegration dynamic. For whilst the company is 
itself "high technology" and its suppliers and market are 
"localised", the suppliers and market themselves are 
predominantly not high technology. The company was set up 
due to the potential for local production linkages with 
local industry and not with local high technology industry 
per se. Whilst there is evidence for the transaction costs 
mechanism, it is again part of a derived dynamic. VA is 
a product of the structural change in the use of IT in all 
production processes in industry (eg. accountancy and 
publishing) rather than a geographically bounded extension 
of the social division of labour within high technology 
industry. Thus, when asked what would be most missed if the 
company was forced to leave Hertfordshire, the interviewee 
replied customer contact yet, at the same time, it was 
pointed out that the company could survive wherever there 
was a concentration of industry, whether or not that 
industry was high technology. 
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PB 
In contrast, PB, founded in 1979 by two local inhabitants, 
did aim to supply hardware and software to the large 
numbers of pharmaceutical (ie. high technology) companies 
in the county. In 1981/2, the company was taken over by 
another local person (the interviewee) who was fed up with 
commuting. Thus, whilst the company was a good proposition, 
the fact that it was close to the new owner's home did play 
a role in the acquisition. 
PB's major supplier is Apple Macintosh based in Uxbridge. 
in fact, its only major supplier is Apple because it is an 
"Apple Centre" and thus only allowed to sell Apple 
products. Hence, PB further exemplifies how the power 
aspect within relationships can mediate the possibilities 
for companies to set up local linkages. In fact, PB has 
permission to buy and sell "Apple compatible" products and 
these products represent their other major form of supply. 
However, in a logic exactly opposite to that proposed by 
the transaction costs mechanism, the role of distance 
within PB's supplier relationships is deliberately 
downgraded. 
For example, the company had recently undertaken a 
rationalisation of its suppliers. At the meeting to decide 
which suppliers to keep or drop, it had been argued that 
one particular supplier was "down the road" and advantages 
could be gained from this. However, the location of the 
supplier was subsequently deliberately excluded from the 
409 
calculation. For it was argued that PB held no sway over 
this supplier's location and thus this factor should play 
no part in its choice as a supplier! A deliberate policy 
against the mechanism's logic was held by the company. 
In contrast, distance played a critical role in the 
company's customer relationships: 
"We can't move out of Hertfordshire. " 
"We have so many customers around here we couldn't be somewhere 
else". 
"The problem is that our customer base is now here. So it's not a 
question of advantages (of Hertfordshire], it's a question of fact 
of life now. We couldn't service this customer base in the way we 
do without being in Hertfordshire. We're basically stuck in 
Hertfordshire with the problems Hertfordshire's got as well". 
(personal interview) 
However, customers were again not chosen on the basis of 
their being high technology. The first market segment was 
"corporate" and Hertfordshire was critical due to the large 
numbers of, in particular HQs of, "top" companies in the 
county. Moreover, again highlighting the role of power in 
relationships, HQs were targetted due to the access they 
subsequently supplied to branches. The second market 
segment was education, in which a presence in the Home 
Counties and London was important but not essential. 
Finally, the third and fourth markets (and predominantly 
local) were the publishing industry and small and medium- 
sized establishments (SMEs) generally. 
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"Local presence" was critical for PB because it provides a 
major after-sales service, including maintenance, along 
with its computer systems. Such maintenance contracts 
include, as standard, an 8 hour "repair or replace" clause 
but the company was increasingly moving towards the 
provision of a2 hour response. To provide such a response 
requires proximity, although for clients in 
Northamptonshire, for example, this presence was maintained 
by an "engineer on the road". So a "distance" mechanism was 
tying this high technology company to Hertfordshire, but 
through its customer (not supplier) relationships and, 
through customers gained by targetting an only 
coincidentally high technology market. Thus, on discussion 
of the concept of "high technology industry being in 
Hertfordshire's air" the respondent argued: 
"As to whether or not it's true, yes, it has got an element of 
truth. As to whether or not it's relevant, no. As far as we're 
concerned it's totally irrelevant. " 
Hence, in the cases of both VA and P8, whilst they were 
high technology and engaged in some form of local 
production, "high technology Hertfordshire" was viewed as 
an irrelevance. 
If the transaction costs mechanism had been overlooked 
within this remaining majority group (due to a 
concentration on major production linkages), it could have 
been expected that "local suppliers and customers" would 
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have figured more prominently as a location factor. In 
fact, of the seven establishments mentioning this location 
factor (see Table 8.1), only one, GS, specifically 
identified "many computer/electronics companies and 
subcontractors" and was chosen as a case study for this 
reason. Another respondent did identify "links with local 
industry" but not "high technology industry" per se. 
The ownership and control properties of linkages, and their 
role in location, were further highlighted by two branches 
in this group of seven. For both these establishments were 
located in Hertfordshire as part of overall company policy 
to provide better geographical coverage for the service 
they offered. Whilst it can thus be argued that such 
policies inherently include a concept of "local presence", 
again this production linkage dynamic is far removed from 
integration into specialist supplier networks as implied 
within the New Industrial Spaces mechanism. 
In contrast, whether any notion of the "local" played any 
particular role in the location factors of "acquisition" 
and "take-over of sister company sites" is difficult to 
decide. Such sites, in certain instances, did have local 
linkages but these examples merely serve to reinforce the 
problems and dangers of prioritising linkages in location 
because they are local, and viewing branches and their 
locational decisions as equal to those of independents. For 
example, the original location decision of such sites was 
often lost in time, but the history of the particular 
function being at that site could be traced through any 
number of a series of company restructuring processes such 
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as take-overs, disposals, rationalisations and expansions, 
etc, 94. Exactly what role, if any, geographical location 
played in these decisions is unknown and hence any 
intepretation of such establishments as "geographical 
outcomes" must be extremely tentative. 
GS 
If we turn to the case study GS, employing 25 people, its 
two location factors were "desirable place to live" and 
"many computer/electronic companies and subcontractors". 
Again, the founder had worked for a major local electronics 
company, but had become disillusioned with a lack of 
commitment to R&D, and so set up his own company, based on 
bar-coding technology, in 1972. GS's major suppliers were 
local and the ease of communications was seen as a 
"genuine off-set against- production costs", although 
suppliers had to be very close. But a supplier base did not 
exist for all aspects of the production process so, for 
example, a "critical" and highly specialised input was 
gained through a link with Edinburgh and Dundee 
Universities (after several years search). In this case, 
it had not been a question of where the supplier 
was but where you could get the supply. 
The customer base for GS was diverse and little to do with 
Hertfordshire. Interestingly, however, the respondent 
recounted a story of a local customer which was a branch. A 
hardware deal had been signed but the branch's HQ had tried 
94 See Massey and Meegan (1982) for examples of the geographical outcomes of some 
such processes and Fothergill and Guy (1991) for explanations of the possible role 
of geography in such decision-making processes. 
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to overturn it on discovering its existence. In other 
words, the branch lacked autonomy to create "local 
linkages". It was not an "independent" entity. 
Again, however, and despite involvement in local supplier 
linkages, the suggestion of a local high technology 
industrial network was dismissed. The respondent argued 
that no communication between local high technology 
industry occurred because no effective mechanism, formal or 
informal, existed for such communication. Indeed, -the 
location of the firm in Hertfordshire was increasingly 
viewed negatively due to "appalling roads", high house 
prices, labour shortages and lack of support from local 
bodies. Recently received literature from Sophia-Antipolis 
had merely confirmed the respondent's negative opinion 
towards the amount of support given to high technology both 
within the county and nationally. 
A further location factor which may provide possible 
evidence for the claims of the New Industrial Space 
theorists is that of labour. For the argument is that 
within the New Industrial Spaces pools of labour with 
particular and deep-rooted skills are likely to be created 
as part of the agglomeration dynamic (see Chapter Four). In 
fact, some of the earlier case studies in Chapter Seven 
provided evidence for such labour markets and the intricate 
and flexible forms they may take. However, it must be added 
that, in certain instances, the case studies also revealed 
how the particular need for skilled labour (or indeed 
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labour per se) has acted to override the operation of the 
transaction costs mechanism. To investigate further the 
existence and role of local labour markets in the New 
Industrial Spaces the company MB was chosen as a case 
study of those establishments citing "labour" as a location 
factor. For, firstly, MB identified the critical supply of 
skilled labour to the point of naming a particular place 
within the county, Barnet95, and secondly, it listed 
"inertia" as a location factor. 
MB 
MB, engaged in the optical precision instruments industry, 
employs 11 people. Despite its small size its turnover 
broke the £1 million mark in 1989 and this had already been 
surpassed as the company entered the fourth quarter of 
1990. It has agents in every continent and virtually every 
country in Western Europe. In 1989, about half of its 
turnover was from overseas customers which (including 
agents) numbered 76. After graduating in physics some years 
ago, MB's founder moved to the area to work for a major 
optical company (W). By his mid-20s he had set up his own 
optical company (D) but, after a dispute with his backers, 
he left to become a technical director of another local 
optical company. D is now a major competitor of MB, itself 
set up in 1983, and started from the founder's bedroom 
where he designed and sold optical components (now also 
sub-systems), which a skilled optical worker produced in 
95 Strictly speaking Barnet and East Barnet are outside Hertfordshire (but right 
on its borders). However, they were part of Hertfordshire until 1965 when, in a 
re-drawing of local government boundaries they were "exchanged" for Potters Bar, 
the location of this case study. 
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the garden shed. 
The interviewee described how in this part of Hertfordshire 
and North London there is more than a 100 years tradition 
of optical manufacturing. Moreover, optical manufacturing 
is an industry whose basic production process is, so far, 
resistant to automation: 
"Optics is one of the few manufacturing methods left which uses a 
genuine hand skill. " 
"So what happens is that companies that wish to work in this 
field, if they want skilled workers, tend to have to locate here. 
Because you'll quite often find that they [the skilled workers] 
will not move... And that is what (is] meant by 'inertia'. [The 
founder] was living here at the time and also there is a pool of 
skilled optical workers. " 
As the interview continued it became clear that this 
specialist local labour market was one element of an 
optical precision instruments "industrial district", 
complete with specialist suppliers and production practices 
based on mutual co-operation. 
"Most of what we require we buy within Hertfordshire as far as we 
can. Raw materials, tools, measuring instruments, devices, 
electrical goods, heating instruments. " 
"It's certainly true around about this part of Hertfordshire 
[that] there are numerous optical companies ... [and] there are 
numerous suppliers of optical materials. " 
"Well, it's an advantage. But, one of the more important 
advantages is the fact that it's a relatively small and specialist 
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industry and we know everybody... They're in effect friends. It's 
certainly convenient to have them close at hand... for example, 
things like transferring materials. It sometimes happens we need 
an operation carried out that we can't do in our own factory. We 
actually take work to somebody else's factory and pay them to do 
the work for us, because we're doing similar kinds of trade. That 
kind of thing is a big advantage. There's a company down in Barnet 
who specialise in glass, we specialise in infra-red materials. 
Quite often they will accept an order for infra-red materials but 
we will make it. And vice-versa, we will get an order for glass 
components, we will subcontract it to them. So that is very good. 
I mean its the kind of thing you would hesitate to do if they were 
200/300 miles away. A lot of these things can literally be 
transferred within the county, within thirty minutes almost in any 
direction. " 
But how do you know you are getting a good price? 
"We expect to get good prices from our colleagues in this 
business. But quite often the price doesn't enter into it. We 
don't sort of go out to competitive tender before we transfer a 
job to another shop. It's done and we pay for it. Because we know 
how much it costs, they know how much they can charge. It's done 
really because of proximity and personal contact. " 
This style of business relationship was symptomatic of the 
cooperation which goes on within the industry: 
"We use each others' facilities. [The founder] is a top flight 
optical designer and you will find that other subcontractors will 
make an inquiry which doesn't define the component adequately, 
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physically. Somebody wants a lens which will do this, a mirror 
which will do that. And they will phone up and say to (the 
founder], 'what do you think? ' and he will tell them. So there's 
that kind of cooperation goes on. We share, if we have to, 
manufacturing processes. There have been occasions where we've 
shared material as somebody needed material quickly and we had 
stock and he wanted it before his normal supply was delivered, 
we'd do that. We share tooling. Optical manufacturing involves 
buying very high precision radius tooling. We share those. We find 
that we might need a tool so we'll ask a company if we can borrow 
it. " 
"There was an optical company started up, I don't know why, over 
100 years ago. But it has produced offspring which are numerous 
small companies... None of the companies in our particular 
business are particularly large. Thirty people is quite a large 
number to employ in this kind of business. Most companies are 
relatively small. Because of the optical skills involved it's 
possible for a man [sic], in effect, to work for himself and make 
a good living. That's because he's selling a skill other people 
can't replicate. So, it's certainly true I think that that has 
happened, there's a kind of cohesive action has happened. In this 
industry we share employment, we share the market, we share 
skills, we share manufacturing. " 
Thus, a description of an "industrial district" was 
supplied by the interviewee, a district which the company 
would be loathe (unable? ) to leave: 
"It would be very difficult to take our skilled workers with us. 
That's almost it stop... The big problem would be personnel. Apart 
from that there isn't actually anything really. There is nothing 
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insurmountable. We would move and we would get by. The fact that 
we would be remote from suppliers doesn't matter, the fact that we 
might lose out on the facility that we had with fellow 
manufacturers, we could get around that. It wouldn't stop us. But 
the biggest handicap would be literally trying to move the skilled 
employees, trying to take them with us. " 
So you could break from the production network? 
"We would if we had to. But I mean it's not something we would 
like to do... (although the respondent gave evidence of people who 
had. ] The greatest impediment would be problems of moving skilled 
workers. If they wouldn't go we couldn't get round it. We would 
lose the interplay with other fellow manufacturers but we could 
live. it would be difficult, but it wouldn't be impossible. " 
Several further points were raised by this case study. 
Firstly, their major suppliers were STC Components in Essex 
and a company in Oxfordshire. Their major suppliers were 
also highly specialist: 
"One of the materials we use to manufacture is Zinc Solenoid(? ) 
which is only manufactured in adequate quantity and quality in the 
United States. Z represents one of the [US] manufacturers. We need 
to buy that material, we buy from both [UK] suppliers. A 
supplier.. . up 
in Coventry and Z in Oxford. It also has happened, 
and this is where you find it's such a small pool, the guy who 
runs Z used to work for W and he also used to work for D. When 
(the founder of MB previously] started D, this guy worked for him 
so they knew each other. " 
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In the case of STC Components, MB deals with an internal 
department which began taking subcontract work. But: 
"The reason that we used them was because they were there. They 
were the only UK source of the kind of coatings we were using. 
Since then there are other companies... " 
Thus, it needs to be stressed, that in the case of the most 
"critical in production" linkages, distance played no role. 
As the interviewee stated, MB had no choice as to where 
to source these supplies from. 
Secondly, there was the continued reference by the 
interviewee to the small pool of key people in the 
industry. Thus, a major supplier and many other suppliers 
were personal friends previously worked with. Moreover, the 
two major customers (including one from France) were also 
personal acquaintances from previous companies. It was not 
a question of labour turnover but labour rotation, a game 
of "industrial chairs" as the interviewee put it. However, 
the pool of such skilled people and labour was getting 
smaller and older. Thus operators were being paid high 
wages with additional perks of company cars and pension 
funds. Critically, this situation was unlikely to change in 
the forseeable future. Whilst ME took on apprentices 
(despite its size) it stood out in the industry in doing 
so. Otherwise, the interviewee was unaware of any 




The above case study highlighted a particular view of 
inertia, a view which supported the New Industrial Spaces 
thesis. For it was a view of "inertia" whereby a company 
felt unable to relocate away from the (unique) advantages 
of the production network within which it was situated. 
Thus, the final case study was PK, a company located in 
the county in 1948 which stated that its location factors 
were "no longer relevant after 40 years! We stay because we 
are here, we may have to move, if we expand, to a cheaper 
area". The question to ask was whether or not forty years 
of location within the region meant their staying put, not 
because they were here, but because of an array of 
advantages gained from "immersion" over time within a local 
production agglomeration. 
PK 
The company employs 80 people and principally designs, 
develops and produces high technology products for the 
automotive industry. It is at present a supplier of Ford. 
It also does subcontract work to keep it "ticking along" 
with local customers including Rank Xerox, Bull and BAe. 
However, an interesting story lay behind the BAe work. For 
the company is literally surrounded by BAe (it is next door 
on three sides! ) but BAe was unaware of its ability. Thus, 
when BAe required a "giro bit" it looked abroad and 
nationally. Subsequently, after the failure of this search, 
the presence of PK was brought to their attention and PK 
was able to meet their requirements. After several decades 
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of location next door to each other BAe was still unaware 
of what PK could offer. Spatial contiguity does not 
generate synergy as a matter of course (see Gordon 
quoted in Chapter Four). 
PK did suggest that there is a "self-contained industrial 
community" but this was for basic "metal-bashing" which was 
not high technology and was argued to be available 
wherever a major manufacturing presence exists. Moreover, 
the company was not worried where its suppliers were and, 
indeed, due to a knowledge of Scotland had recently looked 
to source some of its supplies from there. Thus, when asked 
what would be most missed if PK was forced to move from 
Hertfordshire (and it was not averse to doing so if labour 
supply got worse) the interviewee replied: 
"We know it and know its capabilities. Even if we're not dealing 
with them now, you name a supplier and we probably have dealt with 
them. We're pretty familiar with their strengths and weaknesses. 
There are some local suppliers you wouldn't touch with a barge 
pole. If you go to a new place you don't know who they [the bad 
suppliers] are yet!... Familiarity, I suppose, that's really what 
it comes down to. " 
Thus, whilst this could be viewed as an agglomeration 
advantage, it was hardly the dynamic inspired by notions of 
the New Industrial Spaces. 
8.3 Concluding Remarks 
Thus, unsatisfied with the mere knowledge of its existence, 
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Chapters Seven and Eight have outlined a detailed 
investigation of Hertfordshire as a high technology 
agglomeration. Its cohesiveness as a production complex 
(rather than just a grouping of high technology firms) has 
been investigated, along with the locational imperatives 
which may arise from such an agglomeration and, in 
particular, those imperatives determined by production 
linkages. 
The reality revealed is of a production complex of great 
complexity; in effect, a variety of production complexes. 
Moreover, each complex represents a group of firms 
connected by their own location logic (often? ) based on a 
particular production linkage process. In only some (the 
minority of) cases was this process found to coincide with 
the transaction costs mechanism of the New Industrial 
Spaces theorists. What these results reveal about the 
dynamics of growth within Hertfordshire but, also, the 
alleged dynamics of other contemporary agglomerations of 
production will be discussed in the final chapter. It is in 
the final chapter that concluding remarks on this thesis's 
investigation of the New Industrial Spaces theory will be 
made and the lessons drawn for our continued attempts to 
understand the geography of production. 
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CHAPTER NINE: Variety Is The Spice Of (Productive) 
9.1 The Process and Pattern of Interest 
It has been clear from the beginning of this research 
thesis that whilst much of its content is based on the 
description of patterns - aggregate numbers employed, the 
geography of employment, the geography of production 
linkages, the characteristics of Hertfordshire industrial 
establishments and so on - its explicit focus has been to 
seek to explain these patterns. In other words, to reveal 
the causal processes operating to create these patterns. 
Moreover, the exact form and status of "processes" and 
"patterns", and the relationships between them, has been 
continuously touched upon. 
The pattern of central interest to this research has been 
the apparent emergence of a new form of uneven spatial 
development within Britain. Whilst numerous components 
constitutive of this pattern may be observed, such as the 
(spatial) restructuring of established industry, possibly 
the most symbolic component is that attributable to the new 
industries which have come into being in recent times. Of 
utmost prominence amongst these new industries are those 
referred to as "high technology". Hence, the pattern upon 
which this study has focussed has been that of the uneven 
spatial development of high technology industry in Britain 
and, in turn, the study's central aim has been that of 
illuminating our knowledge of at least some of the 
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processes actively constructing this uneven geography. 
Moreover, this research aim has been followed in the 
context that such knowledge is of a greater significance. 
For it is argued that the rise of high technology industry 
is indicative of a new phase in the historical (and 
spatial) development of capitalism (Scott and Storper, 1986; 
Scott, 1988a; 1988b). Thus, to understand the forces driving 
the uneven spatial development of high technology is also 
to understand those forces shaping the emergent (uneven) 
geography of production as a whole. 
But, from the start, such an aim has been hampered. For a 
pattern based on "high technology" may, itself, be a 
pattern representing a "chaotic conception". It may signify 
a pattern which, in reality, "lumps together the unrelated" 
(Sayer, 1984, p. 127), a pattern which confuses rather than 
illuminates processes and/or, at its most extreme, a 
pattern underlain by no common process whatsoever. Thus, 
this thesis has discussed the use of theories of structural 
change as an attempt to overcome this problem of definition 
(cf. Chapter Two). 
The appearance of certain technologies, and their 
associated industries, may be conceptualised as a key 
element of a greater process of structural economic 
change. Subsequently, it is the structural role ascribed to 
different kinds of technology representing processes of 
change which acts as the overriding definitional criterion 
of particular groups of technologies and the framework 
within which may be devised a series of "indicators". In 
turn, a group of technologies, connected first and foremost 
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by their common inclusion as part of a particular form of 
change, may be labelled "high technology" if so desired. 
Thus, for the New Industrial Spaces theorists (and 
therefore this investigation of the theory), the form of 
structural economic change is the transition to flexible 
production and accumulation; the "technology of 
flexibility" corresponds with "high technology" and the 
producers of such technology represent one of several 
"flexible industrial ensembles", carriers of the new 
systems (both technical and social) of flexible production 
(cf. Chapter Three). 
Furthermore, such flexible industrial ensembles are also 
"spatial" and, moreover, they tend to a particular spatial 
form. These ensembles present more than a new production 
logic, they also present a "territorial logic". And, within 
the theory of the New Industrial Spaces, the argument is 
that the particular spatial form (logic) of the flexible 
industrial ensembles is that of "(re)agglomeration". It is 
this argument which has been investigated within this 
research. Or rather it is the argument as to why this 
should be which has been particularly scrutinised. Why is 
it that (high technology) flexible industrial ensembles 
should tend towards agglomeration (thus forming the New 
Industrial Spaces)? 
9.2 Explaining the Pattern 
The investigation of this argument has involved two 
elements. Firstly, the theoretical explanation put forward 
within the New Industrial Spaces thesis has been analysed 
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for its "logic". That is, does the theory provide a 
structured, step-by-step explanation of a possible process 
of location. Secondly, whilst such an explanation may be 
"theoretically logical" the question to ask then is whether 
or not it is also "empirically logical". In other words, is 
it a logic which firms actually subscribe to in their 
locational decision-making. The investigation of empirical 
logicality has involved a study of firms located in "high 
technology Hertfordshire". 
Investigating the theoretical explanation first, the answer 
for the theorists of the New Industrial Spaces has been 
seen to lie with the "transaction costs mechanism" of 
location which, with the historical shift to flexible 
production, is engendering a tendency to agglomeration. In 
a detailed analysis of this explanatory mechanism, the 
present research thesis has drawn a principal distinction 
between that of a theoretically possible "logic of 
location", traceable through a distinct set of steps, in 
contrast to a theoretical "logic of necessity" as implied 
within the New Industrial Spaces theory. Thus, for example, 
it was concluded that it is theoretically possible that, 
once triggered, the transaction costs mechanism can cause 
agglomeration. But, in a further expansion, it was also 
concluded that the mechanism could operate but be 
overridden, thus agglomeration need not necessarily result, 
and that the outcome of agglomeration may similarly be 
caused by mechanisms other than that of transaction costs. 
The consequence of these conclusions was that a turn to the 
empirical evidence, as put forward by Scott, of 
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agglomeration caused by the transaction costs mechanism 
proved inconclusive. For whilst evidence of agglomeration, 
a possible outcome of the mechanism (but also of other 
mechanisms), was clear to see, evidence for the transaction 
costs mechanism operating to cause such agglomeration was 
not. Concomitantly, as the critical defining criterion of 
the New Industrial Spaces, the lack of evidence for the 
mechanism thus implied a lack of conclusive empirical 
evidence for the New Industrial Spaces themselves. Thus, 
from Chapter Four it was concluded that whilst the New 
Industrial Spaces thesis (with certain refinements and 
provisos) did put forward a theoretically logical 
explanation of agglomeration it had not, as yet, proved it 
to be an empirically logical explanation. 
9.3 The Search for Empirical Validity 
Thus, the remainder of the research thesis is the story of 
the search for that empirical evidence (logicality) and 
hence, confirmation of the validity of the theory of the 
New Industrial Spaces. It is the story of a search 
structured by the knowledge that the identification of a 
"pattern of agglomeration" is not enough, it is merely the 
first step. Indeed, the story becomes a depiction of the 
step-by-step dissection of a pattern of agglomeration known 
as "high technology Hertfordshire". 
Outwardly, high technology Hertfordshire exhibits some of 
the characteristics attributed to the New Industrial 
Spaces. Hertfordshire represents a major contemporary 
agglomeration of high technology industry (cf. Chapter 
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Six). But, at this point, the term "agglomeration" is used 
in the loosest of forms. It represents merely a group of 
spatially clustered firms engaged in producing products 
viewed as "high technology". If the New Industrial Spaces 
thesis is truly to hold any analytical (as against 
descriptive) significance, a much tighter definition of 
"agglomeration" must be taken. And, indeed, such a 
definition may be taken. For the attractiveness of the New 
Industrial Spaces thesis is that the definition of 
agglomeration is not simplistic nor ahistoric nor 
arbitrary. Rather (the definition of) agglomeration is a 
logical extrapolation, structured as it is by the 
characteristics of the historical shift in the organisation 
of production of which it is the geographical expression. 
Hence, the definition of a New Industrial Space 
(agglomeration) may be seen to hold at least four key 
elements: 
1) The New Industrial Spaces are agglomerations of a 
particular historical period. They are part of the post- 
Fordist era of flexible production. 
2) Relatedly, they are agglomerations of leading industry 
of this (flexible) era. In other words, agglomerations of 
the flexible industrial ensembles. 96 Thus, first and 
foremost, it is not a case of whether or not electronics, 
96 This thesis has only dealt with the New Industrial Spaces 
created by the flexible industrial ensembles. However, it must be 
remembered that Scott and Storper argue that a second group of 
New Industrial Spaces are being created by restructuring Fordist 
industries (see Chapter Four), although these authors too have 
predominantly concentrated on the former group of New Industrial 
Spaces. 
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ceramics or pension funds are sold by particular industries 
but rather the fact that these industries are the flag- 
bearers of flexible production systems. 
3) Integral in the production logic of the flexible 
industrial ensembles, is that these ensembles also maintain 
"localised production networks". Production linkage 
agglomeration, over and above (and indeed only possible 
with) locational agglomeration, is an essential part of the 
production strategy. 
4) This is so due to the economies to be gained from such 
agglomeration, principally those achieved through 
shortening "critical" production linkages (although local 
labour markets are increasingly being emphasised, see Scott 
1991). The transaction costs mechanism is the principal 
dynamic of the agglomeration. 
So, if we are to identify a New Industrial Space 
(agglomeration) as against any agglomeration, the criteria 
above must be met. Unfortunately, the previous pages of 
this thesis have highlighted how Scott has thus far failed 
to meet these criteria when identifying the New Industrial 
Spaces. Theoretically, the New Industrial Spaces are a 
clearly defined set of production agglomerations. Such 
definitional clarity has not, however, been carried through 
in the empirical search for, and identification of, the New 
Industrial Spaces. 
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The most sceptical of critics of the New Industrial Spaces 
thesis argue that not even the first criterion may have 
been met (Amin and Robins, 1989; Lovering, 1990). Amin and 
Robins (1989), unconvinced by the empirical evidence for 
the transition to a flexible era itself, are highly 
sceptical that the variety of production complexes across 
Western Europe and North America thus far identified as New 
Industrial Spaces can be grouped under the same rubric. In 
essence, they question the empirical (and theoretical) 
difference between the "old" and the "new". 
Following this study's investigation of high technology 
Hertfordshire, doubt as to the coherent empirical 
application of the second criterion may also be raised. 
Those industries prioritised within the New Industrial 
Spaces thesis are theoretically defined through the 
combination of two principles. First, and foremost, is the 
fact that they are flexible industrial ensembles. That is, 
they are industries based on, and symbolic of, the emergent 
era's organisational principle of flexible production. 
Subsequently, flexible industrial ensembles may also be 
sub-divided into industry groups on the basis that various 
sectors may be identified which produce similar products, 
for example, "business services" or "high technology". 
Concentrating on high technology, this implies that within 
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the New Industrial Spaces thesis all "high technology" 
products are produced, by definition, within flexible 
production systems. The New Industrial Spaces thesis 
conceptualises the appearance of "high technology" with 
that of the new era of flexible production. High technology 
is flexible industrial ensemble is flag-bearer of flexible 
production and accumulation. Thus, the fact of "high 
technology" growth (within the suburban technopoles and 
isolated urban sites of the "sunbelt" areas of North 
America and Western Europe) is viewed as the fact of the 
New Industrial Spaces (Scott, 1988a). 
High technology and flexible? 
When moving to the empirical realm the ordering of the 
principles used in the theoretical definition of "high 
technology" within the New Industrial Spaces thesis has, 
however, become blurred and even reversed. Chapter Two 
revealed how most definitions of high technology are (as 
are official industrial statistics), in actual fact, based 
on the (New Industrial Spaces sub-) principle of product 
created and not method of production. Chapter Three 
revealed therefore that most empirical work on the 
geography of high technology is also, unsurprisingly, based 
on identifying industries by product created. The point is, 
however, that any agglomerations apparent within these 
particular geographies of high technology cannot be 
immediately equated with the New Industrial Spaces. To do 
so would see the sub-principle of "definition by product" 
overriding the critical definitional principle of 
(flexible) "form of production organisation" and, thus, the 
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critical equation of "high technology" industry equals an 
era of flexible production may be broken. 
If such "geographies of high technology" are to be equated 
with the New Industrial Spaces then further empirical study 
of any "high technology" agglomeration must be undertaken 
to discover the methods of production organisation employed 
within them (ie. whether they are flexible or not). Whilst 
such a requirement may be particularly taxing due to the 
method of compilation of official statistics, it is 
critical if the theoretical rigour of the New Industrial 
Spaces thesis is to be maintained. However, in many cases, 
the empirical evidence of a variety of "sunbelt" areas so 
far identified as New Industrial Spaces, fails to apply 
this important theoretical distinction. 
Indeed, this point was brought to the fore by this 
research's investigation of high technology Hertfordshire, 
part of an English sunbelt which has been labelled as a New 
Industrial Space. For the investigation of the region 
initially followed the method, and (empirical) definition 
of "high technology" (see Chapter 5), used by Scott and 
Storper and thus, by default, included the accompanying 
assumption that such high technology industry is also a 
"flexible production system". No investigation of whether 
or not Hertfordshire's high technology industry is a 
"flexible production system" was. undertaken but the wide 
sweep of such an assumption was highlighted by the fact 
that, in Hertfordshire, such a definition of "high 
technology" encompassed establishments employing one person 
to several thousand, in industries ranging from printed 
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circuit boards to aerospace to computer services, and 
establishments which were set up over a 60 year period. 
High technology, flexible and post-Fordist? 
So, a first issue to raise is the ordering of the 
principles used to define flexible industrial ensembles. In 
contrast with many attempts at definition (particularly of 
high technology), it is the process of production 
(theoretically if not always empirically) that is 
prioritised over product created within the New Industrial 
Spaces thesis. A second problematic issue made clear 
through the empirical investigation of Hertfordshire is, 
however, that these principles of definition are not, in 
reality, exclusive to a particular historical (post- 
Fordist) period of industrial production. For a "high 
technology flexible industrial ensemble/district" was 
discovered in Hertfordshire which is not a recent 
phenomenon, namely the optical precision instruments 
industry. This industry had been present in the area for 
approximately 100 years! Whilst it may be part of a 
contemporary industrial agglomeration, its growth is not 
due to the transition to post-Fordism. It is a "high 
technology flexible industrial ensemble" of a different 
era. Or rather, is it that optical precision instruments 
has only become labelled and recognised as "high- 
technology" in the present era? For in previous eras, such 
as Fordism, "high technology" implied car production or 
petrochemicals. 
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Now, within the debate about the move to post-Fordism, 
especially between Gertler (1989; 1990) and Schoenberger 
(1990), we saw how a (post-Fordist) flexible production 
system could exist (but not dominate) within a period of 
Fordist production, and the optical instruments industry of 
Hertfordshire would seem to substantiate this claim. The 
problem is, however, the implication that industrial 
agglomeration in Hertfordshire, because it is high 
technology, is new and thus a New Industrial Space. The 
fact that the optical instruments industry is called "high 
technology" is new; the fact of its existence is not. In 
contrast, the growth of another high technology flexible 
industrial ensemble in Hertfordshire, namely computer 
services, may be seen as new. Moreover, this growth may 
then also be viewed as part of a post-Fordist dynamic of 
agglomeration. However, the point to make is that any 
reading of the (complete) pattern of high technology 
industry in Hertfordshire as representative of a New 
Industrial Space conflates the distinct periods of growth 
of these two ensembles. Thus, Amin and Robins (1989) 
concern over what is "new" as against "old" seems partially 
justified. 
A major argument of this final chapter is that the growth 
of "high technology" agglomeration in Hertfordshire is best 
depicted in terms of successive layers of "high technology" 
investment (Massey, 1984). That is, rounds of investment in 
which the post-Fordist high technology flexible 
industrial ensemble of computer services is merely the most 
recent (see later). It is possible, through careful 
definition, to associate historical forms of "high 
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technology" with particular periods of accumulation and the 
New Industrial Spaces thesis takes this approach. However, 
in the empirical application of this approach, the 
proponents of the New Industrial Spaces have failed to 
continue systematically this distinction. The connection of 
"high technology" with periods of history gets lost in the 
move to the empirical. Yet this failure cannot be ignored 
for, if rectified, it may well transpire that the (truly) 
New Industrial Spaces (and the spatial logic held within 
them) are less widespread than we have been led to believe. 
The concept of industrial ensembles 
In principle, however, the overarching concept of the 
"(flexible) industrial ensemble" held within the New 
Industrial Spaces theory is to be welcomed. For, in 
particular, it breaks what is increasingly seen as a 
sterile and even misleading typology within industrial 
studies, namely the manufacturing - services dichotomy. The 
identification and growth of the "producer services" has 
highlighted a variety of assumptions emanating from this 
distinction. Particularly relevant for industrial 
geographers has been a reversal in the traditional belief 
that a manufacturing presence represents the pre-condition 
for the growth of services in any area. It is now being 
argued that the presence of the producer services is, 
itself, critical in the successful carrying out of 
production, to the point of these services presence 
possibly being a pre-condition for the growth of 
manufacturing (see, for example, Daniels, 1986; 
Marshall, 1982; 1985). But, highlighted by the investigation 
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of Hertfordshire, is the fact that the concept of the 
"industrial ensemble" is still very much in its theoretical 
infancy. 
In Chapter Seven a discussion of the context-dependence of 
the "supplier" and/or "customer" exemplified the issue of 
how we conceptualise the production process (external to 
the establishment). Whilst the manufacturing - services 
dichotomy was seen to encompass an unsatisfactory 
conceptualisation of the production process, the more 
advanced view of the "industrial ensemble" (which allows 
for the "re-integration" of manufacturing and services) 
does not "solve" the problem. 
Indeed, the investigation of Hertfordshire revealed how the 
transaction costs model still involves an implicit 
conception of the production process of an ensemble 
strongly influenced by the manufacturing-services 
dichotomy. For, in contrast to the model's concentration on 
critical production linkages with a local supplier base, in 
Hertfordshire, the "computer services" sector (which 
corresponded most closely to the archetypal flexible 
industrial ensemble) revealed a particular form of 
production process especially geared towards the market 
(and the need for proximity to it) and not the supplier 
base. In some cases this was the City of London yet in 
other cases, such as the firm PB, an important aspect of 
its product was the after-sales service provided which 
included a possible two-hour response rate to any product 
breakdown. This necessarily put a spatial constraint on 
PB's market area. 97 Furthermore, Gordon's (forthcoming) 
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work on Silicon Valley has also highlighted that many 
"critical" production inputs to firms are gained not from 
"suppliers" but rather the customer. 
For the computer services sector of Hertfordshire, critical 
production linkages often proved to be those with the 
market and, where the market equated with London, high 
technology Hertfordshire as supplier base proved of little 
consequence. 98 In turn, any production linkage dynamic 
that occurred did so through customer linkages and not 
supplier linkages, as is implied within the transaction 
costs mechanism. Thus the possibility that the transaction 
costs dynamic may be active through "customer" linkages may 
be raised here (as can the possibility that the rather more 
traditional label of 'proximity to market' could be used to 
describe this dynamic99) but the New Industrial Spaces 
thesis provides few clues on this, even though "business 
services" have been identified as a flexible industrial 
ensemble. 
Moreover, if this is the case, the distinction needs to be 
writ large, the point being best illustrated by reference 
97 Although it should be added that this constraint had been 
overcome for one group of "distant" customers through the use of 
an engineer "on the road" and resident in that area. 
98 A caveat must be added here for in some cases critical 
"supplies" for firms implied skilled labour and Herts did act to 
provide these needs. Again, however, this view of "supplies" sets 
these firms somewhat at odds with the "traditional" manufacturer 
connected to suppliers of a variety of components and sub- 
assemblies through which the mechanism is principally mediated. 
99 Martinelli and Schoenberger (1989) have argued this point 
suggesting that what is new is the type of industry being 
discussed and not actually the organizational and locational 
rationale of this industry. 
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to the Third Italy, held-up as a New Industrial Space of 
great significance. For, although representative of an 
agglomeration of a flexible industrial ensemble, the 
artisan industries of the Third Italy worry little about 
their proximity to the (international) market. In contrast, 
for computer (and, more widely, business? ) services such 
proximity may prove to be "critical". The transaction costs 
mechanism may be relevant in both cases but, if it is, its 
method of operation is also significantly different in 
each case, as is the form of agglomeration outcome. Whilst 
the New Industrial Spaces thesis may not deny this, neither 
does it particularly recognise it. Part of the reason why 
it does not do so lies in the, as yet, underdeveloped 
concept of the industrial ensemble used within the theory. 
The above discussion on the form of production process of 
high technology sectors arose out of the research's 
empirical identification of "production linkages" of 
individual establishments in Hertfordshire. Indeed, this 
research thesis specifically set out to identify (types of) 
production linkages held within an industrial agglomeration 
(cf. Chapter Five). Evidence gathered on the Third Italy 
also represents the systematic investigation of a series of 
"local production networks" (see Amin, 1989, for an 
overview of this research). In the course of gaining this 
evidence, researchers have raised a variety of issues 
concerning the conceptualisation and investigation of 
"local production networks". Yet, while such issues are 
necessarily present within the New Industrial Spaces 
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thesis, their very nature as "issues (of contention)" often 
seems to have been passed over. 
What is a local production network?... More than just 
agglomeration. 
An initial point to raise is the pre-eminence of the "Third 
Italy" as an example of a (New Industrial Space) local 
production network. What must not be lost sight of is, 
however, the variety and number of studies of this region 
which have occurred (including well before the region's 
labelling as a New Industrial Space). In contrast, in the 
transference of this model of "local production network" to 
other regions, too often its emergence from within a 
systematic investigation of production linkages has 
been overlooked. The fact of agglomeration has become 
enough, the fact of local production linkages assumed. A 
most extreme, but illuminative, example is that of Scott's 
(1988b) work on biotechnology in the Ile De France, 
although most of his work is by no means this cursory. 
In a survey of (80) establishments of the growing 
biotechnology industry in the Scientific City (Ile De 
France region), Scott (1988b) maps two clusters of between 
10 and 15 establishments. He concludes that: 
"The biotechnology industry (or at least parts of it) in the 
Scientific City thus appears to be in the incipient phases of 
spatial nucleation and differentiation. It is probable that these 
tendencies are based on increasing interunit linkage... though 
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only scattered and partial evidence is currently available (see 
below). It seems reasonable to expect that, if markets continue to 
grow, further agglomeration will occur on the basis of deepening 
social divisions of labour in biotechnology production and the 
expansion of interestablishments linkages. - (op. cit., p. 74) 
Let us turn to this scattered and partial evidence for 
inter-unit linkages. Firstly, Scott returns to the greater 
conception of "high technology" growth in the region, 
principally electronics (not biotechnology), to argue that: 
"... recent empirical studies have indicated that the 
establishments forming this pattern are now starting to constitute 
a system of industrial activities, for there is evidence of their 
increasing interdependence in the form of input-output relations, 
subcontracting activities, and technical collaboration and 
exchange. " (Scott, 1988b, p. 74, author's emphasis). 
Moreover, a few spin-offs from research establishments have 
been identified but even so Scott acknowledges that direct 
contact between researchers and industrialists has still 
only weakly developed. Thus, he concludes that the 
Scientific City is an emergent technopole which has not yet 
quite taken off. 
Some further questions may, however, be pertinent before we 
draw such a conclusion. Firstly, two (very) small clusters 
of biotechnology establishments in the Scientific City were 
identified. But how do these fit into the national picture 
of biotechnology growth in France? How many other clusters 
of between 10 and 15 establishments are to be found in the 
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country? Secondly, what are the important linkages in the 
biotechnology industry? Scott says of the industry: 
"... it is not so much a homogenous sector as it is a disparate 
assemblage of industrial activities whose sole common denominator 
is a broad but diffuse connection to biological science. " 
(Scott, 1988b, p. 73) 
These activities vary from foodstuffs and brewing to 
agriculture to medicine to pollution controls, so what are 
the critical production linkages of the biotechnology 
industry? 
If it is to the customer, evidence of which is to be found 
within other high technology sectors, how does the 
Scientific City meet these various needs? Moreover, one 
particular fact which is known about "customers" is that 
(in Britain at least) they are increasingly involved in 
downstream integration such that the biotechnology 
industry is experiencing high rates of acquisition and 
take-over (Oakey et al., 1990). This highlights that we do 
not even know if the biotechnology industry of the 
Scientific City is independent or not. As has already been 
raised in Chapters Four and Seven, such an issue may be 
critical in an establishment's choice of (where to hold) a 
production linkage. 
On the other hand, the critical production linkages may be 
to suppliers but, as to what form these supplies may 
take..? The evidence we are given relates to the 
electronics industry of the Scientific City so does the 
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biotechnology industry behave in similar fashion? The 
intimation is that external research sources (at least in 
the Scientific City) may not be critical for electronics, 
but what of biotechnology? 
In fact, biotechnology is an industry (which in Britain is 
not recognised within official industrial statistics) whose 
production process, and place in industrial society, is 
still being discovered and far from understood. Without 
such understanding identification of its critical 
production linkages is fraught with difficulty. To then 
ascribe locational importance to such linkages compounds 
the problem. 
Moreover, it does so in the Scientific City when the only 
evidence of increasing local production linkages is between 
establishments already located in the region. The case 
studies from this research have revealed that a variety of 
processes may lead to the creation of such linkages and, in 
turn, the conclusion that such linkages, in some cases, are 
not particularly critical in production, let alone 
location. The point is that other interpretations of the 
"partial" evidence of Scott may take place. The argument 
here is not to seek to prioritise these interpretations 
over Scott's, merely to point out that the evidence 
provided does not allow any interpretation to be 
prioritised. In contrast, whilst arguments continue over 
the significance of the Third Italy, its status as a series 
of local production networks is generally not in dispute. 
Much greater investigation of agglomerations must be 
undertaken before they may be labelled "local production 
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complexes", let alone New Industrial Spaces. 
In his recent work on the technopoles of Southern 
California, Scott (with Mattingly, 1989 and Drayse, 
forthcoming) has identified individual linkages between 
establishments. Whilst he has gone on to assert their 
importance in location, an important additional step has 
been taken in providing empirical evidence of a production 
network, as against merely an agglomeration of 
establishments. The search for, and identification of, 
individual production linkages does, however, precisely 
involve a central "issue" raised by the early work on the 
Third Italy and at the heart of many debates around the 
existence, nature and significance of "local production 
networks". That is, how many and what type of linkages go 
to make up a local production network? The answer is that 
there is no clear answer! Indeed, the theory of the New 
Industrial Spaces seemingly (see below) allows for this in 
arguing that the exact form of any production network, 
representative of any particular space, is subject to the 
realms of "contingency". 
What is a (local) production network? 
Chapter Seven detailed the series of "twists and turns" 
which must be taken to deal explicitly with the issue of 
how one identifies empirically a local production network. 
Moreover, the chapter's method of dealing with this issue, 
by differentiating the linkages of agglomerated 
establishments, provided new insights. 
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By providing an intricate picture of the various types of 
production linkage which may be found within an 
agglomeration, wider repercussions were raised concerning 
the ease with which a variety of "agglomerations" have been 
listed as New Industrial Spaces (and thus implicitly local 
production networks). If one goes as far as investigating 
the production network as against merely delineating an 
agglomeration, distinct forms of agglomeration may be 
discerned dependent on the type of linkage formed 
within the network. For example, the difference between 
the Third Italy "supplier" agglomeration as against the 
Hertfordshire computer services "customer" agglomeration 
has already been raised. Further evidence from 
Hertfordshire depicted (derived) forms of both high 
technology and non-high technology "ancillary supplier" 
agglomeration. 
Moreover, it was revealed that the "type" of any linkage 
(and therefore agglomeration) cannot be understood without 
understanding the form of social relation which is inherent 
within any linkage. The missing concept of power within the 
relations of production is a particularly weak aspect of 
the transaction costs mechanism of the New Industrial 
Spaces thesis. Harrison and Storper (1990), in particular, 
have discussed how our view of the (agglomeration) outcome 
may be significantly altered by the social relations of 
production within which is set (they use the term 
governance structure). In turn, within Hertfordshire, 
whilst case study KA talked confidently of symbiotic 
relationships with both large and small firms alike, KD 
provided a vision of a sub-contracting network with the 
445 
multinational clearly at the top. 
By dissecting high technology Hertfordshire what actually 
was discovered was a series of "agglomerations within (but 
also extending beyond) agglomeration" or rather "local 
production networks within (but also extending beyond) 
agglomeration". For example, there was the precision 
instruments industrial district focussed on Barnet; and the 
electronics subcontractors orientated to Hertfordshire's 
multinational companies which, in turn, used Hertfordshire 
as the springboard to the South East, Britain or even 
Europe. Furthermore, these differing production complexes 
acted as a further impetus for local industry whether high 
technology computer services (also orientated to the City 
of London) or travel agents and stationers. Thus, a 
variety of production complexes (networks) 
constituted the agglomeration of high technology 
Hertfordshire, some of which were driven by 
separate logics based on a particular linkage 
process (in which transaction costs may have been 
the determining factor). 
This is not, however, a declaration of variety (or 
complexity) for the sake of it. For this variety raises an 
important philosophical point concerning the concept of 
"contingency" held within the New Industrial Spaces thesis. 
For the theorists of the New Industrial Spaces, the variety 
of type of production agglomeration is generally ascribed 
as one more contingency in the final description of the 
outcome of agglomeration. But "contingency" does not merely 
mean "particularity of outcome", in the sense that the 
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local "industrial environment" is facilitated by a state- 
run association pulling together a variety of similar 
bodies to facilitate contact and exchange in one instance, 
or the system of "impannatori" which execute the same 
function in another (the Third Italy). "Contingency" also 
means whether or not those conditions are present such that 
the mechanism may be activated in the first place and also, 
exactly how the mechanism will operate when activated and 
with what results (ie. agglomeration or not). It is through 
this meaning of "contingency" that the variety of 
production complexes found in the agglomeration of high 
technology Hertfordshire must be understood. It is also by 
taking this meaning of contingency that knowledge of the 
social relations of production encapsulated within linkages 
was shown as essential, for these relations may be a 
determining (but contingent) factor in the operation and 
outcome of the transaction costs mechanism. 100 
Linkages as social relations 
There is a further aspect of linkages as social relations 
of production which must also be raised. For as was 
discussed in Chapter Three, a complete picture of uneven 
development can only be gained, not merely through 
100 For example, take the pattern of the multinational surrounded 
by its suppliers. Does this represent the multinational drawing a 
supplier close-by, due to the transaction costs mechanism but 
activated by the multinational's power over its supplier a la 
Fordism, or does it represent the multinational, itself (acting as 
Sabel (1989) would argue), locating within the supplier network to 
gain from its "co-operative environment" a la post-Fordism. Both 
interpretations involve a supplier linkage pattern but with the 
causal mechanism operating in opposite directions. 
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"mapping" the numbers and types of jobs, but also through 
analysis of the geographical organisation of the relations 
of production which underly these distributions. It is only 
in this way that the "connectedness" of one region to 
another may be understood, that the good fortune of one 
region may be seen as precluding that possibility for 
another. 
Within the New Industrial Spaces thesis, the connection of 
any particular space to the "outside" through production 
linkages held at a variety of spatial scales, including 
possibly the global, is acknowledged. Thus, for example, 
Scott has depicted how Silicon Valley is set within an 
international division of labour in the semiconductor 
industry (Scott, 1988b; Henderson and Scott, 1988). The point 
is, however, that all these production linkages, from the 
local to the global, also represent the spatial ordering of 
the social relations of production. Moreover, their coming 
together in any particular space necessarily inserts that 
space into this "global order of things". In turn, this 
insertion necessarily places constraints upon how that 
particular space, and other spaces connected to it, may 
develop. In other words, this interdependency of spaces 
implies that not all can be winners. Most simplistically, 
agglomeration cannot occur everywhere, there is a limit to 
its generalisation. 
Following this line of thought, whilst Silicon Valley may 
represent a New Industrial Space, it also represents a 
space at the pinnacle of the international division of 
labour in semiconductors. Silicon valley's position at the 
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pinnacle necessarily implies that others cannot be at the 
pinnacle and implies that it holds "linkages" which cannot 
be reproduced without Silicon Valley changing (losing? ) its 
own position in the order of things (see also Martinelli 
and Schoenberger, 1989; Amin and Robins, 1989). The point is, 
however, that such implications (and the complete picture 
of uneven development) can only arise through a recognition 
of the framework of the social relations of production 
within which the New Industrial Spaces are set. That 
framework is formed by production linkages but can only be 
"seen" if these linkages are also recognised as 
encompassing social (as well as "quantitative") relations 
of production. 
What is (a) local (production network) ? 
One other "contingent" aspect to the local production 
networks of the New Industrial Spaces often unremarked upon 
is a real, and unresolved, tension throughout industrial 
geography emphasised by the turn to the "locality" as an 
object of study in the last decade. Namely, at what point 
is the spatial boundary of "local" drawn? Within the New 
Industrial Spaces, the actual spatial scale of "local" 
ranges from that of the Italian village or town such as 
Carpi to the M4 Corridor, Orange County or even Southern 
California. Moreover, the drawing of this boundary is 
critical for the theory, for production linkages, by dint 
of them being classified as "local", are ascribed 
particular properties inclusive of causal influence. And 
here, ultimately, is where the investigation of high 
technology Hertfordshire revealed one of the weakest 
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aspects of the empirical evidence for the New Industrial 
Spaces. 
For, firstly, and in following the methodology applied by 
Scott, "local" was defined on the basis of drawing a 
boundary around a concentrated pattern of establishments 
engaged in the production of "high technology" products. 
Thus the logic can run, if allowed, that a spatial 
concentration of high technology industry implies a 
flexible industrial ensemble which implies the operation of 
the transaction costs which implies agglomeration. In other 
words, the tautological use of empirical evidence 
identified in Chapter Four. While this method of 
identifying an agglomeration represents a starting point, 
the tautology must then be broken. 
What is critical about the "localities" of the New 
Industrial Spaces is that they are theorised as places of 
process. In other words, the process of integrated 
production between firms. Such places are created through 
the spatially-bounded articulation of this process and thus 
evidence for this process must be found. Without evidence 
of this process, any attempt at drawing a "boundary" (or 
rather defence of the starting-point boundary) must be 
viewed sceptically. Yet, whilst the "local" borders to a 
string of New Industrial Spaces have been drawn, the 
evidence for the processes supposedly creating these 
borders simply has not materialised. 
In the case of Hertfordshire, the search for such evidence 
was undertaken and eventually led to a totally different 
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conception of the "local". Or rather it led to a variety of 
conceptions of the "local". By identifying the spatial 
extent of those "distance-sensitive" linkages of high 
technology establishments within Hertfordshire (and thus 
the spatial articulation of the process of local 
production), the concept of "local" was defined. And, as 
already stated, what was actually found was a series of 
"networks within (but extending beyond) agglomeration" 
whereby each network articulated its own definition of the 
"local" but all these articulations held the commmon 
element of (part of) Hertfordshire as part of that 
definition. In effect, the process of "localised 
production" occurred at a variety of spatial scales and to 
recount, examples of such spatial scales ranged from the 
industrial district of Barnet; to (high technology) 
Hertfordshire; to (the City of) London and to the Western 
Crescent. 
Furthermore, what may be drawn from this conclusion is a 
alternative (and less arbitrary) conceptualisation of 
agglomeration (place) along the lines presently being 
developed by Massey (1991) in particular: 
"In this interpretation, what gives a place its specificity is not 
some long internal history but the fact that it 13 Con3tructed out 
of a particular constellation of... [social] relations (of 
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situation of co-presence, but where a large proportion of those 
relations... are actually constructed on a far larger scale that 
what we happen to define for that moment as the place itself, 
whether that be a street, or a region or even a continent. Instead 
then, of thinking of places as areas with boundaries around, they 
can be imagined as articulated moments in networks of social 
relations and understandings. And this in turn allows a sense of 
place which is extra-verted, which includes a consciousness of its 
links with the wider world, which integrates in a positive way the 
global and the local. " (p. 9-10) 
The implication of this viewpoint is that high technology 
Hertfordshire may be conceptualised as an articulation of a 
series of co-existent networks of high technology 
industrial production (themselves expressions of the social 
relations of production), each with their own form of 
attachment to Hertfordshire and each providing 
Hertfordshire with a particular insertion into the 
"outside". Finally, however, it remained to be seen whether 
or not this attachment was coincidental or critical (based 
on transaction costs). 
This viewpoint stands in contrast to that framed by a New 
Industrial Spaces outlook. For, firstly, these different 
networks (if known about) are combined under one all- 
encompassing concept of agglomeration. Secondly, these 
networks thus act as one, as a localised production entity. 
Moreover, their connection to this production agglomeration 
is critical and the emphasis is placed upon the internal 
connections to, and of, the agglomeration. Thirdly, these 
connections are deemed critical due to the reduced 
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transaction costs that they entail. 
A fundamental difference between these two 
conceptualisations of high technology Hertfordshire is the 
issue of the "co-presence" of production networks. That is, 
whether or not this co-presence of a variety of networks is 
simply that or whether their co-presence matters. For if it 
does matter, it implies that these networks may thus be 
integrated and may thus be treated as a production network 
as in the New Industrial Spaces theorisation. Furthermore, 
by dint of being a single entity, this production network 
may then primarily be explained by a single process (ie. 
transaction costs). And it is this locational process which 
is the final defining criterion of the New Industrial 
Spaces. 
"transaction costs" locric of location 
If it is argued that the evidence for the New Industrial 
Spaces fails to meet the third definitional criterion (ie. 
evidence of the process of local production which 
delineates such spaces), then the final criterion for 
identifying the New Industrial Spaces simply has not (and 
indeed cannot) be met (ie. locational decisions based on 
this local process of production). The empirical evidence 
for the New Industrial Spaces thus far has failed to 
provide conclusive evidence of the locational mechanism 
behind the pattern. The question as to whether or not the 
transaction costs mechanism can be (let alone is) the 
driving force in (post-Fordist) agglomeration has remained. 
453 
Following the research carried out in Hertfordshire, clear 
empirical evidence has now been provided that the 
transaction costs mechanism is a causal dynamic of 
agglomeration. Moreover, this research has shown that the 
mechanism operates at a variety of spatial scales 
(district, crescent, etc., ) and through a variety of 
production linkages, both customer (eg. the City) and 
supplier (eg. the subcontractor). Indeed, the mechanism has 
also been shown as working within multi-site companies, 
between branches still identified as such and not "reduced" 
(or elevated? ) to the status of independent single-site 
firms. 
Yet, whilst the evidence from Hertfordshire proves the 
empirical validity of the transaction costs logic of 
location, and extends its empirical relevance to include 
(some) multi-site firms, it also fundamentally argues 
against the strongest claims made for the mechanism's 
empirical relevance. There is nothing necessary about the 
mechanism's operation to create agglomeration and, to put 
the argument in reverse, (post-Fordist) agglomeration is 
not necessarily due to the transaction costs mechanism. The 
mechanism is clearly only one explanation for the pattern 
of agglomeration. In fact, "production considerations" of 
the firm, other than production linkages, may equally 
explain the firm's location within an agglomeration or, 
moreover, work to override the mechanism and thus the 
tendency of agglomeration. 
Whilst Hertfordshire represents an undoubted contemporary 
example of high technology industrial agglomeration the 
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causal processes underlying its growth are clearly varied. 
The transaction costs mechanism is one such process in the 
growth of this agglomeration. However, it is only one of 
several which have coalesced to produce the outcome of 
agglomeration. To prioritise this mechanism over others 
would be incorrect and, likewise, to prioritise it as the 
locational logic of a new era of post-Fordism is, at best, 
premature (see Amin and Robins, 1989; Lovering, 1990). 
In conclusion, as early as Chapter Four a criticism of Amin 
and Robins' (1989) against the New Industrial spaces 
thesis, and its foundation upon the asserted shift to post- 
Fordist flexible production, was noted. They have argued 
that it represents a: 
"... highly selective and singular interpretation of structural 
change" (Amin and Robins, 1989, p. 28) 
This research thesis has focussed on the New Industrial 
Spaces as the alleged geographical outcomes of this 
structural economic change. Ultimately, this research's 
combination of theoretical critique and empirical 
investigation of high technology Hertfordshire has 
similarly revealed that the theory of the New Industrial 
Spaces represents a "selective and singular interpretation" 
of the industrial agglomerations of today. 
To reach this conclusion is not, however, to say that 
because the New Industrial Spaces thesis fails fully to 
explain high technology Hertfordshire it therefore fails 
fully to explain contemporary industrial agglomeration. 
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Such a generalisation may not be made from a single case- 
study. But the investigation has raised issues about the 
theory of the New Industrial Spaces which are applicable 
wherever (and whenever) the theory is used to explain such 
agglomeration. For example, its conceptualisation of the 
firm and any subsequent behaviour by the firm, and exactly 
what is meant when using the term New Industrial Space. 
And, moreover, critical issues as to the methodology of 
application of the New Industrial Spaces theory and, more 
widely, exactly how we identify and discuss local 
production networks. 
9.4 High Technology Hertfordshire: An Alternative 
Reading of a Contemporary Industrial Agglomeration. 
Hertfordshire is undeniably a locus for high technology 
industry. It represents one of the United Kingdom's pre- 
eminent spatial clusters of high technology producers. What 
this research thesis has investigated, put at its most 
extreme, is whether or not this spatial contiguity is 
purely coincidental. It has done so, however, with the 
knowledge of a hypothesis which strongly argues that the 
growth of regions of agglomeration such as high technology 
Hertfordshire is no coincidence. Rather, the New Industrial 
Spaces thesis argues that such growth is the direct result 
of locational imperatives brought forward by the historical 
shift to flexible production. The foremost of these 
imperatives is argued to be the increased transaction costs 
associated with the move to more disintegrated forms of 
production. Furthermore, additional imperatives are said to 
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be specialist local labour markets and production 
environments uniquely suited to the particular type of 
production engaged in. The argument continues that these 
various mechanisms somehow combine in the same time and 
space to drive the growth of agglomeration. 
Fragmented evidence for patterns of high technology 
industrial environment and high technology local labour 
markets was gleaned from the investigation of high 
technology Hertfordshire, as was evidence for the operation 
of the transaction costs mechanism. However, such evidence 
was far removed from providing proof of a combined and 
strongly articulated dynamic driving the growth of a 
"bound" agglomeration. Yet, in hindsight, the reason for 
this becomes clear. For, within the New Industrial Spaces 
thesis, regions such as high technology Hertfordshire are 
treated as a total, as a single complete entity whose 
boundary is defined and common to several linked growth 
processes but principally transaction costs. The reality of 
high technology Hertfordshire, however, is an "aggregate 
agglomeration", a group of distinct production networks 
with their own boundaries but which overlap in 
Hertfordshire. With this discovery, however, comes the 
realisation that such a group of patterns allows for the 
possibility of a group of processes of their creation and, 
moreover, a group of processes each with their own spatial 
articulation. 
High technology Hertfordshire constituts a variety of 
overlapping (local) production complexes whose connection 
to the county ranges fron coincidental to critical. It is a 
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constellation of particular networks of social relations. 
Firstly, this implies that this conceptualisation of high 
technology Hertfordshire is not static: 
"If places can be conceptualised in terms of the social 
interactions which they tie together, then it is also the case 
that these interactions themselves are not static. They are 
processes... [Therefore] places are processes too. " 
(Massey, 1991, op. cit. p. 10) 
Secondly, it is this particularity of constellation which 
makes high technology Hertfordshire unique. It is what 
gives Hertfordshire its uniqueness as an agglomeration. 
Thirdly, this uniqueness comes not only from the present 
constellation of these relations but also from the 
historical articulation of such constellations. The high 
technology Hertfordshire of today is built upon a history 
of (layers of) constellations of high technology 
Hertfordshire as a locus of production networks. There are 
both vertical and horizontal dimensions to high technology 
Hertfordshire. 
It is vertical in the sense that it is historical. Some of 
those production complexes which constitute the high 
technology Hertfordshire of today have a long history. 
Indeed, this "history of high technology" has already been 
discussed as particularly incongruous with the thesis of 
the New Industrial Spaces. On the one hand, we have the 
flexible high technology industrial ensemble of optical 
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precision instruments, present in Hertfordshire throughout 
this century, or the flexible (? ) production ensemble of 
aerospace consolidated in the post-war period. In other 
words, flexible high-technology which is not post-Fordist. 
On the other hand, there are a series of other post-war 
high technology establishments such as GEC, Bull, DEC, 
Lucas whose growth has been associated with that of the 
Fordist era of production. In other words, high technology 
which may not be flexible. In the transition to post- 
Fordism these companies (and industries) may be argued to 
be making the turn to flexible production but that does not 
allow them to be regarded as part of a post-Fordist dynamic 
of agglomeration per se. Their location in Hertfordshire 
has already taken place. However, what may be added is 
that, in the turn to flexible production, such industries 
may create a further impetus to agglomeration in 
Hertfordshire, in line with that predicted by the New 
Industrial Spaces thesis. 
This is an important point to make for what it highlights 
is how previous rounds of "high technology" investment have 
acted to provide suitable conditions for further rounds of 
investment in Hertfordshire. It is part of the uniqueness 
(and advantage) of high technology Hertfordshire. 
Furthermore, it highlights how the co-presence of networks 
may, in turn, lead to new emergent powers. The co-presence 
of aerospace and electronics has led to the growth of an 
avionics sector. The co-presence of computer services and 
aerospace is engendering new advances in information 
systems. In contrast, the co-presence of computer services 
and optical precision instruments is of little account. 
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Just one example is how, unlike engineering more generally, 
the introduction of CNC machinery has not yet taken place 
as the manufacture of precision instruments continues as a 
"craft" industry. 101 Thus, the vertical (historical) 
dimension of high technology Hertfordshire is clearly an 
important component of this contemporary production 
agglomeration. 
Indeed, it is very important if we are to explain this 
agglomeration's growth. For this history makes clear that 
it is interaction which has produced high technology 
Hertfordshire. This implies, therefore, that any search for 
a single process of explanation for its growth must fail. 
Rather, the recognition of a variety (and combination) of 
explanatory processes leads to a different research 
question concerned with what (historical) weight may be 
attributed to each process in turn. 
The constellation known as high technology Hertfordshire is 
horizontal in the sense that in the present period of 
accumulation a series of high technology production 
networks of varied spatial scale overlap in Hertfordshire. 
These networks range from the small firm industrial 
101 This move from the co-presence of networks to their 
integration may be argued as a move closer to the model of New 
Industrial Spaces' agglomeration. The important difference is, 
however, that such integration is assumed within the New 
Industrial Spaces thesis from the outset and thus allows for a 
monocausal explanation of such agglomeration. In Contrast, the 
approach put forward here allows for different growth processes Of 
separate co-present production networks which may then 
subsequently move to a shared growth dynamic as they integrate. 
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district of optical precision instruments to another 
configuration of the industrial district inclusive of the 
multinational; from the internal network of multi-site 
companies to the servicing of a variety of markets whether 
the MOD, the City or local industry. Moreover, each of 
these networks is inserted in a particular form into the 
wider system of production such that high technology 
Hertfordshire cannot be comprehended without reference to 
that "outside", whether this is represented by, for 
example, global joint ventures or the Silicon Valley 
headquarters of a Hertfordshire branch. 
Furthermore, if contemporary high technology Hertfordshire 
represents the co-existence of a variety of local 
production networks, just as a history of network co- 
presence may be seen to have precipitated further rounds of 
growth, so the contemporary co-presence of these production 
networks raises the issue of whether or not emergent powers 
will also, in turn, be produced. In other words, the 
possibility exists for their combination in at least some 
instances and thus, possibly, Hertfordshire's movement 
towards that integrated model of agglomeration represented 
by the New Industrial Spaces. 
One particular "glue of agglomeration" increasingly raised 
by the New Industrial Spaces theorists is that of "local 
labour markets" (although other commentators using 
different perspectives have long argued this to be the case 
[see, for example, Massey, 1984; Morgan and Sayer, 1988; 
Keeble, 1987; 1988; 1989]). Evidence of patterns of high 
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technology local labour markets in optical precision 
instruments and computer services was found in 
Hertfordshire. However, as to whether such markets were 
acting as a causal mechanism of growth would require a 
further study as would the possibility that they might in 
some way integrate to create a local labour market critical 
to the whole variety of high technology production 
complexes located in the county. 
An alternative scenario arising from co-presence may also 
be raised and with it an important point. For, while the 
history of high technology agglomeration in Hertfordshire 
is a history of interactions, it is also a history of 
positive interactions -a spiral of growth. Yet, as this 
final chapter is written, high technology Hertfordshire is 
facing a "crisis". Cutbacks in defence spending and fierce 
competition and over capacity in computer electronics 
combined with economic recession has seen a series of major 
redundancy programmes and restructurings, with 
Hertfordshire companies hitting the headlines including 
British Aerospace, ICL, GEC-Marconi, Bull, Hawker Siddeley 
and Rolls-Royce. The presence of such companies may no 
longer be so positive. Or may it? 
For example, many of the companies surveyed in this 
research were spin-offs from the likes of British Aerospace 
and it is argued by some commentators that "recession-push" 
is an identifiable factor behind the creation of new firms 
(see, for example, Keeble and Wever, 1986). It is also 
argued by the unions, amongst others, that many of those 
individuals being laid off hold particular skills which are 
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in demand and should not be lost. Thus, large firm 
redundancy could translate into a further impetus to the 
present growth of new high technology firms in 
Hertfordshire. Furthermore, other interviewees argued that 
labour shortages may lead to their leaving the county. Such 
labour shortages were put down to the pulling power of 
major local employers such as BAe and their recruitment 
policies were often viewed as dictating the possible 
movement out of the county of smaller firms (see also 
Rainnie et al., 1989). Whether these companies themselves 
survive the present economic downturn is an open question 
but, if they do, they will do so in a more favourable 
climate for labour recruitment. A climate which may see 
their continued presence in the county. 
To conclude, the high technology agglomeration of 
Hertfordshire is a leading economic region in the present 
period of structural change. One may call this change post- 
Fordism if one wishes but, the geographical 
characterisation of post-Fordism represented by the New 
Industrial Spaces holds insufficient tools to adequately 
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